ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Samam sarveshu bhuteshu tishthantam paramegvaram,
Vinagyatsu avina9yantam yah pacyati, sa pa9yati !
Samaiji pa9yan hi sarvatra samavasthitam i9varam
Na hinasti atmana atmanam. Tat6 yati param gatim.
Qui videt, ut cunctis animantibus insidet idem
Rex
et, dumfereunt, handperit ilk videt I
Nolet emm, sese dum cernit in omnibus ipsum >
Ipse nocere sibi : quo via summa patet,
(M-Bhagavad-Gitasu, xiii. 27, 28.
fl&acminau'g Colonial library
THE ELEMENTS
OF
METAPHYSICS
IKIMl A (;ni)K R)R LI-X/IVKES AND PRIVATE USE
I'A
DR. PAUL DEUSSKX
TRANSLATED KROM THK SK('UXI) OKRMAX" KDITIOX
WITH THK I'KRSONAL I'OLlAUOkATIOX OK THli AUTHOR
UY (\ M. DUFF
WITH AN AITKNDIX, COXTA1MNU 'I HK Al'TH()K S ADDkKSS UKK()KK
THK IWVMUAY DKVNi'U UK THIs KO\Al. ASIATIC ;
ON THE PHILOSO!HY OF THE
N ITS KKI rt\TItiN*S "in OC't !!>KNTA1* MKTAj.'HYs
KKCKINTJ l> I KtM 'J U tiHIt.tNM I'.MIION, I'OMHAV l
1894
, i// rights rwn

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
THE nature of things as it reveals itself
to the searching eye, immeasurable around,
and unfathomable within, us is one and at
harmony with itself. Therefore truth also, as
the reflection of that which is in the mirror
of the human mind, must be for all times and
countries one and the same; and whatever
the great teachers of mankind in ancient and
modern time have gathered from the im-
mediate contemplation of nature and revealed
in the form either of
religion or philosophy,
that must (apart from errors, M^jch &s a njt^
touch
"only what is specific ai/
essentially concordant, howe
'
nntward hues and forms
vi ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
from the civilisations and traditions oi dif-
ferent ages. If, therefore, we but succeed in
gaining the point of view from which the
essence of things is dissolved without residuum
in understanding, we may expect that,
regarded from this point, all revelations of
the past also will inwardly harmonise and be
reconciled.
This STANDPOINT OF THE RECONCILIATION
OF ALL CONTRADICTIONS has been attained in
the main, we believe, by mankind in the
Idealism founded by Kant and wrought out to
perfection by his disciple Schopenhauer. For
the truth of this Idealism is the more indubit-
ably confirmed, the more deeply we penetrate
into it, by the threefold harmony which we
meet in it, harmony with itself, harmony with
nature, and harmony with the thoughts of
Moreover it is the
between phenomena and
this distinction alone,
possible to give full freedom
PREFACE Vll
of action to the natural sciences in their
tendency to complete materialism, and yet,
by way of the most convincing proofs, to
attain to a philosophical view of things in
which all essential saving truths of religion
are obtained from the mere analysis of the
facts of inner experience, and which will in
course of time be acknowledged for what it
actually is a regenerated and purified Christ-
ianity, constructed on an indisputably scientific
foundation.
From the above standpoint and with the
closest possible adherence to the thoughts of
those immortal teachers, though without in any
respect renouncing independence of judgment,
the present book aims at separating the im-
perishable substance of this teaching from its
temporal and individual husk, and at exhibiting
it, for use in school and life, as systematically,
clearly, and shortly as the profundity of the
subject will allow. At the same time it seeks
to point out the inner harmony of this doctrine
viii ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
with the most important thought - systems of
the past, in particular with the Brahmavidyi
of the Indians, with Plato's doctrine of Ideas,
and with the theology of Christianity. The
justification of the historical views on which
these parallels are based, must be reserved for
another occasion.
The book, having originated in connection
with lectures and being in the first instance
intended for these, is adapted to the horizon
of students ; hence its encyclopaedic character ;
hence also the interspersed quotations, which
are meant to incite to the study of the original
languages, without which a full understanding
of Indian, Biblical, and Greek metaphysics is
scarcely possible. Apart from these the work
contains nothing but what might be accessible,
by a little effort of thought, to every educated
mind, more especially after the whole has been
read through a second time, when, what has
hitherto been obscure will become perfectly
clear, and indeed the whole will first appear in
PREFACE ix
its true light. The table oi contents, forming
a series of questions on all the chief points
of philosophy, is designed to facilitate repeti-
tion and meditation, which should be un-
remittingly practised.
P. D.
The first edition appeared 1877, the second, with a few
additions, 1890. The appendix, "On the Philosophy of
the Vedanta in its relations to Occidental Metaphysics,"
reprinted here from the original edition (Bombay, 1893)
in order to elucidate the parallels of Indian Philosophy
scattered through the work, is in the main an abstract of
the author's larger book :
" Das System des Vedanta, nach
den Brahma-sutra's des Badariyana und dem Commentare
des ankara liber dieselben, als ein Compendium der
Dogmatik des Brahmanismus vom Standpunkte des
fankara aus" (Leipzig, 1883).

CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
PAGE
PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS i
Two standpoints ( i). Common source ( 2),
Method and result of the physical method ( 3).
Method and result of the metaphysical method ( 4).
Synopsis of all the general sciences ( 5).
Historical ( 6),
A. THE EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT
SYSTEM OF PHYSICS
1. ON SPACE 7
Its infinity ( 7). Eveiything in space ( 8),
2. ON TIME 7
Its infinity ( 9), Everything in time ( 10),
3. ON MATTER 8
Everything ib material ; two pioofs ( n).
Matter is imcreatable and indestructible ( 12),
The world is cither infinitely great or infinitely small
( 13).
4. ON CAUSALITY
Persistence and change ( 14). The \*
( IS)-
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Cause and causal constituents ( 16).
Arguing from effect to cause, from cause to effect ; hypo-
thesis and experiment ( 17).
Two corollaries of the law of causality ( 18).
The net of causality is without beginning and end ( 19).
Three forms of causation : cause, iriitation, motive ( 20).
5. ON NATURAL FORCES 12
Laws of nature a priori and a posteriori ( 21).
Groups of phenomena and natural forces ( 22).
Empirically speaking, natural forces do not exist ( 23).
Causality is no bridge between force-manifestations and
force ( 24).
Threefold object of the empirical sciences in the region of
nature and history ( 25).
6. MATERIALISM AS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE EMPIRICAL
VIEW OF THINGS . . 14
Eveiything, also the intellect, is modification of mattei
(26).
Complete dependence of thinking on the brain ( 27).
Rejection of spiritualism ( 28).
7. COMFORTLESSNESS OF THE EMPIRICAL VlEW OF NATURE . 16
The right and the wrong of materialism ( 29, 30).
B. THE TRANSCENDENTAL STANDPOINT
SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS
THE SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS
PART I. THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING
.abstract representations : Understanding
\3r-33).
CONTENTS xiii
Difference between human and animal Und
( 34).
^
Physiological oigan of the Understanding and of the
Reason ( 35).
Significance and danger of rational knowledge foi meta-
physics ( 36).
2. THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE , . . 21
How is peieeplion by the senses, possible? ( 37^
3. THE WORLD is MY REPRESENTATION .... 22
The one indubitable truth.
The Cartesian foim of it ($ 38).
vSignificance of this truth ( 39).
Repugnance to it ( 40).
4. WHETHER THINGS IN THEMSELVES ARE THE SAME AS I
REPRESENT THEM ?........ 24
Voices from Indian, Gieek, and Chiistian antiquity deny-
ing this (41).
5. ELEMENTS OK REPRESENTATION A wuont ANTD A ros-
7'RRIQRl.......... 35
No subject without an object, no object without a subject
The immediate and the mediate object ( 43),
To what the data of a posteriori knowledge are restricted
(88 44, 45)-
6. CUTRS TO THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE A PRIORI ELEMENTS
IN REPRESENTATIONS ....... 27
The six criteria of the a priori elements ( 46).
7. THE A PRIORI ELEMENTS ARE: TIME, SPACE, AND CAU-
SALITY .......... 30
Witnesses from Indian, Platonic, and liiblical metaphysics
(47)-
ELEMENTS OF META?lT^TCS
8. SPACE is AN A PRIORI FORM OF PERCEPTION . . 32
Explanation of this truth ( 48).
Six proofs : ex antecessione ( 49), ex adhaesione ( 50),
e necessitate ( 51), e mathematicis ( 52), c continuitate
( S3). ? infimtate ( 54).
9. TIME is AN ^ .p;?/0tf/ FORM OF PERCEPTION ... 35
Explanation of this truth (55).
Six proofs : ex antecessione ( 56), ex adhaesione ( 57),
e necessitate ( 58), e mathematicis ( 59), e continuitate
( 60), ex infinitate ( 61).
10. CAUSALITY is AN A PRIORI FORM OF PERCEPTION . . 39
Explanation of this truth ( 62).
Six proofs : ex antecessione ( 63), ex adhaesione (. 64),
e necessitate^ Hume and Kant ( 65), e mathematuis
( 66), e continuitate ( 67), #e infinitate ( 68).
ri. THE EMPIRICAL AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL STAND-
POINTS 46
Recapitulation of the above ( 69).
Thiee possible standpoints as regards it ( 70) : the
empirical ( 71), the tianscendent ( 72), and the tran-
scendental ( 73).
12. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL REALITY 51
Origin of perception through the threefold reaction of the
Understanding ( 74, 75).
The nature of empirical reality ( 76). The fundamental
doctrine of Idealism ( 77).
Sense-perception impossible without the Understanding
8, 79).
13. ON THE IMMEDIATE AND MEDIATE APPLICATION OF THE
UNDERSTANDING 56
The faculty of immediate (receptive) and that of mediate
(spontaneous) reaction is one and the same ( So, 81).
CONTENTS xv
PAGE
14. WHETHER THERE ARE INNATE IDEAS ? .... 58
No innate ideas, but only three innate functions of the
brain ( 82, 83),
15. THE THEORY OF DREAMING 59
System of the conscious will. Its action in a waking
state, in sleep ( 84).
Origin of dreams ( 85).
1 6. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYSIS OF MATTER ... 62
Decomposition of bodies into force and space ( 86).
Matter as the objective correlative of the Undeistanding ;
Plato's view ( 87, 88).
17. THE DOUBLE WORLD OF THE HALF-PHILOSOPHERS . 64
The evasion of Ideal-Realism ( 89, 90). Its inadmissi-
bility ( 91).
1 8. KANT AND THE PHILOSOPHY AFTER HIM.... 66
Kantism before Kant ; Kant's fundamental dogma ( 92).
Division of all philosophers present and future into four -
classes ( 93, 94).
APPENDIX TO THE FIRST PART OF METAPHYSICS
REASON AND ITS CONTENT
19. SURVEY 68
The Content of Reason ( 95). Concepts and words
( 96-98).
20. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF CONCEPTS .... 70
The property of nature on which depends the possibility
of forming concepts ( 99).
Example of the ascent from percepts to specific concepts
( 100-102), from specific to generic ( 103). Cate-
gories ( 104). Pyramids of the system of concepts
( 105).
xvi ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS:
21. ON COMBINATIONS OF CONCEPTS 74
Judgments ( 106). Synthetic judgments afriori ( 107).
The nature of the proposition ( 108) ; of the conclusion
( 109)5 of the pi oof ( no).
Source of all concepts and judgments ( in). Miscon-
ception of this ( 112).
22. WHETHER THE REASON is A PARTICULAR PHYSIOLOGICAL
ORGAN ? 79
The organ of perceiving and thinking is one and the same.
Four reasons ( 113-115).
Unity of function in understanding and judgment.
Memory ( 116).
23. RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF THE HUMAN MIND IN GENERAL 83
The intellect is physical, not metaphysical ( 117).
Organisation of the intellectual faculties ( liS).
24. MAN AND BRUTE 84
Difference between animal and human understanding
(119, 120).
All superiority of man due to it ( 121-124).
Yalue of abstract knowledge in practical life ; its limits
( 125).
25. ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE ... 88
Twofold task of language. Derivation from it of three
classes of language ( 126-128).
A hypothesis as to the origin of language ( 129, 130).
The instinct of speech ( 131).
THE SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS -
PART II. THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE
i. THE PROBLEM 93
Fundamental question of all philosophy ; its meaning
( 132).
CONTENTS xvii
PAGE
Fundamental eiror of all philosophy previous to Kant
( 133, 134).
Identity of force, piinciple, and thing-in-itsetf ( 135,
136).
How Kant closed to us the inner being of natuiej and
how Schopenhauer found the key to it ( 137-140).
2. NATURE, VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PURE
INTELLECT, THAT is, FROM WITHOUT ... 98
Gradual obscuration of nature in proportion as one passes
from the a priori to the a posteriori in it ; sudden light
( 141-145)-
3. Tim WAY INTO THE INTERIOR OF NATURE . . . 103
The intellect in face of external and of internal experience
( 146, 147).
Inner identity of bodily movement, volition, Will ( 148).
Inner identity of body and Will. What is Will ? ( 149).
4. CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS WILL..... 107
Two kinds of organic functions ( 150).
Both are manifestations of the same force
; thiee reasons
( ISO-
Identity of vital force, soul, Will ( 152).
Man his own work ( 153).
5. ON THE SOUL AND ITS RELATION TO THE BODY . , 112
The soul is not intellect, but Will ; five reasons ( 154).
The immortality of the soul pioved ( 155-157).
The marvel of the organism explained ( 158).
6. THE WILL IN NATURE ....... 116
The ego from without, representation ; from within, Will
Extension of this truth to other men ( 160).
The Will as brute ( 161).
Two fundamental impulses of all organic beings ( 162).
Nature of sleep ( 163).
Nature of instinct, its occurrence in nature ( 164).
xviii ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
PAGE
The principle of vegetable life it, an unconscious willing
(165).
The diffidences between oiyanic and inoignnic foices
derived from the principles of the phenomenal woikl
(166).
7 TRANSCENDENT REFLECTIONS ON WILL AS THE TITINO-
IN-ITSELF 125
Thiee determinations of Will as thing-in-ilself ( 167,
168).
Preliminary remark on the affirmation and denial of the
Will ( 169).
8. MYTHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE WORLD- PROCESS . 129
An attempt to portiay in the foims of our intellect what
in its nature transcends these ( 170-174).
9. GOD AND WORLD 132
The metaphysical truth as one and the same for all
( 175).
Outlines of Indian metaphysics ( 176).
Development of the Biblical view of things ( 177).
Chief points of Gieek metaphysics up to the time of
Plato ( 178).
10. THE WILL AND THE IDEAS OP PLATO .... 140
The Ideas as the adaptation of the Will to the ft urns of
the phenomenal world ( 179-181).
Contradictoiy character and inadequacy of the Ideas
( 182).
11. THE OBJECTIFICATION OF THE WILL IN NATURE BY
MEANS OF THE IDEAS 144
Enumeration of the physical, chemical, and organic forces
( 183).
The Will and the Brahman of the Indians ( 184).
Relation of the physical and chemical forces to matter.
Generation of inorganic bodies. On the atomic theory
( 185-187).
Organic forces j their difference from the inorganic.
CONTENTS
Two fundamental impulses of all oiganic beings ; \vhy?
Fust ougin of organisms.
The Right and the Wiong of Darwinism.
Three grades of oiganisms ( 188-190).
12. ON THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW OF NATURE AND ITS LIMITS 156
Adaptation, inteinal, external; whence? ( 191, 192).
Stiuggle of individuals ; moial and aesthetic consequences
( 193. 194).
THE SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS
PART III. THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL
1. HISTORICAL ,01
On the inner nature of Platonism.
Plato's attitude towards art ( 195).
Aristotle's view as to the aim and action of art ( 196).
Kant's definition of the feeling for the beautiful ( 197).
2. THE ./ESTHETIC PHENOMENON CONSIDERED FROM THE
EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT 167
A disinterested delight is empirically inexplicable ( 198,
199).
3. INDIVIDUAL AND ./ESTHETIC CONTEMPLATION . . .169
Two standpoints of thinking, two of peiceiving ( 200,
201).
/^Esthetic mode of contemplation : the change which it
occasions in the subject ( 202), and in the object
( 203, 204).
4. SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF THE ESTHETIC PHENOMENON 173
Escape from self, how possible by increase of Under-
standing ( 205, 206).
Second way thither ( 207) ; Indian voices ( 208).
Not willing, but individual willing, vanishes ( 209).
XX ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
PAGE
5. OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF THE ^ESTHETIC PHENOMENON 177
Escape from self through the nature of objects ( 210-
212).
How explicable ( 213).
Change in the object when contemplated ( 214).
Oiigin of art ( 215).
6. ON THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME .... 183
Definition of beauty ( 216).
One-sidedness of our view of nature ( 217).
The sublime as key to the beautiful.
Two kinds of the sublime.
Two contrasts to it ( 218).
7. ON THE BEAUTIFUL IN NATURE 188
Three subjective aids to the contemplation of nature
( 219).
Beauty of inorganic nature ( 220, 221).
Beauty of organisms ( 222).
Grace ( 223).
Beauty of artificial products, wherein consisting ( 224).
8. SOME REMARKS ON THE BEAUTIFUL IN ART . .
.194
On the inner natuie of art. Spuiious and genuine art
( 225).
ARCHITECTURE : Symmetry, adaptation ; which Ideas are the
object of architecture. Classic and Gothic architecture
( 226).
Imitating and interpreting arts ( 227).
Chief object of art ( 228).
The beautiful and the characteristic ( 229).
SCULPTURE : Significance. Advantages. Limits, Tendency
( 230).
PAINTING : Restriction and freedom. Its strength, wherein con-
sisting ( 231).
External and internal significance ; historical painting
( 232).
CONTENTS
PAGE
POETRY: Material. Artifices. Allegory. Metre and ihyme
(233).
Chief subject of poetry. The idealisation of reality.
Poetry more philosophical than history ( 234).
The lyric. The epic. The drama. Tragedy and comedy
( 235).
Music : its subject. Direct nature of its language.
Significance of melody, rhythm, harmony. Music and
text 236).
Parting glance at art : how far one may find in it, in spite
of its speaking only of this world, the promise of
another ( 237).
THE SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS
PART IV. THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY
1. PRELIMINARY 221
Twofold standpoint of thinking, perceiving, acting (
238-242).
Whether morality is a special kind of knowledge ( 243).
Order of procedure : Immortality, freedom, affirmation
and denial ( 244).
2. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL . * . . ,
.229
Kant's idealism and the immortality of the soul stand and
fall together ( 245-247),
Life is assured to the Will and the present assuied to life
( 248).
Indestructibility without continuance conceived as trans-
migration of the soul.
Half-mythical conception of the continuance of the indi-
viduality ( 249, 250).
3. ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL 236
The question of the freedom of the Will as a prelude to
the Kantian philosophy ( 251).
Necessity, chance, freedom ( 252, 253).
xxii ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
PAGE
Physical determinism, metaphysical freedom of the Will
( 254, 255)-
Thiee great transcendental tiuths ( 256).
Identity of the metaphysical and the racial dualism ( 257).
4. THE PAGAN AND THE CHRISTIAN STANDPOINTS, OR THE
AFFIRMATION AND THE DENIAL OF THE WILL TO LIFE . 244
Exoteiic and esoteric Christianity ( 258).
Why must theology inevitably be founded on Kant
( 259).
The deeds of morality are mhacles ( 260).
Division of all human actions into four classes ( 261).
5, EGOISM AS THE GENERAL AND NECESSARY PHENOMENAL
FORM OF THE AFFIRMATION OF THE WILL TO LIFE 250
Proof of this truth ; two impoitant conclusions ( 262).
All natuie lies under the cuise of egoism ( 263).
Derivation of malice from egoism ( 264),
Seeming egoism of moral actions ( 265).
6. THE EGOISM OF AFFIRMATION AS THE SOURCE OF THE BAD 255
Moral illustration of the fundamental impulses, nourish-
ment and generation ( 266).
Restriction of the concepts wrong, right, and duty ( 267).
The sphere of egoism ( 268) ; in man threefold ( 269).
Wrong: three kinds. How far conventional? Two
means ( 270).
The root of badness ; testimony of Holy Scripture (271).
7. THE EGOISM OF AFFIRMATION AS THE SOURCE OF EVIL . 265
Suffering is not the cause of denial ( 272).
Existence is empty, hopeless, aimless, without peace
( 273).
Three kinds of suffering according to the'Sankhya System
( 274).
Outlook over experience ; a consoling voice ( 275).
CONTKNTS xxin
PAOL
8. TEMPORAL MEASURES AGAINST THE BADNESS AND EVIL
SPRINGING FROM EGOISM . , .
'
.
. . 273
Concept of right ( 276) j of the state, tlueefold task
of it (277).
Education: two aims, limits ( 278). Politeness
( 279).
9. LEGALITY AND MORALITY 278
Woithlessness of good woiks ( 280),
Form of this doctnne in Biblical and Indian theology
( 281).
Four fundamental truths of Chnatian teaching and our
own ; how fai moral improvement is independent of
ourselves, and how fai it is yet oui own woik ( 282).
10. ON THE NATURE OF THE DENIAL OF THE WILL TO LIFE 286
Why the nature of morality is called denial ( 283),
Proof that the essence of every moial action is an act of
denial of the Will to life ( 284, 285),
11. THE Two WAYS TO DENIAL 291
Two ways ; common characteristics, differences ( 286),
The peculiar way in which the inconceivable deeds of
denial clothe themselves in the forms of our knowledge
1. THE WAY OF VIRTUE ( 289).
First step : Justice. Two kinds ( 290).
Second step : Love. Three kinds ( 291).
Third step : Asceticism. When only genuine ? Its de-
rivation from compassion.
The real significance of asceticism.
On the Christian doctiine of salvation ( 292).
2. THE WAY OF SUFFERING. Suffering as an element of
affirmation.
Suffering in the light of denial ( 293).
On the ultimate loot of morality ( 294).
On suicide : proof that it is affirmation ( 295).
The significance of death ( 296).
xxiv ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
PAGE
*
THE PRINCIPLE OF DENIAL ..... 311
Freedom, faith, knowledge, as principles of denial
( 297)
How the principle of denial may be aptly named, and
what it is in its innermost nature, A glance at the
Biblical conception ( 298).
Twofold trace of the divine in experience ( 299).
CONCLUSION ( 300) ....... 317
APPENDIX
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE VED^NTA
IN ITS RELATIONS TO OCCIDENTAL METAPHYSICS
Introduction 323
I. Theology, the doctrine of God or of the philosophical
principle 326
II Kosmology, the doctrine of the world 328
III. Psychology, the doctrine of the soul 332
IV, Eschatology, the doctrine of the last things, the
things after death . 334
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS
fj
I, There are two standpoints, and two only, from
which we can investigate the nature of things ; the
empirical and the transcendental.
We are restricted to the empirical standpoint
so long as we regard things in the form in which they
appear to us, that is, as they are reflected in human
consciousness
;
the result is physics (in its broader
or ancient sense), From the transcendental
standpoint we try to discover what things are in
themselves, that is independent of, and apart from,
our consciousness, in which they are represented;
the result is metaphysics.
2. All our knowledge begins with perception^
which is partly external, partly internal,
Out of both these is built up that sum total of
our representations of things which we call experience.
The empirical and the transcendental methods
% B
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
both proceed from experience, but they do so in
different directions.
3. The empirical or physical method takes
the entire material of experience as given, and by
investigating and systematically arranging it, arrives
at a system of physics which embraces all sciences,
whether they have their source in outer or inner
experience.
All that we know through outer experience is
body, that is, matter in time and space. The
relations of time and space are investigated by
mathematics, whilst the pursuit of matter in its
transformations is the object of the natural sciences,
which, as morphology (mineralogy, botany, zoo-
logy), deal with the forms of matter, as aetiology
(physics, chemistry, physiology) with its changes and
their causes. The science of inner experience is
psychology (in the empirical sense). As it has for
its subject the entire phenomena of inner perception,
and accordingly embraces the whole domain of
4 knowing, feeling, and willing, we may include under
it logic (with grammar), aesthetics, and ethics,
whilst side by side with these, as instances of the
same, we may place the history of sciences, arts,
and peoples.
4. The transcendental or metaphysical
method proceeds from the fact that the sum total
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
of experience and of the empirical knowledge
derived from it which forms the system of physics,-
is in reality neither more nor less than a series of
representations in our consciousness. Accordingly
its fundamental question has at all times been, what
are things in themselves (avra Ka& avrd, Atmaii),
that is, apart from the form which they assume in
our mind? To ascertain this, we have first to
analyse the experience filling our intellect, and
decide what part of it is a priori, that is, inherent in
ourselves previous to all perception whether external
or internal, and therefore belonging to the innate
functions of the intellect itself; and what part we
appropriate a posteriori, that is, by means of
internal and external perception, and consequently
have to regard as partaking of the nature of things \
in themselves. The results obtained by this method,
together with their bearing on nature, art, and the
action of man, form a system of metaphysics,
which, supplementing the system of physics, gives us
the utmost attainable interpretations of the nature of
ourselves and the world.
Remark. The term philosophy, the meaning of which
has in course of time undergone considerable change and is
even to-day disputed, denotes in its most limited sense meta-
physics ; in a wider sense metaphysics together with the
sciences of inner experience, which are closely related to it ;
in its widest sense the general results of all sciences from the
most universal point of view.
Oo o
c
:
log
O
Ph
6 Sg
"SKI
pq
I o <" o
^ s fi o
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
6. Historical. Religion and Philosophy
are the two forms in which from time immemorial
metaphysics has manifested itself, bringing to light,
especially in the Indian, Greek, and Christian world,
an abundance of imperishable truths. Until, how-
ever, a century ago, there was no clear under-
standing of the difference between physical and
metaphysical knowledge, and as metaphysics
attempted to vindicate its truths from the empirical
standpoint natural to man, these necessarily assumed
a more or less allegorical form and fell into seeming \
contradiction with each other and with the physical
sciences.
At last came Kant (1724-1804) and by his
Critique of Pure Reason" laid the founda-
tions of thoroughly scientific metaphysics. On this
basis Schopenhauer (1788-1860) has reared a
metaphysical structure without equal, which, though
it may in course of time be modified in details
through the never-ending progress of the empirical
sciences, will yet, as a whole, at no future time
become antiquated, but must remain an inalienable
possession of mankind*
If, guided by this doctrine, we seek to penetrate
into the inner meaning of the various systems,
religious and philosophical, we shall come to the
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
conviction that the essential differences between
natural science, philosophy, and religion originate
after all in a misunderstanding which can be
removed, and which will give way to a mutual
recognition of their right of existence.
A. THE EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT
SYSTEM OF PHYSICS
I On Space
7. Proposition. Space is infinite in every
direction,
Demonstration, If it were not so, it would
have a limit. This would be either a body or a
void, therefore again in both cases space. (Compare
the instance of the javelin in Lucretius, de natura
rerum, I 968-983.)
8* Corollary. Whatever exists, exists neces-
sarily in space ; otherwise it would be nowhere and
consequently not at all.
II On Time
| 9. Proposition, Time is infinite in both
directions,
Demonstration, If it were not so, it would
have a beginning or an end. Both would be points
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
of time (" now "), would have as such a before and
an after, and would consequently be within time
and not outside of it.
10. Corollary. Whatever happens, happens
necessarily in time ; otherwise it would happen at no
time, and consequently not at all.
III. On Matter
11. Proposition. In space and time exists
nothing but matter alone.
Demonstration. (i) That which operates in
space and time we call matter. To exist is to
operate in space and time. Consequently all that
exists is material. (2) We call possible that which
can be represented by us as existing. Only mate-
rial objects can be represented by us as existing.
Consequently there can be nothing but material
objects.
12. Proposition. Matter is uncreatable and
indestructible.
This is proved not so much from the experiments
of scientists, for, even if it were possible to pursue
matter, scale in hand, in its transformations, such
experiments would only demonstrate that until now
we have not succeeded either in augmenting or
diminishing the quantity of matter. The proof of
THE EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT
our assertion lies rather, apart from all perception
(a priori), in the fact that it is impossible to imagine
the creation or the annihilation of matter. And
that which is not possible, cannot, in fact, really be
at all.
13. The quantity of matter in the world is
either unlimited and consequently infinitely
great, corresponding to infinite space, or limited,
and then, compared with infinite space, infinitely
small.
IV. On Causality
14. Substance persists, but it perpetually
changes its qualities, forms, and conditions
(iravra pet). All these changes, without exception,
are governed by the following law.
15. The law of Causality. Every change in
matter is called effect and takes place only after
another change, called cause, has preceded it, from
which the effect regularly and inevitably, that is
necessarily, follows.
1 6. Inasmuch as an effect is only possible
through some foregoing change (called cause) hap-
pening under a particular condition of things, which
condition itself is but a result of changes, we include,
in a wider sense, this condition together with
io ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
the intervening change under the head of cause,
and distinguish in it the different causal constitu-
ents or conditions. The sequence of these may
in many cases vary.
17. The same cause has always the same effect,
while on the contrary the same effect may arise from
different causes. Hence follows, that arguing from
effect to cause is problematical, while arguing from
cause to effect is certain. The former is the way of
hypothesis, the latter that of experiment
i S. Immediate corollaries of the law of causality
are: (i) the law of inertia, for, where there is no
cause, there can be no effect ; (2) the , law of the
persistence of substance, for the law of causality
applies only to conditions of matter but not to
the substratum of all conditions, forms, and
qualities.
19. As space ( 7) and time ( 9) are without
limits, so also the net of causality is necessarily
without beginning or end.
Demonstration. (a) If it were not without
beginning, we should have to assume a first state of
things. In order that this state might develop, a
change would have to occur in it or to it, which
change would itself again be the effect of a foregoing
change, etc.
THE EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT
Remark. This is the rock on which splits the
logical argument, which confounds the metaphysical pri
of salvation (God) with the physical principle of creation.
(b) The chain of causality is without end,
inasmuch as no change can take place at any time
without proceeding as an effect from its sufficient
cause.
20, There are three forms of causation, one
general and two specific, since an effect may pro-
ceed from a cause in its narrower sense, from
irritation or from motive.
1. All changes except the organic proceed from
causes in the narrower sense. Increase of the
cause here always produces increase of the effect.
The causal agent undergoes a change equal to
that which it communicates to the effect (equality
of action and reaction).
2. Irritation (or stimulus) is the form of
causation governing the changes in vegetable life
(plants and the vegetable part of animal life).
In order to operate, this form requires contact
and duration, frequently intussusception. By aug-
mentation of the cause here the effect often turns
into its contrary (over-irritation).
3. Motives (determinants) produce all changes
in the life of animals and men, so far as these
changes belong to the domain of the animal
functions, that is, all voluntary movements, The
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
cause in this form requires neither immediate
contact nor a more than momentary duration.
As the intellect of the brute is limited to per-
ceptual representations, its action is throughout
confined to perceptible and immediately present
motives. The action of man, on the other hand,
can proceed from abstract representations, acting
as motives, in consequence of which his deeds
are often enigmatical and inscrutable, but never
free from that necessity with which the law of
causality sways all that is finite (empirical de-
terminism),
V. On Natural Forces
21. The laws of space and time, the ascer-
tainment of which belongs to the province of
mathematics, and the law of causality are, as we
shall show later, laws of nature a priori. On
the other hand, there are natural laws gained
from perception by induction and so a posteriori,
which are nothing more than an expression re-
duced to rule for the invariable manifestation of
the forces of nature.
22. All that we learn and know by the study
of nature are phenomena (that is states and
changes of matter) in space and time, linked
together by the chain of causality. All natural
THE EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT 13
phenomena are divided into groups, each of which
is formed by a series of phenomena bearing a
common character, and therefore declaring them-
selves as varied manifestations of an inner unity.
This inner unity is termed force, natural force,
an expression borrowed from the observation of
our inner self (instances : Gravity, Impenetrability,
Electricity, Crystallisation, and all Species of
plants and animals). Every state in nature
is a tension of conflicting forces, every
change is a temporary subjugation of cer-
tain forces by others, which, by the aid of
causality, have become the stronger (TroXe/^o? Trarqp
vravTow instances : a building, a chemical union,
the human body in the states of health, disease and
death).
23. To nature as a whole belong all mani-
festations of natural forces, but not the forces .
themselves. Empirically speaking they do not
exist at all, and while the scientist cannot get
rid of them, and yet will never be able to explain
anything but their manifestations, he indicates
the necessity of a method which supplements
his own and belongs to the province of meta-
physics.
24. Thus every event, whether cause or effect,
is the manifestation of a force, and the law
14 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
of causality merely declares that no manifestation
of force can take place without another manifesta-
tion of force preceding it as cause.
It is therefore inaccurate and reprehensible to
speak of a force itself as the cause of a particular
effect (as for instance in speaking of gravity as the
cause of falling),
25. The object of the empirical sciences is
therefore threefold :
1. The determining and describing of pheno-
mena.
2. The ascertaining of their particular causes.
3. The determining of the forces manifested in
them.
This is the task not only of the scientist but also
of the historian, in so far as he has (i) to investigate
and relate facts
; (2) to find out the motive of each
action ; and (3) to portray the human characters
which by motives are manifested in these actions.
VI. Materialism as the Consequence of the
Empirical View of Things
26. Since from the empirical standpoint nothing
exists but matter in its various states ( n. 14), all
that exists must be conceived as modification of
matter. To this the human intellect is no ex-
ception, the more so, as the study of it is in-
THE EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT 15
separable from that of the brute intellect. Now
the intellect of the brute is an organ rendered
extremely sensitive by the accumulation of nervous
matter, which in consequence of the external
irritation of its offshoots, the senses, produces a
reaction, from which, as we shall see later, the
perception of the outer world arises. The function
of this organ is called Understanding. Now
the human intellect is nothing more than an
augmentation of that of the brute to such a
degree of intellectual clearness, that we are able
to decompose our perceptions into their elements,
and to retain these in a changed order, whence
arises, as we shall show hereafter, the apparatus
of the Reason with its concepts and judgments.
27. It is the object of anatomy and physi-
ology not so much to demonstrate the materiality
of all intellectual processes (which is a truth a
priori} as to establish it in single cases. If these
sciences, owing to the inaccessibility of the thinking
organ, have hitherto only partially succeeded in doing
this, they nevertheless have at command a series
of facts which place beyond question the absolute
dependence of thinking on the brain. Such
facts are the symptoms observable in childhood
and old age, in abnormal development or mal-
formation of the brain (mikrokephali, cretins), in
cerebral affections through external injuries or
16 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
internal morbid influences, causing insanity. In
this last case the brain may occasionally have
periods of release (lucida intervalla\ and it may
even happen that, in consequence of general ex-
haustion at the approach of death, the morbid
tendencies disappear and the brain resumes for a
short time its normal functions (Don Quijote).
28. The philosophical spiritualism or doctrine
of the dualism of man (established by Descartes,
modified, transformed, combated by his successors
and finally refuted by Kant, though even now pre-
valent as a popular opinion), according to which
there are two substances, an extended and a think-
ing, blended in man as soul and body and separated
by death, is a fundamental error, equally unsup-
ported by experience, comprehensibility, and proof,
and bars the way to any genuine philosophical
view.
Remark. Kant's refutations are based chiefly on the fact
that existence is only the general form of objects, under which,
therefore, we cannot comprehend that which in all our repre-
sentations is the subject only, without ever becoming the
object.
VII. Comfortlessness of the Empirical View
of Nature
29. So surely as materialism scorns all that
is highest and deepest in philosophy and religion,
THE EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT 17
so surely as its results in the sphere of art are
flat and vulgar, in that of morality hopeless,
desolate, and perverting, so sure is it that, from
the empirical standpoint, it is the only true and
consistent view of things, and so the
" ideal
"
at
which the empirical sciences aim, and to which
in time they will more and more attain. It is
therefore lost labour to endeavour to refute material-
ism. But we may well ask if it is not possible
to supplement it by a higher view of things, which
removes it without, however, contradicting it.
30. Heavy lies on our heart the burden of a
world in which for God, freedom, and immortality
there is no place. Thanks therefore, in all future
time, to those men who succeeded in unhinging
this whole empirical world, after having found the
809 poi TTOV CTTCO in our own intellect.
However strictly the empirical sciences deal with
matters of fact, they yet, according to their nature,
overlook one fact which of all facts is the first .'
and the most certain. Of this we have now to '
treat.
B. THE TRANSCENDENTAL
STANDPOINT
,
SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS
The System of Metaphysics
PART I
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING
I Preliminary Survey
31. The theory of understanding is properly
a part of psychology, and as such deals with the
origin, essence, and connection of all our re-
presentations. These fall into two classes, as being
partly primary, partly derivative. The first are
called (by denominatio a potiorz)
"
anschauliche," that
is, perceptual, the latter abstract representations.
32. The faculty of perceptual representations is
Understanding (ww, men$ } Ver$tand} enUndewenf) ;
the science of which might be called noetics. It
has to show how the mind, by means of its innate
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 19
functions, after external irritation acting on its
offshoots, the senses, (i) produces perceptual repre-
sentations, and (2) establishes the connection between
them.
33. The faculty of abstract representations is
Reason (^0709, ratio, Vernunft, raison}. The science
which teaches how reason manufactures the materials
supplied to it by perception into concepts, and then
combines these as judgments and conclusions, is
logic. The operating with concepts is called
thinking. The external vibrations of the air
by which we communicate our thoughts to each
other, are the words of language, heard also by
the brute, but comprehended only by man
(hence the German word Vcrnunft, from vernehmen,
to comprehend).
34. The faculty of Understanding is common
to us with the brutes. No animal is without Under-
standing, although those (lowest in the scale) in
which the nervous matter is not yet centralised into
a brain, have only a very faint trace of it. Starting
from these, the Understanding increases gradually
with the development of the brain, till it reaches its
perfection in man. At this its highest point, the
functions of the Understanding attain a- degree of
penetration which not only suffices, as in the case of
the brutes, to produce the perception of the outside
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
world, but is at the same time capable of pursuing
the spatial, temporal, and causal connection of the
latter to its farthest ramifications.
The only faculty which distinguishes man from
the brute, is Reason, Simple as are its functions, they
are yet sufficient to explain all the grandeur and
beauty which distinguishes human life from that of
the lower animals.
35- The same organ which, viewed from within
or psychologically, appears as Understanding,
manifests itself, wnen considered from without or
physiologically, as brain (represented in the lowest
animals by knots or rings of nerves). This stretches
out, as it were, its feelers, terminating in the organs
of sense, towards external objects.
Reason, on the other hand, as it seems, is not a
separate physiological organ. We regard it rather
(for reasons to be given later) merely as a particular
application, peculiar to man, of that uniform faculty
of reaction which we call Understanding or brain.
36. Reason, as will be shown later, receives its
entire content from perception, and its activity is
restricted to giving to the materials supplied as
perceptual knowledge such a form as shall make
them easier of survey and so more convenient to
handle. In reality, therefore, reason teaches us
nothing new, and it is a condition of all true pro-
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 21
gress, whether in physics or metaphysics, that, before
all, we go back from abstract representations to the
perceptual world underlying them. And so meta-
physics might indeed relegate the study of reason
and its abstract contents to logic, and abstain from
all inquiry in this sphere, had not the insufficient
knowledge of this very faculty and its bearing been
the source, both in times ancient and modern, of the
'
most grievous errors in the province of metaphysics.
To guard against these, we shall, by way of appendix,
take into consideration reason and its abstract repre-
sentations. At present, however; let us set aside this
secondary faculty of knowledge and turn to the
world of perceptual representations, which alone are
original and embrace all that is real. In this sphere
lies the difficult problem the solution of which will
remain the starting-point and the basis of all scien-
tific metaphysics.
II. The Problem of Perceptual Knowledge
37- How is it possible to perceive by the senses
objects of the external world ?
The empirical explanation, according to which
objects, either' directly or indirectly, by means of
rays of light, waves of sound, etc., affect the nerves
and through them the brain, would perhaps suffice,
if the fact to be explained were my having, whilst
perceiving, certain specific sensations within my
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
organism. But in normal perception this is gener-
ally not the case. It is not subjective impressions
which enter into my consciousness, for I perceive
directly and without being aware of a medium, the
objects and incidents lying outside of me themselves.
In seeing, for instance, I do not perceive the inverted
likeness of the object on the retina, but I see the
thing itself and yet outside of me. It is not
rays of light, not subjective reflections which enter
into my consciousness, but the objects themselves
directly, which yet are distant from me. This is
the fact, and it involves a contradiction.
No empirical explanation can remove it.
III. The World is my Representation
38. If, to escape from this perplexity, I ask
what part of all my knowledge is in reality abso-
lutely and incontestably certain, it is best to
begin, as did Descartes, by doubting everything.
If now I not only doubt all theory and tradition,
but even raise the question, if this world which
visibly and palpably surrounds me, really exists, if
it is not perhaps a mere dream of my imagination,
an illusive phantom of my senses, there is one
truth which I cannot doubt
;
it is : The world is my
representation^
Descartes went too far when he by his famous
"
Cogito, ergo sum
"
restricted (as it seems) that which is
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 23
indubitably certain to abstract representations.
For, that the world, whatever it be in itself, is given
me as a series of perceptual representations, is a
primary fact of which I can never get rid, and which
therefore also I cannot seriously doubt.
39. To this fact alone however is restricted all
indubitable certitude, and our ripeness for the philo-
sophical view of things depends upon our being able
to arrive by self-reflection at a real and sincere
understanding of the great truth :
'
this whole
material world, extended in time and space, is,
as such, known to me only through my intel-
lect Now my intellect, according to its
nature, can never furnish me with anything
but representations. Consequently this whole
world and with it my own body, in so far as I
regard it through my intellect, that is, as cor-
poreal in time and space, is nothing more than
my representation,
4oAThough this truth is irrefutable, we yet
feel a strong repugnance to it. This repugnance
will increase when we consider that even the most
painful injuries to our own bodies are, for our
intellect, nothing more than representations, just as
much as are the pains and injuries with which we see
others tormented/'; If our relation towards external
objects were that of pure bodiless intelligences, the
24 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
above truth would not offend us in the least. The
whole world would pass before us as a series of
empty, meaningless phantoms, resembling the ap-
paritions of a dream in which we are spectators
only, not actors. But here the case is different.
For our relation to the world is twofold, on the one
hand mediate, so far as we perceive the world
through the medium of our intellect, on the other
hand immediate, so far as we are ourselves, in
virtue of our corporeal existence, a part of it.
What we and the things of this world are in the
latter sense, will be taken into consideration later on.
At present this question does not concern us, as we
have now to analyse the world as material in space
and time
;
for in this form the world is known to us
only through our intellect and is consequently only
our representation.
IV. Whether Things in themselves are the
same as I represent them ?
4i.^The world is my representation. As such
it is, in the first place, only the form in which
things appear to me. Now the question is,
whether things in themselves are the same
as I represent them, namely, material in space
and time
3
or if they exist in this form merely for
my intellect, which perhaps, by its nature, is not
able to reveal the real and true essence of things ?
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 25
The former is maintained by materialism, the
latter is preached to us by certain mysterious
voices of the past. Indian sages teach that the
root, out of which springs the varied world, is
ignorance (avidyd\ nay, they conceive this whole
world as an illusive phantom (vtdya). Greek
philosophers (Parmenides, Plato, etc,) accuse the
senses of deceiving us, whilst Christianity teaches
that from the moral depravity of mankind comes
a darkening of the intellect (ecieoTia-fjLevot, rfj SLCI-
voia oWe?, Eph. iv. 1 8 ; one should read in
particular i Cor. ii.). In all these fanciful sayings
is expressed the conviction thatchings in them-
1
selves are other than they appear to us."
An analysis of our intellectual faculties can
alone give us the means of deciding this question.
V, Elements of Representation a priori
and a posteriori
&
42,*' Every representation contains as such two
supplementary halves, a representing subject
and a represented object. These two make
with the representation not three (as a sneering
epigram of Schiller has it) but one. No repre-
sentation is without a subject, none without an
object. Now nothing exists for me but representa-
tions ( 39), therefore also no subject without
26 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
an object, no object without a subject a
truth which Plato (Theaetet. p. 1 60 AB) has already
expressed in his way.
43. All objects of my subject are such either
immediately or mediately. As immediate
objects I can never have anything else but affec-
tions of my ego, that is, sensations within me
(represented physiologically as certain specific irrita-
tions of the sensory nerves extended in the organs
of sense). All other objects, the whole external
world and even my own body, as far as I regard
it from without, are known to me only as mediate
objects: it is only through the medium of those
nerve-irritations that I come in contact with them./
44,
'
Thus all data by which I attain to a
knowledge of the external world, are restricted to
these affections of the nerves which are given as
immediate objects. They are the only thing which
comes to my intellect from without, that is inde-
pendent of itself. Consequently all else, all that
distinguishes wide - spreading nature with its im-
measurable riches from those scanty affections of
the nerves, must come from within, that is, must
originate in my intellect itself.)'
45. If we compare the perceptual world which
is our representation, to a textile fabric in which
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 27
subjective and objective threads intersect as warp
and woof, then all that is objective, independent
of myself, given a posteriori^ is limited to those
affections of the nerves and may be compared to
the thin, isolated threads of the shuttle. The warp,
on the contrary, which is previously, that is a
priori^ stretched out to receive little by little these
interweaving threads and work them into a fabric,
is the natural, innate forms of the subject, the
totality of which forms just that which we call
Understanding or brain.
VI. Clues to the Discrimination of the a priori
Elements in Representations
46. The task of metaphysics consists in rinding
out what things are in themselves, that is, inde-
pendent of our intellect ( 4). We must, therefore,
first of all, deduct from things that which our
intellect contributes to them, namely those forms
which inhere in it originally, that is a priori, and
in which it ranges all materials furnished from
without so as to weave them into experience.
The following six criteria may serve to distinguish
these a priori elements of knowledge or innate
functions of the Understanding from those which
come to it a posteriori or through perception.
They are to us what reagents are to the chemist.
28 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
They may also be regarded as six magnets,
by means of which we extract the iron of our
a priori knowledge from the mixed ore of ex-
perience.
1. Whatever is necessary to transform percep-
tion, given as affection, into perceptual representation,
and consequently precedes all experience as a
condition of its possibility, cannot originate in ex-
perience but only within ourselves (argumentum e&
antecessione).
2. Whatever comes to the intellect from with-
out, has the character of contingency, it might be
otherwise, or it might even not be at all ; that
is, I can imagine it as non-existent Now, in
my representations there are certain elements which
cannot be thought away like everything else, from
which it follows that they do not belong to that
which exists independently of myself, but must
adhere to the intellect itself (argumentum ex ad-
haesione).
3. For the same reason all data given from
without merely suffice to state what is there, but
not that something is necessarily so and not
otherwise. Perception has no tongue for the word
necessity, consequently all determinations of things,
with which is associated the consciousness of neces-
sity, must originate, not in perception, but within
myself (argumentum e necessitate).
4. From this it follows that sciences the
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 29
doctrines of which have apodictic certainty,
cannot have obtained it from perception, and that
consequently that part of the perceptual world to
which they refer must belong to the elements
originally inherent in my intellect (argumentum e
mathematicis).
5. Perception can only furnish me with sensa-
tions. These are, as such, isolated and fragmentary,
for, difficult as it is to grasp at first, the materials of
sensation given from without contain only the sensa-
tions themselves, but not any connection between
them, for such a connection is merely the link
between the different sensations and therefore not
itself sensation. Consequently that faculty which
makes of the variety of perception a unity and
so creates coherence between my representations,
must belong to me a priori. Therefore whatever
serves to establish the continuity of nature, belongs
to the innate functions of my intellect (argumentum
e continuitate).
6. Perception can never embrace infinity. If,
now, I find in my representations of things elements
of which I am conscious as being infinite, it follows
with certainty, that I have not taken them from
perception, but must possess them as forms of my
intellect, wherefore, however far I proceed in re-
presenting, I can never get beyond them, in which
precisely consists their infinity (argumentum ex
infinitati).
30 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
VII. The a priori Elements are : Time,
Space, and Causality
47. Three constituent elements of the sur-
rounding perceptual world, neither more nor less,
are proved by these six touchstones to be forms
belonging originally to our intellect, in which we
range the material of perception, to transform it
into representations. These, therefore, must be
withdrawn from nature in order to retain as re-
mainder things in themselves. They are :
1. Space,
2. Time,
3. Causality.
That it is these three which distinguish the sur-
rounding phenomenal world from that of being-in-
itself (an-sich-Seiend), is the fundamental truth
of all metaphysics, therefore it appears again and
again, pronounced at least indirectly and as in-
ference, in all the various stages of metaphysical
development, as the following instances will show.
In the Vedanta, the most profound metaphysical
system of India, the thing-in-itself appears as the
Brahman, of which it is said, that it is not split by
time and space (de$a-k&la-anavacchinnd} and that
it is free from all change (sarva-vikriya-rahita).
(ankara ad Brihad-aranyaka-upanishad^ i. 3^ p. 79^.
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 31
ad Brahma-stttr&ni, I i,4 p. 64,7.) Now where there
is no change, there is also no causalityv
The exemption from causality of things-in-
themselves is also the fundamental dogma of Plato's
philosophy. Again and again he recurs to the dis-
tinction between the phenomenal world, ruled by
causality, which he calls
" the Becoming and Perish-
ing, but never really Being
"
(^i<yvo^evov real d,7ro\-
\v/jLVov, ovrco? Se ovSeTrore ov, Tim. 28 A), and Being-
in-itself, to which he denies, in the strongest terms,
all change (/zoz^o6i8e9 oz; avro fcaO' avro, oocravra)?
Kara ravra %i, fcal ovBeTrore ovSa/j/fj ov$ap&$ aXX,o/-
GMTIV ov$/jbiav vB%TaL, Phaedon, 78 D). Like
causality, he also restricts to the phenomenal world,
and expressly excludes from Bcing-in-itself, Space
(VjOO? o BT) /cal oveiponro'Kov^ev ^SXeTroi^Te? icat <j>ajjbev
avayfcaiov, elval TTOV TO bv axrav ev TIVI TOTTCO teal
/car6%ov ^pav nva, Tim. 52 B) and Time (ravra Se
irdwra
^p'rj %povov, /cal TO T ?\v TO T ecrTdi %povov
yeyovora elfy, a S^ (frepovres \av6avop,ev eirl T^V
alSiov ova-lav OVK op6&$, Tim. 37 E).
Biblical metaphysics conceives Being-in-Itself
as a personality, but retracts the limitation implied in
this idea, when it maintains as attributes of God ( I )
eternity, that is, timelessness (m
c61am cad-'61am
attah 61, Psalm xc. 2) ; (2) omnipresence, that is,
spacelessness (et-haschschamajim veet-h&arez ant
mal^
1
n
e
um-j eh6vah, Jerem. xxiii. 24); (3) immu-
tability, that is, exemption from causality (hem-
32 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
mah [heaven and earth] J6bdu v
e
attah ta' a mod,
Psalm cii. 27).
As dreaming is opposed to waking, so these
witnesses of the past are opposed to the arguments
for the a-priority of Time, Space, and Causality, which
Kant first established, and Schopenhauer has freed
from false additions and completed. For both is
reserved, as reward, the veneration of many future
ages.
If, however, we try in the following to establish
these proofs, in part more completely and system-
atically, in part more comprehensibly than has been
done by these immortal teachers, we commit no act
of impiety : for here as everywhere we have the
right to look at things with our own eyes.
VIII. Space is an a priori form of Perception
48. Space is that constituent element of the
perceptual world by means of which all objects are
determined in position towards each other. It is,
as such, not something independent of myself, but
an a priori form of perceiving.
First Proof: ex antecessione
49, I have the representation of space. This
representation must come either from experience or
from myself. Now it cannot be drawn from ex-
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 33
perience, because every experience presupposes . it,
for what makes experience is my referring certain
sensations to something outside of me and their
diversity to different places outside of each other.
This presupposes, in every experience, the represen-
tation of space. Consequently it must spring not
from experience, but from my intellect itself.
Second Proof: ex adhaesione
50. In my representation of the outer world (I
can think away everything except space. I cannot
imagine that there is no space, whilst I can easily
imagine that there are no objects in space. I can,
for instance, think away everything in the universe
but not the space which fills it, for to think away
space is absolutely impossible. Hence follows that
space belongs not to the represented objects, but to my
representing faculty, for from this and this alone I
can make no abstraction when I am representing.
Third Proof: e necessitate
51. All particular determinations of space are
necessary and whatever contradicts them is im-
possible. It is necessary, in order to reach a thing,
to traverse all parts of space which separate me from
it
;
it is impossible to be nowhere or in two places
at the same time, etc. Every one feels that the
D
34 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
certainty of this and similar determinations is of
quite a different kind from that which comes to us
through often-repeated experience. For experience
can only tell me that until now something has never
been otherwise than so and so
;
but not that some-
thing is necessarily so and not otherwise, Hence
space, the determinations of which are throughout
necessary, cannot originate in experience, but must
come from myself.
Fourth Proof: e mathematicis
52. Geometry pronounces all its propositions
apodictically, that is, with the consciousness of
necessity. This is the reason why this science
knows properly neither controversies nor hypotheses,
with which the empirical sciences teem in all de-
partments. Hence follows with certainty, that the
dogmas of geometry cannot be gathered from per-
ception, that consequently the subject of this science
is not empirical. Now the subject of geometry is
"
space, and it is only in order to investigate the laws
of space that geometry imagines its points, lines,
surfaces, and bodies. For in these the nature of
space is manifested in the same way, as the nature
of characters which the dramatist wishes to depict,
is revealed in the actions which he invents for the
purpose. Space therefore is an a priori representa-
tion.
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 35
Fifth Proof: e continuitate
8 53. Every external perception (whether of a
body or of its image on the retina of the eye) con-
sists of an infinite multitude of parts which, as mere
affections of my ego, have no relation whatever to
each other but only a relation to me. That, there-
fore, which links these into a connected perception,
must lie not without, but within me. Now the tie
which connects the infinite multitude of external
affections (whether given bygone sense or by several)
into the unity of external perception, is space. Con-
sequently space must lie within, not without me.
Sixth Proof: ex infinitate
54. Space is (as shown, 7) infinite, I knoxv
with the utmost certainty, that beyond all solar
systems, in regions where no telescope can pene-
trate, no experience reach, space still continues.
From experience I cannot know this. It follows,
therefore, that I know it a priori.
IX. Time is an a priori form of Perception
55- ^ime is that constituent element of the
perceptual world by means of which all conditions
and changes, whether belonging to outer or inner
experience, are determined in their sequence to each
36 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
other. As such, it does not exist independently of
me but is a representation a priori.
First Proof: ex antecessione
56. The representation of time cannot be
obtained from experience, because every experience,
in order to be made, presupposes time. For to
make an experience, it is necessary to have certain
sensations either simultaneously or successively.
Now this simultaneity, this succession, does not
belong to the sensations as such ; consequently it
belongs to me and is just that which constitutes the
nature of time.
Second Proof: ex adhaesione
57- Let us suppose the world were to stand
still, all motion being checked, all change suspended.
There would indeed, in consequence of the stoppage
of all clocks, as well as that of the great world clock
(the earth revolving round the sun), be no means of
measuring time. But time itself would continue its
course undisturbed, and one moment follow cease-
lessly on another as before. If in this way I
were to extinguish all inner and outer perception
(which is nothing but a kind of change), there would
still remain to me the representation of (absolutely
empty) time, and this would be extinguished only
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 37
with my intellect itself; from which follows with
certainty, that time does not belong to the things
existing independently of me, but to my own intel-
lectual faculties, to which it adheres as their indis-
pensable form.
Third Proof: e necessitate
58. All particular determinations of time are
necessary, and whatever contradicts them is im-
possible. It is necessary, for instance, in order to
. reach any period of the future, to live through ex-
actly the amount of time which separates it from
the present, neither more nor less. It is impossible
to recall any single moment of the past ; the cer-
tainty of this and similar determinations can never
be attained through experience, however universal
and invariable it may be. One may cloubl, for
example, whether Plato's birth took place according
to Apollodorus in B.C. 427, or according to Athcnscus
in B,C, 429 ; but if any one were to maintain that
both authors were right, and that Plato was born
twice successively, we should not be likely to observe
that such a case had never occurred and was there-
fore extremely improbable, but we should simply
declare such a person deranged, an expression sig-
nifying that something in the mechanism of his head
must have become displaced, which would, in the
present case, be the cerebral function of time.
38 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Fourth Proof: e mathematicis
59. The axioms of arithmetic (the generalised
form of which is algebra) have, like those of geometry,
apodictic certainty. The subject of this science can-
not therefore spring from experience. Now as geo-
metry is the science of space, so is arithmetic the
science of time, as will be clear from the following.
All arithmetic, with its most complicated formula;
and operations, may be regarded as a methodically
abridged counting (hence the name apt,8p,r)Twri, that
is, art of counting). In counting, I abstract from
everything except from time. For counting consists
in the repeated marking of unity, for which I
employ each time a different conventional term (one,
two, three, etc.), merely to know how often I have
marked unity. Now all repetition depends on
succession, and in succession alone consists the
nature of time. So all counting, and consequently
arithmetic is the science of time
;
and from the
apodicticity of arithmetical propositions follows the
a-priority of time.
Fifth Proof: e continuitate
60. Every perception is only possible through
my being affected either outwardly or inwardly for a
certain period of time. This period, however short
it may be, consists of an infinite number of parts
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 39
which are filled by an infinite multitude of corre-
sponding affections in the subject (whether the object
affecting me is at rest or in motion). All these
affections of my ego have, as such, no relation to
each other, but only a relation to me. The thread,
therefore, on which they are strung together to the
unity of perception, is not in the affections them-
selves, that is outside of me, but only within me.
This thread, on which I string all affections coming
to me from without as from within, is time. It
must consequently be given a priori as a condition
of the synthesis of perceptions.
Sixth Proof : ex infinitaU
61. Time is (according to 9) infinite in both
directions. I know with certainty that in the most
hoary past, to which no knowledge reaches, in the
most distant future, which no prophet's eye can
pierce, time was and will be. From experience I
cannot know it
;
it follows therefore, without con-
tradiction, that I know it independently of ex-
perience, that is, a priori.
X. Causality is an a priori form of Perception
(62. As space is the order of things according
to their position, time the order of things accord-
ing to their sequence, so causality is the order of
40 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
things according to their action. Now as every
single place and every single period of time is
empirically determined, while, on the other hand,
space and time themselves, as the general possibility
of the empirical occupation of time and space, are
a priori representations, so also is each single effect
empirically determined, but causality, as the general
possibility of action, precedes them a priori. It is
the net which binds together, in the way laid down
by the law of causality ( 15), all effects, that is, all
force manifestations ( 24), and connects them, in
various ways, as effects of preceding and causes of
succeeding force manifestations.^
As such, causality is in no way an abstract
concept, but, like space and time, a constituent
element of the totality of empirical reality ; though
we are not able to isolate it (for the purpose of
considering it separately) so completely from effects,
as we may isolate space from bodies and time from
events. That causality, however, is an integral part
of the perceptual world, becomes clear if we repre-
sent it as filling space and persisting in time, for
then it appears as that which remains after all
manifestations of force have been separated from
things, and which, in contrast to force, is called
,
matter or substance. This, however, can only be
explained later on (Chap. XVL). Here we have
merely to prove that causality, like time and space,
is an a priori faculty of our understanding.
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 41
First Proof: ex antecessione
63. The relation in the perceptual world of
every effect to its preceding cause, which we call
causality (that is, the being-caused), cannot be
.learned from experience but must belong a priori to
our understanding as an innate faculty, compelling
us to regard each manifestation of force as an effect
and to refer it immediately and unreflectingly to its
cause. This surprising and important truth of the
a priority of causality follows with perfect certainty
from the fact that every experience, in order
to be made, presupposes an application of
causality. All namely, that can come to me from
without, is (as has been shown in 44) affections of
my sensory nerves, and I should never get beyond
these, never attain to a perception of the outside
world, if I did not bear within me a priori the means
of conceiving these affections as effects and of
passing from them to something else, namely to ,
their causes, which I project as bodies in space
(likewise given a priori]. This impossibility of
explaining, without the aid of causality, the gene-
sis of the perception of the external world, shows
clearly and incontcstably that causality itself can
not be gathered from the impressions of the
external world, but must belong a priori to the
intellect.
42 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Corollary. It is exactly the same, as will
become clear hereafter, whether I say : no sensation
can be conceived as body without the help of
causality; or, no force can affect me except
through the medium of matter,
Second Proof : ex adhaesione
64. Causality in itself is not representablc
( 62) ; it becomes so, when, after its union with
space and time, it is called matter. Now, since the
proof ex adhaesione is based on the inextinguishable
nature of certain elements of knowledge ( 46,,,), it is
applicable only to objectively perceived causality,
that is, to matter. It can only, therefore, like every-
thing in the present chapter which presupposes the
identity of causality and matter, be fully understood
after studying the theory of matter (Chap. XVI.).
Matter has the peculiarity of being at the same time
contingent and necessary. I can certainly think
away matter (which with space and time is impos-
sible), but I cannot imagine existing matter as
non-existent. On this depends its uncreatability
.. and indestructibility which (as already remarked in
1 2) is a truth a priori, previous to all experience.
The impossibility, namely, of imagining cither the
creation or annihilation of matter proves that I
cannot sever my intellectual faculties from its exist-
ence, from which follows, that it has not, like the
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 43
forces borne by it, an existence independent of my
intellect, but inheres in the latter as an original form
of perception.
Third Proof: e necessitate
65. All determinations of causality (enumerated
14-20) have the character of necessity ; whatever
contradicts these determinations is impossible.
We may often, for instance, doubt to what cause a
particular effect is to be referred, but, that it must*
have some cause, we are all firmly convinced. As
little, therefore, as a judge would believe an accused,
who, called upon to prove an alibi, should maintain
that, at the moment in question, he had been
nowhere, just as little would he, when a crime has
been committed, allow the possibility of this effect
being without a cause. If the law of causality were
an a posteriori law of nature ( 21), our experience,
however general, could not guarantee that it might
not occasionally admit of an exception.
That experience carries with it no necessity was
a truth of which David Hume was as much convinced
as Kant. But compare the conclusions which the
-two drew from the same premisses.
Hume argued :
Experience has no necessity.
The law of causality springs from experience.
Therefore it has no necessity.
44 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Kant argued :
Experience has no necessity.
The law of causality has necessity.
Therefore it does not spring from experience.
Fourth Proof: e mathematicis
66. Besides geometry and arithmetic, there is
still a third science the propositions of which have
apodictic certainty. It forms that element of the
natural sciences which remains, when we eliminate all
a posteriori laws of nature, these being merely the
expression for the invariable operating of the forces
of nature ( 21), and which Kant, in his
" Mcta-
physische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissen-
schaft," subjected to a separate inquiry. If we
take away from our knowledge whatever has been
gained empirically by induction, there remains no
real action, but only the general possibility of action
(that is, causality), which, viewed as filling space and
persisting in time, constitutes matter (as will be
proved further on). The science of matter at rest
and in motion has apodictic certainty ; con-
sequently its subject is given to us not empirically,
but a priori*
Fifth Proof: econtinuitate
67. If the affections, to which all perception is
restricted, are not even capable of giving me any
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 45
coherence in time and space, still less are they
capable of communicating the connection often so
remote between cause and effect. If therefore this
connection cannot be drawn from perception, it
follows, that it is furnished by my mind, which, in
the same way as it projects bodies in space and
events in time, arranges all perceived force manifesta-
tions as causes and effects in its a priori form of
causality. This, of course, does not exclude the fact
that, in making this arrangement, it is guided in
all particulars by former experience.
Sixth Proof: exinfinitate
68. The net of causality is (as shown, 19)
without beginning or end, that is, it is infinite in
time. Whether it is also infinite in space, we do not
know, because we are ignorant as to whether the
store of matter, to which all effects and consequently
all applications of causality are confined ( 13), is
limited or unlimited. So much, however, we know
positively, that in the most distant star, in the
earliest past as in the latest future, there can never
be an effect without a cause. No experience reaches
to these times and regions ; it follows, therefore,
that we know it independently of experience, that is,
a priori,
Corollary. From this proof also (as from 64)
46 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
may be deduced the axiom, that matter, which is
causality objectively perceived, can never be created
and never annihilated.
XI. The Empirical and the Transcendental
Standpoint.
69. Recapitulation. The result of our
inquiries so far may be summed up as follows :
1. The world is a purely material structure,
which, interwoven by causality, exists in in-
finite space, through infinite time ( 7-30).
2. This same material world is through and
through merely a representation of my
intellect, 'and its materiality is only the
form in which things appear to me ( 38-
40).
3. In itself, that is, independently of my
intellect, there exists nothing but that which
we have called sensations or affections of
the ego ( 42-45). These are, as regards
their real nature, absolutely unknown to us ;
for though physiology, in which the intellect
appears as brain, recognises its affections as
irritations of the sensory nerves, in so doing,
it already regards these as they appear to
us, but not as they are in themselves.
4. Three constituent elements of the external
world, forming the very framework of nature,
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 47
namely, time, space, and the causal
nexus, are, as we have shown by three times
six proofs, the innate forms the totality of
which constitutes the essence of the intellect.
They are, physiologically speaking, cerebral
functions, and consequently not something
existing independently of my mind (appear-
ing as brain).
No one can think of evading the conclusions
which we shall presently draw from these facts, so
long as he has not succeeded in refuting the
whole series ol proofs brought forward by us. That
this should ever happen, that any one should succeed
in undermining singly each of the six proofs adduced
for the a priority of time, space, and causality, and
thereby overthrow the whole structure resting on
them, is, in our estimation, for ever impossible.
That there will be, however, hereafter as before, those
who fancy they have refuted what they have never
really understood, is not only possible but highly
probable.
70. Regarding the facts established by us,
three standpoints are possible : the empirical, which
ignores them ; the transcendent, which defies
them; and the transcendental, which utilises them.
71. The empirical standpoint is that on which
all men stand by nature, and on which most stand
48 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
all their life long. It is that which is alone valid
for all sciences save metaphysics, and for all
practical life, with the exception of purely moral,
that is, self-denying deeds, which for that very
reason, as will be shown later, bear a supernatural
character and are opposed to all actions natural
to man. From this standpoint no notice is taken
of the facts resulting from the analysis of intellect,
for it has to deal only with things as they exist
for us, and not as they may be in themselves.
Whether the wonderful consistency we meet every-
where in nature, and on which we confidently build
< our plans, rests on an objective order of things or
on subjective laws of the intellect, is of no con-
sequence to practical life and to the empirical
sciences serving it. For, though time, space, and
causality are only innate forms of the intellect,
they yet govern all that is earthly with inexorable
necessity, as if they were eternal determinations of
things themselves, because (i) the intellect is every-
where identical, and (2) is inseparable from existence,
(i) On the one hand, namely, the intellectual
faculties in all living beings differ only in energy,
that is, in degree, but, as regards their real nature,
they are everywhere the same, so that all minds
must produce from the same affections essentially
the same representations, just as the digestive organs
in all men draw from the same food essentially the
same materials for the building up of the body.
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 49
(2) On the other hand, the intellect is the ever-
present pre- requisite of existence ; it is, as the
Indians call it,
l the witness " (sAkshin\ which
accompanies the whole changeful drama of life
from birth to death as its indispensable condition,
and there is (as follows from 42) as little a
world without intellect as an intellect without
world. Let it not be objected that many revolu-
tions of our planet must have taken place, before
living and intelligent beings could come into
existence, for all these preceding world periods
of which geology tells, are neither more nor less
than the most immediate present, merely the form
in which things appear to our space-and -time^
bound' mind ; in reality there is no time, and so no
past, present, or future,
72. The transcendent standpoint transcends,
as its name implies, the limits of knowledge attain-
able by experience. For, whatever we have learned
through the accumulated experience of ages, and
whatever may yet be added to it, is like a small
island on the immeasurable ocean. Unsatisfied in
its longings and conscious of a higher origin, the
human mind has at all times sought to pass the
boundaries of knowledge, which have been fixed
once for all by the nature of our intellectual faculties,
and, for the sake of purity of moral action, have
been fixed wisely. But already a thoroughgoing
E
50 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
empirical view of nature, the outlines of which
have been sketched in the "System of Physics,"
cuts off the way to all such attempts to fly beyond
the atmosphere of experience. For, however far on
all sides we would penetrate infinity, we remain for
ever in the desolate cage of empirical reality. Kant,
in his " Critique of Pure Reason," undertook on a
large scale such a relegation and confinement of
transcending reason to the limits of experience.
Yet in so doing he appears to us like Saul, the
son of Kish, who, being sent out by his father
(David Hume) to seek the asses, found a royal
crown. For Kant, in analysing the intellectual
faculties, to discover their bearing, came through
this inquiry, directed against transcending reason
and therefore transcendental, to the greatest dis-
covery ever made in any department of science,
the discovery of the a priori forms of the intellect,
which is and will be for ever the basis of all scientific
metaphysics.
73. The transcendental standpoint, the name
of which we owe to the memory of Kant, does not
presume, as does the transcendent, to pass beyond
the limits of experience, but contents itself with
understanding thoroughly the world as it is given
to us. For this purpose it investigates it, in taking
away from things everywhere that which is imposed
on them only by the forms of our intellect To
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 51
Kant's unexampled acumen is due the discovery
of these forms
; Schopenhauer's immeasurably wide
and profound genius was called to make this dis-
covery fruitful by spreading its light from the centre
of the inner self to the periphery of the world, thus
gaining scientifically what for ages past the pro-
phetic voices of the wisest among men were able to
express only by images.
To both these men posterity will raise one monu-
ment, representing the first, as he sits, self-absorbed
and sunk in profound thought, the other, leaning on
him, with upraised open glance, as if to embrace the
world.
We and many after us tread the path which these
mighty heroes have cleared for all after ages, but we
must tread it ourselves and independently. Not
words, not individual opinions of the immortal
masters must guide us, but nature itself, whose inner -
being they have disclosed to us. Our standpoint is
neither empirical nor transcendent, but transcen-
dental, we touch the boundaries and we do not
transcend them.
XII. Transcendental Analysis of Empirical
Reality
74. The first fruit of the transcendental stand-
point is the solution of the problem of perceptual
knowledge (raised in 37), which, being from the
52 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
empirical standpoint impossible, pointed, for that very
reason, beyond it.
The organ of Understanding, on which, as we
know, the world depends, appears in physiology
as the brain. This, in sending to the sense organs
five differently formed offshoots, stretches itself, as
it were, towards the five states of aggregation of
things (which in the main are the bh{tt&ni> a-ro^la,
elementa of the ancients), the solid, fluid, gaseous,
permanently elastic, and the imponderable, and
adapts itself, so to say, to them ; a thought
which permeates all Indian philosophy, while
amongst the Greeks we find only uncertain traces
of it (compare Aristotle de sensu 2), In what
way, however, the brain manufactures its sensa-
tions into representations, physiology is unable
to read in the furrows and convolutions of this
curiously constructed organ. Here psychology
comes to its aid. To its inner view, the brain
appears as the Understanding, which it conceives
as a structure, framed of time, space, and causality
that is, as a power of reacting upon the incoming
affection in a threefold direction, whereby the per-
ception of the external world arises as follows.
75. It is the Understanding which first
ranges on its innate thread of time all sense affec-
tions it receives, into a coherent series. Secondly,
it takes, by means of its inherent causality, each
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 53
external affection as an effect, which it refers (not
intentionally nor reflectingly, but through the im-
mediate impulse of its own nature) to its condition-
ing cause. This cause, in the third place^ it projects
in space (likewise inherent in it by nature), where it
appears as the material object.
76. The product, arising from the continually
exerted reaction of the intellectual forms upon the
thronging affections, is actually (rear evepyetav} in
each moment a limited and narrow circle of ideas
;
but potentially (/card, ^vvapiv] it constitutes the
whole aggregate of empirical reality, this itself being
nothing more than the consciousness (accompanying
all my representations) of that which can be repre-
sented, beside that which actually is represented.
Remark. To exist or to be real, accordingly, means
nothing else than to be able to be represented by the
senses; while, on the contrary, possible is that the reality
of which (that is, its representability by the senses) can be
represented.
77. Clearly and incontestably appears, as the
result of our inquiries so far, the great doctrine of
Idealism, this very root of all religion and philo-
sophy: The whole of nature, immeasurably extended
in space and time, exists only under the presup-
position of the forms of our intellect and has,
apart from them, that is in a metaphysical sense,
no reality; for it is nothing more than the un-
54 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
ceasingly generated product of the sensuous
affections and the mental forms. The repugnance
to this truth, arising from the physical cast of our
intellect, will be lessened, when we consider that
the material world in space and time is only the
form in which the nature of things -in -themselves
appears to us ; it will disappear, when (in the second
part) we penetrate, by the only possible way, to the
knowledge of Being-in-itself, and then pursue in detail
how this Being, distorted through the medium of
time, space, and causality, appears as that which we
call nature.
78. Never would the senses accomplish the
wonderful work of perception, if the action ex-
erted by external objects on the thin nerve threads,
expanded in our sense organs, were not met from
_within by the reaction of the nervous matter of
the massive and so ingeniously constructed brain ;
and that, as the Indians have already justly under-
stood : " cakshur - Adindm manak - samyogam mnA
vydpdra-akskamatvAd, because the eye, etc., without
union with the mind, is unable to perform its
function" (Wilson, S^nkhya-K., p. 100 n.). It is
not the senses, therefore, which see, hear, feel,
smell, and taste, but the Understanding (repre-
sented as brain) ; as even Epicharmos (B.C. 500)
saw and admirably expressed in the verse (Plut.
mor. p. 96 1 A) :
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 55
opfj /ecu vov$ d/covei,
What in us hears, what in us sees, is mind,
And all its organs are but dumb and blind.
79, Nobody should deny himself the pleasure
of examining by the light of this truth, so simple
and yet so important (in which Physics and
Metaphysics join hands), sensuous perception in
detail, and convincing himself how, for instance,
the phenomena of vision (physically inexplicable,
see 37) become clear, if only we keep to the
fact, that for the Understanding the image on
the retina serves as a mere datum from which as
effect it passes to its external cause, which, by
the aid of touch and of previous experience, it
construes in size, position, and distance, accurately
in space. A whole series of the most difficult
optical phenomena are hereby easily explained ;
such are : the upright appearance of the inverted
image in the eye ; the single vision with two eyes ;
the double vision when the optical angle is not
closed
;
the appearance as body of the flat image
in the eye ; the perception of the nearness and
smallness or the distance and largeness of an
object at equal visual angle ; the increasing and
diminishing of the physiological colour spectrum
according as one looks at a distant or a near
plane ; the illusion of the microscope and the tele-
scope, etc,
56 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
XIII Of the Immediate and Mediate Appli-
cation of the Understanding
80. The passing from the effect within me
to its external cause is the immediate applica-
tion of the Understanding. But the objects
of the external world stand (empirically speaking)
not only to me, but also to each other in various
relations of space, time, and causality. Now the
same organ which builds a bridge between the
immediate objects (appearing, 43, as nerve irrita-
tions) and the mediate objects, serves further to
trace out the spatial, temporal, and causal relations
of the mediate objects to each other, that is, from
the metaphysical standpoint, to create them. (The
strangeness o|" this expression will disappear later.)
This is the mediate application of the Under-
standing. Its higher degrees are called in practical
life quick -wittedness, in science acumen; the
want of it is stupidity, at times associated with
great scholarship.
Remark. Every great discovery depends on the passing
from a well-known effect to its hidden cause (discovery of
America, of oxygen, of Neptune) ; each invention is the
establishing of a cause which produces as effect some in-
tended result (invention of the alphabet, of printing
1
,
of the
steam engine, of a manageable balloon, etc.). Accordingly
the Undeistanding is the instrument on the energy of which
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 57
depends intellectual superiority ; far more than Reason,
which (apart from the faculty of judgment) is closely allied
to memory and scarcely more than a repository,
8 1. In the immediate application of the Under-
standing the intellect remains in that state which
has been called receptivity, in the mediate it
passes into spontaneity. It is of great impor-
tance to understand that both depend on that
same reaction on the sensuous affections which
we recognised as the nature of the Understanding,
and that both differ from each other only in degree.
In perceiving, the reacting Understanding is, so to
say, on the defensive. It contents itself with re-
pelling the attacks of the affections by projecting
them in time, space, and causality. As a result
of the increase of the brain and its power of
reaction in the higher animals and man, the
Understanding passes, as it were, from the defensive
to the offensive. It not only repels the attacks
of the affections, but pursues the aggressor to its
farthest retreats, that is, it apprehends things not
merely in relation to itself, but in the most distant
relations, of their spatial, temporal, and causal
connection with each other. On a similar reaction
of the Understanding, raised to the offensive, de-
pends, as we shall see later, that function of the
latter, peculiar to man alone, which is called
Reason. For it is, in the main, as will appear,
one and the same faculty which, as Understand-
58 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
ing, establishes the connection between cause and
effect, and as Reason, that between the perceptual
world and the predicates abstracted from it.
Remark. An act of the Understanding can, of course,
appear in the form of a logical conclusion (of which later).
In itself, however, it is by no means such, but only the in-
tuitive and, so to say, instinctive passing from one relation
of the perceptual world to another connected with it. There-
fore it belongs, in a certain degree, to the brutes also, which
by means of their innate functions of time, space, and causality,
practise quite correctly the imjnediate, and in part even the
mediate application of the Understanding.
XIV. Whether there are Innate Ideas ?
82. Here is cleared up the old controversy
about innate ideas, the existence of which was
maintained by Descartes and his school, while
Locke disputed it In the words "no innate ideas"
lies the real pith of his philosophy. We saw
already ( 65) how this tenet in Hume's hands
culminated in a conclusion the untenability of
which was obvious. It was this conclusion which
roused Kant from "dogmatic slumber" and drove
him to his great discoveries,
83. All abstract representations, as we shall
show farther on, spring from concrete perception.
There are therefore, indeed, no innate ideas, but
there are three innate functions of the brain, space,
time, and causality, which constitute the very nature
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 59
of intellect. They are as innate in the brain as
walking in the leg or grasping in the hand. The
child brings them ready made with it into the world,
though it has not from the beginning the representa-
tion of space, etc. For it is only upon the stimulus
of external affection that the understanding awakes
and its functions become active. Through constant
use these are hereafter exerted so spontaneously,
that we are not at all conscious of them, so much
so, that mankind had to seek some thousands of
years before it became aware of that which lay
nearest it, and which for that very reason was
so difficult to discover. But if children could tell
us what goes on in their minds during, the first
months of their existence, they would lisp Kantian -
philosophy.
XV. The Theory of Dreaming
84. The nature of sleep might be defined as
a periodical separation of will and intellect, which
causes a temporary suspension of the con-
scious will (of which more in the second part).
The system of this conscious will in our organism
(the eleven indriy&ni^ of Indian psychology) em-
braces three parts :
1 The indriy&ni (originally "the powerful") arc therefore fre-
quently not our senses, but the organs of relation j and irijita-
indriya, samyata-indriya^ etc., is not so much "whose senses arc
tamed," as "whose will is tamed," or as Manu (2, 98) paiaphrases
it :
" Whose will is not excited by the perceptions of the senses."
60 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
1. The sensory nerves of the organs of sense
(buddhi-indriy&yi)) which transmit the affec-
tions to the brain,
2. The brain, which moulds these affections
into percepts and stamps them to resolutions
(in this double function corresponding to the
Indian manas).
3. The motor nerves, which, starting from the
brain, terminate in the organs of action
(karma-indriy&ni) tongue, hand, foot, etc.) in
order to regulate through these the execution
of the resolutions.
In a waking state these three parts are held
in close unity by the conscious will. In sleep the
conscious will becomes latent, and its organs are
isolated from each other ; therefore Homer gives
sleep the unequalled epithet of
" the limb-loosening
"
(Xucr^eX^). This isolation of the brain from the
motor and sensory nerves is the cause of our
having in sleep neither voluntary movement nor
perception. With the ceasing of the external
affection is extinguished also the reaction of the
Understanding, after the representations still occu-
pying it, being no longer fed from without, come
to a standstill, in which falling asleep consists.
Because this cessation of the conscious will is an
indispensable condition of sleep, it is impossible
to obtain sleep, like so much else, by force of
will.
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 61
85. But when external affection and the
thoughts and fancies dependent on it are silenced,
whence come dreams these dramas with such
plastic scenery, such lifelike characters-, of which
we are the spectators and creators in sleep ?
Nothing happens without cause. There is no
perception without affection : so also in dreaming.
The affection during sleep cannot come from with-
out, for in that case the isolation would be broken
and a half-waking state be the result It follows con-
sequently, that the affections by which dreams are
caused, arise from the interior of our organism. We
can with great probability assume the following. As
nature uses (or rather causes) the stoppage of the
machine, in order to repair it, so it may happen
that, through her busy working to and fro, certain
gentle shocks penetrate to those parts of the brain
which, when affected in a waking state, would pro-
duce the perception of the external world. Now
when these (like the strings of a piano when dusted)
are during sleep affected from within to and fro
irregularly and without connection, the Understand-
ing at once performs its accustomed functions (the
strings sound) and creates out of these sporadic
affections, always of course aided by the memory of
previous experience, the perceptions of the dream, so
disordered and yet so distinct, so strangely confused
and yet so consistently connected.
62 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
XVI. Transcendental Analysis of Matter
86. The perception of the material world, and
so the material world itself ( 38-40), arises, as we
have seen, through the Understanding projecting its
affections, by means of causality, in space and time
( 75)- Thus bodies are through and .through
nothing more than affection, that is, force, repre-
sented as filling space. Material objects are, accord-
ing to Kant's excellent expression, force-filled
spaces.
If now I take away force, if I deduct from bodies
all that by which they affect me, there remains
nothing but empty space. Some minds will be per-
fectly satisfied with this decomposition of matter into
force and space. It will be those in whom abstract
has a decided preponderance over perceptual know-
ledge.
87. Others again, with whom the contrary is
the case, will, even after thinking away all force,
imagine that they still retain something besides
space, namely the representation of a dark, confused
mass, which, indeed, owing to the total absence of
force and consequently of all affection, is neither
visible nor tangible nor in any way perceptible, and
yet persists as a certain something before their in-
tellect. It is properly this something which, as it
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 63
remains after the removal of all force from bodies, is
opposed to force as matter or substance devoid
of all quality. Now, since with the removal of force
all reality, that is, all that exists independently of
my intellect, falls away, the remaining matter can
only be a subjective phenomenon, springing from the
forms of our intellect. This phenomenon arises as
follows.
88. In perceiving, the Understanding is un-
ceasingly occupied in projecting the most diverse
effects, given it as affections, in space and time
( 75)- Now, if I try to efface from my consciousness
(what, strictly speaking is, of course, impossible) every
single real effect, there remains to me nothing but
the general form of effecting, that is causality. Now
just as the Understanding continually projects all
concrete effects (all effecting wepyeLa ov) as causes in
space, so it continues, even when I set these aside, to
perceive the general possibility of effecting (the effect
Svvd/jiei> 6V), that is, causality itself ( 62), as filling
space and persisting in time, where it then appears
as that dark phantom of matter or substance. Matter
therefore has no proper reality, as even Aristotle
recognised, when he defined it as merely Svvdpet, Sv.
It is only the possibility of corporeity conceived
as corporeal, that is causality, perceived in space
and time. Consequently it is the combined totality
of causality, space, and time perceived objectively,
64 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
whereas the same totality perceived subjectively (as
we saw, 74) constitutes the Understanding. Matter
is therefore the objective reflex of the Understanding
itself, and is to it what space is to the space-function,
time to the time -function. It is therefore in the
main the same, only viewed on the one side from the
empirical, on the other from the transcendental
standpoint.
Remark. Thus matter originates in the abstraction from
all concrete effect, just as each concept originates in abstrac-
tion from the individual representations underlying it. Curi-
ously enough, however, matter is not an abstract concept but
an element of the perceptual world. This, I believe, must
have been in Plato's mind when he defined matter as
Xappdvov dwro/xoTara Try TQV voyrov and as cforrov
rivi, voQcp (Tim. 51 A, 52 B). Abstracting is an act of the
reason, which, however, in this case leads exceptionally not to
a concept but to a perceptual representation, for which cause
Plato pronounced it spurious, v66o$. (Compare on this obscure
passage and the various unsatisfactory attempts to explain it
my Commentatzo da Plcdonis Sophisto, Bonn, 1869, pp. 32-34,)
XVII The Double World of the Half-Philosophers
89. Kant had proved that the three main
pillars of nature, time, space, and causality, are
nothing but the subjective forms of our intellect :
whence follows inevitably, that the material world,
presented in them, is merely the form in which things
appear to me, but not what they are in themselves.
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 65
90. Admitting the irrefutability of the Kantian
arguments, without however adopting their inevitable
conclusions, a series of thinkers since Kant have
sought refuge in a certain Ideal-Realism, as they call
it. According to them, space, time, and causality
are on the one hand subjective functions of the
intellect, in which we conceive and manufacture into
representations the affections coming from things,
and on the other hand they are the objective forms
of existence of things themselves, so that between
the being of things and our representing of them
there would be a complete parallelism.
91. The absurdity of this assertion is obvious,
since it is nothing but the assumption that every-
thing which is, exists doubly, so that we should have
before us not one, but two worlds, resembling each
other to a hair's breadth, without however having
the least contact with, or relation to, each other.
The first of these two worlds is this real, perceptual
world which I see with my eyes and touch with my
hands. This world is, as we have seen, the product
of a priori consciousness and a posteriori sensa-
tions. Behind this world, according to the above
assumption, lies another, of which we can never
obtain the slightest knowledge, and which there-
fore probably exists nowhere, unless perhaps in
the imagination of those thinkers, whose names we
omit
F
66 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
XVIII. Kant and the Philosophy after him
92. The distinction between phenomena and
things-in-themselves is as old as philosophy itself,
nay, all philosophy (so far as empirical science is not
concealed under the name) expresses the conscious-
ness of this great contrast. It was Kant, however,
who first gave it a scientific basis, by showing that
it is the forms of the Understanding, inherent in our
intellect, by means of which Being-in-itsclf becomes
visible to us as the material world extended in space
and time. The appearance of Kant therefore will
remain for all time the turning-point in the history
of philosophy, and whoever in the future means to
philosophise, must first of all come to an understand-
ing with his teaching. The pith of Kant's doctrine
is the transcendental dogma of the a priority of
time, space, and causality ; each must decide
whether to accept or reject it. There are but two
grounds on which it can be rejected ; there are but
two ways open to those who accept it. Accordingly
the philosophers after Kant fall into four classes,
which include all thinkers, present and future.
93. Those who reject Kant's teaching can have
only two reasons for doing so : either, they are
unable to convince themselves of the validity of his
arguments, in this case our exposition of these
THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 67
invites to a renewed examination of them
;
or they
go their own way, ignoring Kant's discovery,
they will allow us to do the same with them,
94. Amongst those who admit Kant's doctrine,
we distinguish such as accept it, but evade its conse-
quences, of these we spoke in the foregoing chapter ;
and such as have the courage to adopt not only the
transcendental dogma but also the conclusions which
necessarily follow from it,
This was the way taken by Schopenhauer, He
stands in many remarkable respects to Kant as
Plato to Sokrates, All the rest are at best like
the so-called
"
imperfect Sokratists,"
For an Aristotle wait not ! Thousands of busy
hands are stirring in all corners of the empirical
sciences, But a little while, and the whole world
d pipilikabhyas~m\\ perceive the day that has
dawned. Let us hope that under the impending
salutary revolution which Schopenhauer's doctrine
will cause in the domain of empirical science, the
depth of Schopenhauer's thought may not be so
overwhelmed as was that of Plato by Aristotle.
APPENDIX TO THE FIRST PART
OF METAPHYSICS
REASON AND ITS CONTENT
XIX. Survey
|j 95. Reason is an intellectual faculty, peculiar
to man, of forming from perceptual representations
'(by dropping what is different in them and retaining
k
what is identical) "abstract" representations or con-
cepts, further, ofcombining concepts into judgments
and judgments into syllogisms, In contradistinc-
tion to perceptual knowledge the operating with con-
cepts is called thinking,
96, Since concepts, as vibrations of the brain
cells or whatever they may be, are not perceptible,
we need for their communication an external vehicle,
This we have in the words of language, which con-
sist of certain specific vibrations of the air, produced
by the sound of the voice and variously modified
by the organs of the mouth (throat, palate, tongue,
teeth, lips). Thus language, by the manifold com-
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 69
bination of a few primary elements, produces an
astonishing wealth of material, sufficient to portray
in a perceptible form and to communicate to others
not only concepts but also the relations of these
to each other even to the finest shades of distinction.
97. Speaking is therefore so to say the visibility,
of thinking. Now thinking among all nations is
essentially the same, whereas language shows with
different peoples the greatest variety a fact which
is surprising and not easily explained. Logic ex-
hibits everywhere the same problems ; the question
how these are to be solved in different languages, led
necessarily to comparative grammar. This has
started by going back from the corrupted forms of
the historical languages to the primitive languages
preceding them, whereby the problem is not solved
but only clearly stated.
98. A thorough discussion of these topics
belongs to Logic and Grammar. We shall con-
fine ourselves in the following, (i) to showing how
concepts, upon which the whole content of logic
depends, spring from perception ; (2) to explaining
how the functions of Reason have their rbot in
the one and simple reactive faculty of the Under-
standing ; (3) to deriving the difference between
man and brute from the faculty of concepts which
alone distinguishes them ; (4) to hazarding a few
conjectures as to the origin of language.
70 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
XX. Origin and Nature of Concepts
99. It is very remarkable that nature is neither
thoroughly alike nor yet in all parts thoroughly
unlike, but shows a variegated blending of identical
and non- identical elements. Here I see a red,
there a blue flower
;
I meet the same blue again
in the sky, in the bird's wing, or in the stone,
which yet have nothing whatever to do with the
flower, while again all these objects have much
in common with others from which, for the rest,
they are quite different. Thus I often notice
identical phenomena in different places and at
different times. Must these not have some
secret affinity to each other, for how else
come they to be identical? This thought is
the gate by which Plato entered the realm of
metaphysics. But of this later. At present we
are concerned with nature as an aggregate of
identical and non-identical elements only in so
far, as it is on this peculiarity that the formation
of concepts depends.
100. The brutes also perceive the similarity
and dissimilarity of things, often even more perfectly
than man. The dog which rambles with the hunter
through the woods, distinguishes more sharply than
does his master the deer from Its like-hued shelter-
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 71
ing surroundings. There can be no doubt also, that
a dog distinguishes perfectly between an oak and a
fir-tree. But its less developed brain does not react
powerfully enough, its understanding is not sufficiently
independent of things, to see in them anything more
than those relations in which, for the moment, its
will is interested. Not so man. When in an oak
forest he notices how the trees around, in spite of all
difference in detail, have yet something identical in
them, he proceeds to decompose this perception into
its identical and non-identical elements
;
and in ab-
stracting from what is non-identical and retaining
what is identical in the representation, he passes
from the various individual perceptions of oak-trees
to the concept of oak.
I o I . Such is the process in the formation of a
concept. But this destruction of perception which
must take place to obtain a concept (similar to our
destruction of the marvellous organisms of animals,
for the purpose of eating their flesh), is in reality
due to ,the fact, that it is the natural destiny of
the intellect to be an instrument of the will. For
what is of interest to the will is not things, but
the relations of things to itself. From this stand-
point the wonderful continuity of the perceptual
world is dissolved into a number of possible
relations, which in logic are called predicates,
or more characteristically marks (notae). They
72 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
are the provisions which the will lays up in the
storehouse of reason for future use. If our intellect
were not a servant of the will, in all probability we
should form no concepts.
1 02. The sum of the predicates of a concrete
object is infinite. The predicates, however, which
are common to it with other objects, are generally,
at least for our apprehension, very limited in number.
Since the space which every object fills, is always
different, and perceptibility depends on space-
occupation, all concepts, being abstractions from
all that is different, must lose their individual
form. They are not to be confounded with
images of fancy, which are in fact individual, and
for that very reason only single representatives
of concepts, containing much which is not common
to all objects of the same kind.
103. The concepts of the oak, the beech, the
fir, each consist of a number of marks or predicates
which are partly different, partly in all three the
same. If now, again, of these predicates we drop
the non-identical and retain the identical, we obtain
the concept of tree, richer in extent but poorer in
content of predicates, which comprehends oak, fir,
and beech, just as each of these includes the single
objects of its kind. By the same process I pass
from the concept of tree to that of plant, from
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 73
this to that of organism, from this to that of
body, and so at last to the concept of Substance
*
or Being. This concept has an extremely wide
extent, for it comprehends under it all that is ;
the poorer, however, is its content, for it is re-
stricted to a single predicate. But for that very
reason it can have no more general concept above
it. In a similar way I can rise from the per-
ceptions of red, round, cold, bitter, fragrant, etc.
to the general concepts of colour, form, taste, etc.,
and from these to the most general concept of
quality, which as such is restricted to a single pre- -
dicate.
104. These concepts of highest generality are,
according to Aristotle, called Categories, of which
he enumerates ten : ovo'la, WQG-QV, iroiov, 717309 rt,
7TOV, 7TOT6, KelvOdl, e^GiV, TTOIGW, TTflCT^CV (Substance,
Quantity, Quality, Relation, Space, Time, Position,
Possession, Action, Passion), while in India Kandda
undertook a classification of things under six Cate-
gories, which he called fada-artkds (word-things,
essences or concepts corresponding to words).
They are : dravya^ guna> karman^ sdmdnya, vigeska,
samavdya (Substance, Quality, Action, Community,
Difference, Inherency). It might be possible to do
with three Categories: (i) Substance (ova-la
dravyd}\ (2) Quality (TTOCTOV, TTOLOV guna)} (3)
Relation (Trpo? r& sdmdnya, vigesha> samavdya) ;
74 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
for TTOV and TTOTC, as Kant observed, arc not con-
ceptual but perceptual, and the verbal Categories
(fcela-Bai, e^eiv, Troiew, Trao-^w karmaii) can be
reduced to the others by separating the copula,
which is not a concept but the linguistic sign of
a combination of concepts.
105. The whole system oft concepts up to the
Categories is accordingly abstracted from the per-
ceptual world, and may be likened to a number
of interlocked pyramids with a common and very
broad base, namely perception. From this, by
the continued comprehension of several specific
concepts under a generic concept, we ascend from
peak to peak to those few highest summits formed
by the Categories. If now, again, we look with
a bird's-eye view down on these category peaks
and through them to the base, the summits of all
special and general concepts will appear projected
upon the base. And there they lie in reality ;
for if on the one hand general concepts comprehend
specific under them, so on the other hand specific
concepts contain the general concepts, up to the
Categories, as predicates in them (Extent and Con-
tent of Concepts).
XXI. On Combinations of Concepts
106. Every judgment is the combination of
-two (more or less complicated) concepts, in such
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 75
a way, that one (the predicate) is predicated (KCLT^D-
peirai, praedicatur) of the other (the subject) or (in
negative judgments) excluded from it.
107. A judgment is analytical, when the
subject -concept contains the predicate -concept in
it as a characteristic, so that we need only ex-
tract the latter from the former (ex. the rose is a
flower) ; a judgment is synthetic, when we denote
by the combination of concepts a union of two
elements of the perceptual world which are not
already contained in our concept of the subject
(ex. the rose is red). For forming analytical judg-
ments, therefore, we need only the knowledge stored
up by previous experience in the system of our
concepts and no new experience. In this respect
one may say that all analytical judgments are a
priori, that is, independent of experience (excepting
of course the previous experience from which the
concept was originally formed). Synthetic judg-
ments, on the other hand, always show a com-
bination of characteristics not involved in the
concepts themselves, but contained only in the
perceptual world. They would therefore be al-
together a posteriori, were it not that, as we have
seen ( 42-68), certain elements of perception >
are a priori. On these elements are based the
synthetic judgments a priori of the mathematical
sciences ( 52. 59. 66). This observation is im-
76 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
portant for metaphysics, because it was Kant's
starting-point in the
"
Critique of Pure Reason."
1 08. Whatever we think, whatever (by means
of words) we speak and hear, write and read, are
concepts, for the most part combined as judgments.
It is a good exercise to take any book and analyse
a passage of it into nothing but concepts, modified
by various accessory determinations and connected
by the copula (usually contained in the verb).
Remark. It is the merit of the Greeks to have created
a syntax which hides by the cunning of language the mono-
tonous combination of subject and predicate of which the
nature of the judgment consists. On Greek syntax depends
in the main that of all the civilised languages of Europe. The
Indians, on the other hand, led away by the wealth of their
case-forms and the extraordinary facility for composition which
distinguishes their language, express 'subject and predicate
with their accessory determinations, particularly in scientific
prose, by long compounds. As a result, their style generally
is in a high degree logical, but at the same time for the
reader extremely wearisome.
109. The predicate of a subject-concept is of
course valid for all concepts comprehended under
the subject-concept (ex. if all Being is created by
God, so also is evil, since its concept is compre-
hended under that of Being). On this depends
the possibility of drawing particular judgments from
general : a practice we constantly follow in thinking.
Its methodical form is the syllogism (ny&ya^ crv\\o-
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 77
,
of which there are three, or if one likes,
four figures and nineteen modes, which we may here
omit.
S no. Since all concepts whatever are abstracted
from perception, every correct judgment is based
finally upon a relation in the perceptual world,
whether the judgment springs immediately from
perception, or whether it is derived by . deduction
from a more general judgment ( 109) which itself
is in turn obtained from perception by induction.
The methodical process of going back from one
proposition to another, and by means of this to
perception, is called Proof. But perception itself
is the base on which all judgments and proofs,
whether immediate or mediate, are founded. What
we perceive cannot therefore be demonstrated further,
1
that is, reduced to anything else more certain, nor
does it require it. This does not, however, preclude
our making use of proofs, when the question is to
derive from the accessible data of the perceptual
world other facts which belong also to perception,
but escape our observation, whether through being
too far from us in space and time, or because their
relations are too subtle and floating to be grasped
and retained with exactitude by mere perceiving.
On this we may base the justification of Euclid's
proofs in mathematics, which Schopenhauer would
not admit
78 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
in. From what has been said, it is clear that
all concepts and all judgments spring from percep-
tion. (The sole exception are the so-called Laws
of Thought, together with the nearly related abstract
Categories of Kant, in all of which, however, no
content is expressed, but only the general form of
abstract knowledge.) Accordingly abstract repre-
sentations both in physics and metaphysics are
only to be regarded as an instrument by means
of which we grasp the concrete world. This world
itself with its content is the sole subject of all
sciences (excepting logic), and only the data given
by it can guide us to physical and metaphysical
truth.
1 1 2. The neglect of this principle has caused
the gravest errors in metaphysics, whether, like Zeno
and others, men, arguing from the mosaic-like and
abrupt nature of abstract knowledge, have assumed
"
contradictions " in the perceptual world, which
neither asserts nor contradicts, or whether, obey-
ing the impulse given by Aristotle and Kant, they
have regarded concepts (because through them we
retain the essence of perception) as the genetic
principles of Reality. Both errors have in post-
Kantian philosophy given birth to systems which,
for a time, succeeded in attracting the attention and
the approval of their age.
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 79
XXII. Whether Reason is a Particular
Physiological Organ ?
113. Whatever exists is material ( n); so
also the intellect
1
( 26. 27) Brain and intellect
are two names for the same thing. Their difference
arises from the fact that in this case the organ and
its functions are accessible by different ways.
Psychology knows only the function, physiology,
until now, almost only the organ. Both methods
supplement, and do not contradict, each other.
114. Now psychology has taught us two
functions of the human intellect, that of perceiving
and that of thinking. The question is, whether
these are to be regarded as manifestations of one
and the same faculty or of different faculties,
whether Understanding and Reason are two distinct
physiological organs or only two specific functions
of the same organ.
115. The following reasons determine us in
favour of the latter view, by means of which the
unity of the human mind is maintained, a fact of
importance for our later inquiries.
1 Primum anlmum dico, mentem quam saepe vocamusj
In quo consilium vitae regimcnque localum est,
Esse hominis partem nilo minus ac manus et pes
Atque oculei pattes animantis totius extant.
Lucrctiiis III. 94-97.
So ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
1. The structure of the human brain corre-
sponds in all essentials to that of the higher animals,
although its single parts appear in different propor-
tions and in much higher development. From this
certain ignorant physiologists would fain draw the
conclusion that brutes also to a certain degree
" think " (!). We, however, infer from this, that think-
ing is nothing but a distinct operation, peculiar to
man, of the perceiving faculty, that is, of the brain.
2. Knowledge is very likely the product of a
single organ in our head, the brain so far as it
consists of the cerebral hemispheres. In its place we
should find two organs, if Understanding and Reason
were two separate faculties.
3. Our intellect is continually occupied in
subsuming perceptions under concepts. We pass
from perceiving to thinking, from thinking to per-
ceiving, with the greatest ease and without any feel-
ing of interruption. This would scarcely be possible
if these functions were assigned to two different
organs.
4. In the scale of beings we see the development
of the intellect keeping pace with that of the nervous
system centralised in the brain. The more perfectly
formed the brain, the more energetically does the
Understanding fulfil its office, the more powerful is
its reaction upon the affections coming from without
( 74)- In consequence, the products of this reaction,
that is, represented things, are more distinctly
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 81
detached, as it were, from the knowing subject, and
gain through this greater independence and objec-
tivity, Plants, to begin with, are without any
knowledge. They do not react at all (in the sense
in which we have used the word) upon external
affection. In them the receiving of impressions and
the being determined by them completely coincide,
in which essentially the nature of irritation consists
( 2O,2).
- In the brutes these two elements are
sundered. Thus the brute reacts upon external
impressions, but only so far as is necessary to
distinguish itself from external objects, that is, to.
establish between itself and the objects of the outside
world (and partly even between the different objects
themselves) the spatial, temporal, and causal con-
nection springing from the forms of the intellect
( 80). However, the brute intellect is still wholly
absorbed in things, and animals are therefore
at every moment totally dependent on surrounding
impressions. From the brute to man nature takes
in this direction the last possible step by augmenting
the reactive faculty of the intellect to such a degree,
that things appear completely isolated from the
knowing ego and therefore in full objectivity. The
result on the subjective side is the passing of con-
sciousness into self
-consciousness, while on the
objective side it becomes possible to the intellect, by
means of its isolation, to dissolve perceptions into
their elements, that is, their characteristics, and to
G
82 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
grasp and retain these in new combinations as
concepts, wherein the whole mechanism of Reason
consists.
1 1 6. It is therefore essentially one and the
same reactive faculty which, developing by degrees,
establishes as the immediate application of the
Understanding the connection between the affec-
tions of the subject and the external world, as the
mediate application of the Understanding
the connection between external objects themselves,
and as the faculty of Judgment the connection
between the perceptual world and its predicates,
classified as concepts. The faculty of judgment is
the tie which unites concepts with each other and
finally with perception. It is reflecting, when
extracting the general from the particular ; sub-
suming, when ranging the particular under the
general If we take away from Reason the faculty
of judgment, there remains to us only Memory, the
function of which is, to reproduce in part percep-
tual, but chiefly abstract representations. On this
account the brutes possess it only to a very limited
degree, because they lack abstract representations
and with these the possibility of a connected
remembrance.
Remark, Memory is, strictly speaking, not so much a
faculty of retaining representations once had, as rather a
facility for reproducing these by means of "association of
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 83
ideas," which (like a gymnastic exercise) becomes the easier,
the oftener it is practised. For the rest Memory is not, like
Understanding and Judgment, that which makes intel-
lectual superiority, being rather antagonistic to it. Only the
fact that education, instead of cultivating before all things the
Understanding and the Judgment, burdens the memory, can
explain the circumstance, that the minds which on an average
are most gifted by nature, and on the cultivation of which most
pains have been bestowed, that is, those of scholars, have by no
means always the intellectual ascendency to which they other-
wise might have claim.
XXIII, Retrospective View of the Human Mind
in General
1 1 7. The intellect is, as we have shown, nothing
but a component part of the animal organism and
accordingly, like all members of the body, an organ
of the Will (of which later). It is not, therefore,
metaphysical and immortal like the soul, that is, the
Will, but physical and perishable, like the body.
This is the less to be regretted, since it is the
constitution of our intellect which bars our view into
the inner being of things. Nay, the sinfulness of our
earthly life is intimately connected with the existence
of our intellect, since it is intellect which by its
forms creates plurality on which all egoism and
discord depend.
Remark. Yet the world created by the intellect is only
the visibility of sin, while the real root of sin lies still
84 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
deeper (in the freedom of the Will), and remains, therefore,
inaccessible to our intellectual apprehension. But this can
only be fully understood later on.
1 1 8. The human intellect is, as we saw, an
organ of perfect unity with two functions: (i) that
of producing representations, on which depend the im-
mediate application of the Understanding, the mediate
application of the Understanding, and the faculty of
judgment ; (2) that of reproducing representations,
wherein consists the nature of memory and imagina-
tion. The latter differs from memory chiefly by the
fact, that its images arise without the consciousness
of reproduction, and show therefore no connection in
time, space, and causality with the present. On this
depends the value of imagination in works of art and
its unfitness for use in practical life.
Remark I. It may be that of these two chief intellectual
functions the productive is dependent on the quality of
the brain (fineness of texture, proper nourishment, etc.) and
the reproductive on its quantity (in comparison with the
nervous matter of the whole body),
Remark II. It is interesting to compare our division of
the intellect with a very similar one of the buddhi in the
Nyiya- and Vaigeshika - Philosophy (see for instance Bhdshd-
fariccheda, v. 50, 51).
XXIV. Man and Brute
119. Inner and outer perception are common
to us with the brutes. Now these two are the only
sources from which we obtain all our knowledge.
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 85
We have accordingly, as regards the content of our
knowledge, no advantage over the brutes, and our
whole superiority to these is due to the fact that we
can give our perceptual knowledge another form,
namely the abstract form of concepts.
1 20. At first sight this difference may seem
to be a slight one. It is, however, the result of a
qualitative and quantitative development of the
brain which is probably the most difficult work
accomplished by nature. None of the innumerable
species of animals even distantly approach it, no
being known to us has surpassed it. If now it is
the faculty of concepts, that is Reason alone, which
raises man above the brute, all that distinguishes
human life from that of the lower animals and
stamps it with so distinctive a character, must be
derived from Reason.
I2i. Animals are restricted to perceptual
knowledge. This embraces (apart from single
recollections) nothing more than the immediate
present. For its connection with what is absent,
past, or future is only representable by means of
concepts, which the brute lacks. It lives, therefore,
only in the present, which, like a mighty stream,
sweeps unceasingly past it, leaving but a few per-
ceptual images impressed on its memory. Hence
the limitation of its horizon.
86 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
122. Not so Man. Continually is he occupied
in grasping what is essential in the fleeting present,
by storing it in concepts which comprehend under
a few categories the immeasurable variety of the
perceptual world. Thus we have in concepts, instead
of the fragmentary perceptual recollection of the
brute, a connected consciousness of the past, even
though the amount of perceptions we retain in them
is but limited. By means of concepts we control,
besides the narrow circle of the perceptual present,
the immeasurable totality of the absent and reckon
with it in all our thinking and acting. Through
concepts we anticipate nine-tenths of the future. It
but seldom happens that the capricious course of
things does not confirm the calculations we have
made beforehand in abstract concepts.
123. Thus is opened to our view the whole of
the world, the reproduction of which in a system of
methodically arranged concepts is the aim of all
Empirical Science. At the same time we become
aware of the sorrowful and fleeting nature of our
existence. Death, which is unknown to the brute
until the moment of dying, stands before our eyes as
an ever-threatening necessity, and the fear of possible
suffering torments us more than actual distress. Both
drive us to Philosophy ; it is, according to the Indian
view, the remedy for all the ills of existence ; it is, as
Plato says, a preparing for death (Phaedon, p. 64 A),
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 87
124. Again, the planned action of one or of
several individuals in co-operation is only possible
through the faculty of concepts. On it depends all
that serves to protect and adorn our existence : art
and science, education, government, justice, law,
agriculture, industry, commerce in short, whatever
we oppose to nature as civilisation, and by which
human life presents such a striking contrast to that
of the brutes. All these great institutions are un-
known to the brute, and its intellect, confined, as it
is, to the present and unaware of the greatest wants
and dangers of the future, would not suffice to
guarantee the safety of its existence, if all -wise
Nature had not provided a means, where knowledge
is insufficient, for guiding the steps of the brute
without knowledge as though it were with kaow-
ledge. This provision of Nature is instinct, one of
the most important facts for philosophy, with which
we shall have to deal later.
125. The action of brutes is throughout deter-
mined by perceptual motives confined to the present :
hence the transparency of all that they do. Man,
on the contrary, has not only perceptual but also
abstract motives, which allow him a deliberate
choice, since, before he acts, he can reflect, that is,
allow the different motives to try their power on his
will, in order to experience which of them is the
strongest. For by the strongest motive his action is
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
in every case determined, and his decisions are never
free, though the determining motives may often not
be apparent to us. The acting according to abstract
motives is called reasonable, and in it lies a great
prerogative of Man : for his power increases in pro-
portion as he is able to free himself from present
impressions and be guided by the consideration of
the totality of things (present to him in abstract re-
presentations). The moral worth of a character,
however, depends on what sort of motives influence
the will, and not on the form, whether concrete or
abstract, which they adopt to determine our actions.
XXV. On the Nature and Origin of Language
126. Concepts, as modifications of the substance
of the brain, are not perceptible. In order to be
communicated, they need certain external symbols,
These are the words of language, peculiar to man
alone. The relation between concept and word
cannot be an accidental one
;
and yet it is not a
thoroughly necessary one, as appears from the
diversity of primitive languages.
127. The sounds of language had to express
two things : firstly, concepts and, secondly, the relation
of concepts to each other. Hence the necessity for
two elements of speech: signs of signification
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 89
and signs of relation. In all languages these two
must appear either separated or united as words.
In the latter case the union is either a merely
external one and causes no change in the signs, or
it is internal, so that the two elements mutually
influence each other (whether by strengthening of
the root or weakening of the termination). Hence
we have three possible stages of speech, which
include all known languages.
1. The isolating languages (ex. Chinese)
range signs of signification and signs of relation (as
far as the latter are not entirely suppressed) together,
without any union.
2. The agglutinative languages (ex. Finno-
Tartaric
s Polynesian, and the majority of languages)
combine both elements without altering either.
3. The inflectional languages (Semitic and
Indo-Gernianic) make of the two elements an organic
whole in which one modifies the other. This proves,
perhaps, that man at this stage of language first
attained the intellectual energy to grasp the concept
and its relation as a unity.
128. Just as comparative anatomy regards the
higher organisms of the animal kingdom as a more
perfect development of the lower, so the anatomy of
the primitive languages leads to the assumption that
the inflectional languages were originally agglutina-
tive, and these again isolating. The supposition is
90 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
obvious that these three stages of language correspond
to three stages in the growth of the thinking faculty.
We may leave undecided, how far the isolation of
the concept-sign and the relational sign to which
modern languages have in part returned, bears
witness to a deterioration of thought.
129. But suppose we had reduced all languages
to that stage in which all concepts were expressed
by isolated monosyllabic roots, the chief problem
would still remain unsolved ; for how came men to
choose for a particular concept just these sounds and
no others ? The theory, that the denotation of con-
cepts by sounds was due to convention (6e<rei,\ falls
to the ground, for all convention is only possible by
means of language. Moreover concept and 'word
have certainly grown one with the other, as the skin
grows together with the body and is not drawn over
it afterwards.
130. The following theory (together with ono-
matopoeia and other subordinate influences]) might
lead to a satisfactory explanation of the origin of
speech ; whilst the diversity of the primitive lan-
guages might be attributed partly to original physio-
logical race-differences, partly to the deeply-moulding
influences of climate, soil, occupation, food, etc.
Imagine man in the condition of the brute, restricted
to perception and like the brutes absorbed, as it
REASON AND ITS CONTENT 91
were, in it, By degrees the reactive faculty of the
intellect increased ( U5>4), the apprehension of the
surrounding present became more and more objective,
and the subject opposed itself more and more deter-
minedly to external objects. This awakening of man
was expressed through his denoting his relation to
the outside world by gestures (of the hand, foot, eye,
etc.). Herewith the animal state was passed, for no
animal attains to a real gesture language. Now in
the same way as to-day the (untrained) deaf and
dumb accompany the gestures with which they
make themselves understood, by more or less articu-
late sounds, so it might happen that the desiring,
refusing, pointing at, grasping, seeking, etc. which
were manifested through that primitive speech of the
limbs, were at the same time accompanied by a
corresponding movement of the organs of the mouth.
Thus, for instance, the pointing with the hand might
be accompanied by a pointing of the tongue, which
'
however was not visible, but as ta (the demonstra-
tive pronoun) became audible and so perceptible even
in tha dark. Little by little perhaps these gestures
of the throat, tongue, and lips would take the place
of the analogous gestures of the limbs which formerly
they had accompanied. In this way exchanging
visibility for audibility, they were able, even in the
absence of the object to be denoted by them, to refer
to it. Thus on the one hand the mind became inde-
pendent of the corresponding present, while by the
92 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
same process on the other hand the perceived object
passed into its fancy image and by restricting the
reproduction to the essential outlines of the object
into its concept.
131. The process and the further development
of language to its highest perfection belongs entirely
to the sphere of conscious Will, and yet it cannot be
admitted that languages are the product of conscious
design. For it is impossible that the childlike con-
sciousness which meets us in the hymns of the
Rigveda, should have created a language the analysis
of which demanded all the penetration of a P^nini.
Language therefore belongs to the unconscious
creations of the Will within the sphere of con-
sciousness, that is, to the productions of instinct,
and we must explain the high perfection of primitive
speech In the same way as we do the geometrically-
woven web of the spider and the wonderfully-ordered
communities of the bees and ants.
THE SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS
PART II
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE
L The Problem
132, "What is the World?" This is the
simple fundamental question of all philosophy. The
immediate answer would be: "Well, the world is
nothing but the world. It lies extended before your
eyes, and moreover all empirical sciences are engaged
in investigating more and more minutely every part
of the universe," Those who do not acquiesce in
this answer are called philosophers. Even after
all the instruction of empirical science, they cannot
get rid of the tormenting question :
" But this so
much investigated and well-known world what is it
in its real essence ?
"
Their continued asking shows
that they distinguish the What of the world from
the world itself, that they regard the world as the
appearance of an essence which in itself does not
appear, and which no progress in empirical science
can ever reach.
94 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
133. It is this real essence of the world which
philosophy has sought since the most ancient times
as the principle from which the existence of the
world with all that it contains, may be, derived and
explained. The character therefore of every philo-
sophical system is determined by the two questions :
(1) what principle of the world it establishes, and
(2) how from this principle it explains the world.
Almost all pre-Kantian philosophers erred mainly in
this, that (as is already indicated by the name apxtf,
principium) they transferred the forms of our under-
standing, space, time, and causality to the principle
of the world, and further used these forms as a bridge
to go back from the world to its principle. Kant,
however, proved that it is just by means of these
innate functions of our Understanding, that the prin-
ciple of the world, which he called the thing-in-itself
(Ding-an-sich), is, presented to our eyes as the
universe extended in space, time, and causality.
Hence we must neither transfer these forms of
knowledge to the thing-in-itself, nor abuse them, to
derive from it the world which is its appearance.
134. The impossibility of establishing a spatial,
temporal, or causal connection between phenomena
and the thing-in-itself becomes evident to us even
in an empirical way, if we try, by means of facts
and with the help of bold hypotheses, to picture to
ourselves the life of the Universe as it exists in
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 95
infinite space through infinite time. However far
we may go by the clue of causality backwards, for-
wards, and on all sides in space and time, we reach
only what is in nature, but never that which (to
speak figuratively) lies behind it, that is, we are
always restricted to Physics without ever being able
to penetrate to Metaphysics.
Remark. In contradistinction to Physics or the science
of Nature, the science of Being-in-itself (des An-sich-seienden)
is happily expressed by the name Metaphysics, though (like
the beautiful name Veddnta) we probably owe it to a mere
literary accident.
135. The natural sciences show us the world
as a totality of matter which perpetually changes its
qualities, forms, and conditions ( 14). Now all
these changes in matter and also (as we showed,
74"76. 86-88) material objects themselves are
finally only a sum of effects; and these effects
are one and all nothing but the varied manifesta-
tions in space, time, and causality of that which in
itself does not exist in space, time, and causality,
and is therefore absolutely unknowable. It is this
unknowable essence which scientists call force, and
which in a series of original phenomenal forms (the
physical, chemical, and organic forces of nature) is
manifested in all those effects, constituting nature.
In so far as these effects concern our body and
therebv make us conscious of the existence of
96 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
things, they have been mentioned already under
the name of sensations or affections ( 43. 69,3 .
75)-
8 136. The scientist or student of nature can**
accordingly only indicate how, that is, in what form
of space, in what sequence of time and under what
causal conditions force is manifested ; but he does
not know what force in itself may be, because it
exists neither in space nor time, nor is it to be found
by means of causality ( 24). From this it becomes
clear that the same entity which philosophers seek
as the principle of the world, is that which is pre-
supposed by Kant as the thing-in-itself, and by
natural science as force, and by both given up as
unknowable.
137. Philosophy meanwhile is engaged in
explaining the world from this principle, this force,
this thing-in-itself ( 133). Now all explanation is
the deriving of the unknown from the known and
not the reverse. If therefore the problem of philo-
sophy is not absolutely insoluble, there must be
some point from which the thing-in-itself is not
only accessible, but even more immediately and
more intimately known than the whole phenomenal
world which is to be explained from it.
There is such a point, and there is but one.
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 97
138. All knowledge is a process in our intellect
The latter is for ever bound to the forms which con- *
stitute its nature ( 69^). Now it is in these forms
that the thing-in-itself appears expanded as the
world. Consequently, so long as we perceive things
through our intellect, that is, so long as we are
human beings, a knowledge of the thing-in-itsclf is
impossible to us. So argued Kant. He believed
to have thereby overthrown Metaphysics for
ever.
139. Kant's conclusions would hold good for
all time, if our intellect and its three forms were the
only way to reach things. But this is not so. More
intimately known to me indeed, than this whole
world, is the intellect in and through which all its
manifestations are presented to me ; but there is
one thing still more intimately known to rnc than
my intellect, and that is I myself. In our own
inmost self therefore, if anywhere, must lie the
key which opens to us the inner understanding of
nature. Here it was found by Schopenhauer. No
sculptor's chisel, no poet's hymn can worthily cele-
brate him for it.
140. Plato deplored that our intellect, in which
he placed the centre of the soul, should be bound to
a body which dims the purity of our perception of
things (Phaedon, pp. 66 B, 79 c). But we must
II
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
rather praise this dispensation, since our body is the
only thing which we apprehend, not merely, like
everything else, from without, but also from with-
in. Before, however, guided by Schopenhauer, we
make use of inner experience to open to us the
understanding of the external world, let us cast a
glance at nature, as it would appear to us, if we
were, as Plato wished, pure bodiless intelligences,
that is, if external experience alone and not internal
as well were at our command.
II. Nature, viewed from the Standpoint of Pure
Intellect, that is, from without
141. The a priori forms of our intellect : time,
space, and causality, are perfectly familiar and com-
prehensible to us. The a posteriori force, given as
sense-affection, which we weave with these forms into
the totality of nature ( 45. 75), remains entirely
unknown and inconceivable. Hence follows, that
the intelligibility of nature reaches just so far as
the a-priority in it, and that the phenomena of the
inorganic and organic world become gradually more
mysterious and incomprehensible in proportion as
a-posteriority prevails in them.
142. All that the investigator of nature can
determine, is the manifestation of force in a certain
place, at a certain time, and as the result of a certain
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 99
cause. In this alone lies the comprehensible part of
phenomena, Accordingly what we understand is the
spatial fc m and the temporal sequence of pheno-
mena, but ,iot what appears in this form and this
sequence. Likewise the causality of phenomena,
that is, their being conditioned, is comprehensible,
but not that which, occasioned by cause, appears
as effect ; and one can follow, step by step, how the
comprehensibility of natural phenomena decreases in
proportion as, in the scale of mechanical, physical,
chemical, and organic phenomena, the effect gradually
overwhelms the cause, in becoming, in comparison to
it, more and more dissimilar, mighty and independent ;
which is due to a gradually increasing suscep-
tibility or, so to say, sensibility of organic and
inorganic beings. While namely the force, embodied
in all nature from the stone to man, becomes more
and more susceptible to the causal influence, which
thereby turns from cause in its narrower sense into
irritation, from irritation to perceptual and finally to
abstract motives ( 20. HS,4), the causes become
ever more heterogeneous, insignificant, and remote in
comparison to the effects which they produce, and
for this reason the comprehensibility of the effect,
consisting in its causality, becomes slighter and
slighter.
143. Among all sciences geometry, arithmetic,
phoronomy, and logic are alone absolutely clear,
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 99
cause. In this alone lies the comprehensible part of
phenomena, Accordingly what we understand is the
spatial fc m and the temporal sequence of pheno-
mena, but ,iot what appears in this form and this
sequence. Likewise the causality of phenomena,
that is, their being conditioned, is comprehensible,
but not that which, occasioned by cause, appears
as effect ; and one can follow, step by step, how the
comprehensibility of natural phenomena decreases in
proportion as, in the scale of mechanical, physical,
chemical, and organic phenomena, the effect gradually
overwhelms the cause, in becoming, In comparison to
it, more and more dissimilar, mighty and independent ;
which is due to a gradually increasing suscep-
tibility or, so to say, sensibility of organic and
inorganic beings. While namely the force, embodied
in all nature from the stone to man, becomes more
and more susceptible to the causal influence, which
thereby turns from cause in its narrower sense into
irritation, from irritation to perceptual and finally to
abstract motives ( 20. HS,4), the causes become
ever more heterogeneous, insignificant, and remote in
comparison to the effects which they produce, and
for this reason the comprehensibility of the effect,
consisting in its causality, becomes slighter and
slighter.
143. Among all sciences geometry, arithmetic,
phoronomy, and logic are alone absolutely clear,
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 101
involuntary changes in plant and animal life, in
irritation
;
for the voluntary movements of animals,
in motives. Already in the case of irritation
increase of cause may lead to a contrary effect, and
changes in the effect take place without correspond-
ing- changes in the cause, whereby even the pheno-
menon of life gains such a mysterious independence.
Yet, in the case of irritation, the action is always
conditioned by contact in space and a certain
duration in time; also the receiving of the
impression and the being determined by it
still completely coincide.
145. In the voluntary movements of animals
these two are sundered ; the cause appears here
as motive, the effect as 'bodily movement The
medium between the two is the intellect. The
latter is at bottom nothing else but that same
susceptibility to the causal influence, inherent in
everything that exists, which appears here, in
conscious beings, in an intensified form as a specific
organ, namely, the brain. In proportion as the
intellect becomes perfected in the animal scale, the
gap between cause (motive) and effect (movement
of the limbs) becomes ever wider, and with that
the incomprehensibility of the causal influence ever
greater. This incomprehensibility reaches its highest
degree in the action of Man, since this is determined
not only by perceptual but also by abstract motives
102 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
( 125). Here the effect is even no longer confined,
as in the case of the animal, to the presence of the
cause
;
the thread between cause and effect has
become so thin, that many have even ventured to
deny its existence and to declare the action of man
as (empirically) free, that is, as conditioned by no
cause whatever.
The external comprehensibility of natural pheno-
mena, which consists in the transparency of the nexus f
between cause and effect, has here at the highest
stage completely vanished, and consequently the
manifold and ever-changing movements of our own
limbs would be for us the darkest point in all
nature were they not of all the most clear, because,
by a particular chance, the philosophising intellect
itself forms here a link in the secret chain, and is
thus initiated into the mystery of Nature at the very
point where it appears in its highest development
Remark. To the increasing incomprehensibility of natural
phenomena corresponds, in a practical respect, an increasing
difficulty in the management of them ; for every influence is
possible only by way of causality, and that, as has been shown,
becomes obscurer, the higher we ascend in nature. Hence
inorganic bodies are more easily managed than plants, these
than animals, and animals than men. Compare from this
point of view the increasing difficulty in the task of the
mechanic, the chemist, the gardener, the physician, and the
teacher.
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 103
III. The Way into the Interior of Nature
146. We have shown how the viewing of things
from without, whether by the subjective method of
Kant or the objective method of empirical science,
leads finally to an inscrutable entity (the thing-in-
itself, affection, force), which is for ever unattainable
by way of external experience. For wherever we
may turn to grasp the thing-in-itself, there stand
ever between it and ourselves, as a darkening
medium, the innate forms of our intellect, sshowing
us how it appears in time, space, and causality,
but not what it is in itself.
147. All things in the world are accessible to
me only from without, with one exception. This
exception is my own self (Atman}, which I am able
to comprehend firstly, like everything else, from
without, and secondly, unlike anything else, from
within. In both cases that which comprehends, is
the intellect, woven of time, space, and causality,
that which is comprehended, the sensation, given to
the intellect as nerve-irritation. Thus far internal
and external experience are similar. But the great
difference between the two is this. On the one
hand I know my ego as an object of external
experience, like every other thing, by construing
in space, with the help of causality, the affections
104 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
given to the external senses, through which process
my Self, just like everything else, appears in my
perception as a through and through material body.
Now, on the other hand, I do not conceive the affec-
tions coming from within, like those from without,
as effects which I project as causes in space and
time, On the contrary, my ego, as object of
inner experience, is free from space and causality,
and there remains only the form of time in which
expanded inner experience is reflected in the in-
tellect. Thus time is the only barrier which hinders
me from knowing by the inner view, what I am as
thing-in-itself. The question is, whether it may not
be surmounted.
Remark. The outer world and the inner world both
lie as feelings in our consciousness and are both for the in-
tellectual ego something foreign, something else, a non-ego.
And yet we treat them both differently. For we consider the
external impressions, given by the senses, as aliens and expel
them from us by means of causality. The internal or subjective
feelings of volition, pleasure, and pain on the contrary receive
from us the rights of citizenship and remain, as belonging to
our ego, untransformed. This is explicable only by the fact,
that the intellectual ego is not the final point of unity in our-
selves, but recognises above itself another and a still higher
ego, from which these internal sensations spring. We are
; about to disclose this higher ego in us as the willing ego.
148. When I move any limb of my body
(ex. hand or foot), this process, regarded from
without, appears as a bodily change in space, time,
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE IS 105
and causality ; regarded from within, as a volt
that is, as Will, expanded in time. We disting
here three things: the bodily movement, the
volition accompanying it, and the Will manifested
in it But these three are not different in them-
selves but only so for our intellect, because their
difference springs only from a different relation to
our intellect (i) Bodily movement lies always
in time, space, and causality. (2) The volition,
corresponding to it, docs not lie in space ; it lies in
causality, so far as every volition is determined by a
motive, and again it does not lie in causality, in so
far as I do not conceive inner like outer affection
( 75) as an effect, which I refer to its external
cause. Finally, every volition fills a certain time
and consequently appears certainly and necessarily
in the form of time. (3) Will itself, however, which
appears to the external senses as bodily movement
and to the internal sense as the single acts of volition,
lies neither in space, nor in causality, nor in time. It
lies therefore beyond the reach of our intellect and
remains thus in itself absolutely unknowable. We
know it only in so far as it is mirrored in the in-
tellectual form of time, in which it appears extended
as volition.
149. That which appears to our intellect as
bodily movement, is in itself Will. But just as
not only the changes in matter, but also material
io6 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
objects themselves are nothing but sensation which
we construe as bodies in space, time, and causality,
so also, as will appear in the following, not only the
movements of my limbs, but also the limbs them-
selves of which my body is composed, are intrin-
sically and in themselves Will. The understanding
of this" truth is somewhat difficult, because in a
normal state I am little or not at all conscious of
my body. I become conscious of it however, the
moment some outward influence affects it, which
inwardly makes itself directly felt as sensation.
This sensation is (with the exception of normal
sense
-affections) either pleasure or pain, that is, a
willing or a non-willing imposed on us by the
corresponding impression. From this it appears,
that not only the movement of the body, but also
the body itself, as far as I am at all conscious
of it, enters into my consciousness as Will.
Remark. Let it be said here once for all, that by Will we
do not mean, as one might expect, the acquired sovereignty of
the reason over the claims of desire, nor mere intentions,
resolutions, or decisions, which are nothing but calculations
of motives concluded m the intellect and provisionally and
revocably approved by the Will. But Will here and through-
out is for us that which is better known to us than anything
else and therefore inexplicable by anything else, that which
indeed underlies all inner emotions, all desiring, striving, wish-
ing, longing, craving, hoping, loving, rejoicing, grieving, etc,
but of which we first become fully conscious in performing
externally any movement of our limbs, or in experiencing any
influence on our body (hunger, thirst, pleasure, pain, etc.).
THIC METAPHYSICS OK NATURE 107
IV. Conscious and Unconscious Will
150. All changes by which the life of my
organism is sustained, are either voluntary (animal,
conscious)- and result from motives, or involuntary
(vegetative, unconscious) and produced by irritation.
The first are all, as we saw, manifestations of Will.
The question is, whether we must assume for those
involuntary functions which serve for the nutrition
of the body, a different principle from Will, or if in
both cases it is the phenomenal form alone that
varies, while that which appears in it remains the
same.
151. The following reasons lead us to the
highly important conclusion, that it is one and the
same force which appears, on the one hand in the
voluntary movements of the limbs, on the other, in
the involuntary vital processes of digestion, circula-
tion of the blood, breathing, etc.
r. The fundamental character of every natural
force is the striving to take possession of matter, by
driving back or subduing those other forces, which
till then had the mastery of it. Hence arises that
hostile behaviour towards each other of natural
forces striving for manifestation by reason of which
nature everywhere and always presents the spectacle
of a struggle of opposing forces. Also in the service
of our organism a whole series of physical and
toS ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
chemical forces are continually active. But all these
are, in a state of health, kept down and governed by
a higher central force which manifests itself in the
unity of the whole notwithstanding the diversity of
the parts, in the unity of the aims notwithstanding
the variety of the efforts. For the unity of these
aims we see voluntary and involuntary vital functions
co-operating in perfect harmony. They are not,
therefore, like the physical and chemical agencies
in their service, the manifestations of opposed forces,
held temporarily in reluctant subjection, but it can
be only one force which manifests itself in both in
different ways.
2. As in the whole, so in all its parts this unity
of conscious and unconscious life is apparent. Thus,
for instance, the use of the hand belongs to the
voluntary manifestations of life, but its form is the
work of those involuntary functions to which the
nutrition of the body is due, together with its forma-
tion, renewal, and healing. Now the function of the
hand is predetermined in its whole structure. There-
fore that which uses the hand, cannot be only
accidentally related to that which forms and nourishes
it. This would, however, be the case, if the forming
power and the employing power were fundamentally
different.
3. Every organic movement, whether voluntary
or involuntary, is, physiologically speaking, the con-
traction of a particular muscle. No muscle can
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 109
contract without being irritated by the nerves ending
in it. This nerve-irritation springs, in the case of the
muscles of voluntary movement, from the cerebral
system, in that of the muscles of involuntary move-
ment, from the sympathetic system. Now that which
is essential in every movement, is the effect, appear-
ing as contraction ol the muscle ; that which is
accidental (and therefore capable of being replaced
by other influences, for instance, by electricity),
consists in the conditioning cause, appearing as
nerve - irritation. Accordingly voluntary and in-
voluntary movements differ not in what is essential
but in what is accidental, not in the effect but
in the kind of causation which provokes it We
must therefore conceive them as manifestations of
one and the same force which appears in two
different forms.
Remark. It is of great importance to understand, that
the difference between the voluntary and involuntary functions
appears so considerable only to us, that is, to our know-
ing intellect, because in the case of voluntary movements
the intellect by chance forms itself a link in the chain
irritating the muscles ( 84), while it is absolutely excluded
from any participation in the involuntary movements. But in
itself it is only a secondary and unimportant difference, that
the nerves, stimulating the muscles to contraction, should take
their way in the one case through the brain, in the other
through the ganglia.
152, It is therefore one and the same force
no , ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
which is manifested through two diverse but har-
moniously co-operating phenomenal forms in the
voluntary and involuntary processes of life. It is
this force which has been called by physiology and
"psychology (in their best moments) vital force and
soul respectively. Yet these two names signify as
much as x and j/, that is, a something perfectly
unknown, and therefore do not further our under-
standing. Now this force, as far as it appears in
voluntary, that is, conscious movements, is not only
known to us, but even better known than anything
else in the world, under the name of Will. Again we
have shown that the being accompanied by con-
sciousness concerns only the causality of will-pheno-
mena, that is, what is accidental and belonging only
to the forms in which Will appears, and that, apart
from the kind of causation, it is one and the same
force which produces on the one hand, by means of
motives, the conscious and voluntary phenomena
of life, and on the other by irritation the unconscious
and involuntary. Accordingly philosophy here makes
use of its right to give to the popular significations
of words the sense, resulting from a more accurate
conception of nature, and so requires that we ac-
\ custom ourselves to recognise Will even there where
it is not, as in voluntary movements, accompanied
by consciousness. We call that, therefore, which
operates in the vegetative functions of the organism,
the unconscious Will.
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE in
153. Thus that of which I become aware (in
that part of the phenomena of life alone accessible
to inner experience) in each movement of my body
( 148), in each sensation of pleasure and pain ( 149)
as Will, even this entity, more familiar to me than
anything else, it is which, without the aid of intel-
lect, accomplishes as unconscious Will, namely as
unknowing impulse, blind instinct, determined by
irritation, all the involuntary processes in my organ-
ism
;
on which processes depend through digestion,
circulation of the blood, breathing, secretion, etc. not-
only the nutrition, but also the whole growth and
development of the body. From that, therefore,
which immediately enters into our consciousness as
Will, we need only deduct the share of the intellect,
to retain that which, as the inner impelling principle
of our whole life, not only perpetually sustains, by
the assimilation of new and the elimination of waste
materials, the integrity of our body, heals its wounds,
combats foreign forces intruding as diseases, and (if
not overcome by these in death) subdues them, but
which also produces all growth of the body from
birth and its original formation before birth, after it
has burst into existence (in generation) with that
impetuosity, characterising the manifestation of all
forces of nature. Thus every man is, in the deepest
sense, his own work : for each is through and through
the objectity of his own Will, which, originally and
essentially unconscious, accomplishes as sexual im-
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
pulse, generation ; as plasticity, formation in the
womb and growth after birth ; which in unconscious
wisdom unattainable by any consciousness shapes
from the beginning all organs of the body in con-
formity to its original aims ; and amongst these, as a
regulator of its relations to the external world, the
brain, that is, the intellect, through which at last it
emerges, in the full light of knowledge, as that which
it essentially and originally is, namely as Will
V. On the Soul and its Relation to the Body
154. The human organism with all its different
parts and functions forms throughout a perfect unity.
Yet men have always distinguished two elements
in it: firstly, the material body, given as an object
of external experience ; secondly, the immaterial
soul, accessible only to the inly-directed conscious-
ness. In remarkable coincidence, explicable only
by the fundamental tendencies of human nature, we
see in Indian, Greek, and modern philosophy the error
arise, that the soul is essentially and in the first place
a knowing being, whereas on the contrary all facts
of psychic life unmistakably prove, that the centre
of man is to be sought not in the head, but in the
V heart, not in knowing, but in willing. To this in
particular the following facts bear witness :
i, The intellect develops, like all organs of the
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 113
body, in childhood, and decays with these in old
age, as is well and truly described by Lucretius (III,
445-458). Will alone in man does not age ; for as
already the Mah&bharatam (xiii, 367) has it :
jiryanti jiryatah ke$&> dantA jtryanti jiryatah,
*cakskuk-p
f
otre ca jiryete, trishnA ekA na tit jfryate ;
" Of him who grows old, the hair grows old,
The teeth grow old of him who grows old,
The eyes grow old, the ears grow old,
Desire alone does not grow old."
2. The intellect suspends its activity periodically
in sleep, the Will, as unconscious Will, is, like the
heart, unwearying.
3. The intellect is, like all organs of the body,
an instrument of the Will, as the submissive servant
of which it throughout appears, while the dominant
factor is the Will
;
a truth which, if not perhaps
apparent in the study, is seen everywhere in practical*
life,
4. Descending in the animal scale, we see the
intellect more and more diminishing, while Will, as
we shall show, animates everywhere with the same
vehemence even the lowest animal.
5. Excellences and defects of intellect are not
taken into account at all, when it is a question of
determining the real, that is the moral worth of Man.
I
114 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
But to the deeds of a man, and to them alone, as
manifestations of the quality of his Will, we attribute
a significance reaching beyond the tomb.
Thus is shown everywhere, that what is primary
and radical in man, is the Will, while all that is con-
nected with the intellect, belongs only to the physical
and perishable form in which our Self (Atman)
appears, but not to the metaphysical and eternal
substratum of it, that is, the soul.
155. So long as we place the essence of the
soul in intelligence, we shall, notwithstanding all the
proofs for immortality adduced by a Platonic Phaedon,
be ever driven back by consideration of the facts to
the conclusion of the candid Lucretius (III, 462):
quare particip&m hti quoque convenit esse ;
for nothing is more certain than the annihilation of
the intellect by death. Only when we resolve to
break with tradition, and, in accordance with the
facts of inner consciousness, to place the essence of
the soul not in the intellect, but in the originally and
essentially unconscious Will, shall we succeed in
establishing, in spite of all attacks of materialism, the
timmortality of the soul ; and that not by artificial
and easily misleading arguments, but as a simple and
inevitable conclusion, drawn from the tenets of Kantian
philosophy here set forth by us.
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 115
156. Like everything else in nature, I myself
am on the one hand phenomenon and on the other
thing-in-itself. As phenomenon, viewed through
the forms of my intellect, my being appears as body,
which, like all that exists, is through and through
material. Now the same entity which, viewed ex-
ternally, appears as the body, moving in time, space,
and causality, when viewed from within, apart from
space and causality, enters my consciousness as
volition, or, when I strip off the form of time, as
Will. We have shown that Will is the principle not
only of the voluntary movements, but also of the in-
voluntary nutritive functions, on which the nourish-
ment, growth, and origin, and consequently the whole
existence of the body, depend. Accordingly my
body is nothing but Will itself, objectified in space
and time through causality, and all its members, hand,
foot, brain, stomach, genitals, etc. are the objcctity of
the various tendencies of Will.
157. Hence follows, that that which as thing-
in-itself, and so independent of time, space, and
causality, is my soul, that is, my Will, appears in
phenomenal form as my body, extended in space,
existing in time, and subject in all its manifestations
to causality. Now all becoming and perishing, all
being born and dying is possible only in time by
causality. Consequently as body I had a begin-
ning and shall have an end, as Soul, that is as
n6 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Will, I am on the contrary uncreated and
immortal.
T<w<? yevecrt,? pev aTrio-ftevTai KOL amo-ros o\edpo$.
158. My organism appears as a variety of
material parts which co-operate for the maintenance
of the whole harmoniously and in conformity to its
original aims. This unity in plurality remains for
empirical science an absolutely inconceivable miracle.
Even the conception of the body after the analogy
of human works of art, as the planned work of an
all -wise Creator, does not explain the facts. For
apart from its being objectionable on moral grounds,
this extremely bold hypothesis would only suffice to
explain a mechanism but not an organism. The
solution of the riddle from our standpoint is ex-
rtremely simple. The Will as thing -in -itself is a
perfect unity. Our body is just this undivided Will,
as it appears viewed through the forms of our intel-
lect. These cannot make any change in its essence,
and therefore the phenomenon, though appearing
1
extended in space as body, and in time as life, shows
the same unity which it possesses as thing-in-itself or
Will.
VI. The Will in Nature
159. My own ego alone is accessible to me in
two ways : firstly, from without as representation,
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 117
that is as body ; secondly, from within as Will, that is
as soul. All the rest of nature is given me from one
side only, namely as representation. The question
is, whether it is merely this, and consequently a
phantom without reality, an empty semblance, an
illusive apparition, or whether, being externally like
myself appearance, it may be also internally the same
as I am, namely Will.
1 60. No one will seriously doubt that all
human beings, like himself, are inwardly conscious of
themselves as willing, and that consequently their
bodies, like his own, are objectifications of Will, even
though no actual proof of this can be adduced, since
all proof leads from one point of the represented world
to another, but never beyond representation in which
alone the external world is given to me. But we
meet here a case where analogy is more convincing
than any proof could be.
1 6 1. After admitting that all men, just like
ourselves, are objectifications of the Will, we shall
find it impossible to deny the same in the case of
the brutes. For what distinguishes man from the
brute, is the organisation of the intellect (88 IIQ-
^wO y
125). Now intellect belongs to the form of appear-
ing, but not to that, which appears through this
form ( 154- 155)- Consequently Being -in -itself
(das An-sich-Sciende) in man and brute is the same,
thus here as there, Will.
n8 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
5 162. Diverse as are the different animal species
o
as regards their external appearance, they are yet
identical as regards that which they will. All
animals, from the highest to the lowest, arc embodi-
ments of the Will to life, which in all stages strives
equally to conserve itself. Hence all exertions
of the brute are concentrated in the. two tendencies,
to preserve the individual by nourishment and
protection, and the species by propagation and
care of the young. This is the everywhere identical
problem. The consideration -of how it has been
solved by nature in the endless variety of animal
species, ever differently and yet ever in like per-
fection, forms an inexhaustible source of entertain-
ment. From this point of view zoology gains an
interest which no other could give it.
163. The Will as the objectification of which
every man and every animal appears, is originally
and essentially unconscious. It is only in a limited
sphere of animal life, becoming narrower as we
descend the scale, that it furnishes itself with
consciousness. Nothing proves more clearly the
secondary and so to say borrowed nature of all
conscious life, than the necessity of sleep. In sleep,
owing to* the isolation of the brain from the motor
and sensory nerves, consciousness is periodically
extinguished, that is, the union between will and
intellect is suspended, and the latter, for the sake
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 119
of its (that is the brain's) nourishment, is merged
completely in unconscious life, which, as the central
and essential entity, unwearyingly exercises its func-
tions, whether we sleep or wake, This is already
taught by a passage of the Veda in the Qatapatha-
brdhmanam x. 3, 3, 6 : Yadd vai purushah svafiti,
prdnam tarhi vdg api-zti, pr&nctm cakshuh, pr&nam
manah) pr&nam yotram. Sa yadd prabudhyate,
prdndd eva adhi- punar j&yante. (When a man
sleeps, speech is merged in life, eye in life, mind in
life, ear in life. And when he awakes they are
reborn from life.)
164. The intellect is nothing but a material
organ with which the Will provides itself for the
sake of regulating its relations with the outer world.
Hence it is, that all productions of the conscious
Will bear the stamp of outwardness, artificiality,
mechanism as opposed to the inwardness, natural-
ness, organisation which distinguishes the creations
of unconscious Will. Therefore with these no work
of human skill can be even remotely compared.
The unconscious Will operates in the vegetative
functions of the organism throughout with adapta-
tion, yet without consciousness, and
1
thus witho.ut
knowledge of the end to be attained. But
marvellous indeed is the encroachment of this un-
conscious Will with its blind and yet adaptive
activity on the sphere of conscious Will which is
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
manifested in Instinct and the artistic impulses
of animals. That which operates in the bird building
its nest, is obviously Will. And yet the year -old
bird can have no consciousness of the purpose for
which the nest Is built. Consequently it must be
unconscious, not conscious Will, Will working by
irritation, not by motives, which appears in these
instinctive operations, though the details of execution
may be regulated by motives. Thus the same
unconsciously - purposive action which prevails in
the nutritive functions as the rule, trenches excep-
tionally as instinct on the domain of conscious life,
and that always in such cases where the intellect is
insufficient for the purposes of nature.
'
Hence in
man, owing to the perfection of his intellect, it shows
itself but rarely (for instance, in sexual love). In
animals it appears more frequently, and most strongly
where the intellect is least perfect, while at the
same time the vital operations remain complicated.
Accordingly it reaches its climax in the social
instincts of the insects. In proportion as the
cerebral and sympathetic nervous systems in these
coincide in the ganglia, their voluntary actions are
regulated throughout by instinct and consequently
stand under the same guidance as the involuntary
functions of nutrition. Accordingly we might go so
far as to consider a swarm of bees as an organism
resolved into its component parts, Like the
unconscious life of a single organism, the whole
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 121
social life of bees and ants is dependent on irritation,
with this exception, that in details it is replaced by
slight motives, because the contact is removed by
which the operating of irritation is conditioned.
Remark. The distribution of the different organic func-
tions (nourishment, propagation) amongst different individuals,
whether co-existing (queen bee, drones, and workers) or suc-
ceeding each other (caterpillar, butterfly), differs only in degree
from the separation of the sexes among the higher animals
and men, and operates, like the latter, under the guidance of
instinct.
165. Descending in the scale of organic beings
we see conscious voluntary life ever retreating before
the unconscious operation of the Will, until the
former utterly disappears. The point where the last
remnant of consciousness and voluntary movement
is extinguished, marks the transition (difficult to
determine empirically) from the animal to the vege-
table kingdom. In the plant unconscious life,
serving the purposes of nourishment and propagation,
fills therefore the whole sphere of its existence. Now,
as we have seen, unconscious no less than conscious
life is the manifestation of Will. Consequently the
life of the plant must be conceived as an uncon-
scious, involuntary willing, and every plant, like
animal and man, is an objcctifi cation of the
Will to life. This is difficult to grasp only for
the reason, that the sphere in which we immediately
know Will, has here utterly disappeared, and that
122 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
sphere alone remains in which we can approach
it only mediately and by inference.
Meanwhile not only are the exertions which fill
up the life of every plant, obviously the same as
those of animals, namely, nourishment and propaga-
tion, but also their bodily organs show a striking
analogy, since, for instance, the digestive organs
reappear as roots, the respiratory organs as leaves,
the genitals as blossoms. Further, a number of the
manifestations of vegetable life, as, for instance, the
striving of the root after good soil and moisture, that
of the branches after light and air, as well as many
single facts are inexplicable, unless we assume, as the
inner principle of vegetable life, a desiring, a craving,
a striving, in short a willing, albeit an unconscious
one.
1 66. No sharper boundary line is drawn in the
whole of Nature than that between organic forces,
appearing as living organisms, and inorganic
forces, variously manifested in the physical and
chemical processes of inanimate nature. Neverthe-
less considerations like the following show that the
great difference between organic and inorganic forces
after all concerns the form of appearance alone, but
not that which appears in these entirely different
forms, (i) In all effects, whether belonging to the
sphere of animate or inanimate nature, that which
manifests itself is force. Now force is related to its
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 123
manifestations not merely as a general concept to
its different underlying perceptions ( 100), but as
the thing-in-itself to the phenomenal world ( 136).
Consequently the identity, denoted by the word
force, is not an abstract but a concrete identity,
and the diversity of operating forces springs not
from the nature of force in itself, but from the
forms of its appearance. (2) Accordingly the great
diversity in the action of organic and inorganic forces
is to be explained for the most part by their relation
?to the forms of appearance, that is, by circumstances
;of time, space, and causality. It is first of all
causality which, as cause in its narrower sense,
occasions inorganic, as irritation and motives,
organic change ( 142-145), and thereby draws
between both a boundary, admitting of no inter-
mediate links. After causality it is time and
space out of which arise the profound differences
between organic and inorganic phenomena. While
namely every organic force (plant or animal) suc-
ceeds in giving full expression to its being only in
a variety of spatial parts (as organism) and in a
succession of temporal conditions (as life), every
inorganic force on the contrary reveals its whole
inner being in an undivided and everywhere identical
manifestation, admitting only of differences in degree.
(The only exception is crystallisation, which may be v
regarded as a first attempt at organic life seized by,
rigidity in the very process of formation.) Hence
124 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
is clear that the essential differences between organic
and inorganic forces find their explanation in rela-
tions of time, space, and causality, from which follows,
that they do not originate in Being-in-itsclf, but only
in the forms through which it appears to us.
We have only therefore to take that force-mani-
festation in which alone the being of force becomes
accessible to our inner apprehension as Will, namely,
our own self, and to strip from it all its appearance-
forms, to which not only consciousness, but also life,
,and organisation belong, and we shall retain in the
unconscious, inanimate, inorganic Will that
which is manifested as inner impelling principle in all
forces of inorganic nature.
Even clearer than by proof will this truth become,
when we observe in detail the action of inorganic
forces : when we see the eagerness with which
* substances enter into chemical combination, the
vehemence with which the electric poles strive after
union, the impetuosity with which the dammed-up
i water everywhere seeks an outlet, or when, in lifting
a heavy weight or pressing against a solid body, we
immediately feel how our striving is resisted by
a contrary striving which fundamentally must be
identical with the striving in ourselves and thus, like
that, Will, even though as gravity and impenetra-
bility it shows the greatest possible distance in its
form of appearance from our own Will.
THE MKTAl'llYHK'S OF NAT URIC 125
VII. Transcendent Reflections on the Will as
Thing-in-itself
8 167. All is matter. Such is the final con-
clusion from the standpoint of physical science
(8 26). Kant's doctrine alone leads beyond this,
when proving that the essential conditions of cor-
poreal existence, space, time, and causality, are
only subjective faculties of our intellect, and that
consequently the materiality of things is only the
form in which the being of the thing-in-itself appears
to our eyes. What that Being-in-itself is, was found
in the only possible way by Schopenhauer. It is
nothing but Will which, as physical, chemical, and
organic force, intrudes into time, space, and causality,
thereby appearing in all changes of bodies and in
bodies themselves. To him who has understood
Schopenhauer's teaching aright, every phenomenon
of the universe, wherever we may look, is resolved
into Will. Hence the final conclusion of meta-
physical science is : All is Will.
1 68. That which makes Will appear to us as
world, is the innate forms of our intellect. As we
cannot get rid of them, and Will as thing-in-itsclf
lies beyond them, only negative assertions about
Will are possible to us.
I. The Will as thing-in-itself is not in space
I 26 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
and time. Now all plurality is conditioned by a
spatial co -existence or a temporal succession of
parts. Although therefore the Will is manifested
as a plurality of phenomena in space and time,
in itself plurality is unknown to it. This truth
has at all times been felt (ev ical Trav> One and
All), but the proof of it is only possible by Kant's
philosophy,
2. Like plurality, divisibility is also condi-
tioned by space and time. The Will as thing-in-
itself is therefore indivisible. We must not think of
it as divided amongst its phenomena ; for each of
these contains it entire, every being in nature is a
manifestation of the whole and undivided Will to
life, just as each of the thousand images of the sun
in the water reflects the entire sun. When therefore
Plato (Farm, p. 131 E) asks : riv o3z> rp&Trov r&v
elb&v TCL a\\a i^GraXr^erai, fjbijre icarh pepy fitfre
Kara o\a fj,Ta\afJt,/3dve(,v Svvd/jiGva ; the Bhagavad-
(xiii, 1 6) may answer :
avibhaktam ca bJt&teshu, vibhaktam iva ca sthitam
(undivided he dwells in beings, and yet, as it were,
divided); and Kant may furnish the key to this
enigma by his doctrine that space and time do
indeed separate the manifestations but not the
manifested, so that every one finds and feels him-
self to be the entire, limitless Will to life, the totality
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 127
of all that is real. Hence it is, that the natural man
(avQpairos ^VXLKO^J as his deeds show, restricts
all
reality to his ego; he knows everything in him-
self. And hence it is, that the regenerate (in the
Christian sense) extends his ego to all reality ; he
knows himself in everything. He celebrates
solemnly (in the Communion) his unification with
all creatures as a member of the body of Christ, rov
rh irdvTa eV ?racrt TrkTjpov^evov (Ephcs. i. 23), and
Nature thousand-tongucd greets him with the
"
great
word," which we shall have later on to consider:
" Tat tvam ast" (That art thou), while from his
inmost being re-echoes the consciousness :
" AAam
brahma asmi" (I am Brahman).
3. All phenomena of the Will to life are subject
to causality, and therefore, in all their manifestations,
to necessity. On the contrary the Will, as thing-in-
itself, does not lie in causality and is consequently
uncaused and free. Here is the meeting-point of
two great truths, that of the freedom of the Will, and
that of the necessity of all its manifestations. It is
true that our deeds are the necessary and inevitable
results of our innate character (expressed in corpori-
sation) : and yet we cannot get rid of the con-
sciousness of responsibility for our actions which
is called conscience : and rightly so : for this innate
character is after all our own work ( 153), and our
whole life is only the empirical and therefore neces-
sary development of our in itself free willing. This
128 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
truth finds its mythical expression in the Indian
doctrine, that all deeds and destinies of our existence
are the inevitable, though not immediate (tf/rfmz),
consequence of our own actions in a previous life,
and so dependent on ourselves. And the same
truth seems to be in Plato's mind, when he describes
(Rep. x, p. 6 1 7 D sq.) how the soul before its birth
chooses with freedom from the lap of Lachesis the
lot which predestines with necessity its fate and,
with its fate (6 1 8 D, E), its actions in the future life.
169. Will as such has two possible modes and
two alone : willing and not -willing. In reference
to earthly existence willing appears (as we shall
show in the metaphysics of morality) as the affirma-
tion of the Will to life, of which this whole world
is the manifestation
;
not
-willing as the denial of
the Will to life, the manifestation of which has
been called by religions in their figurative language
bliss, unio mystica, Kingdom of God, Kingdom of
Heaven, etc., butwhich, apart from its breaking through
in every moral action, remains completely unknown
to the intellect, nay is absolutely inconceivable by it.
To the intellect therefore it appears as the negation,
the extinction (nirvdnam} of all existence. Yet it is
well to notice that it is only to our understanding,
bound to the finite and its limits, that this world of
affirmation appears as the existing, and negation as
the non-existing. On the contrary, viewed from the
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 129
highest standpoint, the world of denial, unknown
to us, yet transparent in every moral deed, is that
which really and truly is (TO ov), while on the other
hand this whole world of affirmation metaphysically
speaking is that which is not (TO py ov\ and in a
moral sense that which should not be.
VIII. Mythical Representation of the World-
Process
170. There where there is no longer a Where,
therefore here, everywhere and again nowhere,
then when there is no longer a When, therefore
now, in all eternity and again at no time, was, is,
and will be the Will (the Deity, the Brahman, the
Thing-in-itself), and besides it nothing. Each of
us is this Will, and again each of us is not this Will :
for we are all estranged from its original nature, which
is Denial without sin, without sorrow, without
existence.
171. Now there was formed, not at any time,
but before all eternity, to-day and for ever, like an
inexplicable clouding of the clearness of the heavens,
in the pure, painless, and will-less bliss of denial a
morbid propensity, a sinful bent: the affirmation
of the Will to life, In it and with it is given the
myriad host of all the sins and woes of which this
immeasurable world is the revealer.
K
130 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
172. When in the life of our body some serious
disorder has taken place, nature by a violent augmen-
tation of the vital processes summons all her powers
for the purpose of curing it. Thus arises fever, which
is at the same time the symptom of disease and an
attempt at cure. What fever is to disease, that is
this whole world to the self-affirming Will. It is the
visibility of affirmation ; and in giving to all sin and
its train of evils the most full and terrible expression,
it holds up to the erring Will a mirror of its own
striving, guilty of all the woe of existence, if haply it
might attain to a full understanding of itself, and
thereby come to a turn, to a return, to salvation.
173. Salvation springs from knowledge
(jftdndd muktik, Kapila 3, 23). Now the full
knowledge of the world is only possible by means
of the human intellect. Therefore all nature up to
man is but the way which the affirming Will travels
in gradual development, in order to attain to the
human intellect and by it to saving self-knowledge.
But also as man it passes through long series of
generations, furnishing itself in every womb with a
new intellect, in order to approach by progressive
purification the realm of denial ( 250).
174. Long periods in the life of nature had to
elapse before an intellect could arise. On the other
hand all these past world-epochs are only possible
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 131
through time, and this again through intellect.
Herein lies a contradiction only for our imperfect
understanding, because of its being bound to tem-
porality. This, however, in the process of the world
has no significance. Therefore the fall of the spirits
took place from time immemorial, and again it takes
place now and at each moment. But saving denial
also is ever present, and in denying, the individual
saves himself and in himself all creatures, even
because he is in himself the entire Will to life.
When therefore it stands in the Veda (Ch&ndogya-
upanishad 5, 24, 5) :
Yathd iha kshudhitti bdld m&taram pari-up&sate
evam sarv&ni bMt&ni agnihotram updsate>
"as here below hungry children sit round their
mother, so sit all beings round the fire-sacrifice
(brought by him, who has the knowledge of
Brahman)," we might perhaps add as explana-
tion in the language of the Bible (Rom. viii. 1 9) :
97 yelp a,7rofeapa8o/cia r^ /eTt<rea>9 TTJV aTroKaXvfyw r&v
vi&v rov Oeov aTre/cSe^era^. Thus the regenerate
saves himself and the groaning creation : and yet
affirmation still continues, even after he has found
the way out of its circle. Also this world for ever
and aye will exist, will affirm, will suffer, but again
all time in the light of denial is nothing, and all
that it contains fades away as the shadow-play on
the wall for the Will, when it has turned.
132 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Thus contradictory appears metaphysical truth,
when we attempt to clothe it in the words and con-
ceptions of empirical thought
IX. God and World
175. There is nothing but Will ; its true state
is denial (as is proved by the approbation we
give to every moral, that is denying action). An
aberration of the Will is affirmation, of which this
whole world is the manifestation and the purifying
process.
In these words, which can only be thoroughly
understood later, lies the metaphysical truth, which
for all times and countries is one and the same.
Accordingly we see it springing up wherever the
human mind penetrates to the depths, even though
the form in which it appears, shows the greatest
varieties.
To exhibit this identical content and to derive
its various forms from the influence of the respective
civilisations, is the subject of the history of meta-
physics. Here we must content ourselves with
pointing out some of the most important of these
forms.
176. In India we can trace metaphysics back
almost to its first beginnings. The forces, appearing
in the manifestations of nature and more especially
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 133
in the striking phenomena of fire, thunderstorm, the
firmament, etc., are presented in the hymns of the
Rigveda in transparent personification as the gods
Agni, Indra> Varuna, etc. Nay, to a certain extent
we see the forces of nature even in the hands of the
poets crystallising into personal gods. This primitive
view of the world is true, so far as man recognises
in all action of nature his own being (Will) ; it is
untrue, so far as he transfers not only his own being,
but also its form of appearance (personality) to the"
forces of nature.
We know that these forces from the lowest to the
highest are only the original forms in which the Will
to life variously appears. This truth came to light
in the second period of Indian life in the conception,
that there is but one Being, the (impersonal) Brahman^
and that all gods, men, animals, plants, and inanimate
beings are the diverse manifestations of it The
relation between phenomena and the thing-in-itself is
conceived figuratively as an emanation of the world
from Brahman, compared to the coming forth of the
web from the spider, the plants from the earth, the
hair from the body. But at the same time the
eternity of the souls, for ever circulating In the
Samsdra (that is in the phenomenal world) is main-
tained ; from which follows clearly, that their relation
to Brahman is to be conceived not as the temporal'
relation of the effect to its cause, but as the relation
of the time-conditioned to the timeless, that is, of
134 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
phenomena to the thing-in-itself. With this meta-
physical antithesis between the undivided Brahman
and the manifold world, as which it appears, is imme-
diately connected the ethical between denial and
affirmation in the sense of the celebrated " Tat
tvam asz" (That art Thou), a sentence which ex-
presses in three words at once the deepest mystery
of metaphysics (the ev /cal irav) and the highest aim
of morality (the aryairijo'ew rov TrKycriov <rov cJ>9
creavroz/). As an interpretation of this great truth
we may consider, as in a wider sense our whole
work, so already the motto prefixed to it, which we
here translate :
"The Lord of all things dwells
In ev'ry living being,
Not dying when it dies.
He who sees him, is seeing.
" Such will not, when in all
This highest Lord he knows,
Wrong through himself himself,
And to perfection goes."
177. In the Bible we have before our eyes the
grand spectacle of the real and eternal truth breaking
its way forcibly as Christianity through the dia-
metrically opposed teaching of the Old Testament,
The fundamental dogma of primitive Judaism is
Theism, according to which the world is created by
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 135
a personal Being, similar to ourselves (Gen. i. 26, 27),
a hypothesis at the boldness of which we are not
surprised only because we are accustomed to hear it
from our youth up. The first consequence of Theism
is Optimism. If the world is created by God, it
must be good, and this is expressly asserted (Gen.
i. 31). A further consequence is complete Annihil-
ation by death: only what is uncreated can be
immortal
;
if the soul has arisen from nothing, it
must return to nothing : TO w&ev els ovSev p&Tret,
(what is nothing turns to nothing). Accordingly
the Old Testament (with the exception of the latest
books) does not admit the immortality of the soul.
Now, if our existence is limited to this life of affirm-
ation, our aims can be only immanent and conse-
quently egoistic. Therefore the Law appeals solely
to egoism, in making its incentives fear of punish-
ment and hope of reward (one may read Lev. xxvi.
Deut. xxviii.), on which account it was rejected by
the deeper conception of Christianity (Rom. iii. 28).
This view of the world, in which Theism, Optim-
ism, Nihilism, and Eudsemonism cohere with admir-
able consistency, seems to have been not so much a
result of natural development, as rather the inspiration
of a single man, perhaps of Moses, whose great-
ness it is not easy to overrate, who found in it the
means of disciplining a race corrupted by slavery.
With the people it never became very popular, as
the frequent, and otherwise rather inexplicable at-
136 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
tempts at apostasy seem to prove. But also the
thinkers of Hebraism struggle against it in many
passages of the Old Testament. So already in the
narrative of the Fall, which cannot be reconciled
with the creation of the world by an all-wise and
good Being. Still less could the human mind
acquiesce in the doctrine of the punishment of the
evil and the reward of the good in this life, a theory
contradicted by experience at every step (compare
Job and Psalms xxxvii. Ixxiii).
A fundamental change took place in Hebrew
metaphysics during and after the Babylonian Cap-
tivity through Persian and Greek influence, which
prepared the ground for Christianity. To Theism
was added the doctrine of Satan (that is Anhro-
mainyu\ which made it possible to exonerate God
from the authorship of evil (still ascribed to him for
instance in Isa. xlv. 7, 2 Sam. xxiv, I, but no longer
in the post-exilic parallel passage in I Chron. xxi.
[xxii.] i), and to maintain him as the principle of
denial, that is morality. At the same time the
belief in the immortality of the soul and with it a
transcendent morality, not founded on egoism, broke
way, while Optimism, in consequence of bitter ex-
perience, gradually gave place to Pessimism, which
is the basis of every real religion.
In this intellectual atmosphere we see the eternal
and everywhere identical truth as Christianity
struggling painfully upwards, like a plant through
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 137
rock and rubble, towards the light. Adapting its
theory to the Old Testament and to* the historical
traditions of the life of its founder, Christianity per-
sonifies (Rom. v. 1 2-2 1 ) the affirmation of the Will
to life in Adam, the denial of it in Christ. We
are all (according to the theory of original sin)
Adam, and we all shall become Christ through his
being formed in us (Gal iv. 19). This cannot be
effected by the Law (not so much, because, according
to the Pauline theory, it cannot be fulfilled, but
rather because it is founded on egoism, and there-
fore, even if fulfilled, does not lead beyond this). To
Christianity therefore the springing up of meta-
physical knowledge, independently of our Will while
in the state of affirmation, appears as Grace, which
accomplishes in us regeneration, that is the returning
of the Will to denial. Thus the truth as Christi-
anity burst the hardened bark of the contradictory
and in itself untrue Mosaic teaching, the conscious-
ness of which inspired the fourth Evangelist (chap. i.
17, 1 8), with the words : o vopos Si,& Ma>i)<reo)5 eSo^,
97 %a/W fcal f} a\^9 ela St,a 'I^troO HpivTQv eylvero
(thus not by Moses). eov ouSek ewpa/ce ira^Trore
(thus not even Moses, as is maintained, Num. xii. 8,
Deut. xxxiv. I o), o povoryevrjs u/o?, o &v a? rov Koforrov
rov Trarpos, eKelvos ^rjy^<Taro. Compare the side-
glances he occasionally throws (for instance chaps,
iii. 10, iv. 21, v. 39, vi. 49 [viii. 6], viii. 58, x. 8) on
the religion of the fathers.
138 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
178. Also the gods of the Greeks, as is
apparent from the etymology of their names and
the character of many of their myths, were originally
personified forces of nature (comp. Plato, Kratyl. 397
c), moulded by the poetic genius of the Homeric
age into ideal human figures (Herodot. 2, 53). In
opposition to the necessarily discordant plurality of
gods Xenophanes proclaimed the unity of the
Divine. His disciple Parmenides (as already
Xenophanes in part himself) denied to this unity
personality and change and opposed it as Being
to this world as Non-being : whereby the dis-
tinction between phenomena and the thing-in-itsclf
was very sharply expressed. Proceeding from
Parmenides Plato examined the nature of Being.
In the phenomenal world with its ceaseless becoming
and perishing he discovered a series of constant
forms which, as eternal types of things, find ex-
pression in all that exists, but are themselves
untouched by the flux of becoming. These proto-
types of things, lying beyond time, space and
causality ( 47), each of which is manifested as a
formative principle of being in a plurality of similar
individual things, were called by Plato Ideas (IBeai,
187], that is, perceptual forms). What he sought
under this name can be nothing but the series
of formative forces through which the Will finds
expression in all manifestations of nature. Ideas
therefore must be well distinguished from Concepts,
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 139
which indeed share with them their universality (the ev
eVl
'jro\\&v) ) but lack their concrete form and
thorough - going determinedness, for which reason
Platonic Ideas were rightly denoted by Aristotle as
alo-OijTci, a'l'Bia, though not rightly as such rejected
by him. Meanwhile it is not to be denied that in
the philosophy of Plato, to whom was lacking on
the one side knowledge of nature and on the other a
complete system of logic, Ideas and concepts are
not duly discriminated. Thus we can consider our-
selves as Platonists only so far as we are permitted
to retain in the case of Plato (as in other respects
in that of Kant) what is true and excellent in his
teaching, purified from wrong ingredients. Here
therefore we distinguish strictly once and for all
between the Idea as unity, not yet broken up into
plurality of individuals by its entrance into the
forms of time, space and causality, and the Con-
cept, which is unity re-established by abstract
thought out of the plurality of individual things.
Accordingly, to Concepts, as abstract outlines of
perceptual representations, we can grant no other
existence than that in the human mind, while by
i>
Ideas we understand, neither (with Plato) mere
abstractions as the Good, the Beautiful, nor (with
Kant) certain concepts of reason transcending the
possibility of experience {soul, universe, God),
but solely the physical, chemical, and organic
forces underlying all action in nature, since
140 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
these are the forms through which the Will to life
gives, in gradually increasing distinctness, expression
to its essence. In this sense therefore we appro-
priate the Platonic Ideas, and make them the
starting-point of our further considerations.
X. The Will and the Ideas of Plato
179. Retrospect and further problems.
We have recognised Will as the inner principle of
all manifestations of nature and have given some
characteristics of its essence (necessary to the under-
standing of what follows, though themselves only
to be clearly comprehended in the course of our
whole inquiry). We have further pointed out the
harmony of our fundamental theory with the cul-
minating points of metaphysics in all ages and
countries. There now remains for us to show in
this second part devoted to nature, how the thing-
in-itself appears as the world, that is, how the
one, free and existence-denying Will (by means of
a change not further explicable to us, but originating
in its freedom) affirming itself in the forms of our
intellect, time, space and causality, which are the
principles of the visibility of affirmation, appears as
a plurality of beings, subject to the constraint of
causality, separated by space and time, and (in so
far as they do not penetrate the illusive nature of
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 141
the order Imposed by the intellect and its form)
persisting in mutual hostility.
1 80. The affirmation of the Will to life
is its state of being split into plurality in the forms
of our intellect : space, time, and causality. Now
the Will in itself is absolutely unformed and therefore
completely heterogene to these forms of the subject.
In order therefore to appear in them, it must to a
certain extent adapt itself to them. This the Will
does in shaping itself to a series of operative forms
of existence, through which, in self-combat, it forces
its way Into time, space and causality, and comes
to appearance in all individual existence. These
original Will-forms, opposed to perishable things as
their imperishable prototypes, are precisely what
Plato sought and partly found under the name of
Ideas, and what we shall have shortly to enumerate
as the Forces manifested in the life of nature. They
are called the grades of objectification, because
through them the Will to life with ever-increasing
distinctness brings its being to appearance. Thus
these Ideas are the footprints on the road, by which
the affirming Will, sunk to existence and striving
after deliverance, painfully works its way upward to
its complete revelation in Man. This, being its
real and final goal, was only possible by the long
preceding series of grades ; for mankind presupposes
both the animal and the vegetable worlds, as these
142 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
again presuppose inorganic nature for their exist-
ence as well as subsistence.
8 1 8 1. Since Ideas lie beyond empirical reality,
that is where nothing is to be found but the thing-
in- itself, they are at bottom identical with this,
but they are the thing-in-itself as it appears
to our eyes, when we conceive it objectively and,
so to say, regard it through the atmosphere of the
phenomenal world. They are the coloured pictures
in the glass of the magic lantern through which the
light of the Will throws on the wall of time, space,
and causality the shadow-play of the phenomenal
world. Or we may compare the Will to a harper,
and its appearance in the life and action of nature
to the music. The Ideas would then be the not
very numerous strings of the instrument from the
ever - varying combination of which proceeds the
inexhaustible wealth of the progressing harmony.
182. Ideas are concrete forms adapted to space,
moreover a plurality. Yet, as even Plato saw ( 47),
they do not lie in space. From this contradiction it
becomes clear, that they can only be regarded as an
imperfect attempt to make conceivable to us what is
in its nature inconceivable. From the plurality of
Ideas spring all differences in nature, for, since these
do not originate in the intellect, which remains one
and the same towards all diversity, all differences
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 143
must be rooted in the thing-in-itself. But how the
unity or rather non- plurality of being-in-itself can
be reconciled with the differences of the phenomenal
world rooted in it, is, like the possibility of a plurality
of Ideas, a transcendent question, which passes our
comprehension. For us indeed unity and plurality
are opposites, for the thing-in-itself both and with
them their opposition are nothing.
For the rest Ideas do not thoroughly suffice for
the explanation of the phenomenal world, for the
variety in the individuals representing one Idea
can be satisfactorily explained neither by the more
or less imperfect subdual of the matter, seized upon
and moulded by the Idea, nor by the adaptation to
external circumstances (by which are conditioned
the varieties of species). On the contrary in man as
in part already in the higher animals (also in this
respect his precursors) the specific character, in
which is expressed the idea of the species, is supple-
mented by the individual character, which for
us is an impenetrable mystery (pmne individuum est
ineffabile] and seems to indicate the stage which
every individual has reached on its way to denial.
This dark point will receive some more light in our
further considerations.
Remark. If one compares antique sculpture with medi-
aeval and modern painting, the characters of Sophokles with
those of Shakespeare, and lastly, the Platonic doctrine of Ideas
with Schopenhauer's doctrine of Will, one might, infernng the
144 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
nature of the age from these its highest manifestations, con-
jecture that the individuals of classical antiquity had more of
the typical, less of the individual in them than those of modern
times, that consequently the modern man has become more
conscious of himself, perhaps even has approached nearer to
denial than the ancient. This assumption, which might be
interpreted very much in favour of Christianity, must at any
rate be understood, not as a progress of mankind in general,
which in the main was and ever will be impossible, but rather
as an approaching ascent of the individual towards denial.
XL The Objectification, of the Will in Nature by
means of the Ideas
183. Every physical, chemical and organic
force is a Platonic Idea, that is, one of these
primary forms through which the Will comes to
expression in all manifestations of the universe. To
facilitate the understanding of this doctrine we here
draw up tentatively a list of all primary forces, which
however contains much that is questionable, and
without doubt will admit of many improvements.
The goal which by this means we aim at rather
than reach, is the enumeration of the total content
of what is a posteriori in nature, that is, of that part
which remains when we take away the a priori
elements of time, space and causality with all that
belongs to them (such as extension, divisibility,
inertia).
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 145
A. Physical Forces :
(1) Impenetrability ; its mere negation is
Porosity, on which depends the Com-
pressibility of bodies.
(2) Gravity, perhaps connected with cohesion.
(3) Cohesion, appearing in three degrees as
solid (<f>i\ia), liquid, and gaseous (vel/co^.
Different varieties of the same are hardness
and softness, brittleness and toughness,
ductility and perhaps elasticity.
(4) Adhesion, closely related to cohesion ; to it
may be referred the capillarity, endos-
mose, and absorption of gases.
(5) Heat (Temperature) ; connected on the
one hand with cohesion, the three forms of
which are conditioned by it, on the other in
a peculiar way with light.
(6) Light, perhaps to be regarded neither as a
body (according to the emission hypothesis),
nor as a change of body (according to the
undulatory hypothesis), but rather as a force
which, appearing like every force in conse-
quence of certain causal influences, is mani-
fested in all bodies, on the one side in
luminosity, on the other in visibility as
its correlative.
(7) Magnetism and Diamagnetism, probably
more or less common to all matter.
(8) Electricity, closely related to magnetism,
L
146 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
appears as a polaric contrast (usually latent
in bodies, but manifesting itself in conse-
quence of certain causal influences), the poles
of which striving after union attract their
complement in other bodies.
(9) Crystallisation, a striving, perhaps common
to all matter, to assume in its transition from
the liquid to the solid state a regular form,
according to the nature of each substance :
a prelude to organic force.
B. Chemical Forces :
(1) Each of the 66 Elements.
(2) Every Chemical Combination.
C. Organic Forces :
(1) Each species of plant.
(2) Each species of animal.
Man.
184. In this list (presupposing its correctness)
we have before our eyes the whole apparatus of
Ideas, that is of forces, through which the Will to
life affirms itself, in penetrating through these into
time, space, and causality, and appearing in all
changes of bodies as well as in the bodies them-
selves. One should accustom oneself to see in
every process of nature a mutual interpenetration
of forces, and to regard that which alone is operative
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 147
in these forces as identical with what works and
strives in us as Will, For, as already a very ancient
passage of the Veda (Brihad-ciranyaka-upanishad
3, 7, 15) says:
" Yah sarveshu bhtiteshu tishthan
sarvebhyo bMUbhyo 'ntaro, yam sarvdni bktitdni na
vidur, yasya sarvdni bMtdni fartram, yah sarvdni"
bhtitdni antaro yamayatiy esha te dtnid, antarydmt,
amritah " " he who dwelling in all beings differs from
all beings, who is not known to all beings, of whom
all beings are the embodiment, who from within
governs all beings, he is thy soul, thy inner ruler,
thy immortal part."
Remark. Such passages as the above show clearly, that
the Brahman of the Indians, which, as we saw, lies outside of
time, space, and causality (47), which
" in the sleeper remains
awake, forming and working at pleasure
3 '
(comp. 163), in
which, according to other texts of the Veda, "the sun rises
and sets," "on which all gods depend" ( 176), "all worlds
are founded," and which yet again " dwells in size as a thumb-
breadth in the cavity of the heart," that this Brahman^ the
unity of which with the soul (brahma-dtma-aikya) is the funda-
mental dogma of the Vednta, notwithstanding the intelligence
ascribed to it ( 154), is after all nothing else but what we call
Will. This might explain what is already said in a hymn of
the Rigveda (10. 129), that out of the Tad (that is Brahman)
there arose through tapas (self-renunciation, turning of the
Will, here to affirmation) first Kdma ("JQ/ocos, also according to
Hesiod and Parmenides the eldest of the gods), that is
affirmation, and that this became the first germ of manas,
that is of intellect ( 84), which also according to our system
is only the principle of the visibility of affirmation ( 117.
172. 173. 179. 180).
148 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Thus, apart from errors in details, the Biahman of the
Indians, the Ideas of Plato, the Creator and Saviour of
Christianity, the Thing-in-itself of Kant, the Forces of natural
science, and the Will of Schopenhauer, constitute an indissoluble
1
totality of metaphysical truth,
185. All the above-named forces, through
which the Will objectifies itself in order to appear
in time, space, and causality, are restricted to matter
( 86-88) as their place of appearance. Yet the
relation of physical, chemical, and organic forces to
matter is a characteristically different one. While
namely the relation of organic forces to matter is,
as we shall see, an accidental one, the physical
and chemical forces on the contrary are attached
to it with necessity, and that so that in every sub-
stance are inherent (as it seems) all physical forces,
but only certain, alternating, and mutually exclusive
chemical forces. These chemical forces appear to
our space -bound comprehension as the various sub-
stances in nature, and their general character seems
to be, that each of them constitutes an aggregate of
all the physical forces, but shows these in gradually
and characteristically determined combinations. Thus
one might regard the physical Ideas as the real com-
batants, the chemical as the commanders of the troops
in this bellum omnium contra omnes.
1 86. The physical forces inhere one and all, as
it seems, in every substance, though in variously
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 149
graduated differences of intensity, in which indeed
consists the diversity of inorganic bodies, that is, of
all chemical elements and combinations occurring in
nature. Accordingly all bodies, the moment causality
permits, should show themselves as (i) impenetrable ;
(2) more or less heavy ; (3) striving to hold together
or to scatter their particles ; (4) more or less adhesive ;
(5) more or less warm ; (6) more or less visible
(colours) ; (7) magnetic or diamagnetic ; (8) electric ;
(9) capable of crystallisation.
187. Chemical forces, like physical, are also
necessarily inherent in matter, yet they do not appear
like these in every substance, but each of them in
one particular substance, to which it is restricted
once and for all. Thus, for instance, gold is a
chemical force, which shows certain distinct physical
properties, that is, it holds the physical forces captive
in its service in certain relations, modifiable in a par-
ticular way by causality. This force, as a chemical
one, is restricted once and for all to a particular
place of appearance, movable in space, into which
we project it and so construe it as body. In this
sense every part of matter is the place of appearance
of particular elements and particular chemical com-
binations, which, being equally primary forces of
nature and captors of physical Ideas, wrestle with
each other for the possession of matter, while causal
influences decide which force remains victor over
150 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
matter, and which is temporarily subdued. Thus,
for instance, a certain substance appears now as
oxygen and hydrogen, now as water, according
as causality favours the one or the other. For
water is by no means a regular aggregate of
oxygen and hydrogen, but like these a throughout
homogeneous substance, and therefore just as much
as the elements to which it temporarily yields
the field, the objectification of a primary force of
nature, which, however, in order to become mani-
fest, is restficted to the same, substance as the
elementary forces in competition with it. In order
to maintain the purity of the species as the estab-
lished grades of objectification, for which here as in
the organic sphere nature takes the greatest care,
elements can only combine in certain determined
relations of weight. Yet these- are only the acces-
sory, not the essential condition of the manifestation
of natural force as a chemical combination, that is,
they do not belong to it, but to the causal conditions
under which it appears. Often therefore very
different forces have their place of manifestation in
the same elements, combined in the same proportions
of weight (as for instance starch, ligneous fibre, sugar
in C
6
H
5
O
5 , or,
if one regards these as organic rather
than chemical forces, calcareous spar, arragonite,
marble, chalk in CaO.COA
2'
As organic bodies come into existence by genera-
tion, so inorganic bodies are produced by chemical
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 151
affinity. Now, just as the sexual impulse is but the
first intrusion into appearance of that Will which
later stands before us in time as organism ( 153), so
affinity is nothing but the desire for manifestation of
those chemical forces which, after their manifestation,
are seen by us spatially as (simple or compound) bodies.
Remark. Notwithstanding the variety of natural forces,
all action in nature goes back to a unity. But this unity,
which we have recognised as identical with the Will in our-
selves, is not physical but metaphysical. When, therefore,
natural science endeavours to reduce all forces of nature to a
physical unity, we must regard this as a trespassing beyond
the limits of its sphere (indicated 25), which in our estima-
tion can have no lasting success. It is to this endeavour to
explain nature by one physical principle, that the atomic
theory owes its existence, the aim of which is to interpret all
processes in nature as the varied union and separation of
mechanically moved atoms. We may suppose these atoms
either as extensionless and so mathematically indivisible,
or as extended and therefore only physically indivisible.
If the first, then by no amount of such atoms, however great,
could an extended body and consequently a world be pro-
duced. If atoms should on the other hand be merely physi-
cally indivisible, they must be conceived as minute bodies the
cohesive power of which resists all separation, while they are
only by accident, that is relatively to our body and its organs,
so small, that they (unfortunately) entirely escape our percep-
tion and thus remain nothing but a mere hypothesis (with
which we believe it possible to dispense). Hence is evident,
that the atomic theory, in the most favourable case, would
lead not to unity of force but to the reduction of the forces
ruling in nature to a few (such as impenetrability, cohesion,
adhesion, chemical attraction). Such a result (which after all
152 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
might be easily reconciled with our system) would, however, be
applicable only in a subordinate degree for interpreting
natural phenomena. For the undeniably teleological con-
stitution of nature, of which we shall shortly have to speak,
will for ever mock all attempts to explain the universe by
a merely mechanical operation of forces,
1 8 8. As the physical forces are seized and
bound to a particular place by the chemical, so
again are physical and chemical forces in that mutual
interpenetration which empirically speaking is called
matter, temporarily fettered by the organic forces,
in which the Will appears in significant gradation
as plant, animal, and man. The Will, it is true,
appears entire and undivided in every physical and
chemical force ( 168, 2). But while in these it
manifests its being in a dull, one-sided way, and
almost only in a simple and (apart from differences
in degree) identical manifestation ( 166) ; as organic
force it expands itself, for the clearer expression and
unfolding of its being, into a plurality of parts in
space as organism, and into a plurality of con-
ditions in time as life.
189. The physical and chemical forces are
necessarily inherent in matter (that is, in force-
filled space) : if I think them away, I abolish all
matter
; they have therefore their omnipresence and
immortality in the indestructibility of matter. On
the other hand organic forces cling, as it were, acci-
dentally to matter, for they have their essence not
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 153
in matter but in its form. To conserve this form,
they need continually the supply of new materials,
and in order not to lose matter for ever, when aban-
doning it in death, they require a means to perpetuate
their existence beyond the individual. Hence the
instincts of nourishment and propagation, which
form the two fundamental impulses of all organic
beings.
Remark. When we reflect how Nature everywhere with
a seeming indifference gives over to destruction her marvel-
lously formed organisms, while providing with the greatest
care for the preservation of the species through the strength
of the procreative impulse and the abundance of seeds, we
must conclude that to her the production of the individual is
very easy and that of the species very difficult. How the latter,
that is, how the first entrance of organic Ideas into the pheno-
menal world is to be represented empirically, is for philosophy
a secondary question, the ventilation of which, however, being
now in fashion, seems of primary importance. Since in going
back in the history of our planet we come to a state in which
the temperature of the earth admitted of no organic life, we
must necessarily assume a first origination of the organic out
of the inorganic through spontaneous generation (generatio
aeguivoca). This is in fact no more marvellous than is for
instance the crystallisation of water in the air into the so
regularly formed and complicated snow crystals, and, like this,
is to be regarded as the entrance of Will from spacelessness
into space. From the first organisms produced by spontaneous
generation must have arisen by development all existing
species, whether produced (according to Cuvier) indepen-
dently of each other, or (according to Lamarck and
Darwin) the one from the other. Many facts, in par-
ticular the
"unity of type" in the formation of organisms,
154 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
favour the latter theory. In no case, however, aie we thereby
justified in effacing the bounds, so strictly drawn by nature
between species and species. And as little can we assume,
with Darwin, that the production of higher out of lower
species is due chiefly to external mechanical influences ("the
struggle for existence"). Against his theory there are the
following objections : (i) Why do we meet in nature, as also
in fossils, a series of fixed grades and not a continuous chain
of graduated forms, leading the one into the other ? Why is
'
it just these intermediate links and not rather the lower species
which have perished in the struggle for existence ? (2) The
Will to life objectifies itself entire and undivided in every
species of the plant and animal kingdom. Each of these
therefore, the highest as the lowest, is equally perfect and
equally fit for life, for all its organs cannot but correspond
exactly to the aims of the Will manifested in them, since they
^are these aims themselves conceived as bodily parts.
Hence follows, that every individual is the more perfect and
the more fit for life, the nearer it approaches the type of its
species, since perfection is nothing but fitness for the aims of
life, and the type of the species, that is the Idea, is just that
fitness viewed as a fixed form of all parts and functions to
the respective ends of the Will, objectifying itself through the
Idea. Therefore a deviation from the type of the species is
never
"advantageous" to the existence of an animal, unless
perhaps transitorily, through adaptation to external circum-
stances, with the removal of which it appears as a deformity,
prejudicial to the perfection of the animal, and therefore to its
fitness for life.
Natural selection presupposes a selector, the struggle for
existence a straggler. This is the Will to life, which, striving
after deliverance, has in accommodation to external circum-
stances risen from grade to grade, from Idea to Idea. These
transitions may have been effected in one of two ways, either
by the Will springing in a favourable moment from the lower
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 155
to the higher grade, or by the agency of intermediate links
which, as hybrids, were dropped after having served their
purpose. For nature everywhere shows itself anxious to pre-
serve in the inorganic realm by equivalents, in the organic
by sterility the purity of the species, that is, of the Ideas
conceived empirically, and only admits of certain variations
within these, which may be regarded as the Idea adapting
itself to different external circumstances.
It is scarcely necessary to remark that, from our standpoint,
every moral objection to the descent of man from brute dis-
appears. For all nature is, as we saw, but a metaphysical
essence, sunk through its own guilt to physical existence and
working its way upward to full self-knowledge, which it reaches
in man, and through which alone it attains to salvation. Thus
Darwinism and Christianity, like all fundamental contradictions
of natural science, religion, and philosophy, are reconciled in
the system of Schopenhauer.
190. As the Will to life as plant concentrates
its whole being In reproduction, it has at this stage
the power of transforming inorganic materials into
organic. Since it finds all these in one place, it
does not need the power of locomotion. As animal
the Will furnishes itself, in correspondence to its
more complicated aims, with voluntary movement,
and, for the guidance of its steps, with an intellect,
of which, when insufficient, the unconscious Will, as
we saw ( 164), vicariously takes the place. The
animal intellect reaches its highest possible develop-
ment ( 115, 4)
'
m man. Beyond him it needs
no further development, since in man the Will
156 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
attains to turning, to denial, to salvation, and
with that to the really ultimate aim of the natural
creation.
XII. On the Teleological View of Nature and
its Limits
191, The Will as thing-in-itself is one and
harmonious, To its affirmation as world on the
other hand self -conflict is essential, becoming
visible in the plurality of its manifestations in time
and space. Beyond the phenomenal world there
is harmony, within it discord. Now not only the
Will, but also the Ideas through which it is mani-
fested, lie beyond space and time. Therefore, as
their plurality is an unspatial one ( 182), so also
their contrariety is not a mutually exclusive, but
rather a harmoniously co-operative one.
From this unity and harmony of the being-in-
itself of Will, manifested in every organism through
a particular Idea and in all existence through the
totality of Ideas, is to be explained the teleological
adaptation in nature, which meets us everywhere,
and which, when connecting the manifestations of
life in the individual organism to a unity, we call
internal
;
and when appearing as a relation of
different organisms to each other and to inorganic
nature in the universal life of creation, external.
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 157
192. The one Will to life, in objectifying
itself entire and undivided in every living being,
appears expanded in a plurality of parts in
space as organism, and in a plurality of conditions
in time as life. On this depends that internal
adaptation, by means of which all parts of an
organism show a mutual dependence, so that each
organ seems both aim and means of all others, while
again the organism and its life appears as the
ultimate aim of all the organs. Of this we have
already spoken ( 158). Beside this we notice to
our surprise an analogous phenomenon, a certain
external adaptation, permeating the totality of
nature, in so far as the different organic Ideas
through which the Will appears in the higher grades
of its objectifications, adapt themselves to a certain
extent in part mutually to each other, in part to
inorganic nature and its conditions, a correspond-
ence which can only be explained by the unity
of all Ideas grounded in the Will as thing-in-itself.
Thus, for instance, we see the plant adapting itself
to soil and climate, the animal to its element, to its
prey, nay (through the teleological formation of its
protective organs), to its. natural enemy. Thus the
eye is formed to correspond to light, the lungs to
air, and just as later manifestations adjust themselves
to the earlier, so we see (for instance in the adapta-
tion of the atmosphere, of light and heat to organic
life, in the obliquity of the ecliptic by which all
158 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
vegetable life is conditioned, etc.) earlier manifesta-
tions anticipating the later, and forming themselves
with regard to the future needs of these. For the
unity of nature appearing here i a transcendent
unity, for which temporal conditions and so an
earlier and a later have no significance.
The teleological order of nature is, on the one
side, a constitutive principle of existence, on
the other hand, a regulative principle of know-
ledge (in organic nature perfectly reliable). It may
therefore well have been this which was in Plato's
mind as " the Idea of the Good," of which he says,
that like the sun it is the cause on the one hand
of being, on the other of knowing (Rep. vi. p.
509 B).
193. To this harmony of Ideas, on the mutual
correspondence and accommodation of which depends
the teleological constitution of nature, appears in
crying contradiction the discord in the manifestation
of these same Ideas in space, time, and causality.
They all, as phenomenal forms of the Will to life,
possessed by the mania of existence as, by a demon,
force themselves with impetuosity into being, in
mutually disputing matter and therefore perpetually
combating, hindering, supplanting, and suppressing
each other. Thus Plato's doctrine of the Idea of
the Good and the unenvious goodness of the Creator
is reconciled with the verdict of Heraclitus :
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 159
Trarrjp Trdvr&v. From this bellum omnium contra
omnes springs in a moral respect on the one hand
the evil, on the other, the suffering of the world,
both of which therefore are essential to affirmation
and can only be removed with it. And again in
an aesthetic respect arises from it the imperfection
of phenomena, especially in the organic sphere, as
a result of which every phenomenon gives only an
approximate expression to the Idea manifested in
it, since a part of the force striving for manifestation
is everywhere consumed in the combating and sub-
duing of opposed forces. Hence the law, "that
every organism only represents the Idea of which
it is the image, after deduction of that part of its
force, employed by it in the subdual of those lower
forces which dispute matter with it."
194. Thus we see, wherever the eye turns,
only phenomena, not things-in-themselves ; and the
whole realm of nature, wherever expanded in all
spheres of the heavens, shows us indeed in all
its parts, the thousandfold -repeated images, el'SeaXa,
o/ioici/wmfc of Ideas, but not Ideas, not Will, not
Being -in -itself. Thus Plato was right, when he
compared us (Rep. vii. p. 514 A sq.) to prisoners,
sitting chained in an underground cave and forced
by their fetters to look without moving on the wall
in front of them, so that they see neither the light
at their back, nor the objects passing behind them,
160 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
nor even themselves, but only the shadows of these
objects and their own shadows on the wall before
them, and take these for the real things. Is it
possible for us to turn away our gaze from this wall
of time, space and causality, in order to see no longer
the shadows of things, no longer the images of Ideas,
but the prototypes, as they are in themselves, the
Ideas themselves in unspoiled form and beauty?
This question leads us to the considerations in
our third part.
THE SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS
PART III
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL
I Historical
195. It was Plato who, animated by a meta-
physical spirit, directed to Being-in-itself, turned his
searching gaze on the inconstant flight of the
phenomenal world, in order to find out, what amid
the " flux of becoming
"
of Heraclitus was the Being
of Parmenides, what amid the ceaseless coming into
existence and perishing of things was the unchange-
able and the constant, In doing so, he observed
that nature, notwithstanding plurality and becoming,
is yet not in itself throughout varied and changing,
that on the contrary we perceive in it ever the
same manifestations in different places and at
different times
; which, being in themselves identical,
would coincide to a unity, were they not separated
by space and time. Space and time, however, are a
M
162 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
nonentity as Plato felt, and as every metaphysical
mind from the first has more or less clearly felt,
though the late discovery of the secret, by the
demonstration of the subjective origin of space and
time, was reserved for the genius of Kant. He
thereby became the founder of a new era in the
history of the world, of the manhood of humanity,
of the period of organic thought (that is, of
scientific thought carried through every department),
the germs of which, sown by him, begin even now to
sprout, and the fruits of which, defying all calculation,
rest in the bosom of futurity. Had it been granted
to Plato, undisturbed by foreign influences, to
extract time, space, and causality from the world of
perception, and thus to restore the identity separated
by them to a unity, the becoming and developing to
an unchangeable entity, he might have attained not
to his, but to our Ideas, and perhaps have saved
mankind some two thousand years of metaphysical
error. But fate had decided otherwise as to the
intellectual life of many ages, when it was pleased to
throw Plato into the arms of Sokrates, whose mission,
though a very meritorious one and of great im-
portance for philosophy, was of quite another kind.
Sokrates namely, without concealing the fact that he
neither rightly understood nature (Plato, Phaedr. p.
230 D) nor the profound views of nature of his
predecessors (Diog. Laert II. 22), had turned away
voluntarily from both, in order to direct all the
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 163
power of his mind to a single subject, the action of
man, a one-sidedness which, though justifiable, was
fatal to philosophy. He believed to raise human
action essentially, in making it dependent on fixed
concepts, present to the mind as purposes. Thus his
untiring activity was directed to the logical deter-
mination of ethical concepts, which as one,
universal, and constant, should be realised in the
plurality of actions. Now just as two crystals, in
penetrating each other, mutually destroy the purity
of their formation, so in Plato's vast mind the
tendency towards Ideas realised in nature, which
he had received from the teaching of Heraclitus and
ParmenideS, was combined with the Sokratic striving
after concepts to be realised in the action of
man. It is this blending of these outwardly similar,
but inwardly fundamentally differing elements which
gives the writings of Plato so enigmatical a character.
This might also explain how it was that Plato,
like Ulysses, who, set down on the coast of Ithaka,
did not recognise his fatherland, missed, nay spurned,
the only way which might have led him to that
intuition of the Ideas which had been the longing
of his youth, namely the way of Art, with the
highest productions of which he, as the immediate
heir of an art development without equal, was so
nearly connected.' But the overwhelming personality
of Sokrates, whose ethics ran :
" TO db<eXfc/<60z>
cuyaOov" (the useful is good) and whose aesthetic
164 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
creed was " TO xptfo-^ov fca\ov
"
(the serviceable is
beautiful (Xen. Mem. 4, 6), had fascinated him, as
he may at times have felt himself and seems to
express in the Symposion (p. 216 c) under the
mask of Alkibiades. And to a development of
Sokratic tendencies it is due, that we sec him, the
metaphysical genius, heir to the throne of the world-
annihilating Parmenides, busied with the con-
struction of a State concept the realisation of
which would scarcely have been of significance for
the highest aims of mankind, and for love of which,
guided by moral considerations, he deals in a
lamentably summary way with art. *Thc pheno-
menal world, he argues, is an imitation of 'the Idea,
art is an imitation of phenomena: hence it is an
imitation of an imitation, and merits no serious
consideration,
196. Aristotle also does not rise beyond the
conception of art as an imitation of the real. But it
is not so much the individual (ri /ca9* Itfacrroi/) as
the universal (TO, /eatfoXou) which art has to imitate,
and while the historian relates what happened (r<i
), the task of the poet is more ambitious
: he has to represent what, according
to the nature of things, might happen (ola &v
yevoLTo). This involves that not phenomena as
such, but the universal and essential expressed in
them, is the object of art.
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 165
Aristotle, moreover, turned his attention to the
influence exerted by art on the contemplating
subject. According to him it is the aim of
the tragedy, by exciting fear and pity, to
accomplish in us a purification from similar
emotions (8^ eXeou real <f>6/3ov vrepaivovcra ryv T&V
TQLQVT&V TradqjjidTCdv fcddap(riv, Poet. 6). If we may
generalise this passage, we have as Aristotle's
fundamental view of art something like the following :
"All of us, one more, another less (Polit 8, 7, p.
1342 A 5 sq.), have emotions (for instance, fear and
pity) and the need of giving them utterance. The
satisfaction of this need in practical life is often
attended by unpleasant consequences, while in art it
is harmless, and in this lies (apart from subordinate
aims as Trcu&eia, Biaja)^, instruction and amusement),
the value of art/' This conception of art as a
psychical Kathartikon (which one might be tempted
to parody after the manner of Aristophanes) is
certainly an unworthy one. Still it contains much
that deserves consideration, and has arisen, as we
might conjecture, through Aristotle associating
wrongly two perfectly right observations. He
noticed how art often calms marvellously the excite-
ment of the mind (Polit 8, 7, p. 1342 A 8 sq.).
On the other hand, he could not fail to observe that,
by the contemplation of a work of art, certain
emotions are stirred within us (in tragedy, for
example, fear and pity). But that these aesthetic
166 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
emotions differ toto gcnere from those of practical
life, that their relation to these . is that of the
supramundane to the mundane, of the metaphysical
to the physical, from seeing this Aristotle was pre-
vented by the restriction of his view to the empirical
world. Appealing to a single case (p. 1342 A 8) he
co-ordinates, without being aware of the perdpacrw efe
a\\o yevo$3 both kinds of emotions and looks merely
at the difference in their practical results. Art thus
becomes for him the means of procuring relief from
emotion not, as in life, with subsequent suffering, but
with delight (jcov^ea-dat peP ?;Soz/>}9), and of enjoying
a harmless pleasure (^apav afiXaprf) unattended by
evils.
Two thousand years passed away before the need
was felt of advancing beyond the aesthetic views of
Aristotle.
197. It was Kant who here also laid a new
foundation, in going back from the comparing
contemplation of beautiful objects in nature and art
to the contemplating subject, in order to analyse
(after the less important attempts of others) for the
first time seriously and penetratingly the feeling
called forth in us by the beautiful, and with it the
real root of the aesthetic phenomenon. He defined
the feeling for the beautiful as a delight, to which,
amongst other qualities, he ascribed that of being
(unlike the delight in what is pleasant or good)
TIIK METAPHYSICS OK THE BEAUTIFUL 167
entirely unconnected with interest, that is
without relation of any kind to the desiring faculty
(the Will) of the feeling subject.
Kant, in thus defining the feeling for the beautiful
as a disinterested delight, stated a psychological
fact, the accuracy of which every one may test by
self-observation. The love of the beautiful is a
delight and therefore under all circumstances an
emotion of the Will, but this emotion takes place
without the beautiful object having any relation to
the Will of the beholder, that is, any interest for his
person. Nay, the impression of the beautiful fades
away in proportion as any relation of the beautiful
object to the desires of the subject enters his
consciousness.
In this emotion of the Will without relation to
the Will lies a contradiction which from the
empirical standpoint is irreconcilable.
II. The JEsthetic Phenomenon considered from the
Empirical Standpoint
| 198. In the empirical, that is the individual view,
subject and object are always connected by nearer
or remoter relations of space, time, and causality.
The consciousness of these relations is called the
interest (according to its etymology from inter-esse
"to take part in") which we take in an object
168 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
This interest is twofold It is called satisfaction,
when the object is favourable to the purposes of out-
Will, dissatisfaction, when unfavourable to these.
Hence it is clear that, from the empirical standpoint,
pleasure is only a special kind of interest, that
therefore all pleasure is an interested one, that is,
dependent on the consciousness of the relations
between object and subject.
199. Now, since all interest which I take-in an
object, shows itself as the consciousness of a relation
to the same, and since every relation is nothing but
a connection in time, space, and causality, which, in
this sense, make up the sphere of interest, it follows
that a disinterested delight is only possible, so far as
this connection, or at least the consciousness of it, is
removed. Hence the subject of aesthetic delight is
not the Will so far as it is individualised in time,
space, and causality, and necessarily entangled in the*
net of relations, but the Will only in so far as it
feels itself raised above the individuality as which it
appears, Here the disinterested delight in aesthetic
contemplation shows itself as a phenomenon leading
beyond the natural order of things, the explanation
of which accordingly devolves on metaphysics.
This will become clearer by contrasting the
individual with the aesthetic contemplation of
things.
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 169
III. Individual and Esthetic Contemplation
200. There are, as we saw, two standpoints
from which to investigate the world by abstract
thought, the empirical and the transcendental..
To these correspond exactly two alone possible
methods of regarding things through perception, the
individual, which is the rule, and the aesthetic, which
occurs transitorily and as an exception under certain
subjective and objective conditions.
201. In the individual contemplation subject
and object stand to each other as individual beings,
belonging to the totality of empirical reality. As
such they are, as we saw, always connected by
nearer or remoter relations of space, time, and
causality, in the consciousness of which relations, in
fact, all interest consists. ^Esthetic perception
occurs, when, with full activity of the mind, the
consciousness of these relations, and so the possibility
of an interested pleasure is completely extinguished,
so that both, subject as well as object, face each
other lifted,
'
as it were, above time, space, and
causality, that is, above the principles of finite earthly
existence. This marvellous, though not rare process
is conditioned by a momentary transformation
occurring in both, subject and object, which demands
further examination.
170 ELEMENTS OF MKTAPIIVSICS
202. The subject in the individual mode of
contemplation is the beholding individual, We know
that individuality is Will, appearing as body in time,
space, and causality. Thus it is, that all organs of
the body are instruments of the Will, embodiments of
its strivings directed to certain ends. One of these
organs is the intellect (the brain). Hence from the
individual standpoint it is nothing but an instrument
of the Will, destined to work in the service of its aims.
Amongst all the complicated organs which
nature has produced for the service of Will in the
state of individuality, that is of corporisation, by far
the noblest and most marvellous is the human
intellect
;
so noble, that the fulfilment of its natural
destiny, that is, its activity in the service of the
individual Will, seems to us an unworthy bondage,
and the more so, the more highly developed the
intellect is. And how should not the human mind,
which traverses all distances, measures all heights,
illuminates all depths, which unrolls to us the
picture of the universe, nay, in metaphysics leads even
a step beyond this, how should the mind not feel
it as hard bondage, to be daily and hourly employed
in furnishing the individual from whom it sprang,
with motives for his actions, merely that he may
find his ant's path through the whirl of existence,
how should it not feel itself like the bird, which,
capable of soaring through the heavens finds itself
confined to a narrow cage ?
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 171
From this " penal servitude of willing
"
there is
an eternal deliverance, of that we are not yet
speaking here, and a transitory rest, a short hour
of respite. This comes in moments of aesthetic
contemplation. To this we are raised so often as,
on occasions which we shall have next to consider,
we succeed in leaving behind us the consciousness
of our individual existence with all its trials and
torments, so that the intellect faces things no longer
as an instrument protecting the interests of the
Will and careful only of the (real or possible)
relations of things to it, but as a clear mirror,
undimmed by any personal interest, as pure subject
of knowing, which in complete self-devoting objec-
tivity no longer spies out and searches for the
individual relations of things, but contemplates the
pure objective being of these in itself.
203. But also in the contemplated object a
change takes place, the moment we rise from the
individual viewing of things to their aesthetic con-
templation. The object we contemplate remains
indeed in both cases the same. But it appears in
ordinary life as an individual object, bound to us
by spatial, temporal, and causal relations which, in
so far as they regard our personal interest, appear
in a strong light, thereby obscuring more or less
the objective being of the thing. In aesthetic con-
templation, on the contrary, in which every possible
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
relation of objects to our Will vanishes from our
consciousness, things are regarded, not for what they
are as particular material individuals, bound to us
by time, space, and causality, but for what they are
in themselves, apart from time, space, and causality,
that is, only so far as they are embodiments of
Being-in-itself, of the Idea present in them.
204, From what has been said it becomes
clear, that the aesthetic phenomenon is connected
with certain subjective and objective conditions, of
which, as we shall see, now the former, now the
latter preponderate and thus call forth their correla-
tive. In proportion as the contemplating mind is
inclined to objectivity, it will succeed easily in
seeking in things no longer the individual, but the
Idea, And in proportion as the contemplated
object is a clear expression of the Idea manifested
in it, it will succeed in taking us out of our subjec-
tive mood and raising us to aesthetic will-free
contemplation.
To understand this thoroughly, we must examine
more closely those subjective and objective con-
ditions under which the aesthetic phenomenon takes
place.
TI1K METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 173
IV. Subjective Conditions of the -Esthetic
Phenomenon
205. A beautiful but often wrongly translated
1
passage of the Kathaka-Upanishad (4, i) runs as
follows :
Par&nd kMni vyatrinat SvayambMs,
TctsmAtfanw <[>afyafi\ na antaratwan.
" Outwards the Self-existent bored the holes,
Hence men look outward, not within their souls " ;
that Is, the intellect is, according to its nature, an
external organ. Bright and clear lies before us
the external world, extended in the three forms of
our intellect, dimly from within is mirrored in our
consciousness the Will, expanded in the single
perceptual form of time as volition, and this only as
a rule, not always,
206. For, as in looking upwards from a deep
mine, the stars are visible to us even by day, but
1 With thanks we acknowledge here the furtherance which Indian
studies and, through them, one of the most important branches of
philosophy have received by the incomparable Sanskrit Dictionary,
which Otto Bochtlingk and Rudolph Roth, aided by other
excellent scholars, have, after five -and -twenty years' labour, shortly
completed. To them we dedicate the following epigram :
Vena samskritahhdsMydjftfinam stip&yanam kritam,
Adwttya-dvaya'&rabdham vande grantham anuttamam.
Sakalam jfoifam y&bhy&m Brahma*mdy&-prakfyake
Bhdsharskabhe sam&vnttam, tdbhydm astu namd namah I
(1877.)
174 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
no longer, when we ascend to the light ; or as,
when sitting quietly, we feel the beat of the heart,
the pulsation of the blood through the veins, but no
longer, when we are moving about : similarly, in
the normal state of knowing is reflected in our
consciousness the Will, with its ever -unsatisfied
cravings, but no longer, when the intellect, raised by
innate energy or by a sudden spring-tide of its
powers, conceives the external world with increased
clearness, so that its more energetic light chases at
once all shadows of personal toil and trouble from
our consciousness.
207. That which is primary and radical in us
is Will, what is secondary and accidental is intellect
( 154). Hence it is that the preponderance of
knowing over willing which is the conclitioti of
aesthetic contemplation, occurs only as an exception,
It is attainable in the first place, as we saw, by an
increase of intellectual energy, but further also by
the mitigation of willing. Therefore very subjective
natures who cling narrow-mindedly to their own
personality, even when gifted, will not easily rise to
the intuition of the beautiful In vain the most
wonderful aspects allure them, for in all they hear
the inner voice of the Will crying disconsolately:
"
It is of no use to me ! " Well might they also
seek relief from the torment of willing, well might
they also seek to escape from themselves,
- THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 175
sed timor ct minae
Scandunt codem quo dominus : neqm
Decedit aerata triremi, et
Post equitem sedet atra cura.
But where, through a happily constituted nature,
by culture and education, practised renunciation and
self-denial, desire has been tamed, the impetuosity of
willing abated, there nature and art will easily
succeed in drawing the beholder out of himself, in
order to manifest themselves to him, no longer as a
complexity of possible motives of willing, but in
their purely conceived inner objective being, bathed
in the light of beauty.
| 208. In this sense it is not only genius (pre-
ponderance of intellect), but holiness also (denial
of willing) which is favourable to aesthetic contem-
plation. This at least must be the meaning of the
Sankhya-Karika, when it says (v. 65) of him in
whom the Will to life has turned :
prakritim pagyati purushah,
prekshakavad auasthitah, susthah,
"the spirit beholds nature, spectator-like standing
aloof, well-standing." Yet in the judgment of the
Indians (surrounded by great examples of denial),
aesthetic contemplation docs not necessarily ac-
company holiness. Thus Sad^nanda, himself an
"ascetic of the first order" (paramahansa), says in
176 ELEMENTS OK METAPHYSICS
the Vedantasar'a (p. 219, I ccl Mcnf.) of the
delivered : asya, jn&n&t pfo"vam mdyamAnAnAm <w
dhdra-vzhdm - ddtndm amwrittwac^ chubha-vAsanAnAm
eva anuvrittir bhavati^ $ubha-acubhayor aitdAstnyam
vd ; " Even as for him the functions of nourishment,
walking, etc. which were practised by him before
knowledge, still continue to exist, so also continue
in him the impressions of the beautiful, or he remains
indifferent alike to the beautiful and to the not
beautiful."
209. Whoever has been touched by the beauti-
ful in nature or art, and who could here be
excepted ? knows that in the enjoyment of it
there lies an unearthly bliss. This, like every
feeling, is an emotion of the Will. Accordingly
the delight in the beautiful is not conditioned
through a removal of the Will (without which
neither being nor knowing is possible), but through
the being raised above Will in the state of in-
dividuality, which is, as the metaphysics of
morality has to show, the phenomenal form of the
affirming Will and consequently the bearer of all
sin and sorrow. Here and here alone lies the
point of contact between aesthetics and morality.
'The aim of morality is the negation of individuality,
that of aesthetic intuition the temporal forgetting of
it The positive delight of aesthetic contemplation
is to us a warrant, that beyond individuality there is
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 177
not a painless Nothing, but a state the exuberant
bliss of which cannot be compared to any earthly
feeling of delight.
1
Remark. The state of freedom from willing is three-
fold: (i) empirical, obtained, by satiety, filled by sport or
ennui, a second misery; (2) aesthetic, obtained by rapture,
filled by the most expressive drama; (3) moral, obtained by
renunciation, filled by active pity, which is a sonow without
pain.
V. Objective Conditions of the Esthetic
Phenomenon
210. The nature of the aesthetic phenomenon
consists, as has been shown, in a transitory raising
of the mind above individual existence and its
conditions : space, time, and causality. This can
be attained in the first place, as we saw, by the
contemplating subject being withdrawn by pro-
cesses in himself from the consciousness of his
individuality. But it may also be provoked by the
contemplated- object inviting, through its nature,
more or less distinctly, to a forgetting of all that
1 In the state of deliverance our individuality (as the bearer of
sin and sorrow) is thrown off like a husk, and notwithstanding our ego
continues to exist (though not in time). It is just that super-individual,
blissful, godlike ego, dwelling entire and undivided in each of us
( 168, 2), which, passing from its latent state, is manifested
transitorily in aesthetic contemplation and permanently in the moral
sentiment. If one asks whether in the state of deliverance a plmality
of egos can co-exist, the correct answer is, that the question of unity or
plurality hab for the realm of Bcing-in-itself no meaning.
N
178 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
is finite in its imperfection and limitation, in which
case we call the object beautiful. The full under-
standing of this word, impossible without meta-
physics, will be attained in the course of our
considerations.
211. We know the Ideas ( 178-184) as the
formative forces of the phenomenal world, the fixed
types through which the Will gives expression to
its being in all manifestations of the universe. We
saw ( 193) how these Ideas in the form of which
the Will is objectified, are forced, in thrusting them-
selves into space, time, and causality, to struggle
with each other for the conditions of existence. By
this they suffer a more or less considerable loss of
force, so that in no manifestation is their being fully
and clearly realised Accordingly no individual is a
perfect ectype of its Idea (no horse, for instance,
equals the horse-in-itself in horsehoof) : yet one
approaches it more, another less.
2 1 2. The less namely an Idea is, in its mani-
festations, thwarted, checked, stunted, overwhelmed
by other manifestations, that is, the more perfectly
an object embodies, by favour of external circum-
stances, the Idea of which it is the bearer, the nearer
to the Idea, the more ideal, the more beautiful is the
object, and the easier it will be to it (apart from ex-
ceptions to be mentioned later), to draw us out of
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 179
our subjectivity and raise us to the view of Being-in-
itself, in awakening in us, through its approximation
to the Idea, a reminiscence, though a timeless one,
of the world of Ideas. The contradiction in these
words shows that they only say in the form of a
simile what we shall try in the following to express
directly, though we may scarcely hope to succeed
perfectly in doing so.
213. The aesthetic phenomenon is and remains
a process within the subject Nevertheless the feel-
ing for the beautiful is called forth by a concurrence
of subjective and objective conditions, of which, as
was remarked above, now these now those pre-
ponderate and thereby call forth their correlative.
Freedom from individual volition favours the con-
ception of things as 'representatives of Ideas, the
approximation of objects to the Ideas calls away the
mind from its individual cares. Now this mutual
influence is only explicable by an original kinship
between object and subject. This is described
mythically by Plato (Phaedr. p. 247 A sq.) as a
contemplation of the Ideas taking place beyond the
phenomenal world before birth, by which he ex-
presses in terms of space what is spaceless, in terms
of time what is timeless. Similar images occur in
the Upanishads of the Veda ; the scientific way was
opened by Kant and Schopenhauer.
Independently of our intellect there exists not
i8o ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
this world, but the thing-in-itself, Will alone. In it
is no subject, no object. For Being -in -itself is
broken up into these only in so far as, entering the
forms of representation, it becomes visible to itself as
world. The first step is, that Will shapes itself into
objective form (presupposing the subject, 42) as
the graduated series of the Ideas, In a certain
sense one may say with Schopenhauer, that these arc
the Will, so far as it, as object, presupposes the sub-
ject, but not yet the subject's subordinate forms,
space, time, and causality. For these last are the
perceptual forms, not of the pure subject of
knowing to which, as the subjective correlative
of the Idea, we unself ourselves in aesthetic con-
templation ( 202), but of the subject, so far as
it, as individual intellect, is a texture of space,
time, and causality. Into these its innate forms,
and so into the iregion of imperfection, our intellect
projects the Ideas. Here they fight for space, time,
and causality, that is, they fight to become a repre-
sentation of my intellect. On this battle depends
the imperfection of their manifestations. That
which compels them to become realised indistinctly,
, disparately,. and stuntedly, is therefore only my
beholding individuality. Now trie more perfectly
they nevertheless manifest themselves (from causes
the explanation of which, according to 182 is
impossible' to us), the more easily will they remove
this restraint and with it my individuality imposing
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 181
it. Conversely, the more easily I tend to get rid of
the consciousness of my individuality, the sooner
shall I succeed in grasping intuitively through in-
dividual things the Ideas behind them, just because
their existence as individual things is determined
only by my own individuality.
Such difficult ways we must take to grasp ap-
proximately that which the nature of our intellect
prevents us from understanding completely.
214. One and the same object appears to us in
quite a different light, according as we regard it
individually, as an aggregate of possible relations
to our Will, or aesthetically as ectype of the Idea.
(Both kinds of contemplation are in reality very
often blended, and it is impossible to decide where
disinterested pleasure ceases and interested begins :
so for instance in the admiration of the beauty of
the beloved.) But aesthetic contemplation is not
content with comprehending the temporal under the
aspect of the eternal (sub specie aeternitatis\ the in-
dividual thing as representative of the Idea, but it
proceeds further to infer from the imperfect the
perfect, to restore from the individual the Idea,
We have arrived, by the way of abstract
thought, at the conviction, that every being is a
manifestation of Will, which, however, hindered by
external influences, nowhere attains quite clearly to
objectification. But in considering for instance an
182 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
animal the parts of which arc imperfectly formed,
we are able, starting from the metaphysical know-
ledge that all its organs are the objectively mani-
fested strivings of its Will, to say how these organs
should be constructed in order to conform perfectly
to the aims of the here objectified Will, that is, in
order to express clearly and entirely the Will-form
or Idea manifested in them. What we do here by
Abstract reasoning, that the^ artist mind attains by
'way of intuition. The Artist therefore is an un-
conscious metaphysician. Guided by an insight into
the nature of things which fathoms deeper than all
abstract knowledge, he is aljle io_ understand the
"half-uttered words of nature," to infer^from what
she forms that which she intends to form, to
anticipate from the direction she takes the end she
is herself unable to reach. The instrument 'which
accomplishes this idealising transformation of reality
is Imagination. In so far as the imagination, in
contradistinction to the memory, reproduces repre-
sentations detached from their spatial, temporal,
and causal relations ( 1 1 8), it isolates these from
their connection with reality and its control, and
transforms them, fertilised by the artist's mind striving
after the ideal, into the Idea itself which appears in
them.
215. Thus aesthetic contemplation rises from
the merely disinterested view of nature to the behold-
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 183
ing of the Ideas themselves. Few indeed are able,
by this way, to rise from manifestation to the heights
of Being-in-itself. Still fewer have the power of
imparting what they have beheld on these heights
(as it were
" on the back of the heaven," eVi r<j> rov
ovpavov vd>T<p, n&kasya prishthe^ as it is called with
remarkable coincidence both by Plato, Phaedr. p.
247 C, and .by the Mundaka-Upanishad, i, 2, 10).
These few are the genuine artists. According as
they express what they see in buildings, statuary,
colour, speech, or sound, they are called architects,
sculptors, painters, poets, and musicians.
This is the deep, because metaphysical, Origin
of Art.
VI. On the Beautiful and the Sublime
216. Like the whole world as representation,
so is also the beauty inherent in it a subjective
phenomenon, consisting, as has been shown, in a
momentary and transient state of deliverance from
the consciousness of individual willing. Only so far
as this deliverance is determined by the energy with
which the Will manifests itself through the Idea, can
we speak of an objective beauty, existent in things
themselves. Beauty in this (objective) sense may be
defined as distinctness of the manifestation of
the Idea, and an object is beautiful in proportion as
one of the Ideas (enumerated 183) attains a com-
184 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
plete and unchecked visibility in it. Now since, as
we know, all that exists is manifestation of the Ideas,
every aspect of nature, every scene in human life
may raise us to that state of aesthetic contemplation
which has its root in the forgetting of our own in-
dividuality ; and that alone is excluded which, by its
nature, rouses desire or disgust, that is, inclination
or disinclination of the Will the complete silence of
which is the indispensable condition of aesthetic
intuition. But apart from these exceptions, so
soon as our mind is in the required state, every-
thing in nature appears to us radiant in the light
of beauty. Yet we usually call an object beautiful
only, when it manifests an Idea with striking
vividness, and when by the eloquence with which
the metaphysical in it speaks to us, we are drawn
upward to the same.
217, Meanwhile it is well to bear in mind that,
notwithstanding all objectivity of mood, we can never
thoroughly do justice to the beauty of which creation
is full, because our standpoint towards nature is
always more or less restricted and one-sided. It is
more especially the inadequacy of our sense organs
and their specific determination (necessary to the
service of the Will) which allows us a merely
relative, but no absolute judgment of what is
beautiful or ugly. Thus for instance we prefer the
voice of the nightingale to that of the raven, because
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 185
it sounds sweeter to our ear, while, apart from that,
croaking is perhaps just as significant and, in so far,
beautiful for the Idea of the raven, as is warbling
for that of the nightingale. Again vegetable secre-
tions in most cases affect our sense of smell agreeably
and thus lead easily to an aesthetic conception of the
vegetable world, while with animal secretions exactly
the reverse takes place. So again we consider the
swift horse, the majestic lion, the light - winged,
bright - feathered bird as beautiful, toads, spiders,
reptiles, and vermin on the other hand as not
beautiful, because the determination of all their
organs in the service of the Will (on which, as we
shall see, all beauty of the organism depends) in the
one instance comes within the
.sphere of our per-
ception, in the other not, although it is quite as
much there. And again the monkey, this wonderful
embodiment of the climbing instinct, appears to us
ugly, because, misled by an accidental likeness, we
cannot help comparing it with man. It is due to
this One-sidedness of our standpoint, that in many
cases we ourselves presume to improve the Idea
aesthetically, as for instance in shaving the beard.
But nature did not work for eyes like ours which
dwell only on the surface, when she covered . the
delicate and eloquent features of mouth and chin
with a mass of insignificant hairs.
Remark. From the above it is clear that, in reference
to beauty, only individuals of the same species should, properly
186 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
speaking, be compared with each other, not representatives of
different species. Yet, since the Will attains in the scale of
the Ideas to a gradually clearer manifestation ( 180), it may
certainly be said that in beauty the inoiganic Ideas aie sur-
passed by the organic, lower organisms by the higher, and all
other Ideas by man.
'2 1 8. A special kind of the beautiful, dependent
however alone on our subjectivity, is the sublime,
the feeling of which arises as follows, Often in
some aspect certain Ideas, though manifested very
clearly, yet fail to draw us out of our individuality,
because the very grandeur and power of the aspect
in which consists its beauty, has in another respect
a terrifying effect on our Will, in making us conscious
of the littleness and weakness of our personality.
Now if, in such a case, we succeed in soaring above the
anxiety of the individual Will to objective contempla-
tion, and in such a way, that our personal fear remains
in the background of our consciousness, without
however drawing us down from aesthetic contempla-
tion to concern for our own ego, there arises in us
the feeling of the sublime. In reality all that is
beautiful is sublime, since by its elevation above all
earthly wants it raises us also beyond our individual
existence. But it is only when this exaltation takes
place consciously (in being wrung from the in-
terests of the troubled Will) that the every-
where identical nature of the beautiful comes,
by the accidental fact of our personal resistance,
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 187
to our immediate perception, and is then called by
a very characteristic name the sublime. The
objects which call forth in us this mood (revealing
the inner essence of all that is beautiful) are called
mathematically sublime, when it is their size in
space and time which reminds us of the limitation
of our own individuality (the starry heavens, eternity).
They are called dynamically sublime, when the
forces of nature (that is the Ideas) display in them
an activity by the overwhelming power of which is
awakened in us the feeling of danger to our own
personality (a thunderstorm, a tempest, a volcano),
or again, when they oppress the Will, in arousing
the" consciousness of being destitute of the conditions
of our subsistence (a winter landscape, a desert).
Remark, The sublime, which exhorts to the renuncia-
tion of willing with all its misery, has its exact opposite in
what is alluring, so far as this, by provocation of desire,
draws away from aesthetic contemplation to the sphere of indi-
vidual willing. Since all that stimulates our Will removes the
condition of will-free intuition, that which allures (in the sense
in which we here use the word) is incapable of rousing a purely
objective contemplation and is therefore to be rejected in art
(painted food or drink for instance which stimulates the appe-
tite, figures exciting lust, indecent scenes in romance, Offen-
bach's music). As the alluring rouses the desire, so the
disgusting excites the aversion of the Will and consequently
admits as little as the other of the conception of the Ideas
which are manifested in it as in all that exists. By this the
objections, raised by Plato in the Parmenides (p. 130 c-E), are
answered.
iSS ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
VII. On the Beautiful in Nature
219. The Ideas in the distinct manifestation
of which all beauty (in an objective sense) consists
are, as we know, nothing but those physical, chemical,
and organic forces of nature through which the Will
to life is manifested in all that exists. Now as the
imperfection of the manifestations of the Ideas is
conditioned solely by their entrance into the sub-
jective functions of space, time, and causality, so also
is the greater or less* energy of their appearance a
subjective phenomenon, existing only for us. We
need not wonder therefore at seeing this energy and
with it the beauty of natural objects connected in
the first instance with a series of purely subjective
conditions. To these belong before all the neces-
sary objectivity of mind on the part of the be-
holder ; further novelty and rareness of aspects
(as in youth, in travelling, in strange natural pheno-
mena) greatly facilitate the conception of the Ideas
appearing in things. Lastly we may mention as
depending on a relation of the object to the con-
templating subject and therefore belonging to these
subjective conditions the due order and fitting
alternation of objects amongst themselves. This
indeed furthers aesthetic contemplation in a high
degree, since the contrasts point to, and thus mutually
interpret, each other. (Compare for instance the
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 189
monotony of the plain with the mountain landscape
in which hill and dale, forest gloom and sunny
flowery meadow, rigid rock and lively water alter-
nate.)
After these subjective aids to aesthetic contem-
plation it is on the energy and distinctness with
which the Ideas are impressed on matter, that the
beauty of nature depends. This occurs, however, in
different ways, according as the Ideas belong as
physical and chemical to the inorganic, or as types
of plants and animals to the organic sphere.
220. The bodies of inorganic nature are, as we
have seen ( 183. 185. 187), the chemical
Ideas manifested objectively in space. These, that
is the chemical elements and combinations occurring
in nature, appear, wherever they fill space, with equal
distinctness. Hence the energy of their action upon
us in which lies their aesthetic significance will as
a rule be the greater, the more extensively they occupy,
space. Thus the feelings inspired in us by the ocean
are very different from those aroused by a specimen
of its water in a glass. Each of these chemical Ideas
contains in itself, as we found probable ( 185.
1 8 6), all physical forces, though in different degrees
of intensity. Hence follows, that the aesthetic effect
displayed by the physical Ideas will be the stronger,
the more intensely they appear in the substances
to which they are bound. Thus for instance the
190 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
physical Idea of gravity appears more distinctly in
stone than in wood, a fact of great importance, as
we shall see, for the aesthetics of architecture. In
inorganic nature therefore (in contrast to the organic
world) it is partly by the extension, partly by the
intensity of their manifestation, that the distinct
appearance of the Ideas and therefore the beauty of
objects is increased. Thus it is that mountains, a
waterfall, a great fire affect us so powerfully, while
diminished a hundfedfold they would scarcely draw
from us a glance. This might perhaps explain how
it is that even space and time themselves, when per-
ceived in great dimensions, dispose us to the sublime,
although they are not Ideas at all but only the con-
dition of the possibility of their phenomenal appear-
ance. For it is just this possibility of their being
filled which raises us to aesthetic contemplation.
221. We saw ( 185. 187) that the essence
of the' chemical forces consists in their being an
aggregate of all physical forces in gradual and
characteristically determined combinations, appearing
in a particular place. It is therefore ultimately
always and only the physical Ideas which speak to
us in the bodies as also in the corporeal changes of
inorganic nature. Yet of these (the list of which,
183, should be referred to) not all are fit to pro-
duce an aesthetic effect Least of all perhaps heat,
since this has reference not to the external objective
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 191
senses but to feeling in general and by this directly
to the Will, the excitement of which removes the
condition of aesthetic contemplation. Among the
physical Ideas which invite to will-free perception,
maybe named first impenetrability and gravity,
the wrestling of which with each other is everywhere
visible (in the heavy mountain, the sustaining earth,
etc.). Rigidity takes form in the towering moun-
tain cliffs, and that the more distinctly, the steeper
their descent and the more jagged their forms.
Fluidity in its vivid war with gravity appears in
water, when winding as murmuring brook through
the meadows, or precipitated as raging waterfall, when
as stream it bears mighty ships, when it reposes as
the smooth mirror of the lake, or rolls along as billow
of the illimitable ocean in the avripiOpov <ye\a<rjj,a of
^Eschylos. As solidity in land, fluidity in water,* so
the third mode of cohesion appears in curling
smoke or in the clouds driven by the wind. But
above all inorganic Ideas 'it is that of light, together
with its reflection in colour, which is not only the
necessary condition of all beautiful aspects, but also
by its own beauty gladdens the noblest of the sense
organs.
222, In organic nature we may define beauty
by a formula of Kant's as conformity to an aim,
perceived without consciousness of the aim.
As everywhere else, so in the case of organisms
. 192 ELKM KNTS OF MKTAH iYSICS
beauty is due to a distinct appearance of the Idea.
The Idea of an organism is the Will so far as it is
presented as a series of spatial parts and temporal
functions which co-operate for the unity of its aims.
The more clearly therefore in an organism the
adaptation of all its forms and movements to the
aim strikes the eye, the more these are the mere
embodiment of the purposes of the Will the more
expressively appears in them the Idea of the organism
and the more beautiful is it. Therefore organic
beauty is conformity to aim, not referred (as in
anatomy and physiology) to a concept by abstract
thought, but conceived intuitively, without reflection,
and so without perception of an aim.
223. Plants are restricted to beauty of form.
In "animals and men there is added the beauty of
motion, called grace. As beauty in the narrower
sense, that is, beauty of form, depends on the
adaptation of all forms to the aims of the Will, so
grace consists in the visible adaptation of move-
ments to their aim, by virtue of which the aim in
each case is attained in the shortest, simplest, and
most natural way. To this law are subject not only
the movements of the limbs, but all manifestations of
life. Accordingly an action, a speech, a book and
the like are, in an aesthetic sense, the more pleasing,
the more determinedly, distinctly, and. immediately
is expressed in them the desired aim.
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 193
224. To this is due also the greater or less
beauty of industrial products, for instance
household furniture, clothing, utensils, etc. These
ara not, properly speaking, works of art, since they
serve not for the presentation of an Idea but for
practical purposes. Nevertheless they have a beauty
independent of their practical end, a beauty which,
as such, cannot depend on anything but the distinct
manifestation of an Idea. In manufactured articles,
as in the whole of nature, are expressed firstly the
Ideas appearing in their materials (gold, silver, silk,
wool, wood, iron), yet only so far as the beauty lies
in the materials, not so far as it lies in the form.
The Idea manifested in the beautiful form of such
objects can be no other than the Idea of man, whose
will, as in every movement, every word, finds qx-
pression also in the forms of industrial products.
These will therefore like bodily movements be the
more beautiful, the more naively and directly they
express their aim and through it the creative will of
the artist. Thus it is the graceful movement of the
artist hand, taking the shortest way to its end, which
to-day even speaks to us from antique vases. For
the beauty of Greek life, which lay in the distinct
revelation of the Idea of man, extended, as to all
else, so also to the activity of the craftsman and
gave his productions a beauty never since re-
attained. This was probably what misled Plato
into assuming the existence of Ideas of manu-
o
194 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
factured articles, as for instance tables and beds
(Rep. x. p. 596 B), an error which was however
soon recognised (Arist Met. xL 3, p. 1070 A 1 8,
i. 9, p. 991 B 6).
VIII Some Remarks on the Beautiful in Art
225. Art and Metaphysics arc near akin.
These two and (besides morality) these alone rise
above empirical existence and its petty interests.
Both dwell in the contemplation of Being-in-itsclf,
which by metaphysics is apprehended in concepts
and by art in immediate intuition. For the artist
looks through nature to that which is behind it, and
which, though imperfectly, appears in it'. This, the
thlng-in-itself, the Will, he seizes intuitively in its
phenomenal forms, the Ideas. He " tears it out of
nature" (as Albrecht Durer says), and portrays it
isolated in the work of art, the task of which is
always, to make visible an Idea (not a concept), in
giving it, from a particular point of view, pure and
unimpeded development. To this it is due that
poetry is not only, as Aristotle says, more philo-
sophical than history, but that art in general is
more instructive than reality. For while we see
the Ideas in nature broken up in space, time, and
causality, and thus only
"
through the mist of objec-
tive and subjective contingencies," the artist removes
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 195
this mist, so that the true Being of things becomes
perceptible, in the interpreting mirror of art, even
to the duller eye. To gain this for the voluntary
perception of the Idea, in which alone all beauty
lies, the artist makes use of certain allurements
(Icnocinia) which flatter the senses and captivate
the interest. Such arc : beauty of colour in paint-
ing, that of tone in music, rhyme and metre, inter-
esting actions and exciting complications in poetry.
Spurious art plays with these means, without having
anything to impart to us by them. The genuine
artist uses them alone for setting in relief (as a
picture by the frame) the Idea the presentation of
which is the sole aim of every art. Architecture,
sculpture, painting, poetry, and music (which, as we
shall sec, goes yet deeper) serve this end, each in its
own way. Here we must restrict ourselves to show-
ing briefly in what sense each of these tries to
reproduce the Ideas and thus to reveal the inner
essence of things.
226. Architecture is only partially a fine art,
in that its laborious and costly works have, in the
first instance, a practical end, different from the
artistic and often indeed antagonistic to it The
task therefore of the architect is to vindicate, as far
as is compatible with practical requirements, the
claims of art It is only with these last that we
have here to do in determining which Ideas speak
ig6 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
to us in the beauty of a building. We leave out of
sight the historical development of architecture, for
our task is not to explain, how beautiful styles have
arisen under the influence of necessity and tech-
nique, but if possible, to discover, why certain forms
i rather than others have been recognised as beautiful
and in consequence retained.
Whether or not the fancy of the architect has been
spurred to creation by aspects of nature, such as
avenues of trees and arches of boughs, an imitation
of these or of any other natural objects cannot be the
aim of architecture. For why should the artist wish
to imitate laboriously and inadequately what nature
offers everywhere in unattainable perfection ? More-
over in this case the copy would be very unlike the
original, the column very unlike the tree trunk, and
yet superior to it in beauty.
As little can symmetry be the aim of architec-
ture as a fine art, for in that case the model would
have a similar effect to the finished work
;
and
again where symmetry is wanting or marred (as in
ruins), the aesthetic effect would be lost, neither of
which is the case. Symmetry and the mathematical
clearness of proportions are certainly of great im-
portance firstly, in serving to isolate a building
from its surroundings ; further, the symmetrical
arrangement of all its parts facilitates the survey of
its usually huge complexity and, in placing the
mind of the beholder in a due and harmonious state,
TUK METAPHYSICS OK THK BKAUTII-'UL 197
makes It open to the reception of what is to be
imparted. Yet all this merely proves It to be the
right way in which something speaks to us, but not
that something itself.
If, on the other hand, we seek the beauty of a
building in the perfect adaptation of all its parts to
an end, it cannot be its practical end that is here
understood, since, in this sense, a building may be
very appropriate to its purpose without being beau-
tiful, or very beautiful without being appropriate.
/Esthetic adaptation lies rather in the obvious deter-
mination and necessity of all details not to a prac-
tical end, but to the consistency of the whole as
such, so that each single part is, as it were, required
by all the rest. Therefore we ask further: what
speaks to us from this whole, the significance of
which is manifested in this subordination of all
details? What arc the Ideas appearing in it, the
revelation of which as end determines the adapta-
tion of all the parts ?
Like every object in nature, a building is a
manifestation of Ideas, yet only of those appearing
in its materials. Thus the architrave, through its
gravity, seeks the earth, while the walls, by their
rigidity, oppose this tendency. Rigidity and gravity,
these lowest grades of the objectification of the Will
to life, the bass notes, as it were, of all nature,
appear in every building in a state of tension,
engaged in a continual wrestling with each other.
198 ELEMENTS OF METArHYSICS
The more clearly this struggle comes to view, the
more distinctly are revealed the Ideas battling in it,
the more beautiful therefore must be the building,
since beauty, here as everywhere, consists in manifesta-
tion of the Ideas ( 216). Here lies the key which,
rightly used, might suffice, not so much to explain
all that architecture has produced in the varying
taste of different ages by which it is influenced
more than any other art as to throw light on the
secret charm which the really beautiful works of
architecture immediately exercise on our feeling,
and this the more strongly (generally speaking) the
greater their size. For the distinctness of the Ideas
here manifested increases in general with spatial
extension ( 220). In addition to extension it is
further, as we saw, by intensity that inorganic Ideas
act. This is the reason why wood, easily as it
assumes all forms, is not so suited for works of
architecture as stone, in which these forces are more
powerfully manifested. To display this revelation
of gravity and rigidity, and thus render it more
significant, is the architect's task* For this purpose
he treats the Ideas inherent in his materials in much
the same way as does the dramatist the types of
humanity which he wishes to bring before us. As
the latter, for instance, invents important actions, so
.that by conflicts and fatalities of all kinds the nature
of the characters he represents may be disclosed, so"
the architect gives clear manifestation to the action
THE METAPHYSICS OK THK BKAUTIFl'L
of the forces embodied in stone by depriving them
of the nearest and most immediate way to the
satisfaction of their striving and compelling them,
by a struggle against resistant forces, to reveal more
vividly their being. Thus the architrave tends
through gravity to press the earth, but is allowed
to do so only circuitously through the columns in
which the rigidity, of the stone struggling against
gravity becomes visible. This contrary striving of
rigidity seems to be expressed in the upward
hastening fluting, while the pressure of the archi-
trave appears in the enlargement of the column at
the capital, as perhaps also in the slight bulging
(ex/row) at the first third of the height Accord-
ingly the column is an embodiment of rigidity striv-
ing against the weighing roof, and the columnar
arrangement is the type of architectural beauty.
This will be the greater, the more all parts of the
building are determined by the struggle of the forces
here displayed, so that there is nowhere too much,
nowhere too little, every weight having its appro-
priate support and every support being required
by the weight to be borne. Then, under the influ-
ence of light which, reflected from huge masses of
stone, attains itself to the most beautiful and varied
manifestation is revealed to our gaze the powerful
yet measured striving of fearful and destructive ele-
mentary forces, here presented in majestic calm, and
yet in the fullest energy of their mutual action.
200 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
If this explanation of the aesthetic effect of
architecture be the right one, we must award the
palm, before all others, to Greek architecture. For
here in the everywhere vividly portrayed struggle
of gravity and rigidity the action of the Ideas
present in the material receives fullest expression,
and their inner being in consequence the clearest
revelation. As the Classic architraval structure dis-
plays the struggle between gravity and rigidity, so
Gothic architecture shows rather the victory of
rigidity over gravity. The latter, turned aside, as
it were, flows from the point of the arch ineffectually
through the columns to the earth, while rigidity,
freeing itself more and more from every weight,
tapers farther and farther aloft. Thus the Gothic
style becomesva beautiful symbol of the soul, purify-
ing itself, from what is earthly and oppressive, and
rising devoutly to heaven. For the rest it remains
far behind the Classic in point of real aesthetic effect,
though taking pains to hide this want of native
energy by external ornament, borrowed from sculp-
ture and painting.
227. Architecture differs from sculpture, paint-
ing, and music in that it does not portray Ideas in
a material foreign to them, but merely gives clearer
expression to those Ideas inherent in its own materials.
It is not therefore like the others an imitating, butmerely
an interpreting art. In this sense it has its analogue in
TIIK MKTAHiYSICS OK THK DKAITII'UL 201
the artistic arrangement of water. As in architecture
rigidity is portrayed at war with gravity, so here the
fluid element is seen in its action under the most
diverse influences, in which the rushing waterfall
may be compared to the Classic, the rising fountain
to the Gothic style. In a similar way landscape
gardening, as also landscape painting, helps, by
tasteful grouping ( 219), to interpret the vegetable
world. For the Idea of Man, so far as this is
revealed in the external form, gymnastics and dancing
may be named as interpreting arts, as representing
the human form in the highest development of its
power, dexterity, and grace. Dancing reaches its
greatest perfection in the ballet, but moral considera-
tions seem to prevent this ever being raised to the
dignity of a fine art.
228. The Will, which strives in a dull and
one-sided way even in inorganic forces, which sprouts
and grows in the plant, and desires restlessly and
eagerly in tho brute, arrives at the full and distinct
unfolding of its essence in the light of Ivnowledge
first in Man
;
so much so that, compared to him, all
the rest of nature seems little more than a mere foil.
Hence it is that art, though not excluding sub-
ordinate Ideas (landscape and animal painting,
animal sculpture, descriptions of nature), yet finds
its proper and worthiest theme in the Idea of
Man, and an inexhaustible subject in the portrayal
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
of human nature and action from every point of
view.
229. We distinguished in man a twofold character,
that of the species and that of the individual
( 182). Every man is, in the first place, a repre-
sentative of his species, of the Idea, of the type of
mankind. Approximation to this constitutes human
beauty. Besides this, however, every human being
has its peculiar individual character, by which is
conditioned what is characteristic in the action as
in the outward appearance. Both elements must be
expressed in the work of art ; the beautiful without
the characteristic is insignificant, the characteristic,
without the beautiful tends to caricature.
Remark. The characteristic element is not a new
principle besides the beautiful, for both are the distinct
appearance of the type, in the one case of the species, in the
other of the individual, which, at the highest grade of the
objectification of the Will, gains, as it were, the significance
of a particular Idea.
230. Sculpture has, if not for its sole, yet for
its most important task the reproduction of the Idea
of Man, so far as this is revealed in the external
form. This form is, in all its parts, expressive, since,
as we know, the whole body is only the objectively
represented Will. It is due to a presentiment of
this truth, that works of plastic art have always been
held in high estimation. Contrasted with the human
figure, as an embodiment of the Idea of Man, the
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE KKAITU'TL
garment in which we clothe it is of little importance,
since the Ideas speaking to us in its draperies are
only those of its materials and very inferior in kind.
Hence sculpture prefers the nude, and, where free
to create, tolerates drapery only so far as it reveals
rather than conceals the form. In this sense, how-
ever, it can be of great service in inviting the mind
to produce spontaneously, by passing from the effect
to its cause, the indicated forms and so to conceive
them more fully. Sculpture has the advantage of
reproducing its forms in plastic roundness and full
distinctness. On the other hand, to avoid the sem-
blance of reality and the dead life of wax figums,
it renounces colouring, from which the tinting of
particular parts in order to give them greater dis-
tinctness, as was customary among the ancients, is
widely removed. The strength of sculpture lit\s
therefore in the expression of the figun% while in
facial expression, which demands eyes and colour,
it cannot vie with painting. Now, .since the in-
dividual character is before all stamped on the face,
the character of the species, on the other hand, on
the whole figure, sculpture has chiefly to portray the
latter, even though always in a particular individual
direction (as Zeus, Apollo, Hermes, Hera, Artemis,
Aphrodite, etc.). Thus in sculpture the beautiful
element predominates over the characteristic ( 22y\
and beauty of form can be far less dispensed with in
plastic works than in painting.
204 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
231. Painting renounces the relief of plastic
art and confines itself to the flat surface. As com-
pensation it has the possibility of freer movement
and richer development, as also the privilege of pro-
ducing, by the charm of colour, the most splendid
effects. These means allow it, in contrast to the
narrow limits to which plastic art is confined, to
draw all that exists within its sphere and to raise
us now by the approximation of objects to the
Ideas speaking in them, now by well -calculated
grouping, leading to intimate comprehension, or
again by the mere detaching of the subject thrown
on the canvas from reality and its interests to that
objectivity in which we see everything as beautiful,
because everything merely as a reflection of the
Ideas. Painting thus becomes a teacher in the
aesthetic comprehension of nature, a fact of which
we become aware when, on leaving a picture gallery
and going into the open air, we find everything there
also glorified by beauty, because we see it with ob-
jective eyes. Inexhaustible is the wealth of the
domain open to the painter, yet the highest object
of his choice remains the Idea of Man, so far as it
is in any way accessible to the eye in external being
and doing. In the reproduction of the human
figure painting certainly cannot equal plastic art Its
strength a strength attainable by no other art
lies instead in the delineation of the face, through
which Will illumined by knowledge finds for the
THE METAPHYSICS OF THK IIKAUTIFIW 205
various strivings and feelings in which it is
festcd, its most eloquent and beautiful expression.
Nor is it alone the affirmation of the Will to life
which the painter portrays in the varied scenes of
human life, throughout so significant and
" interest-
ing wherever seized." In the unearthly brightness
of saintly faces he tries to reproduce the reflection
of that turning of the Will to denial which seems to
call to us : u There is a better world.
11
232. An action, an occurrence, a scene in life
is of external significance, when it forms an im-
portant link in the causal chain governing human
life (ex. the action or word of a prince). It is of
internal significance, when human nature from
some point of view receives clear and characteristic
expression in it. From this it follows that, for the
representation of the Idea of Man, not so much the
outer as the inner significance of an action is of
account, that consequently this, not that gives the
work of art its real value. If, nevertheless, the
historical painter takes his subjects by preference
from outwardly significant events in history and
legend, the reason is the same as that which makes
the dramatist choose the heroes of his works amongst
crowned heads rather than from the people, a fact
of which we shall have to speak further on.
233, Freer in its movements than sculpture is
206 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
painting, freer than painting is poetry. It becomes
so at the cost of renouncing entirely the visible and
the concrete, and choosing as the material for por-
traying Ideas (to which visibility is essential), the
words of language, that is the representatives of
abstract concepts. These are only suitable as a
means of artistic portrayal so far as the poet
succeeds by his words in setting the imagination of
the hearer to play, in such a way that it creates
spontaneously the image in which the Idea appears.
This therefore adapts itself more intimately and
appropriately to the individuality of every hearer
than is possible with the plastic and pictorial arts,
which impose on all alike a ready-made object or
scene. This transformation of his concepts into
concrete form by the imagination of the hearer the
poet attains by the aid of various artifices peculiar
to himself. In the first place he will, as far as
possible, avoid all wide and general concepts of a
very abstract nature. Again, he makes a general
concept more concrete in limiting its sphere by an
added epithet. Finally he facilitates the closer and
more concrete apprehension of concepts by forcing
the hearer to extract these from images to which
he refers either in place of, or for the illustration of,
the concepts. This he does by means of Allegory,
by which we here understand (according to the
etymology from a\\o$ and ayopevuv) in general the
art of expressing one thing by means of another,
THE METAPHYSICS OK THE HEAUTIl-'UL 207
that is, a concept by a concrete image (to be created in
the imagination of the hearer). We regard therefore
all figurative expressions, metaphors, similes, parables,
etc. as allegories. Thus Plato in the Phaedrus (p.
2530 sq.) makes the concept of the soul perceptible
In comparing it to a charioteer and two horses
(anticipating its division into intellect, conscious
and unconscious Will), an allegory which, with slight
differences, occurs also in Indian philosophy (Kathaka-
Up. 3, 3). Accordingly allegory leads in poetry from
the abstract to the concrete, and by this to the primary
source of real knowledge. In plastic and pictorial
art, on the contrary, it leads from perception to the
abstract concept and so to what is inferior, because
secondary. Here it appears in the form of allegorical
figures by which an abstract concept or general
truth is to be illustrated. Now the ultimate aim of
art is the portrayal of the Idea, not of the concept.
Hence in plastic and pictorial art allegorical figures,
so far as they illustrate the concept, have no artistic
value, but only so far as, besides this, they give clear
and definite expression in some direction or other
to the Idea of Man.
As further auxiliary artifices in poetry we find
metre and rhyme. It cannot be denied that,
even by the best poets, clearness and definite
expression of thought are more or less sacrificed to
these. Thus the metrical fall of the syllables and
the sing-song of the rhyme arc dearly bought, from
208 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
which may be inferred that their value is not a low
one. This value seems to lie chiefly in the fact
that our ear, listening to their regular recurrence,
anticipates, as regards its form, that which follows,
so that this appears to be not absolutely new, but
prepared for by the preceding. It thus gains a
kind of legitimacy and necessity which disposes us
to assent the more readily to it. Metre and rhyme
serve moreover, like absence of colour in sculpture
and the flat surface in painting, to keep us in mind
of the fact that we have to do, not with an object
of empirical reality, but with a work of art. Thus
they help to sustain the objectivity of mood,
necessary to aesthetic contemplation.
234. So much for the auxiliaries of poetic art.
Its aim, like that of all art, is the portrayal of the
Ideas, above all of the Idea of man. It is true, no
sphere of being is to be excluded from poetry, but
in descriptions of nature the absence of definite
percepts is prejudicial to it, an evil which (as
Lessing has shown in the Laokoon) the art of the
poet can only partially overcome. On the other
hand poetry celebrates its greatest triumphs in the
description of human life and action. For here,
being no longer restricted like plastic and pictorial
art to reproducing the external, it lays bare the
whole inner organisation of the character, as docs
the sculptor the external form, Since man can
THE METAPHYSICS OK TilK P.K.UTlKn,
only reveal his being in a plurality of spatial and
temporal manifestations, the Idea of man cannot in
consequence be so perfectly represented by sculpture
and painting (restricted as these are to a single
well chosen moment) as by poetry, which, by
idealising reality, unites in a whole that which
in life appears but fragmentary. For poetic
idealisation consists, not in representing men other*
wise (better or worse) than they arc in reality, in
which case the poet would only give an untrue
picture of life, but in bringing together in poetic
representation, especially in the drama (though not
necessarily, as the French used to believe), that
which is in reality separated by time and space.
We may often notice that the greatest poets are not
very strict in observing the laws of time and space,
the nothingness of which they feel by a kind uf
metaphysical instinct. Thus Helen and Penelope
arc even after twenty years still young and attractive,
and Agamemnon arrives in Argos just as the taking
of Troy has been announced by the fire signals.
The less, however, the poet concerns himself with
the merely formal conditions of reality, the more
carefully will he treat its material part, as that
containing the Idea. Here he will take pains to
remove everything irrelevant and contradictory, by
which in real life the revelation of a character is
marred, since through temper, error, or other casual
influences we all very often act otherwise than befits
210 ELEMENTS OF METArHYSICS
our individuality. While therefore in real life we
frequently act as it were out of character, in poetry
the characters must be "sustained." By this is
meant that the poet must only lay stress on such
features as are characteristic of the individual, so
that we are compelled to create out of the few
pencil strokes, with which for instance Shakespeare
furnishes his characters, a definite and consistently
connected personality. Here the poet is aided by
the right given to him of lending to his char-
acters beautiful and eloquent language, by which
every emotion finds distinct expression, whereas in
real life deepest pain and greatest joy are often
dumb.
While poetry exercises and sharpens the eye for
the apprehension of human nature, it becomes an
excellent means of promoting our knowledge of
mankind. Thus for him who studies his Shake-
speare assiduously, all men by degrees will gain a
certain transparency. In this respect poetry
accomplishes far more than history, which, besides
being full of falsifications, represents what has
happened, imperfectly and with inadequate or
problematical motivation. It has, moreover, as
its aim the outward significance of actions for the
progress of history and not their inward significance
for the revelation of man : Sio ical
<fit\>o<ro<f)<i!>Tepov
teal (TirovftawTepov TTOMJW ItrropUft <TTLV, as Aristotle
rightly observes (Poet. 9).
THE METAPHYSICS OP TIIK UKAlTIFUt, 2u
235. Perfect objectivity of mind is necessary
to poetry as to every other art. When therefore (to
name only the chief kinds of poetry) we distinguish
the epic and the drama as the objective from the
lyric as the subjective species, our meaning is only,
that in the lyric the subject himself with his joys
and sorrows is treated by the poet with the same
objective contemplation as is, in the epic or the
drama, the external world. That which the lyric
poet describes, we all experience. But while man
in his torture is dumb, a god, as Goethe says,
vouchsafes to the poet the power of uttering what -he
suffers. That is, he alone has the power of mind
to maintain, even in face of the suffering of his own
Will, that objectivity of mind in which we recognised
the necessary condition of all esthetic contemplation,
and which is perhaps nowhere more difficult than
where it has to portray our inner being tossed by
the storm of passion. This is why even the lyric
poet seems not to attain this objectivity at once, but
only after his mind is strengthened by contemplation
of the outer world to that intuitive power which
enables him to detach from himself, as an objective
image, his own state of mind and so to free himself
from it, as did Goethe by his songs. For this reason
the lyric poet turns his gaze now on his own
agitated soul, now on the surrounding external
world, as may be seen in so many of Goethe's poems.
It appears very distinctly, for instance, in the song
212 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
"To the Moon," where the aspect of the moon,
filling wood and valley with hazy lustre, disposes the
poet to a contemplative mood and so enables him
to conceive objectively also his inner being. There-
fore he says the moon "loosens" his soul, and
likens it to a friend to whom one confides one's
sorrow, to obtain relief.
To the subjective poetry of the lyric is opposed
the more objective epic, which, in throwing off the
fetters of metre, gained as the novel freer move-
ment, thus adapting itself to the richer content of
a more complex civilisation. Both the epic and the
novel are yet to a certain extent subjective. We
see indeed the events for he alone reads Homer
worthily who follows with the eye what he describes
but we do not lose sight of the narrator. In the
drama the poet vanishes completely behind his work,
It is thus the most objective and so the highest and
most difficult species of poetry, in the original creation
of which only two peoples, the Indians and the
Greeks, succeeded (though in totally different ways).
The aim of the drama can be no other than to
illustrate the Idea of man by placing before us a
series of characters. In order to disclose these to
us, the dramatist invents an important plot, power-
fully affecting the interests of the persons concerned
and forcing them in their passion to reveal to us
their inmost being. For, as the nature of water is
not displayed so long as it remains at rest in the
THE METAHIYSJCS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 213
pond, but when as brook it drives the mill, as river
bears ships, when it rushes downwards as waterfall
springs upwards as fountain or splashes high in the
ocean surge so men seldom reveal their inner
being in the common occurrences of daily life, but;
often, when some terribk fatt\ some extraordinary
wickedness^ or finally some accidental chain of
circumstances brings about situations calling all
passions of the soul into stormy play.
This conflict we see in tragedy kindled to a heat
which allows of no other issue than the death of the
combatants, whom, even when not bearing arms, we
call characteristically enough the heroes of the piece.
These the poet chooses by preference from among
princes and high-placed dignitaries, for the fall from
the height has a more terrifying effect, while the
sufferings of the poor often arise from causes which
to the rich appear trivial, and might in many cases
be easily removed. But the tragic poet has to .show
how over this existence there sway forces which even
high birth, wealth, and might are powerless to resist
So the mighty man, the king, the hero dies, but In
him we often see extinguished, before life itself, the
Will to life, since excess of sorrow has taught him
the true lesson of the worth and meaning of this
existence. Thus tragedy disposes "us to the sublime
( 218) in showing everywhere to what irremediable
conflicts this existence to which we all belong, may
lead, so preaching with earnest voice the turning
214 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
away from willing and its unhappiness. Comedy,
on the contrary (so far as it does not pursue satirical
or political ends foreign to poetry), seems to
encourage the affirmation of the Will to life, in
leading through hindrances and intrigues of all kinds
to a happy solution," though, in doing so, it must
-be careful to drop the curtain at the right moment.
236. Music is, as the name implies, the work
of the Muses, the art /car eo%??z>, and indeed the
whole drift of our inquiry leads us to recognise in
it the summit of all art, because the most immediate
expression of Being-in-itself at which all art aims.
This dignity is assured to it not only by the incom-
parable expressiveness of its language but also by
the importance of what it imparts to us by it.
That which speaks to us in the sounds of music is,
as has long been recognised and often repeated, the
feelings, the affections and passions of the human
heart. Now these are nothing but the Will mirror-
ing itself from within in the intellect, that Will
which, as we know, is the thing-in-itself, the prin-
ciple of all being. Music therefore, in portraying
the world of feelings of the soul, discloses at the
same time the inner being of all nature. For that
which, in the imtn'ediate light of knowledge, flows
and surges in us as emotion, freeing itself from the
soul in sighs, words, and tones, and forming itself
into an objective and relief-giving image that it is
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE UKAUTTFUL 215
which sighs and vibrates as unconscious suffering,
as unfclt feeling in all sounds and tones of creation.
For that which roars in the thunder, murmurs in the
water, groans in the axle of the wheel, whispers in
the leaves of the tree, howls as wolf and coos as
clove, is nothing but the one Will to life, animating
us also : u aitad-famyam idam sMvani) tat satyavi,
sa citing tat tvam asi, ^vctakcto !
" u Of the essence
of that is this universe, that is the Real, that is the
Soul, that art thou, O CJvctakctu !
'*
(Clubidogya-
Upanishad) vi. 8-16).
Two ways lead to the knowledge of Bcmg-in-
itself, that is Will, the external way of cognition
and the internal way of feeling. All other arts
take the outer way, in seizing and portraying the
Will in its perceptual forms, the Ideas. Even
poetry, to which the inner world is opened, can
only impart what it sees there indirectly by means
of cognition through concepts. Music alone sets the
Ideas and the whole perceptual world aside, to take
its way through the ear, past the intellect, imme-
diately to the heart, to unfold, as an objective
spectacle, its revelations directly in the fading of
the hearer, though without any suffering on his
part ; and again and again we wonder how this
way of looking immediately and yet objectively at
Being-in-itsclf became possible to us,
The sole theme of music is the Will in all its
. joy and all its sorrow,
"
Accordingly it is pure weal
2x6 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
and woe which speak to us in the flattering accents
and the deep pathos of its sounds ; whether they
reproduce in short merry melodies the joyous aspira-
tion and speedy satisfaction of the Will, the soaring
of hope, the fiery striving, the rejoicings of victory
and festive mirth
;
or whether, in melancholy sounds,
deviating from the keynote and winding through
varied intricacies and painful dissonances, they be-
come an image of pain, now raging in frantic fury,
now creeping along in gnawing, slow-consuming
craving, or seeing in desolate and utter despair all
hope of life vanish, till at last, in the return to the
keynote, the greatest heartache finds rest, though it
be but that of the grave.
The fundamental character of willing, by the
portrayal of which music discloses the depths of the
human heart and with these the inmost being of
the world, consists, in small things as in great,
in the Will being now at variance, now recon-
ciled with surrounding circumstances, Let us tiy
to understand how this alternate disunion and re-
conciliation of the mind with the world is portrayed
by music through its agents, melody, rhythm, and
harmony. The soul of a musical piece is the
melody, in which is easily recognised the rising
and falling of willing, the intensity of which is
expressed in the dynamics of the sound. Now in
empirical existence there are two elements opposed
to the Will with which it must reckon and struggle,
TIIK MKTAN1YSICS OF THK BEAUTIFUL 217
in the concord of which with it consists all satisfac-
tion, out of the resistance of which to the wishes of
the heart springs all pain. These elements are on
the OIK* side the order of the universe in space, time,
and causality given a priori, on the other those
inorganic and organic forces of nature, added a
/*<tt/v7<"/7\ which are akin to the Will and share the
field with it, now favouring" and furthering its efforts,
now resisting it and preparing struggle and distress,
Similarly in music there is opposed to that sequence
of sounds which we call melody, on the one side
rhythm, with its .# priori regularity, which drives
the melody striving after the repose of the keynote
ever farther, allowing it no rest till the tonica, or at
least a harmonic interval coincides with the accent
of the rhythm. On the other hand we have
har.mony, akin in its nature to melody, which it
accompanies in its course as the surrounding forces
of nature accompany the Will, now furthering, now
hindering it- To complete the parallelism, we have
in the dissonances, in their painful expression allow-
ing of no rest, a self-evident objective picture of
iwsurmountccl hindrances and unsatisfied strivings.
The consonances, on the other band, paint that
harmony of human willing with the surrounding
and accompanying powers of the external world, on
which in fact all satisfaction depends.
Profoundly has Schopenhauer, to whose un-
equalled genius we owe also these interpretations,
2i8 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
further likened the bass and the deeper voices in
music to the Ideas of inorganic nature, and the
higher intermediate voices to those of the vegetable
and animal world.
Not particular occurrences, not single scenes of
life, are the subject of music, but willing alone, that
willing which underlies and is manifested in all
external being and doing, in joy, pain, longing,
anguish, hope, and all other emotions of the heart.
Music lifts these out of the visible world in which
they find expression, and pictures them alone and
independently in complete generality and yet in
thoroughgoing concrete distinctness. Thus music
is to the text of a song or an opera what the in-
ternal is to the external, the soul to the body. The
text gives us in words some important incident,
some passionate mood of mind, the music describes
alone and in themselves the emotions and strivings
of the Will expressed in them. Every piece of
music therefore interprets as clearly the essence of
the incidents which it accompanies, as music as a
whole mirrors the objectified Will in all its erring
and striving, in all its suffering and its satisfaction,
thus disclosing and revealing the deepest mystery
of being, the heart of the world, the ultimate ground
of all that is finite.
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 219
237. So we sec music, so all art engaged in
unveiling and interpreting the innermost being of
this whole world. Yet it is always this world alone
of which art tells us in all its forms, words, and
sounds. Beyond it no artist is borne by the flight
of his fancy, from it even a Dante and a Milton
must borrow all colours for their pictures. True, it
is not things themselves but the Ideas of things
which the artist portrays. But what separates the
things of this world from their Ideas, is only their
empirical reality, their existence in causality, space,
and time, with the consequences of such an exist-
ence. From these hindrances, originating in our
own intellect, the artistic genius* sets things free.
By this not so much the contemplated object is
changed as the method of its contemplation and
through this the contemplator himself. How the
phenomenon of the beautiful is explained by pro-
cesses within us, by the deliverance of the beholder
from himself, Schopenhauer has taught us, but it
was known also before him. r/Qrav rt, r&v i/cef
2$acTtt', Plato says (Phacclr. p. 250 A),
xal ov/ceP avr&v yliyvovrat,. And
Goethe also says (Faust, H. p, 258) :
*< Von Schonhcit ward von jchcr viel gesungen,
Wem sic erschcint, wird aus sich selbst entrtickt."
"Of beauty they have sung in every nge,
Who sees it is from bonds of self set free."
220 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
But this state of transport, in which we seem to
lose ourselves, is rather a return to ourselves,
a return from the strange land in which we so-
journ to our true home. For it is indeed only
above empirical existence that existence which is
not and ought not to be that the beholder feels
himself raised, when his ego pales as a shadow in
the light of beauty, when his whole individuality is
dissolved, as it were,, in contemplation. This fading
away of his individual existence is the source of
that bliss which fills the beholder. It is a sign that
the goal of our existence, that which is really posi-
tive and essential, must be sought beyond indi-
viduality. In raising us to this, the contemplation
of the beautiful grants us a satisfaction without
measure, not by the fulfilment of wishes, but by the
temporary removal of the entire possibility of such.
Yet ever and again the beholdef, after being lost in
contemplation, is laid again under the ban of
reality. He awakes like a captive who, slumbering
in his dungeon, dreamt of freedom.
Is there from this dungeon of existence an
escape without return ? From these bonds of em-
pirical reality in which we are driven from life to
death, from death to new life in perpetual circuit
is there an eternal deliverance ?
This question points to the last and the most
important subject of our inquiry, to which we now
proceed.
THE SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS
PART IV
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY
I Preliminary
238. Man has two opposed activities. The one
going from the external to the internal is knowing,
the other directed from within to without is acting,
Knowing is twofold abstract and perceptual Thus
we have three fundamental functions thinking,
perceiving, acting,
239. These three functions are originally and
essentially physical (belonging to the phenomenal
world), that is, they presuppose the reality of caus-
ality, space, and time. Under this supposition
thinking is empirical, and leads, as we have shown,
to materialism, perceiving is individual and
apprehends things according to their (nearer or
remoter) spatial, temporal, and causal relations to
the beholding subject, but not according to their
222 ELEMENTS OF MKTAVIIYSICS
objective Being-in-itself. Lastly, acting Is egoistic,
that is, affirmative of the ego or the Will to
individual existence, as is clear from the following.
Acting is the passing from one state to another
by means of an act of the Will. Such is only pos-
sible, if the succeeding state is preferred -to the
preceding ; this again presupposes that by this
change dissatisfaction is decreased or pleasure in-
creased. Now space, time, and causality restrict
my being, and with it the possibility of feeling plea-
sure and pain, to my individuality (and to what I
consider as belonging to the sphere of my ego, such
as family, property, honour, etc.). Consequently,
pleasure and pain, from the empirical standpoint,
can only be motives of action so far as they have
reference to our own individuality ; that is, all
action is egoistic, affirmative of the individuality.
240. We know that the physical order of the
universe originates fundamentally in an error, since
space, time, and causality, on which it is based, are
not, as we naturally suppose, aeternae veritatcs^ that
is, an eternal and unchangeable order lying in things
themselves, but only functions, originating in our
intellect, in which we conceive Bcing-in-itself (Will,
the Ideas), and so behold it as world* Hence
in contrast to our inborn consciousness of the
physical order of the world in space, time, and
causality,stands the truer, better,more real conscious-
THE METAPHYSICS OK MORALITY 223
ness of the metaphysical order without space,
time, and causality. And in fact the whole task of
metaphysics is reduced to showing how this cpn-
sciuusness of the metaphysical order comes to light
in the three departments of thinking, perceiving, and
acting, and how from these there spring, like three
stems from one root, the three metaphysical pheno-
mena of Philosophy, Art, and Morality (which last
conception, if one only understands it deeply
enough, coincides with that of Religion).
241. Space, time, and causality are called, as
the basis of the physical, that is, of the individual
order of things, the principle of individuation.
Through innate entanglement in this principle and
its illusion our thinking is empirical, our perceiving
individual, our acting egoistic, that is, it distinguishes
between the ego and the non-ego, and so affirms the
individuality. It is due to a penetration of the
principle of individuation, that our thinking becomes
no longer empirical but transcendental> our perceiving
no longer individual but (esthetic^ our acting no
longer will-affirming but will-denying* The follow-
ing scheme, rightly understood, will greatly facilitate
the insight into the connection of our whole meta-
physical system. Committed to memory it will at
the same time serve to keep in view the conscious-
ness of the organic unity of our philosophy, which is
indispensable also to the understanding of all details.
224 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Physics (World)
(1) Thinking: empirical
(2) Perceiving: individual
(3) Acting : affirming
Metaphysics (God)
transcendental Philosophy.
(esthetic Art.
denying Religion.
242. Explanation of this scheme. Firstly>
we have, in the sphere of thought, the empirical
standpoint, restricted to space, time, and causality,
and culminating in materialism ( 7-30). Opposed to
this is the transcendental standpoint, from which
we demonstrated the subjectivity of space, time, and
causality ( 47-68), deducted these from the world
( 69-77. 86-88), and deciphered the remainder, that
is force, as Will ( 1 46- 153, 159-1 66), thereby attain-
ing to the last possible understanding of nature*
Secondly, the perception of things rises from the
individual view which regards them as a totality of
spatial, temporal, and causal relations to the behold-
ing subject ( 198-201), to aesthetic intuition.
This penetrates and sets aside these relations, seizes
the true -inner being of that which is here manifested,
that is the Idea ( 202-224), and embodies it in
works of art ( 225-236). Now it is this same two-
fold nature of consciousness which appears thirdly
and lastly in the actions of man as two tendencies
opposed as magnetic poles of the Will manifested'
in them. For opposed to the natural and egoistic
actions, affirming the Will to life, are certain ac-
tions which, often externally not distinguishable from
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 225
the first and blended with them, yet show inwardly a
diametrically opposed striving
1
. This is, according to
different standpoints, defined as good, moral, holy,
Christian, etc., but is more fittingly described as a
denying of the Will to individual existence/
For the only explanation of these actions is that the
actor always sacrifices in them to a certain extent
his own individual and limited existence by expand-
ing his ego beyond the bounds of his individuality,
recognising his own self in others, and thus breaking
through the barriers of space, time, and causality in
a practical respect as does the artist in an intuitive
and the philosopher in an abstract way.
243. According to this parallelism, which will
find its further elucidation in the sequel, the denial
of the Will to life and with it all virtue and holiness
depends on nothing but a penetration of the principle
of individuation ( 241), consequently on knowledge
alone, But this knowledge is of a quite peculiar
kind and related in a metaphysical sense to the
doctrine of the subjectivity of space, time, and caus-
ality, as is in an empirical sense intuitive understand-
ing to abstract knowledge. Now, just as no physical
abstract doctrine can ever replace the physical
intuitive knowledge of the world, so our metaphysical
abstract teaching (irrefutable as it is) would scarcely
succeed in producing that metaphysical intuitive]
understanding on which moral action depends. Nay,
Q
226 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
we shall be compelled farther on to recognise that
the metaphysical knowledge of the a-priority of space,
time, and causality, which, as contradictory to the
nature of our own intellect, was in abstract form
only attainable in the most intricate ways, is in the
intuitive form in which it underlies moral phenomena
no longer an intellectual act at all. For intellect is
nothing but a texture of space, time, and causality, all
of which are here suspended. Thus the moral pheno-
menon is a deeper rooted process, a partial or total
transformation of the Will itself, which, in moral
actions, turns itself as it were away from the world and
its order. To us only, since we have no intellectual form
. in which to conceive it, and must therefore of necessity
clothe it in the heterogeneous forms of affirmation,
this turning of the Will to denial appears as an
unconscious removal of these, as an intuitive break-
ing through the phenomenal forms of affirmation,
space, time, and causality. In this point, to which
our consideration will repeatedly recur, lies the real
difficulty unparalleled in any other science of the
metaphysics of morality. The deeds of denial,
though occurring daily before our eyes, are to our
intellect, as a mere organ of affirmation, as little con-
ceivable in their real essence as is the freedom
,(absence of causality) in which they have their root.
Hence our attempt to portray these in the forms of
our understanding must remain imperfect in like
manner, as does the image of a corporeal object on a
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 227
plane surface, the proportions of which are indeed
accurately depicted, but in a distortion regulated
according to the laws of perspective.
244. Order of procedure. The Will is, as
thing -in -itself, exempt from causality and conse-
quently free ( i68,3). Hence with regard to indi-
vidual existence two ways are equally open to it.
The one is the willing of individual existence which,
as the affirmation of the Will to life, viewed
through the forms of our intellect, appears as the
world, extended infinitely in space and time and
regulated throughout, in small things as in great, by
causality. The other way is the not-willing of this
same individual existence, the manifestation of which,
as the denial of the Will to life, lies beyond the
forms of our understanding and remains therefore
wholly barred and inconceivable. Therefore we
know the denial of the Will to life only in so far as
it breaks through this world of affirmation in moral
actions, actions which, for that very reason, are at
variance with the natural order of things and its
laws originating in the intellect. They gleam through
the darkness of existence as the light of another of
a better world. But we have no eyes to catch this
light save by its reflection in morality. Hence
we must restrict ourselves to showing, by the aid of
experience, both affirmation and denial in the deeds
of men, thus making the last step honestly possible
228 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
to an intellect like ours. To this end we have to
prove beforehand, that to the affirming Will existence,
to existence the present is assured (immortality of the
soul) ; secondly, that necessity, as the mere pheno-
menal form of freedom, does not release us from the
responsibility for what we commit or omit (freedom
of the Will), This being done, we must take into
consideration this world as the stage of the affirma-
tion of the Will to life, to understand how on the
one side all wickedness, on the other all evil of
which the world is full, spring necessarily from
egoism, which, as we shall see, is the fundamental
form of affirmation and inseparably bound up with
it. Consequently a salvation from moral and
physical evil is only possible through a complete
transformation of our being, consisting in a turning
of the Will, In this change of the Will we shall
recognise, in accordance with the fundamental doc-
trines of Christian and Indian religion, the real moral
goal and the ultimate aim of this existence. The
nature of this turning of the Will to denial, -the
ways it takes and the principle manifested in it will
be the subject of the last questions which we have to
raise and so far as the nature of our intellect
admits of it to answer.
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 229
II. On the Immortality of the Soul
245. The immortality of the soul, this truth
dearer to men than any other, stands and falls with
the fundamental dogma of Kant ( 92). From
Kant's doctrine follows the immortality of the soul,
from the immortality of the soul the doctrine of
Kant.
246. We showed already above ( 155-157)
how the immortality of the soul is the inevitable
consequence of the a-priority of space, time, and
causality. Whoever therefore has followed our con-
siderations, will not misunderstand us if, for the sake
of imprinting this important truth and its proofs in the
memory, we throw it into the form of a syllogism.
Time exists only in our consciousness.
Beginning and end are only in time.
Consequently beginning and end exist
only in our consciousness :
that is, they belong only to the form in which our
intellect sees things, but not to things as they are in
themselves. Thus from the ideality of time follows
immortality.
247. Conversely, whoever clings, from whatever
23o ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
grounds, to the immortality of the soul, must acknow-
ledge transcendental Idealism as a necessary conse-
quence of his belief. For, questioned from the
empirical standpoint, nature asserts not immortality
but exactly the reverse. Openly and naively she
preaches in her unmistakable language the truth
that man by generation comes from nothing to
existence and by death returns from existence to
nothing. If therefore the belief in immortality is to
be maintained at all, we must necessarily deny to
the assertions of nature objective and absolute
validity. Now to do so, we obtain a scientific
right alone by Kant's doctrine that nature is only
manifestation and not thing-in-itself, that consequently
the truth of her assertions is merely subjective
valid for intellects like our own and relative.
248. We shall arrive at a more intimate under-
standing of immortality than is possible by way of
abstract conclusions, in proportion as we are able to
understand the profound saying of Schopenhauer,
that life is assured to the Will, and the present
assured to life.
I, The Will, in the state of affirmation, has to
life as which it is manifested, not a merely accidental
relation, as to a thing which it may take or not .take,
but is necessarily bound up with it. For life is in
fact nothing else but the Will itself, as it is portrayed
in the higher grades of its objectification in the forms
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 231
of our intellect Thus life is the visibility of the
Will to life, accompanying it as the shadow the
body, and, like the shadow, showing itself, wherever
the light of the intellect shines. Where therefore
there is Will to life, there also is life, so long as the
forms of our intellect, that is, so long as time, space,
and matter exist, consequently to all eternity. Aeons
indeed may pass away in the life of nature in which
no organic or living being exists, but in these there
is no intellect, therefore no time, therefore no world.
They are only an empty scheme of the empirical
view of things. Therefore Schopenhauer says with
truth, life is assured to the Will; or as an
Indian verse says (AshtdvakragtiA, 10, 3) :
Yatra yatra bhavet trishnfr, samsaram mddhi tatra vai.
" Know that wherever there is desire, there in truth
is also the samsAra"
2. But further. We, it is true, divide time into
the infinite past, the infinite future, and the ex-
tensionless present, separating them. But in reality
there is no past, no future, and there never will be
one. Both are mere abstractions
; the sole form of
existence is the present Perishable as it is, it can
yet never be lost Step by step it accompanies
existence as its never - failing phenomenal form-
Since then to-day it is still to-day, and this truth
will never lose its validity, we may assert, as a result
of the most immediate observation an observation
232 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
irrefutable and to be experienced every moment
the tenet of Schopenhauer : the present is assured
to life.
249. The immortality of the soul is the time-
, lessness of our inmost being, the Will. It is therefore,
properly speaking, no real continuance of life beyond
v * > /
death, but an jndestructibility without continu-
ance in time. In vain we torment ourselves to /
"""""
i*'/
realise perceptually this abstract and, in an empirical
*
sense, contradictory concept, for it sets aside these
very forms of the intellect through which alone
perceptual knowledge is possible, If therefore we
would bring the conception of immortality nearer
and make it more intelligible, we must resolve on
doing violence to truth and, just as the soul itself
has been conceived as substance, that is, in the form
of spacfe, so we must view its immortality through
the spectacles of time. These presupposed, im-
'
mortality appears as the transmigration of souls,
.
a myth removed from the truth only in so far as
it views in the form of time what is timeless.
Hence it is met with not only as a primitive belief
perhaps of all peoples, but has also been for the
wisest of all time a subject of wondering meditation,
In the Bible even there are traces of it, though these
are scanty and uncertain (Ps. xc. 3 ; St. Matth. xi. 1 4,
xvi. 14 ; St. John ix. 2). Its real home is India, where
from of old it has been the basis of belief, and has
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 233
an incredibly great practical influence. To the Indian
this whole world appears as the samsAra ( 176), that
is, the transmigration-circuit of souls. These pass
from one body into another, to receive punishment
and reward for the deeds of a former life from all
eternity to all eternity, unless one attains to perfect
knowledge (samyag-dar$anam\ in which case his soul
leaves the cycle of empirical existence to enter
niru&nam^ which is home, rest, bliss,
250, If we could resolve to adopt this concep-
tion of immortality as a transmigration of souls
figurative it is true, yet nearer to the truth than any
other we might perhaps answer the question as to
the continuance of our individuality thus, that
our individuality does indeed endure beyond death,
but only so long as the affirmation of the Will of
which it is the expression. Animals, with the
exception of the highest, have only the character
of their species, no individual character ( 182.
229), In proportion as in animals the entire
empirical manifestation finds its full explanation
in the Idea of the species (and all varieties in the
adaptation of this Idea to the various external
circumstances, 182* 189), in the same proportion
is the single animal a mere cctype of the Idea. In
the eternity of the Idea, therefore, the brute has its
immortality. The phenomenon of Man, on the
other hand, cannot be explained only by the
234 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
character of the species, since this in him is sup-
plemented by an individual character (equally
innate and manifested in the whole life). Hence
this character is, as much as the Idea of the species,
a principle of the explanation of the phenomenon,
must lie therefore behind it, and is consequently not
dissolved with the dissolution of the phenomenon.
'
Individuality is the innate character of the Will.
Life is its expansion in the light of intellect, through
which is attained either an approach to denial or a
hardening in affirmation. Both are the very fruit of
life
;
for as this we have to consider that modifica-
tion of willing which the individual takes over with
it from life to death. Now if Schopenhauer's
hypothesis is right, that the (individually determined)
Will is, as the radical element in us, inherited from
the father, the intellect as the secondary from the
mother, the riddle of generation (that most mys-
terious point in the empirical order of things) is
solved. The Will, united in the father with an
intellect which does not suffice for the renunciation
of willing (and with it of generation), seeks a new
intellect, which the mother gives it, that is, the Will
hastens from generation to generation to an ever
new expansion of its being in the light of another
intellect, until, attaining perfect self-knowledge, it
freely denies itself and enters salvation. The fol-
lowing verse of Goethe's might be interpreted as a
description of this process :
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 235
Alles* Vergangliche
1st nur ein Gleichnis (is phenomenal, not the
thing-in-itself) ;
Das Unzulangliche
Hier (in denial) wird's Ereignis (denial is, so
to say, the only real process in the
phenomenal world) ;
Das Unbeschreibliche (for thinking which
we have no intellectual form),
Hier ist es gethan (practically accom-
plished) ;
Das Ewig-Weibliche (the intellect always in-
herited from the mother)
Zieht uns hinan (to salvation).
Against this r61e which generation seems to play
in the plan of salvation, it might be objected that, in
the case of generation being by accidental hindrances
prevented, or in so far as it terminates in the woman,
an advance to salvation is cut off to the Will. But
such objections merely prove that we have here to
do with a transcendent process, the connection of
which is partly revealed to, partly hidden from the
empirical view of things, restricted as this is to the
surface of nature, in the same way as threads,
wound into a ball, when seen from without, now
allow of their inner connection being traced, now run
inextricably into each other.
236 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
III. On the Freedom of the Will
251. The contrast between the empirical and
the transcendental standpoints runs, as a continuous
contradiction between the two methods of considera-
tion, through our whole system, But it . appears
nowhere so clearly as at that point where, turning
our gaze within, we perceive through the veil of the
phenomenal world, here becoming more transparent
( 148), Being-in-itself as the Will. Here this great
antinomy which solves all the riddles of existence,
which includes and reconciles all other contrasts
the contrast between phenomena and the thing-in-
itself was, long before the time of Kant and
Schopenhauer, thrust on the thinking mind, and
led to the old controversy whether man's Will is
free or whether it is in all its manifestations
necessarily determined by motives and consequently
not free a question which, in a limited but specially
important sphere, acknowledges as possible and in-
vestigates that contrast which Kant and Schopenhauer
were called upon to extend to the whole of existence.
Thus their philosophy is heralded (as the sun by the
dawn) by the question as to the freedom of the Will
which, centuries before their time, in the philosophical
as in the theological domain, occupied, tormented,
and set at variance the minds of men.
252. To be necessary means nothing more
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 237
than to follow from a given cause. Every
change in nature therefore is necessary, since every
change can only occur so far as it forms a link in
the chain of causality. This does not exclude its
being in other respects the opposite of necessary,
that is accidental. For to be accidental means
merely not to follow from a given cause. Ac-
cordingly every occurrence in the world is both
necessary and accidental ; necessary with regard to
the concatenation of causes from which it springs,
accidental in respect to every other causal series
with which it meets in space and time without
however being determined by it. Accident or
chance, therefore, is every intersection of two
independent causal series which, meeting in space
and time, unite to form a new event.
Remark. Thus it is necessarily caused by motives that
some one passes a house at a certain time. And it is just as
necessarily determined by causes, that at the same moment
a tile is loosened from the roof and falls. But the unfortunate
coincidence of the two events is a chance.
253. As chance is the negation of a particular
:ausal connection, so freedom (in the sense in which
ve here use the word) is the negation of all causality.
\ccordingly the question as to the freedom of the
Vill signifies this : Are the actions in which man's
Vill is manifested, the necessary and inevitable pro-
,uct of the character and of the motives influencing
238 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
it, or does the natural law of causality here suffer an
exception, so that to a certain man in a given case
(that is under the influence of a particular motive)
two contrary actions are possible ? Is it for instance
equally possible to a man, arriving at a point where
the road diverges, to go to the right or to the left ?
That a man, apart from physical impossibilities, can
do what he will, of that there is no doubt. But
whether he can also will otherwise than he wills,
whether in a given case from that which he wills and
accordingly does, he could as easily will and so as
easily do the opposite, whether for instance in the
above case where, if he will, he may go to the right,
or if he will, to the left, he could just as easily will
to go to the right as to the left that is the
question.
254. Whatever enters and can enter the domain
of our understanding, consequently whatever exists
( 76), is subject to the constraint of causality,
because this is an innate form of our intellect, from
which we cannot under any circumstances escape.
Now the action of man belongs like everything else
to that sum total of empirical reality which is de-
pendent on the intellect. It follows therefore that
our actions must be throughout the necessary product
of those inner tendencies or springs of action (as we
may call them) forming the empirical character, and
of the motives which, from without, call these into
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 239
play. Accordingly if these two factors were only
fully known to us, the future action of a man might
(as Kant says) be predicted with the certainty of an
eclipse. This will appear less paradoxical, if we
reflect that the deeds of a man are only the visibility
of his Will, that is, merely the reflection of his innate
character in the intellect woven of space, time, and
causality. What in itself is Will, appears in space
as body, in time as life, in causality as those actions
constituting the course of life. Actions, therefore,
can never turn out other than is the Will of which
they are the mere visibility. That is, they must
necessarily proceed as they are and not otherwise
from the quality of the Will which is stimulated to
manifestation by outward motives.
255. The doctrine of determinism is a
corollary of the law of causality, and consequently a
simple application of a principle established a priori^
that is before all experience, to a case which certainly,
of all possible cases, is the nearest. This being so,
it is strange that not only the ordinary mind can in
no wise reconcile itself to this doctrine, but that even
acute and profound thinkers (such as Spinoza,
Priestley, Voltaire) have succeeded only after long
resistance in acknowledging this truth, a truth de-
monstrable a priori (that is with mathematical cer-
tainty). But they all probably experienced what
each of us experiences as regards the freedom of the
240 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Will. If we look through the apparatus of our
intellect, that is, outwards at our actions, we - see
them springing with necessity as effects from the
motives which, as causes, determine the Will. So
soon, however, as we direct our attention inwards to
the only point where (according to 148 and with
the there given restriction) it is granted to us to set
aside the forms of our intellect and seize the thing-
in- itself as the Will within us, we are overcome
again by the consciousness a consciousness yield-
ing to no logical argument that our Will is free.
Free not merely so far as we can do what we will,
but also so far as it depends on ourselves alone at
every moment and under every circumstance to will
thus or also otherwise. Therefore no criminal even
would (save for the sake of appearance and without
believing his own words) allege the necessity of his
deeds as an excuse for them. And again no proof
of determinism will ever be valid and overwhelming
enough to prevent the freedom of the Will being
again and again proclaimed as a fact of inner con-
sciousness. This consciousness of the freedom of
our Will, which signifies nothing less than the ever-
open path to salvation, cannot possibly be explained
(as by Schopenhauer) as a self-delusion, due to the
intellect becoming acquainted with the resolutions
of the Will first in their execution and before that
considering contrary decisions equally possible. For
if this were so, in the course of life the intellect
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 241
having become acquainted with the Will it serves
that consciousness of freedom would disappear. We
must rather admit that in this duality of our con-
sciousness of the necessity and freedom of our action
is expressed the great contrast between phenomena
and the thing-in-itself, which, as we shall see, has a
far-reaching moral significance. This significance
appears at this point the most important of all
so clearly that it made itself felt even to the ordi-
nary mind untouched by philosophy. Accordingly
we might call that conviction of the freedom of the
Will an innate chapter of metaphysics, implanted, as
indispensable, in every man.
256. There are thus three great transcendental
truths mutually requiring, supporting, and supple-
menting each other :
1. All that belongs to the phenomenal world lies
in the bonds of space, time, and causality ; the thing-
in-itself proved as Will is, on the other hand, free
from these intellectual forms in which the world is
built up.
2. If I look outwards, I see everything through
the medium of space, time, and causality. If I look
within, I perceive, under certain restrictions, that
which exists independently of these intellectual forms
the Will as Being-in-itself, beyond which there is
no being.
3. If I look outwards at my deeds, I see that
R
242 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
they all, being necessitated by motives, must with-
out exception be as they are and not otherwise.
If I look inwards, I find myself free and equally
capable of willing an action or its opposite. In this
consciousness of freedom is rooted the responsibility
for what I do or leave undone, the nature of which
can under certain circumstances give me qualms of
conscience, not to be reasoned away by any subtlety
of a priori deduction.
Remark. If after all these explanations some one still
asks : "Am I then really free in my action or am I not ? "
The exact answer is: "You are not, for your action is the
necessary product of factors which as causes precede in time,
and consequently belong, in the moment of action, to the past,
are therefore no longer in your hand and yet inexorably de-
termine the present. You are not free. That is just as
certain, as it is certain that this table stands before you, just as
certain, but also not more certain. And so, 'just as this table
in space and time has only empirical reality, but as thing-in-
itself is at the same time spaceless and timeless (however
inconceivable it may be), so your action is only determined
phenomenally by causality, as regards its inner nature on the
contrary it is at the same time exempt from causality that is
free (inconceivable as it may be). Hence you are neverthe-
less*free."
257. Thus every man has for himself and in
his inmost being the knot which joins two worlds,
the moral diversity of which will be the further
subject of our inquiry. For the contrast between
phenomena and the thing-in-itself is finally nothing
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 243
but that between the affirmation and the denial of
the Will to life. For as space,- time, and causality
on the one hand separate phenomena from the thing-
in-itself, so also on the other they divide affirmation
from denial. They are indeed only the forms of
affirmation on which individual existence, and with
it all sin not indeed depends (for then the intellect
would be the sinful element) but yet seems for our
conception to depend, so that every act of denial
appears as a practical breaking through of these
forms, as an unconscious passing beyond them.
Here already it becomes clear that only the deeds
of affirmation are necessary\ while those of denial on
the other hand are free, and that an action will con-
tain just so much freedom, that is, exemption from
causality and consequently incomprehensibility, as it
contains denial, that is, morality. Since, however,
the works of denial appear on the stage of this
world, they must of necessity enter its forms and so
be manifested in the hue of affirmation. Therefore
they also, though belonging to a world order of
eternal freedom, must nevertheless, seen through the
spectacles of causality, appear to our understanding
as in a certain sense necessary and determined by
motives. This occurs inr a way, it is true, which at
once distinguishes them from the deeds of affirma-
tion, springing from the opposite tendency of the
Will, and which will next be the subject of our
investigation.
244 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
IV. The Pagan and the Christian Standpoints,
or the Affirmation and the Denial
of the Will to Life
258. Opposed to the standpoint of affirma-
tion or the Pagan is the standpoint of denial
or the Christian. It is true, the conceptions
Paganism and Christianity are not used here in the
ordinary and historical sense, but in a somewhat
different one, to be gathered from the further course
of our inquiry. We shall not, however, forgo these
names in a book designed, in the first place, for
Western readers. For firstly, in setting forth the
doctrine of the denial of the Will, we must attach it
to the historical form in which we have received it,
and this for our part of the world is Christianity.
Again it is of importance to point out to our
theology with all energy the way she must take for
her safety, the way she sooner or later will take,
though momentarily she delays breaking her earthen
vessels, not knowing that their contents, in the
process of elimination of foreign matter, have
crystallised and need no longer any tradition as
covering.
Remark. The eternal saving doctrine of denial appears
in Christianity as the giving up of one's own sinful will
to a holy will conceived as personal. This is an
anthropomorphic conception, irreconcilable with science, and
has the further objection that it leads away from the main
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 245
purpose and (what is worse) favours eucUemonisrn. On the
other hand we cannot hope to find a form more capable of
deeply moving the soul, one more conducive to the spirit of
genuine religion, than that of the Bible. Therefore for the
people also in the future it will still have currency as exoteric
teaching: tKtivois o*e ro?9 ew ev TrapafioXais ret- Trai/ra
yi'verat (St. Mark iv. n); enough, if by means of science
we succeed in leading the thinking portion of mankind, not as
hitherto away from the thing, but rather more deeply into it,
namely from exoteric to esoteric Christianity, which is the
metaphysics of Schopenhauer.
259.. We have reduced all becoming and all
being in nature to an operating, all operating to a
willing, and have denoted the principle of this
willing, which shows itself in various forms in
conscious and unconscious, animate* and .inanimate
nature, by the word Will. In doing so we found
that the Will, which is the thing-in-itself and with
that the ultimate principle of all being, is unknown
to us as it is in itself. We know it only from a
particular side, namely so far, as in willing or
affirming individual existence, Will is objectified as
this .universe in the phenomenal forms of affirmation,
time, space, and causality.
Now it is in some way conceivable even a priori,
that Will since as thing-in-itself it is not subject to
causality, and consequently lies outside the sphere
of all constraint should be capable not only of a
willing, but also of its reverse, namely, of a not-
willing'. That is, it is originally equally possible to
246 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
it to will individual existence, that . is, to affirm it,
and consequently to appear in space, time, and
causality, or on the contrary not to will it, that is,
to deny it. We are, however, prevented once for all
by the nature of our intellect from understanding
whether, and in what way, there is opposed to the
realm of willing or affirmation, which is this
infinite world, a realm of not-willing or denial.
For since with the forms of our intellect individua-
tion, and with it affirmation is necessarily established,
such a realm of denial can never be manifested in
these forms, can consequently never be the object of
an understanding like ours. Nay, for this realm of
denial (pourftela T&V ovpav&v) there seemed indeed
no place left after Copernicus by his discovery had
taken away the heaven. Infinite space, infinite
time, and the unending chain of causality, these
principles of material, individual, sinful existence,
filled everything till a stronger than he came, who
in his turn took away space, time, and causality, in
proving them to be the subjective forms of per-
ception, thus making room for another order of
things than ours.
260. From what has been said it follows
undoubtedly, that theology, to exist at all as a
science, must base herself on Kant's doctrine. This
she will do the more speedily, the sooner, at a time
when she is most
'closely pressed by historical
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 247
criticism and natural science, she remembers her real
advantage. Unlike theology philosophy considers
it her task to analyse what is given by nature, to
reduce it to its ultimate elements and there to stop.
We might, therefore, at the point which our inquiry
has reached, content ourselves with stating that the
existence of a realm of denial, opposed to that of
nature, is not impossible, so that of a denial of the
Will there would be no further question, but that
nature itself here offers a series of phenomena
absolutely inexplicable by the natural principle of
the affirmation of the Will to life. In investigating,
namely, by aid of the surest experience, the action of
man, which is in general, like the rest of nature, an
expression of the affirmation of the Will to life, we
meet a series of actions which are in the natural
order of things inconceivable, being diametrically
opposed to this world and its laws, contradicting
these in every sense and, as it \vere, totally unhinging
them. These phenomena, which can only be
conceived as a breaking through of denial into the
sphere of affirmation, are the deeds of genuine
morality. They are preached, as the Gospel of a
better world, daily before our eyes in a way which
cannot be gainsaid. They are, in the truest and
strictest sense of the word, miracles, which occur
around us ever anew, and if all other miracles fall
to the ground, these will remain, and they are
sufficient.
248 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
The deeds of morality are miracles because
(strange as it sounds) they are impossible and yet
real. This is the contradiction they bear in them,
this is the difficult problem which they lay on the
thinking mind. To this it is due that moral
investigations, as the most important, are also the
most difficult in the whole range of philosophy. In
order not to err here we must take into con-
sideration the totality of action possible to man.
For this purpose it is necessary to classify the same
according to some principle which will guarantee the
completeness of our procedure. Such a principle we
have now to seek.
261. Legislation, the aim of which is protec-
tion from wrong, is concerned with one thing alone
that certain actions should be done and certain
others left undone, As to the causes from which
this doing or this leaving undone springs, it is
indifferent, for that lies outside its province. The
standpoint of morality is exactly the reverse. For
it external action is only of significance so far as it
is the symptom of something internal, of the moral
disposition from which it springs. To determine,
therefore, the worth or worthlessness of an action
morality looks not at the outward result, but solely
at the intention, at the aim pursued with this.
According to their aims, therefore, we have to
establish our classification of actions.
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 249
There are two things and two alone which can
determine that manifestation of our Will which we
call action either the wish to further well-being or
the intention to cause ill. Now, on the other hand,
this intended well-being or ill, which as aim underlies
all actions small or great, refers necessarily either to
our own selves or to others. Accordingly every act
possible to man pursues as aim either one's own
well-being or another's ill, or one's own ill or
another's ill. This being so, all human actions
may be divided into four classes to one of which
every action must inevitably belong. These four
classes go back to as many possible main springs of
action which, as we shall see, determine the moral
merit or demerit of actions, so far as two of them are
based on the affirmation, two on the denial of the
Will to life, as shown by the following scheme.
Aims : Springs of action :
1 . Another's ill malice \
2. One's own } . > Affirmation (Paganism),
> egoism I
well-being J )
3. Another's j . }
well-being j
WH
> Denial (Christianity).
4. One's own ill asceticism J
Since action can have no aims other than these
here enumerated, these four springs of action
mentioned above are the sole possible ones. Yet
250 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
they may be still further reduced to two, since, as we
shall see, all malice originates in egoism, and every
act of compassion contains as its essence an act of
asceticism. Thus the totality of human action
appears as the expression of two opposed currents,
one egoistic, affirming^ mundane, the other ascetic,
denying, supramundane, which in reality are often
indistinguishably blended, the clear and strict
separation of which, however, and their reduction to
two opposed principles, is the highest, as it is the
last, task of our philosophy.
V. Egoism
as the General and Necessary Phenomenal Form
of the Affirmation of the Will to Life
8 262. The affirmation of the Will to life is its
t)
existence in space, time, and causality. Such an
existence is necessarily and inevitably an egoistic
one, so that egoism is proved to be the general
phenomenal form of the affirmation of the Will.
Proof: Every existence which as body occupies
a particular space, and as life fills a particular time,
is of necessity a limited one. For however great
may be the space and time in which it is, there
still remains sufficient space and time in which it
is not, because, as we have proved ( 7. 9), space
and time are infinite. This limitation of every
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 251
existence involves its having on this side the limit
ego, beyond it non-ego, It is exactly the
consciousness of this distinction between ego and
non-ego which makes egoism. Thus it is necessarily
bound up with the forms of affirmation, space, and
time.
From this proposition follow two conclusions of
the greatest importance for the metaphysics of
morality.
1. If egoism is the general phenomenal form of
the affirmation of the Will to life, it follows
that all deeds springing from egoism (or
malice, which proceeds, as we are about to
show, from it) contradict the world order of
affirmation, reach beyond it, and bear
witness to another order of things than
ours.
2. The egoism of affirmation is, as we shall
further understand, the inexhaustible source
of all that is bad and evil. It is con-
sequently the only and radical sin in us.
If now it is necessarily bound up with
empirical existence, it, and with it sin, can
only be removed .by the removal of
empirical existence itself. Now since
existence is assured to the Will ( 248),
such a remdval is not attainable by re-
nouncing life but by renouncing the Will ;
to life.
252 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
263. All empirical existence, from the stone to
man, is properly speaking egoistic, for all that exists
distinguishes between ego and non-ego. Thus even
inorganic bodies : the boulder which, in crashing
downwards, shatters whatever lies in its path ; the
machine, in crushing what obstructs its motion ; the
ball when, in piercing the body, it leaves behind the
sharply-defined traces of its ego. But we speak of
egoism in its narrower sense only in the case of that
existence which distinguishes, not by its mere action,
but with consciousness, between ego and non-ego,
that is of animal and human nature. Meanwhile
the brute even is not aware of its egoism in abstracto.
It knows it only subjectively, not objectively
( II S)4)j and thus not with full consciousness. This
last appears only in man, and with it comes the
knowledge of the sinfulness of existence itself, on
which is based the possibility of a conversion of the
Will to denial.
264. Besides egoism, which aims at one's own
good, we have named above, as the second spring
of affirmation, malice, the ultimate aim of which
consists in occasioning another's suffering. Here
the pain of another is not, as in the case of egoism,
means to an end, namely our own welfare, but Is
itself end and immediate satisfaction. One might
therefore be tempted to refer malice to the influence of
supernatural demoniacal powers, but that it can be
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY
psychologically demonstrated as merely the manifesta-
tion of a very high degree of egoism, which there-
fore remains as the only spring of affirmation, as the
necessary phenomenal form of which we have recog-
nised it. All willing namely involves a not having,
consequently a wanting, consequently a suffering.
Hence follows, that to a more intense willing there
corresponds a severer suffering, that accordingly
there increases, with the degree of egoism in general,
the degree of the suffering attached to existence.
Now the extreme egoist sees around him others
who cling less vehemently to existence, and its
delights, who are less afflicted by egoism and ac-
cordingly suffer less than himself. The mere sight
of them is for him an injury, in that it reminds him
of his own privation, and makes it, by contrast, first
really perceptible and painful. From this arises an
ill-feeling towards them which, so long as they are
happy, is manifested as envy and, when some evil
overtakes them, as malicious pleasure in their
misfortune, two very familiar sensations, since
scarcely any one of us is quite free from them. Now
from this pleasure which delights in another's misfor-
tune, it is but a small step to real malice, which
spontaneously causes another's suffering to find in
the sight of it alleviation of its own torment. For
malice always springs from severe personal suffering,
whether arising, as we have shown, from excess of
egoism or from heavy misfortunes. One should
2
2S4 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
therefore never forget, in seeing a malicious act, that
he who perpetrates it, must be very unhappy, and
that the surest way of giving him in his inmost
heart a wholesome wound is to recompense his evil
with good. For he too, however deeply entangled
in affirmation, is a man, and in every man slumbers
the spirit of denial, and there is none in whom it
may not be awakened. This cannot be done by
preaching morality (which as a rule is but turned to
ridicule) but by practising it. For love is a fire
which kindles wherever it reaches and can melt, if
only hot-enough, even stone and iron.
Remark. Like malice, revenge, which is closely akin to
it, pursues as ultimate aim another's suffering. But it is far
more pardonable, because here it is not a high degree of
egoism, but injury inflicted by others which drives us to
cool the heat* of our own suffering by the aspect of the
torments of him who is guilty of it. Hence revenge is often
overcome in the very moment of execution by pity, which with
malice is not so easily the case, because malice is rooted in
egoism which excludes pity as its opposite pole. Very different
from revenge is punishment ; the aim of the one is to injure,
of the other to better, and therefore to benefit, like the physician
whose hand we bless even when it cuts, even when it burns.
Of this we shall speak further on.
265. As from causality springs the necessity of
all our action, so from space and time arises the
egoism in which it is rooted. As little therefore as
we can imagine a free action, that is one not deter-
mined by motives, so little is it possible to conceive,
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 255
from the empirical standpoint, of another spring of
action than that of egoism. This goes so far that
even the actions of pure morality, in which is mani-
fested the denial of the Will to life, that is, the
removal of natural egoism, appear, merely in order
to be comprehended by the forms of our intellect,
as both, necessary ( 257) and egoistic. But the
egoism of these deeds is no longer an individual one,
but one expanding the ego over the totality of being.
Its real nature is thus totally removed, so that it
remains merely as a form of comprehension, inherent
in the intellect and therefore irremovable, in which
we here even range what presupposes its removal.
Of this seeming or moral egoism, clad in which
the otherwise inconceivable deeds of denial appear,
we shall
.speak later. At present it is with real
or individual egoism, as the natural form of all
empirical existence, that we have to do. Here we
shall show how from it, in which, as we have seen,
all deeds of malice are involved, on the one hand all
that is bad, on the other all that is evil springs
with necessity.
VI. The Egoism of Affirmation as the Source
of the Bad
266. The two fundamental strivings of that
egoism which has reached organic existence, even
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
when embodied in man, are nourishment and pro-
pagation. These, considered in the second part of
this book ( 162. 189) from the physical, are now
reviewed from the moral side.
1. We saw that the body is nothing but the
objectified Will to life, manifested in space, so that
instead of affirmation of the Will we might also say
affirmation of the body. The affirmation of the
body is only possible through nourishment; that
is, we cannot affirm our own existence otherwise
than by denying continually the existence of others
(plants and animals). If we would not ourselves
perish, we must resolve to inflict on other beings, no
less vehemently desirous of life than we, and as
much the aim of their own existence as we are of
ours, that which, if done to ourselves, we should
regard as the greatest wrong.. Here it becomes
clear that sinfulness is bound up with existence
itself and can consequently be removed only with
its removal.
2. All existence in time comes sooner or later to
an end. Time itself is alone infinite. But the Will
to life, of which each of us is an embodiment, aims
not at existence at a certain time but at existence
absolutely, therefore since time - is merely the
phenomenal form of this existence at existence in
all time. From this springs that instinct to prolong
existence beyond one's own life which is manifested
in generation. By this is tied ever anew the knot
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 257
of existence. And it is not only by the feeling of
life here reaching its climax, but also by the conse-
quences attending it, and still more by the conscious-
ness of guilt accompanying it, that generation proves
itself the sharpest expression of willing, the focus
of the affirmation o the Will to life. To the Will
affirming itself in generation the gates of salvation
are opened anew in the child, while it becomes for
its parents, by the sacrifices it imposes on them, a
means of discipline to denial. This is the meaning
of the paradoxical scripture text (i Tim. ii. 15):
o-w^crerafc 8^ r?)9 Tfcvoyovla$ (applicable not only
to the woman but also to the man).
If even existence, sustaining itself by nourish-
ment and propagation, is a sin, much more so is the
augmentation of these tendencies beyond what is
natural and necessary. From this spring gluttony,
unchastity, avarice and the like, vices, not only
directly repudiated by our moral feeling (the voice
of denial within us), but condemned also by nature H
herself (the principle of affirmation) and visited by '
her on the offender.
Remark. It is because the body is the mere visibility of
affirmation that we are ashamed of it, and especially of those
parts which are the expression of the focus of affirmation,
although only after innocence (which is the mere unconscious-
ness of guilt) has given place to the knowledge of good and
evil," and therewith to the consciousness that corporeal exist-
ence itself is sin (Gen. ii. 25 ; iii. 7). On the contrary we
S
258* ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
are not ashamed of the face, from which glances the possibility
of salvation, and yet nobody likes to be gazed at long and
attentively.
267. Of actions which ought not to be there
are two possible kinds, so far as these refer either to
another than the doer or to the doer himself. In
the latter case such actions may, as has been shown, be
very reprehensible (owing to their expressing always
a high degree of affirmation), but they are not
properly speaking wrong. For the conception of
wrong involves the suffering of it at the hands of
others, because against one's own will : volenti non
fit injnria. The name of wrong must therefore be
reserved for those actions in which the degree of
affirmation of one's own egoism goes so far as to
break from its own sphere into that of another, in
order to deny it.
Remark. For the same reason there can be no such
thing as duties towards ourselves. For all duty (even
that of parents to their children) rests on an express or tacit
contract according to which I freely undertake to perform
certain things. If I do not fulfil these, I do wrong, unless the
other releases me from my obligations. Now if I am that
other myself, no release is necessary. Thus it becomes clear
that the conceptions wrong, right, and duty can have a meaning
only in reference to others.
268. Every ego commands a certain circuit
This is called the sphere of egoism. Thus in-
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 259
organic bodies possess the place they occupy in
space. Like these the egoism of plants is confined
to a particular spot. Yet even they greedily stretch
their roots downwards, their branches upwards.
The brute loosened from the soil, manifests its
egoism over a narrower or a wider range. But first
in man is associated with superior force the concep-
tion of property and consequently the capability of
possessing. He declares all other beings in nature
as without rights and possessions, as things for his
use. Accordingly men have appropriated the whole
earth and divided it amongst themselves nor would
they scruple to divide the moon, if they could only
reach it.
269. Every man's egoism has a threefold
range. It extends firstly to what he zs, secondly to
what he has> thirdly to what he represents. Accord-
ingly in man we can distinguish three spheres of
egoism, under which may be ranged all that is valu-
able in life, all aims of earthly desire. This three-
fold division therefore forms the basis of the doctrine
of happiness that is eudaemonology, or as we might
more appropriately call it, egoismology, as Schopen-
hauer, descending from the height of his Christian
view of the world to the standpoint of ancient Pagan
ethics, lays it down in his "Aphorismen zur Lebcns-
weisheit."
260 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
First Sphere of Egoism: what one is
In the first place every one has a primary right
to -his own body and his own life, as also to the
(intellectual and physical) forces of his body and the
work produced by them. Here already it becomes
clear, that suicide, though in a high degree repre-
hensible (as we shall show later), cannot (apart from
eventual obligations from which a man withdraws
himself by it) be properly called wrong.
Second Sphere of Egoism: what one has
Next to his own body and life, every one extends
his egoism over a larger or smaller circle of objects
which he calls his own. It may be disputed whether
the right of property rests on the first seizure, or on
the cultivation of a thing. In reality the two are
for the most part blended, since seizure as a rule
demands work, and the cultivation of a thing is fre-
quently restricted to the taking possession of what
nature offers.
Third Sphere of Egoism.: what one represents
Besides body and life, goods and chattels, there
is still a third thing which we call ours. This is
the opinion which others have of us, on which
depend honour, rank, and fame. Ideal as are
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 261
these possessions, based on the mere opinion which
others have of us, they become of importance through
the close relations of men to each other, which make
us in so many ways dependent on others. Hence it
is that ambition for rank and fame is so powerful a
spur even of nobler natures. Honour again, which
has not to be acquired but merely preserved, is held
so precious that with its loss (as the saying is) all is
lost. The striving to gain by outward demeanour
the favourable opinion of others, in order to shine in
their estimation, on which one relies rather than on
his own judgment of himself, is called vanity. The
exact reverse of it is pride, which is the firm con-
viction of one's own worth, joined to a certain in-
difference to the opinion of others about it, and is
quite compatible with real humility, which is the
knowledge of the nothingness of existence applied
to ourselves, and is with right regarded as a Christian
virtue akin to denial.
Remark. Honour is^ further divided into commercial
honour, relating to integrity in business and conduct ; pro-
fessional honour, having reference to fitness for, and faith-
fulness in, duty in an entrusted post; and sexual honour,
which refers to the relations of the sexes and is for the female
sex especially of great importance. A ludicrous species is
knightly honour, so far as it seeks not to deserve the esteem
of others through seemly behaviour, but rather to gain it by
defiance, with force, weapon in hand. It thus thinks to coerce
the opinion of others, while it is in fact its freedom from con-
straint which is the prerequisite of the recognition given as
honour.
262 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
270. Wrong is the invasion of the territory of
another's egoism. It is therefore threefold, according
as it occurs in one of the three spheres of egoism :
1. Wrong to the body, whether by injury of it
(cannibalism, murder, mutilation, wounding,
torturing of every kind), or by unlawful
appropriation of its powers (slavery, forced
service, withholding of pay).
2. Wrong to property (robbery, theft, fraud).
3. Wrong to honour (insult, slander).
The respect due to the sphere of another's egoism
rests to a great extent on convention. For this
reason also the conception of wrong as an invasion
of this sphere is a conventional one. Therefore
according to the time, the country, and the personal
views of the doer, an act must pass as a proof of
generosity and self-sacrifice which, under other
circumstances, would be accounted a grave crime.
For moral judgment, which looks not at the deed
but at the spirit manifested in it, must take as
standard not what is wrong, but what in each single
case was regarded as such.
There are two means of doing wrong: force
and cunning. The latter is more contemptible
because it involves a confession of one's own weak-
ness, also, perhaps, because it always rests on
reflection and is conditioned by intellectual
superiority, which should rather lead to the removal
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 263
of iniquity. Considered from the moral standpoint,
however, both, force and cunning, when standing in
the service of wrong, are equally reprehensible. It
is just as wrong to injure our neighbour's body
by open assault as by poison, his property by
robbery as by theft, his honour by open insult as by
evil-speaking behind his back,
271. All wrong consists in the seeking of one's
own good at the cost of another and rests con-
sequently upon egoism. From egoism, which can
at times turn to malice ( 264), all that is bad in
the world springs, according to the law of causality,
with necessity.
Now it is clear that what is reprehensible when,
in accidentally interfering with another's interests, it
produces on the one hand what is bad, on the other
what is evil, remains equally reprehensible even
when no such interference takes place. Thus sin
lies not in the deeds through which, by aid of
casual circumstances (motives), it is manifested, but
in egoism, and therefore in our natural existence
itself. This namely is throughout nothing but the
embodiment of the Will to life, as it affirms itself in
one more, in another less vehemently. The intensity
of this affirmation admits of an infinite number of
degrees which together form a graduated scale of
moral worth or worthlessness, from the freezing-
point of absolute egoism to the boiling-point at
264 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
which our ego evaporates in self-denying love to
others. Each of us occupies by nature a fixed point
on this scale, movable by no arbitrary influence, by
which the innate character is indicated. This
character develops in actions at the instance of
motives the occurrence of which is determined by
chance, and on which it may for instance sometimes
depend that a certain character, that is, a certain
degree of vehemence of affirmation, takes, in the one
case, the form of a peaceful and regular life amid
one's fellow-citizens, in the other that of a criminal
career. A poetical illustration of this truth may
be found in many novels. It strikes us still more
directly when, in studying the faces of famous
criminals, we find them to our surprise very like
those of ordinary men.
The doctrine that sin is innate is one of the
deepest truths of Holy Scripture. Even in the
Old Testament, the original spirit of which it
contradicts ( 177), we see it gushing forth here and
there like a living spring amid stony ground (for
instance Gen. vi. 5, viii. 21 ; Ps. li. 7), while in
Christianity it expands to a lake, enabling us to
cross to the opposite shore of salvation. OUa
<ydp, says the Apostle (Rom. vii. 1 8), on ov/c ol/cel
GV 6/jioi, TOVT isovw zv rfj aapfcl /-60V, a<yaQ6v. These
words, which we may appropriate in their entirety
to ourselves, signify firstly, that the (empirical) ego
is identical with the body which we have demon-
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 265
strated as its objcctity ( 156), secondly, that that
which ought not to be, is our ego, our empirical
existence itself.
From our considerations on the ultimate root of
human nature, as also from the passages of scripture
cited, which may have arisen from similar considera-
tions, it follows inevitably that sin can never be
extirpated by a change of works, which are merely
its outward symptoms, but alone by a change of the
inmost basis of existence, through a transformation
of the egoistic -Will itself. In the feeling of this
truth the Psalmist already prays (li. 12): "Create
in me a clean heart, O God, and renew (chaddfech]
a right spirit within me.!" If in these words he
considers the prayed-for transformation of his heart
as one not dependent on his own action, we must
also in this agree with him.
Before, however, we can follow the train of these
thoughts, we have to look at the egoism of affirma-
tion from the reverse side, to convince ourselves
that from it proceeds, as on the one hand the
badness, so on the other the infinite suffering of the
world, with equal necessity.
VII. The Egoism of Affirmation as the Source
of Evil
272. -The doctrine of the nothingness of
existence and of the suffering of the world takes a
266 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
prominent place in the thought systems of the
sublime masters Buddha and Schopenhauer. For it
is, according to them, suffering, whether felt as our
own or known as that of another, which is the
cause of that turning away of the Will from life, in
which we shall recognise, in harmony with the
greatest among men, the ultimate goal, the highest
destination of our existence. A deeper reflection,
however, shows that this motivation of self-
denial by the suffering inseparable from existence
belongs merely to the attempts to represent, through
the medium of the intellect, what is for it irre-
presentable. The turning of the Will is a process
belonging to the order of things -in -themselves;
therefore it does not admit the application of the
law of causality. Consequently to speak of a
motive for this change of Will is inadmissible (even
if it be called a quietive). Moreover the denial of
the Will, if we see in it merely an escape from the
sorrows of existence, would not be distinguished,
save in the more suitable choice of means, from
suicide, from which (as will later become clear) it is
fundamentally different (since suicide according to
248 is an endeavour which misses its aim). And
further it would come under the general conception
of the striving after happiness and thus fall com-
pletely in the sphere of affirmation, the exclusion of
which is just what is essential in it. We shall see
later how the supposed causation of self-denial by
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 267
suffering belongs merely to the hue of affirmation
clad in which the deeds of denial must appear, if
they are to be in any way conceivable to us. Here
we have merely to show how the nothingness as
also the suffering of existence is necessarily based
on the affirmation of the Will to life and can there-
fore only be removed with it (for where there is
denial, there, as will later become clear, the whole
possibility of suffering has vanished), even though
the removal of suffering cannot be considered as
the real aim of denial without misrepresenting it.
273. The affirmation of the Will to life is
willing as it becomes visible in space, time, and
causality as world. We have now to show how in
and with these primary elements of existence all its
sufferings are inevitably bound up.
Every existence in space and time is a limited
one, consequently, however great it may be, it is
yet, in comparison with the infinity of space and
time, infinitely little and in so far nothing. We
realise this nothingness of existence more clearly
than ever, when drawing near the temporal limits of
our existence, that is, death. Then, looking back on
life, we first understand in their deepest sense the
words with which on his lips Buddha died: "All is
withouf permanence."
On the other hand our existence is subject to the
constraint of causality, from which springs the
268 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
necessary predetermination of all our doing as of all
our suffering, so that we can escape neither the one
nor 'the other. As therefore space and time con-
dition the nothingness of our earthly existence, so
causality determines its hopelessness.
This existence is essentially a willing. It is
important to understand how all suffering is only
possible under the assumption of willing, nay,
consists solely in this, while on the contrary, as will
appear later, not-willing, which constitutes denial,
can be as little touched by suffering as the sunbeam
by the storm-wind. Thus, with the Indians, we might
recommend the denial of the Will as the surest
remedy for the ills of existence, but that it could be
foretold with certainty, that, for those who seek it
as such, it is as little to be found, as is darkness by
lighted candles.
Every single act of willing has an aim. Willing
m general is without aim : "All is vanity,"
dmar Kohehth,
H*btthb&ttm, hakMh&bel!
as it is preached with untranslatable pathos by the
Hebrew sage.
This aimlessness of willing is manifest in all
nature, from the course of the planets revolving
without rest and goal in unwearying labour round
their fixed star up to man. Look for instance at
the plant ; slowly and laboriously its life develops
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 269
from seed to leaf and stalk, from leaf to blossom,
from blossom to fruit, to cease with what it began
with the seed. As the plant, so the animal, so man.
In the first third of his existence he lives to obtain
a living ; laboriously he prepares himself for a
calling. In the second third he thinks of propaga-
tion
;
he founds a family. And in the third he can
observe how his offspring start again from the
beginning with the same comedy, while he, dying to
enjoyment and work, feels himself more and more
set aside and excluded from the circle of flourishing
life. This is the wormwood which remains to men,
when they have drained the cup of life to the dregs.
The philosopher alone (in the sense in which each
may be one) stirs the draught and drinks healing.
Willing, the visibility of which is life, rolls im-
petuously between two alternating states. From
desiring it hastens to attaining, from attaining to
new desiring. Now all desiring involves a want
and consequently a suffering. All attainment on
the other hand proves disappointment, so far as the
end gained does not allow us to rest there without
the feeling of emptiness, stagnation, dissatisfaction.
So tauml' ich von Begierde zu Genuss,
Und im Genuss verschmacht7 ich nach Begierde,
Thus reel I from desiring to enjoying,
And in enjoying languish for desire.
Between the pain of working and the ennui of
270 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
repose we are tossed hither and thither, and it is
wisdom to prefer to possessing striving, to enjoy-
ment labour and sorrow (Ps. xc. 10).
274. The Sdnkhya system distinguishes three
kinds of suffering, ddhi-&tmika> ddhi-bhautika, ddhi-
daivika, caused by ourselves, by others, or by fate :
a classification we may adopt, though not quite in the
sense of the schoolmen.
The first class of sufferings (ddhi-dtmika) springs
from ourselves (Atmari). We saw already how
individual existence as such is an inexhaustible
source of suffering.
The second class (Adhi-bliautikd) includes the
sufferings which the various beings (bhtitdnf) in
which the Will manifests itself as plurality, decree to
each other through the mutual Interference of their
egoistic tendencies. From this springs that per-
petual war and struggle of beings against each other,
which assumes through all civilisation and humanity,
through state, legislation, education, and the like,
only another and milder form, but remains essen-
tially the same. .
So far as all suffering comes either from within
or from without, it might be collectively assigned to
one or the other of these two categories. Yet the
Indian may be right in distinguishing besides these a
third class of sufferings (ddhi - daivikd), springing
neither from the nature of our individual existence,
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 271
nor from the deliberate selfishness and wickedness
of others, but decreed to us by the gods (deva\ or
by fate (daiva), that is, by chance. For not alone
in the fate tragedies of the ancients (as for instance
the " King QEdipus
"
of Sophokles), but also in daily
life we may see often enough how from the best
intentions which others may cherish towards us, from
the most active preparations we make for our own
happiness, through chance, error, and misunderstand-
ing of all kinds, the greatest misfortune arises.
Thus every existence, even the happiest, seems
continually beset by mischievous powers which
threaten every moment to assert their claims on it
Hence Schopenhauer says rightly, that all earthly
happiness walks on undermined ground.
275. Calm and unbiassed reflections like these
may serve as a standard for estimating the value of
an existence such as ours, and for furnishing in a
question, the candid and competent reply to which
must rest on the individual experience of each, a
general and abstract rule, such as philosophical
inquiry demands. Now, if we would turn from
these to immediate experience, to see how almost
everywhere it shows us want, misery, and wretched-
ness as the fundamental type of this existence, if,
looking from our own perhaps bearable lot as from
an oasis in the surrounding illimitable desert, we
would fix our eyes on the fate of men in less favoured
272 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
circumstances and in less settled times and countries,
to let pass before our imagination the countless
pictures of misery, famine and plague, battlefields,
hospitals, prisons, and torture, or if we would but
cast a glance at the dark alleys and narrow houses
of our cities, and again a glance at the palaces and
villas of the rich, to see everywhere discord, ill-will,
vice, with grief and misery in their train, then
indeed we might chime in with the melodious wail of
Sophokles :
pr) fyvvai rbv airavra w-
/ca \6yov TO 8, eVel <f>avfj,
ftf}v(U KGidevoOev irep 77-
nay, we might with Shakespeare raise the impious
question :
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffir
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortuney
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing^ end them
did there not sound to us from another region a
voice of unearthly strength, yet unspeakably mild
and consoling: "In the world ye shall have
tribulation; but be of good cheer, I have
overcome the world!"
1 Not to be born is of all the best ; but by far the next best is, if
one is born, to return thither whence he came as quickly as possible.
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 273
Who thus speaks, is the Will to life who over-
came the world by overcoming himself ; who thus
speaks, that art thou, so soon as thou wilt.
VIII. Temporal Measures against the Badness and
Evil springing from Egoism
276. All wrong consists, as we saw, in an
invasion of the sphere of another's egoism, whether
injuring the person, the property, or the honour of
our neighbour. Wrong is the origin of right. Every
man namely is allowed to protect himself, to repel
the intrusion of another into the sphere of his own
affirmation of the Will, even if this should involve
an invasion of the Will-sphere of the aggressor, an
injury to the injurer. This warding off of wrong
is the right which is everybody's due by nature.
Therefore if there were no wrong, we should as little
speak of right, as of light, if darkness were unknown
to us. Like wrong, the warding off of it which is
called right, may be exercised in two ways: first
by force, secondly by cunning. Here may be
answered the question, in how far there can be a
right to lie.
277. In the natural state of things every one is
free to injure others to the utmost. At the same
time he must, on his part, expect injury from every-
body else. Very soon probably men came to the
T
274 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
conviction that, under such circumstances, the
pleasure of doing wrong was as a whole far out-
weighed by the pain of suffering it. They thus
agreed to purchase, by renouncing the practice of
wrong, freedom from suffering it, and to maintain
this principle with united force against the egoistic
desires of the individual. Such a union of men is
called the state. It is in its nature an institution
for protection against wrong. This does not
exclude the possibility, that such a common authority,
superior to all resistance of the individual, when
once in existence, might in a wider sense be, and
as a fact is, employed for the representation and
furtherance of other common interests.
Remark. The task of the state as a protective institu-
tion is threefold : (i) protection from without, (2) protection
from within, (3) protection against the protector.
First Task of the State: protection from without.
The maxim of therightof the stronger, abolished now
within every civilised state, is still the only one valid between
state and state, from which we may judge how immature our
race still is. For it may be foretold with certainty that the
time will come when war will be looked back upon as a long
past atrocious barbarity of a dark age.
Second Task of the State: protection from within.
To be an egoist is, humanly speaking, allowed, so long as
one's egoism is not of such a degree as to injure others.
Accordingly what the state considers as its task is the repres-
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 275
sion, not of the egoism of its subjects, but of such manifesta-
tions of it as are hurtful to their fellow-men. The state fulfils
this task by opposing to the motives for doing wrong a series
of stronger motives for not doing it, in the form of threatened
punishment. The penal code is therefore merely a register
of counter - motives against crime, and the criminal law of a
state is restricted to the deterring from crime by punishment,
not to the expiation of it : for the very reason, that it lies
quite beyond the capacity of a judge to try the heart and
reins, and so determine the real worth or worthlessness of a
deed. This justification of the right of punishment first set
forth by Plato, is comprised by Schopenhauer briefly and well
in the words of Seneca (de ira i, 19, 7) :
" N&nofrudens
qitia peccatum est^
Third Task of the State: protection against the
protector.
The omnipotence of the state, laid in the hands of an
individual, may easily lead to abuse. Hence arises, on the one
hand, the necessity of setting certain constitutional limits to it,
on the other, the justification for placing the ruler, by means
of property, honour and the like, so high above the rest, that
his egoism, paralysed by the immediate satisfaction of all its
wishes, cannot break out to the detriment of his subjects. On
the egoism of the ruler depends also the advantage which
a hereditary monarchy has over other forms of government
By means of it the well-being of the royal family is indissolubly
linked with, and in a certain sense dependent on, the welfare of
the land. An elective monarchy, on the other hand, though it
has the advantage of placing in every case the ablest in
the highest position, seems to be less recommended by
experience, in that it furthers the temptation to enrich one's
own house, to found, a family power and the like, thereby
leading, as history has shown, to the r-uin of the countiy.
276 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
278. In and with the state there is a second
and important means for accustoming egoism to the
limits necessary to make life as a community toler-
able. This is education, which (apart from preparing
us for a calling) pursues two aims, firstly the culture
of the intellect, secondly the culture of the Will
(i) On the intellectual side the aim of education
can only be to acquaint the pupil with the true
nature of the world and life, in giving him the
benefit of the experience which others have made
before him, in order to spare him his own perhaps
bitter experience, (2) On the other hand the
task of education is to cultivate the Will, Yet on
this its influence is a limited one. Every influence
namely takes place by way of causality through
motives. These already presuppose, in order to
operate, a particular quality of Will. Hence follows,
that a 'real change of the Will, a transformation
of its innate character (consisting in a certain
degree of intensity of affirmation) is not possible by
means of education. Virtue, therefore, in the moral
sense, cannot be taught : velle non discitur^ as the
teacher of Nero said. Nevertheless the value of
education for the culture of the Will is incalculably
great, since it often rests on this alone, whether a
certain man takes the precipitous path of vice and
crime, or accustoms himself to earn, by peaceable
and honourable activity in the regular relations of
life, that satisfaction of his egoism which answers to
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 277
its innate demands. This aim education accom-
plishes in determining the Will, the transformation
of which lies outside its province, to take, by means
of well-chosen motives, a harmless way to its satis-
faction. On this path it keeps it by example,
instruction, and restraint, until it becomes habit
or second nature. Thus it is by building on
the indolence of human nature, that education
makes out of evil-natured characters tolerably good
men.
279. In spite of right, law, and state, our.
egoism would often grate harshly against that of our
fellow-men and make existence an uncomfortable
one, if it were not admitted as a principle, inculcated
by education, that each of us, so far as is possible,
and so long as no serious interests are at stake,
should disavow his own egoism and appear to be
wholly at the service of the egoism of another. This
hypocrisy universally practised, seen through by
every intelligent mind, and, because the intention
of deception is absent, permissible is politeness.
Of that denial of the Will in favour of another the
attainment of which is the highest, as it is the hardest,
moral task, politeness makes a semblance to de-
light the eye. Yet it is after all a prescribed course
of action, a dug canal which, it is true, leads uphill
from the stream of Will, and can therefore never be
filled by it, so long as it follows the natural laws of
278 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
egoism attracting, like gravity, earthwards. But
to the operation of supernatural forces is due the
removal of these natural laws, in a way of which we
shall immediately have to speak, as also the gradual
transmutation of that which as politeness is mere
semblance and hypocrisy into hearty good-will and
sincere love of our neighbour.
Thus politeness is indeed no virtue, as the Chinese
believe, but yet a way-mark to virtue, which the Will
may or may not follow, and meanwhile a valuable
surrogate of it.
IX. Legality and Morality
280, Let us assume that it were possible,
whether by religious menace, or by temporal pre-
cautions against egoism, to suppress all excess of it
to such a degree that injustice should be completely
banished from the earth. Such a condition of perfect
legality would outwardly resemble an order of
things in which right sprang unfailingly from
morality. Yet inwardly both would be funda-
mentally different, and whatever civilisation might
gain through legality without morality, the eternal
aims of our existence would not be in the least
furthered by it. For all such efforts to banish evil
from the world by means of police, justice, and
superstition, can only be compared to a medical
treatment which removes the symptoms of the
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 279
disease while leaving the latter untouched. At
most we might perhaps succeed in checking the
manifestation of egoism in life, but never in sup-
pressing egoism itself. All such outside influences
must as such necessarily take the way of causality.
There is no possibility of influencing a man other-
wise than by furnishing him (whether through threats
and promises, or by instruction and example) with
motives for his action. These are in their nature
nothing but intellectual images. As such they enter
the sphere of knowledge, which they may enlighten,
correct, transform, and from which they may, accord-
ing as they are applied, impel the Will to manifesta-
tion in very diverse directions. At the Will, however,
they find their natural limits ; and just as rays of
light, reflected from bodies, make these visible without
changing their nature, so motives, in breaking against
the Will, bring its inner being to manifestation in
actions, though in no way capable of modifying in
the slightest degree the kernel of our being, that is,
our innate
"intensity of the affirmation of the Will to
life. From this inborn determination of our Will
proceed, as the mere reflection of it in space, time, and
causality, all deeds as necessarily as from the tree its
fruits. They have therefore in a moral sense no
further significance than this, that they are the
visibility of our Will. From this truth, which is
entirely scriptural (St. Matth. xii. 33-35), it follows
inexorably, that even actions which are good, con-
aSo ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
formable to law, that is, legal actions are in a moral
sense quite as worthless and reprehensible as bad
ones, so long as, like these, they spring from the soil
of our natural existence, which, as we have shown, is
nothing but affirmation of the Will to life, that is
egoism and consequently sin, Briefly and forcibly
this conclusion is expressed in the words of St
John (iii. 6) : TO yerfevvypivov e/c rfjs (rap/cb$ <rdp%
IO-TLV. Disheartening as may be these considerations
for all those whose horizon does not extend beyond
natural existence in space, time, and causality, so
little will they discourage us if we are animated by
religion, that is, by the consciousness that the better
part of our being, that our original Self is to be
sought not in this world at all but beyond it, not in
our natural existence but in that which lies behind it
and which persists even after its dissolution. Hence
these principles, gained from the observation and
investigation of the facts, little popular as they are,
form nevertheless the foundation of the two great
religions of mankind, of the Christian, Which main-
tains the worthlessness of good works, and of the
Indian, which even asserts their condemnability, as
the following glance at both confirms.
281. In Biblical theology there corresponds to
the difference between legality and morality that
between justification by the law and justification by
faith, which is generally speaking the distinction
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 281
between the Old and New Testaments. The law of
the Old Testament accompanies its commands and
prohibitions with threat of punishment and promise
of reward. It addresses itself accordingly to the
egoism ofman, for which alone punishment and reward
have significance. Thus the law, if fulfilled, would
have as consequence legality without morality. The
insufficiency of this ethical standpoint, felt only here
and there in the Old Testament, appears everywhere
distinctly in the New (though the latter is in other
respects far from being free from lapses into eudae-
monism). Christ points (St. Matth. v. 20-30) with
the greatest emphasis from the outward deed to, its
inward root, and lays stress on purity of heart and
mind. The fourth Evangelist puts into his mouth
(St. John iii. 3) the summons to a new birth which
springs avwdev, from above, that is, not from physical
but from metaphysical influences. St. Paul contrasts
with justification by works justification by faith %6)pl?
fyyav vofjLOv, with which is bound up a renewal of the
whole man, and from which virtuous works proceed
with necessity. What faith is, we shall have to ask
further on. Here, however, we may denote it as that
which has as its inevitable result morality,
It is impossible that faith in this sense can consist
in a mere holding as true certain external facts,
Deeper, purer, more developed, we meet the same
contrasts on the soil of Indian theology. Thus
(Jankara (in the survey of the Vedinta doctrine
282 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
with which he prefaces his commentary on the
Brikad-dranyaka-upanishad) distinguishes two por-
tions of the Veda, the section on works (karma-
k&ndd) and the section on knowledge (jfi&na-
kdnda)) which are analogous to the twofold division
of the Bible. On their connection ankara expresses
himself essentially as follows. The deepest reason
Why the world is "imposed" on the soul, is the
ignorance (ajfldnam) of the latter, "which has as
characteristic the illusion peculiar to it from nature
of being both actor and enjoyer
"
(kartritva-bhoktritva-
$var{ipa-abhiin&na-laksJianam^\ that is, expressed in
our - language, of being individual, so that at
bottom ignorance is the same as that which we
call entanglement in the principle of individuation
( 241). From this ignorance springs "the wish to
attain what is desirable, to avoid what is undesirable"
(ishta-anishta-prdpti-parihdra-icch&) or, as we should
say, egoism. From this again proceed all works,
good as well as bad, without distinction. These
require for their expiation a repeated imposition of
the world on the soul, that is, a renewed course of
life, and they too determine the quality of the same.
Now for him who is animated by the egoistic desire
1 Compare with our literal translation of these epithets that of
Frank: " quae designator per cupidinem et arrogantiam, qua agens
et fruens in propriam fertur naturae formam" or that of Roer :
"which by its nature prides itself in the feelings ofself, dominion and
possession" and ask how the profound philosophical views of the
Indians can strike root with us, so long as one is referred to translations
of this kind.
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 283
after welfare, is designed the section of the Veda on
works. This teaches the means by which for the
succeeding birth a better state may be secured in
the Samsdra. A preponderance of sinfulness leads
downwards into the bodies of animals and plants.
Obedience to the laws of Scripture raises to the
world of the fathers, to that of the gods, to that of
Brahman. Equilibrium of virtue and vice leads
again to human existence, Thus by works may be
acquired a higher rank in the cycle of transmigrating
souls, but they are unable to lead beyond these to
an eternal union with the Brahman. This is possible
by knowledge (jn&nam) alone, which is taught in
the knowledge section, that is, in the Upanishads.
Knowledge in the Indian system corresponds to
what by Christianity is called faith. Its result is
annihilation of works, cessation of transmigration,
and eternal deliverance. And while even in the
New Testament it is still said of the dead that
die in the Lord : r^ Se epya avr&v a/co\ov0el /ACT'
avr&v (Rev. xiv. 13), a wonderful and oft-quoted
verse of the Veda says :
Bhidyate hridaya-granthi^ chidyante sarva-samfayM,
Kshiyante ca asya karm&ni> tasmin drishte para-avare.
" Of him who sees that which is the highest and
the lowest the knot of the heart breaks all his
doubts are solved and his works become nothing"
(Mundaka-upanishad) ii. 2, 8).
284 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
282. At the turning-point which our inquiry
has reached, we shall briefly summarise its chief
results.
1. The Will is, in an empirical sense, not free:
as the tree so its fruits, as the man so his
deeds. These all, being called forth by
motives the occurrence of which is deter-
mined by chance, spring from the inner char-
acter with inexorable necessity.
2. This inner character is Will, and affirming
Will, the nature of which, as we have shown,
is egoism. This, as the kernel of our natural
existence, animates us all with greater or less
intensity, and from it proceed not only all vice
and crime, but also honest work and the
moderate enjoyment of a legitimate course of
life. If therefore anything in us is sinful
and condemnable, it is our whole natural
existence.
3. From this it follows incontestably, that moral
improvement is not possible by a change in
our actions, but, if at all, then only by a
change of the Will which forms the basis of
,
our existence, by a transformation of the
innate character, a new birth of the whole
natural man.
4. Such a transformation depends neither on an
external influence by others nor on self-deter-
mined resolutions of improvement. For all
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 285
motives have their limits in the inborn
character. They may develop it in actions
and so reveal it, but they can never change
it. This (and no more) is the bearing of
Schopenhauer's doctrine that the innate char-
acter is constant and invariable.
To these empirical facts and the cheerless
prospect they reveal, is opposed the claim of re-
ligion which urges moral improvement, and addresses
itself in doing so to ourselves is opposed the voice
of conscience which, unperplexed by all these reflec-
tions, pronounces its inexorable verdict of condemna-
tion on wickedness is opposed experience itself,
which, in spite of all deductions of empirical
knowledge, shows instances of sudden and total
change of Will, as also of a gradual progress towards
good, of an increasing purification of our inner
character in the course of life. These phenomena,
which will occupy us further, cannot be explained
from the principles of natural being, above set forth
by us, from the unfree nature of the Will and the
invariability of the character. Thus it seems as if
we were drawn to good by a power lying outside
of ourselves, and stretching from the world beyond
into this. Yet every one feels that good would no
longer be good if effected in us by another than
ourselves. Accordingly our moral improvement is
in a certain sense entirely independent of ourselves,
and again in a certain sense entirely our own work.
286 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
In the affirmation of the Will, of which our natural
existence, as also this infinite world, is the embodi-
ment, this power of change does not lie. But
affirmation is only a part of us, is only the one pole
of our being, the opposite pole of which lies in
eternity and is yet near and attainable in the inmost
heart of each of us. Here is the point where
necessity and free-will, the work of grace and
improvement by one's own power, Augustine and
Pelagius join hands, where the strife of ages finds
final reconciliation in the philosophy of Schopen-
hauer.
These hints will become more intelligible, if we
now proceed to consider the denial of the Will
to life, by determining firstly, at the hand of
experience, its nature, by showing further the ways
leading to it, and lastly by investigating the new
principle manifested in it.
X. On the Nature of the Denial of the Will
to Life
283. Above we divided all actions possible to
man into four classes, according to their four funda-
mental tendencies, so far as all, without excep-
tion, aim either at the well-being of one's self or
the well-being of others, or at the ill of one's self or
the. ill of others. We then showed how egoism,
striving after the well-being of self, is the funda-
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 287
mental type and the indispensable phenomenal form
of the affirmation of the Will to life. We saw
further how it is this egoism, arising at times to
malice, which occasions harm to another without
benefit to one's self. Thus all deeds in which is
expressed the affirmation of the Will to life, are
reduced to egoism. Besides it no other spring of
action for the Will in the affirming state is even
imaginable. This was deduced above ( 262) from
the limitation of existence in space and time, but it
may also be directly perceived in the following way.
All ill is a restraint of willing, all well-being is an
unrestrained willing. Now affirmation is in its entire
nature nothing but willing. Hence it lies in its
inmost nature to be a continual struggle against
the restraints of willing, consequently an unceasing
striving after one's own well-being.
But strangely, nay, marvellously, the surest ex-
perience offers a series of actions the ultimate
aim of which is not the good of self but partly
that of another at the cost of one's own, partly
even one's own ill, sought voluntarily and purposely
without further object. In the sphere of these
actions is included all that we call kindness of heart,
morality, virtue, and holiness. These stand in con-
tradiction to the entire natural order of things, based
as it is on egoism. For such actions, when genuine,
show everywhere a more or less high degree of
renunciation, resignation, and denial of self and its
2SS ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
interests. This it is indeed which gives them that
more than earthly value which appeals so directly
to our feeling. Accordingly we have to recog-
nise, as the principle of these actions, a removal of
affirmation in which all sinfulncss consists, a denial
of the Will to life. This expression, though ob-
jectionable and liable to misunderstanding by reason
of its seeming negativeness, must be retained, since
it alone denotes that which, as a universal and essen-
tial characteristic, distinguishes these actions from
all others. For the rest it goes back to no less an
authority than Jesus Christ Himself, who says : " He
that will come after me, let him deny himself,
aTrapvrfcrdo-do) eavrov" (St. Matth. xvi. 24).
We have now to show how such an act of self-
renunciation forms the essence of every moral
action.
284. All actions, consequently those of morality
also, relate either to the doer himself or to another.
In the first case all egoistic actions, aiming at the
well-being of self, are excluded from the sphere of
morality. They may be prudent (adapted to a par-
ticular end), nay, even wise (adapted to the welfare
of our whole existence), but good they cannot be
called. For the motive of self-love underlies them,
and this, as every one feels, robs an action of its moral
worth. Thus of these deeds relating to one's self,
only those can be called moral which pursue, by an
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 289
act of renunciation, the ill of self as aim, that is
ascetic actions, the moral significance of which will
appear later on. Here we turn from these, the self-
denying character of which is beyond question, in
the first place to those actions which have as ulti-
mate aim the good of another. We shall see in the
case of these also, that, what lends them moral worth
and assures them our recognition and admiration, is
always an act of self-renunciation, of denial of the
Will to life.
285. A deed the ultimate aim of which is the
furtherance of another's welfare, contains as a rule
two elements the one eud&monistic, so far as the
other's happiness is furthered by it, the second
ascetic^ so far as this furthering of another's happi-
ness is for the doer associated, in every case,
with greater or less sacrifice that is, so far as he,
in order to promote another's welfare, curtails and
denies his own. Now the question is, whether both
these elements are essential to a good deed, and If
not, which of the two constitutes its real essence and
gives it its moral worth.
Let us suppose the eudaemonistic element were
wanting. Suppose a sacrifice, made with the best
intentions, fails through accidental circumstances
in its object, and, instead of furthering our neigh-
bour's good, causes exactly the reverse. Such a
deed would nevertheless, for our feeling, retain its
U
290 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
full worth. Conversely let us suppose that a kind-
ness, though highly beneficial in its effects, yet fails
in the ascetic element, whether through its being
associated with no renunciation on the part of the
doer, or through its having as cause some egoistic
motive ambition, vanity, hope of reward here or
hereafter, in short, any kind of striving after one's
own good, such an action, in proportion as we
discovered its real egoistic spring, would immedi-
ately and inevitably lose all moral merit in our eyes.
For, in fact, all good works undertaken with an
egoistic view in the background, have their reivard
(St. Matth. vi. 2), and only such deeds have not their
reward which are practised without any hope or wish
of reward, without any idea of a possible recompense.
For they are accompanied by what the Indian
regards as the requisite of morality and expresses in
the beautiful compound, iha-amutra-phala-bhoga-
virdga, that is, "renunciation of the enjoyment of
reward here and hereafter."
From these considerations it follows indisputably,
that what we recognise as worthy and admirable in
a moral action, not seldom with the feeling of per-
sonal shame and, as it were, reluctantly, is nothing
but its ascetic element that is, that act of self-
renunciation, of denial of our own Will which is
manifested in it.
This denial of the Will has three degrees.
Either it goes only so far, that we forbear injuring
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 291
another, in that, even where we might, we will not
further our own good at the cost of his. Or it may
determine us to make some sacrifice of ourselves, that
another in his need may be helped, Or lastly, it
takes as its ultimate aim the renunciation of self
with no other object than that of combating the
striving after well-being and happiness implanted in
each of us by nature, because we recognise that
it is sinful and ought not to be. Corresponding to
these we have, as the three alone possible virtues,
justice, love, and asceticism. They are the
three steps by which, in gradual ascent, the way
leads to the denial of the Will. But thither there
is yet another way, without steps, rough and steep.
Both of these we have now to examine.
XI. The Two Ways to Denial
286. All of us, so long as we continue to
thrust ourselves by birth into this world of suffering,
find ourselves in a state of affirmation, that is of sin.
But we are all also called to enter into salvation
through the strait gate of denial. Thither lead
two paths, one of which each of us will sooner or
later take, one smooth and pleasant the way of
virtue
;
the other hard and terrible the way of
suffering. True, in both cases the great guide to
salvation is suffering, which is, as we showed, essen-
tial to this existence, and the object of which is, to
292 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
point away from it to what is better. But the dif-
ference is, that in the first case it is the known
suffering of another which, as we shall now show,
becomes, as compassion, the source of all virtue.
In the other, on the contrary, it is the felt suffering
of ourselves which breaks at last even the hardest
Will and leads into the arms of salvation. Thus
that eternal compassion which never forsakes any
one of us, speaks to us first gently by the medium
of the intellect, then harshly and terribly in attack-
ing the Will within us, that is ourselves,
287, Before considering more closely these two
ways to the denial of the Will, the one through
another's, the other through our own suffering, it is
of great importance to understand the following
consideration, which, though repeatedly hinted at,
can only here be developed as a whole.
To the physical order of things is opposed a
metaphysical order, to the realm of affirmation a
realm of denial, which yet remains completely
closed and incomprehensible to the intellect framed
as it is of space, time, and causality. Our intellect
is only the mirror of willing, which (being in itself
no intellectual phenomenon, no object of knowledge)
is expanded by the intellect in its forms, space, time,
and causality, and so becomes visible as world. In
this sense intellect is the i/ofa of Anaxagoras which
creates the world ever anew in each of us, and
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 293
which determines the teleological constitution of
things ( 158. 192). It is also in the truest sense
the light with the origin of which begins, according
to Genesis, the creation of the world. It is, how-
ever, but a natural light, designed for the manifesta-
tion of willing, that is, for the investigation of
Nature, but destitute of all organs for the compre-
hension and conception of the Supernatural.
Hence we can denote and describe this only as
non-willing, denial of the Will, mrvdnam (that is
extinction), heaven (the infinite void of space), thus
by purely negative expressions. And yet denial
must rather be the really positive and existent, in
comparison with which this great and glorious world
is a mere dream, a shadow, a breath, a nothing.
The realm of denial is inconceivable to us, because
we are forced, by reason of these very intellectual
forms of space, time, and causality, to exclude it
from the sphere of what, from our standpoint, we
call being. Similarly the deeds of denial, springing
from, and bearing witness to, this realm, though taking
place daily before our eyes, are nevertheless in their
real essence inconceivable. This is the meaning of
Jesus, when He compares the spirit of denial mani-
fested in such deeds that is, the Holy Spirit who
accomplishes in us the turning of the Will, the new
birth to the wind, the sound of which we hear but
cannot tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth.
These deeds are inconceivable, because, as free, they
294 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
lie beyond causality, as non-egoistic, beyond space
and time, to which our understanding is irrevocably
bound. Meanwhile these deeds of denial, while
breaking through the natural order of things, rank
at the same time as integral parts of it. Like all
occurrences in this world they are a possible object
of knowledge, and must as such appear clad in the
livery of the prince of this world, in form and hue
of affirmation, that is in space, time, and causality.
This takes place in the following singular way.
The universal phenomenal form of all affirming
actions is this, that they proceed with necessity
from the inner character and from the motives in-
fluencing it from without. The inner character is
always egoism ; the motive always a suffering, for
this alone ( 239) impels to that change of our
condition which we call action ; the action occurs
always with necessity. These three elements,
egoism, suffering, necessity, are the phenomenal form
of affirming actions. Now it is just in this pheno-
menal form that deeds of denial also appear, because
this form is based on our intellect, from which we
cannot escape. Thus it is that the deeds in which
the Will denies itself, though belonging to a sphere
where eternal freedom reigns, appear under the
aspect of necessity. Hence they seem further
to be the product of egoism as character, and of
suffering as motive. Yet this egoism is no longer
an individual one, restricted to the sphere of the
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 295
empirical and limited ego, but one which expands
itself over our neighbour, over our fellow-creatures,
and lastly over all being. And corresponding to
this it is no longer individual suffering, but the
suffering of others, appropriated by compassion,
which he who denies himself makes his own. For
it is not as a vicarious and atoning sacrifice, as
Jewish realism believed, but because he knows
himself one with all that exists, that the Holy
One (and all who 'resemble Him) bears the sorrows
(Isa. liii. 4), that He bears the sins of the world
. (St. John i. 29).
As far as the heavens are from the earth, so far
are these deeds of denial from those of affirmation,
and this difference proclaims itself at once in the
inner heart. So soon, however, as we dissect an act
of self-renunciation under the lamp of the intellect,
it seems in it also to be egoism which, fleeing
from suffering, performs the moral act with
necessity.
This conception of holiness as an egoism which
recognises itself in others, is, as we showed, an
inadequate one. Yet it is the deepest comprehen-
sion of these supernatural deeds, attainable by the
plummet of our intellect. We owe it to the pro-
found thought of Indian sages, whose works are full
of it, and from whom Schopenhauer has adopted it.
Briefly and simply it runs in the words of Manu
(12, 91):
2g6 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
sarvabhftteshii ca dtmdnam, sarvabhfltAni ca Atmani
samam pa^yan^ Atmay&jt svArAjyam adkigacchati.
"
Recognising himself in all beings and all beings
in his own self, he, kindling the sacrifice to self alone,
enters into absolute freedom,"
288. From the above it follows that the turning
of the Will to denial can in no wise be regarded as
an (egoistic) flight from the sufferings of exist-
ence
; though indeed denial, as the way to not
willing, is certainly the true panacea of willing as
well as of all its hindrances, that is of all suffering ;
and although the constitution of the world, so full of
suffering, whether known in others or felt in our-
selves, if it does not produce the turning of the Will
(for it is not subject to causality), yet, for our con-
ception, seems to produce it. With this reservation
that we have here to describe what is in its nature
indescribable, that therefore our description of it is
in a certain sense figurative, we turn to consider the
two ways to denial, of which the first is virtue, the
second suffering,
289. By the first way the Will attains the
turning to salvation in making, through the medium
of knowledge, the sufferings of others its own, thus
averting itself (apparently egoistically) from exist-
ence and its sorrows. The appropriation of
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 297
another's suffering by knowledge is called com-
passion. It is in the (practical not poetical)
sense in which it is here used an empirically in-
explicable, because essentially metaphysical, pheno-
menon. For the compassionate man, in recognising
himself in the sufferer and accordingly making his
pains his own, removes practically and unconsciously
the barriers of space fixed between ego and non-
ego, just as the philosopher removes them by abstract
knowledge, the artist by immediate intuition.
From compassion as an egoism expanded by
transcendental knowledge spring, as we shall show,
the three alone possible virtues of justice, love, and
asceticism, though, however, only for the intellectual
or external conception which drags everything down
to that sphere of willing, of affirmation, of egoism,
alone accessible to it. In reality on the contrary,
and viewed from within, all virtue is a not-willing
and has its root in the ascetic soil of denial, to tread
which is meanwhile forbidden us by the nature of
our intellect. Thus it is that the purest and highest
of all virtues, that of asceticism, is the least in-
telligible.
First Step to Denial : Justice
290. He is just who does no wrong to
another, in that he refrains from breaking into the
298 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
sphere of another's Will ( 270), in giving, in
respect of body, property, honour, to every one his
own (suum cuique). This behaviour may proceed
from two very different causes. Either it arises
from egoism, so far as the just man forbears doing
wrong from fear of awkward results to himself,
whether temporal punishment, loss of good name, or
retribution hereafter, or from pure indolence, habit,
or vanity. This kind of justice (Swaioo-vvv] TrdvSri^o^
has no moral worth. Opposed to it is a justice of
a different origin (S(,jcat,oo-vv7) ovpavia) a justice
which does no wrong to another, because it will not
have him injured, and this, because it anticipates the
pain which would befall the other by the infliction
of wrong; consequently it has its origin in com-
passion. Compassion is accordingly the moving
spring of all genuine justice, even when just action
proceeds not from the immediate emotion of the
heart, but, as oftenest, from the once accepted, in-
violable principle, under no circumstances to take
from another what is his due. For this principle
itself springs ultimately from compassion, by which
it is fed, as the reservoir out of which we draw at need,
is fed by the scanty and intermittent spring. Mean-
while our consciousness repudiates an injustice, even
when he against whom it is directed does not suffer
under it, whether because he does not feel or because
he never learns his loss. This shows clearly that
the ultimate basis of moral justice appears only to
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 299
our affirmation-fettered comprehension as compassion :
in reality it is the, to us unintelligible, asceticism of
denial.
Second Step to Denial: Love
291. There are three kinds of love, which philo-
sophy has to discriminate, even though in reality
they often merge in, and blend with, each other :
(i) sexual love (epoo?), to be conceived as the love
to the limbs of our own body, and closely akin to
maternal love, which is likewise dependent on in-
stinct ; (2) love of friends (<t>i\ia\ which makes
sacrifices and, as the case may be, accepts them,
and which rests moreover on the egoistic needs of
communication, amusement, consolation, advice, etc. ;
(3) the love of our neighbour (a^airrf), which is
stimulated by compassion (the reverse and negative
complement of which is joy in another*s joy) to aid
the sufferer, without distinction of person, a love ex-
tending to all that suffers, therefore, of course, to
animals also.
This last kind alone is a moral phenomenon, akin
to the denial of the Will. Conjugal love, parental
love, and the love of friends are such only, so far as
they contain the ascetic element. This is indeed
always more or less the case, in spite of their being
primarily rooted completely in egoism. For in a
wonderful way we find this world of affirmation
dashed. with an element of denial without which it
300 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
could scarcely exist. It resembles that element of
fire snatched by the world-forming Prometheus from
another sphere, a small portion of which serves to
sustain the world, while the whole would con-
sume it.
With justice, which renounces the seeking of
personal well-being at the cost of another,
love ranks as a higher step to denial, so far as love
furthers another's good at the cost of its
own. While the just man recognises himself in
the other only so far as is necessary not to injure
him, he who is possessed by love goes a step farther.
He breaks through the barriers of his individuality,
fixed by nature, in order to treat the other as himself
(ayaTrycTGis rbv 7r\7)(riov a-ov o>9 creavrov), just because
he sees in the other only himself again. Thus he
stretches this recognition of his ego in his fellowmen
farther and farther, until it even extends to those
who are hostile to himself (a^airaTe 7-01)9 fydpovs
Vyctwz>), until he gives to him who demands his cloak
his coat also, nay, gives up his life for his enemies.
Here the love of the neighbour passes into complete
denial of self, here the second virtue is absorbed
in the third and highest.
Third Step to Denial: Asceticism
292. Asceticism is related to the other virtues
as is to the repentance of single transgressions the
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 301
consciousness of the sinfulness of our whole exist-
ence. Like all that is highest, it is the most
exposed to misunderstanding and abuse, and can
only be called genuine where it appears as the
continuation, as the intensification of justice and
love, Hence it is only under this condition, that
it is admitted in Scripture (i Cor. xiii. 3), Its
connection with the lower steps to denial is, accord-
ing to the external view of our knowledge, the
following. Compassion, from which all true virtue
(for our conception) flows, may reach a degree at
which the recognition of one's own ego in another
embraces all that lives, so that a man now lives in
and for others as formerly he lived in and for him-
self. But continually, so long as he is in the body,
the saint is in danger of being drawn down from the
heights of this knowledge to the illusion of indi-
viduation. For he sees, as the Apostle says (Rom,
vii. 23), "another law in his members warring against
the law of his mind." Thus the never quite con-
quered sinfulness of corporeal existence drives him,
in perpetual struggle "to mortify the members of
the body
"
(Col. iii. 5)
" and its deeds " (Rom. viii. 1 3),
"
to crucify the flesh with the affections and lusts
"
(Gal. v, 24). From this in fact asceticism, in all its
manifold forms, proceeds, from mere abstinence of
every kind up to the most fantastic feats of Indian
ascetics. These last, filled with the consciousness,
that with the annihilation of willing disappears at
302 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
the same time that hindrance of willing which is
called pain, devise for the body the most exquisite
tortures, in order to attain by these, and to con-
firm ever anew, the certainty, that the soul has freed
itself from the body, the Will from affirmation.
There are, however, as we shall see, other means of
ascertaining this. Hence we do not wish the Indian
form of asceticism to become ours, but we hope that
the spirit which prompted it, may be also found
among us.
For just as it is the final aim to deny not life,
but rather the Will to life, so also it is no kind of
external work which marks the ascetic, but the
inner spirit ajone. This is what is essential and
identical everywhere in the denial of the Will.
Deeds are merely its external symptoms and may
therefore be very varied. So, for instance, asceticism
may be manifested in the poverty which will not
enjoy while others starve, in fasting and maceration
which, In order to work against the affirmation of
the Will, weaken the body as its manifestation.
Again it may take the form of chastity which out
of compassion for that which is to be begotten, and
in order not to perpetuate the state of
-
sin, abstains
from generation, or solitude to which the ascetic
withdraws, in order to flee from the world and its
lusts. These all, so far as they spring from a genuine
ascetic spirit, are great and admirable.
But this very spirit, originating in the conscious-
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 303
ness of the sinful nature of our existence, may also
be manifested in quite another way, nay, it may
be recognised, wherever, in things small or great, is
manifested a striving against one's own natu.re
without an egoistic motive, Accordingly, so
far as this condition is fulfilled, not only he is an
ascetic who becomes voluntarily poor, but he also
who, instead of using his wealth for his own grati-
fication, applies it to the alleviation of another's
suffering, or to enterprises in the service of humanity.
Nor is the observer of perfect chastity alone an
ascetic, but he also who in self-denying labour sacri-
fices himself for his family ; again not merely he
who through all kinds of mortification weakens the
body, but also he who in devotion to the calling
which is his lot, fulfils his duty without regard to
his own welfare, even to the sacrifice of his own
personality. He therefore who desires to take the
highest road, will find the opportunity for doing so
in the position he fills, whatever it be. In this
sense the Code of Man u already says (i I, 235) :
brdhmanasya tapojfi&namjapah kshatrasyarakshanam,
vaigyasya tu *tapo vdrtd, tapak gMrasya sevanam.
" The asceticism of the learned class is knowledge,
the asceticism of the military class is protection,
the asceticism of the merchant class is labour, the
asceticism of the 9&dra class is service."
304 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Hence it is not our work that we must change,
but rather the spirit from which it springs. It is
not to idle quietism that we must flee, rather must
we persevere in the battle of life, conscious that the
labour of existence is laid upon us to purify us from
egoism and the sinfulness arising from it. For the
rest we may with the Brahmans take upon us hard
and painful penances, or with Buddha restrict the
claims of asceticism to poverty and chastity ; with
John the Baptist we may eat locusts and wild honey,
or with Jesus drink wine and take part in mirthful
feasts
;
with the countless martyrs of all creeds we
may die for our convictions, or (what is harder) live
for them, as did Schopenhauer. The question is not
what we do, but how we do it. Thus we shall not
ask with the Philippian gaoler (Acts xvi. 30),
"What must I do to be saved ? " but rather, "How,
in what spirit, shall I live and work ?
" The answer
is in the Bible words (i Cor. x. 3 1) : Efore ovv eo-fftere
elfre Trlvere elVe ri Trotetre, iravra, eZ? Sogav Qeov
Troielre. As an interpretation of the mythical part
of this the following gloka may serve :
tasm&d asaktah satatam k&ryam karma samdcara>
i asakto hi dcaran karma param Apnoti p&rushah I
"
Fulfil therefore at all times the duty incumbent
on thee without attachment (to existence) ; for he
who does his duty without attachment, that man
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY IS 305
attains what is highest" (Bhagavadgtt&>
cf. 9, 27).
But one point more we shall mention which may
perhaps throw some light on the fundamental dogma
of Christianity. The saint, to whom true knowledge
has arisen, knows himself as the entire Will to life
( 1 68, 2). Accordingly he is filled with the con-
sciousness that he removes the sufferings of the
whole world in removing his ego, which he knows
is the bearer of these. And this consciousness
indeed does not lie, for the saint, in removing and
delivering the Will in himself, has removed and
delivered this whole world. For him who is light-
ened by transcendental knowledge, there remains of
it nothing but an unsubstantial phantom, a shadow-
play without reality ( 174). To us alone it will
not seem so, just because we are still on the empirical
standpoint of affirmation, and only so far as tran-
scendental knowledge awakes in us, can we take part
in his deliverance. Thus might be understood the
doctrine of Christianity, that Christ in His person has
saved the world, but that we are not therefore saved,
until we appropriate Christ's work in faith. Faith
is, as will later become clear, precisely that tran-
scendental knowledge.
293. Happy he who takes to denial the smooth
path of virtue through justice, love, and asceticism.
He is spared that second and terrible way which
X
306 t ELEMENTS OF METArilYSICS
*9
--___________.
leads thither by one's own suffering. Many are
those who have to take this way, and often we may
observe how a very egoistic Will, clinging vehe-
mently to life, is transformed by the breaking over it
of some great calamity, whether it be long confine-
ment to a sick-bed, the bitter loss of what was dear,
or, as with the criminal before execution, the near
approach of death. This is the way of suffering,
called by Schopenhauer Sevre/w TrXofc, which is the
harder to men, the more vehement the Will which is
to be broken. For all suffering is only a hindered
willing. The more vehement this willing, the more
intensely is felt its hindrance, the heavier therefore
the suffering. Where, on the contrary, the willing
of life has turned to not willing of it, there, with
the removal of willing, is removed also the possibility
of its hindrance, consequently the possibility of
suffering, And when the body freed from willing
lasts for a while like the rolling of the potter's
wheel after the vessel is finished, even physical pain
will be felt only as a faint echo.
294. Retrospect. Having established the
nature of the denial of the Will and considered the
two ways leading to it, we shall try, by summarising
what has been said on the unknowable root of
morality and our inadequate representation of it, to
advance in this difficult question to the utmost
attainable clearness.
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 307
Approaching our task from without we dis-
tinguished first ( 261) two aims of morality:
another's well-being and our own ill, and corre-
sponding to these two moving springs : compassion
and asceticism. Further, however, we saw on the one
side that every moral deed is in its nature an ascetic
one ( 285). On the other hand we were forced to
derive, as the other virtues, so also asceticism (if we
would not give up the understanding of it) from
compassion, in recognising in it a struggling against
the natural hindrance of compassion, that is, against
individuation ( 292). Thus we see the two moving
springs of morality unexpectedly coinciding and
standing in relation to each other as the external to
the internal, or perhaps as soul to body. . For like
these they are in themselves an identity which,
considered from two opposite standpoints, appears as
twofold.
Regarded from within all morality is denial,
its moving spring is always an ascetic one, its aim
always the ill of self. But one's own ill as aim
of an action may be expressed perhaps in words,
but to think it with concepts or to imagine it in any
other way isj, impossible. For since all being is
willing (that is affirmation) we should here have to
conceive the activity of a non-existent For
doing this, however, we have no intellectual faculty,
since the intellect is an organ of affirmation springing
from, and calculated for, it alone.
3oS ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Thus we arc restricted to the external con-
sideration of the mystery of morality, in which
not-willing appears as willing, denial as a peculiar
kind of affirmation. For here in the distorting mirror
of our intellect moral deeds like all others appear
as an (egoistic) flight from suffering ; and what
distinguishes them from the works of affirmation is
not a change of the Will (which retains its egoistic
determination) but a change of knowledge. This
is attainable by the first way in recognising one's
self, as teach the Indians, in all living beings, in
feeling their suffering as compassion, and in assisting
its alleviation by deeds of virtue. Or it may be
attained by the second way, in gaining by one's own
personal sorrow a knowledge of the nothingness and
the suffering of existence, so that one seems to
prefer to the state of being that not-being which is
only attainable by denial. Again and again we
reached points where we became clearly aware of
the inadequacy of this whole conception. Of such a
kind is also what follows.
295. If suffering, rather than the mysterious
transformation of the inner being, wena the true and
sufficient cause of denial, then it would only need
the necessary degree of suffering, in order to bring
the Will always and infallibly to the turn. On the
contrary experience shows, that suffering may lead
to an entirely different end, one which, far from
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 309
being denial, is rather a high degree of affirmation.
This last refuge of the Will to life, broken by no
suffering, is suicide, In it we see that self-conflict
which is essential to the Will in the state of affirma-
tion ( 191) in its highest and most terrible struggle,
in that the individual, taking arms against himself,
destroys himself. What drives a man to suicide is
always excess of suffering (suicide through insanity
is not suicide). Now all suffering is a hindering of
willing, and is, as we saw, the more strongly felt,
the more vehement the willing. It must be felt in
a very high degree to outweigh the love of life
implanted in us. Hence it is that suicide always
betokens a high degree of the affirmation of the Will.
It is condemnable for this reason alone, that the
suicide flees from the suffering which should lead
him to denial. We know that he flees in vain, since
life is assured to the Will to life ( 248). Where
there is Will, there also is life, because it is only its
visibility, given us as a boon for the attainment of
self-knowledge and through that, of denial. Of this
boon the suicide robs himself, in taking from his
Will its visibility, that is, life which might have led
to salvation. Hence the deep compassion which
seizes us in every such case.
296. Hard sounds the word denial. Yet the
Saviour who first used it says again : " My yoke is
easy and my burden is light," and only to us it
3io ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
seems otherwise so long as we are full of affirmation.
To be healed from this, life is granted us, the
teachings of which no theory can replace. Only in
the course of life comes the right acquaintance with
the nature of affirmation, and with it the possibility
of a turning away from it. Hence in youth we do
not so easily reconcile ourselves to the Christian call
to denial. Not so farther on. In old age, when the
true worth of life has been taught by life itself, then,
oftencr perhaps than it appears, the dying away of
the body is met by a dying away of the Will. This
it is which gives the face of the old man that con-
templative serenity, so different from the expression
on other aged faces on which the Will, unbroken by
existence, and looking back on vanishing life, stamps
a quite peculiar disappointment And so death
draws near. He has, as the Indians say, two faces.
The one is fearful and terrible. He shows it to
those who, when the capacity for living fails, are yet
full of the craving for life. His other face is friendly
and kind. He shows it to those in whom the Will
has turned. Thus the apostle saw him when, at the
end of a life course without compare, he was in
doubt only as to whether he should die or live
for others (Phil. i. 21-24), In the hour of death
is decided, as Schopenhauer says, whether a man
falls back into the bosom of nature to new life, new
suffering and death, or whether he belongs to these
no longer, but enters the realm of denial, called in
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 311
the Bible flaatXeia T&V ovpav&v, by the Indians
Nirvdnam, which expression denotes "extinction"
and at the same time "bliss." True, it is an
extinction, but only of the intellect and with it of
this infinite world of which intellect is the bearer.
But even the Pagan poet asks in deep presentiment :
Tt9 olSez/j el TO ffiv JJLG.V ecrrt, /cardaveiv,
TO KdTQavelv e 771; ;
and the Christian buries the children as soon as
they are born with Christ by baptism into death
(Rom. vi. 4), well knowing that from the highest
standpoint this life of sin is death, the dying with
Christ on the other hand, the entrance into real and
eternal life.
XII, On the Principle of Denial
297. There still remains a last question, the
satisfactory answer to which lies, it is true, less in
our power than that of any other, By what means
is wrought in the Will, the fundamental character of
which is the*clinging to life, that mighty transforma-
tion and turning away from life which is, as we saw,
the source of all virtue and holiness, and which is
appointed, as last and highest aim, to each of us ?
Causality is only the phenomenal form of the
affirmation of the Will, while the Will itself lies
312 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
outside of it, and is consequently free. Hence the
only possible explanation of this process lies in this
freedom of the Will which is just what makes it
impossible to give a cause for its turning. But
freedom in this sense is a purely negative concept,
and if anything is positive, it is certainly that of
which we are here speaking,
Christianity teaches that that transformation
and new birth of the inner man as which it describes
the turning of the Will, is wrought by faith. The
question is, what is to be understood by this ? The
definition of faith as ehTri^o/jbevuv vTrocrTaws, Trpay-
fjuvrav e'Aey^o? ov fihefro/jievcov (Heb. xi, l) is a purely
verbal one, and amounts finally to a being con-
vinced without sufficient grounds. In vain we
look around for another and non-mythical explana-
tion of this very real condition which the Christian
religion calls faith. Only so much is clear that
faith is (i) the sufficient cause of morality and,
nevertheless, (2) an intellectual phenomenon of
a kind indeed specifically distinct from empirical
knowledge.
Indian theology takes us a step farther in this
direction, in defining empirical knowledge summarily
as ignorance (avidyfi) and opposing to it ( 281)
the principle of denial as knowledge (vidytf). By
this is understood the metaphysical knowledge of
the unity of being from which flows naturally the
annihilation of the individual state, as also virtue
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 313
and morality, since these are only a recognising of
our own ego in others. We acknowledged that this
doctrine (in the sense of which the concept of TTWTW
may be interpreted to the people) contains the
deepest conception of denial attainable by us. But
even this remains, as we saw, coloured over with the
hue of affirmation, in so far as it derives the works
of denial from compassion, that is, from egoism
expanded by knowledge which, stimulated by the
suffering of the world as motive, produces the
phenomena of virtue and holiness with necessity.
But it is in fact not the willing but the not-willing
of life, not egoism but the exact reverse of it which
shines forth in the deeds of denial. To think and to
conceive this, however, is not granted us because, as it
seems, denial would in that case sink to a speculation
of egoism. And so we see spread over the most
important of all questions a veil which no mortal
hand shall ever lift.
298. If we may give to the most significant of
all objects the most significative name, if it is meet
to leave to the obscurest thing the obscurest word, it
is this principle of denial and nothing else which
we might designate by the name of God. Yet under
this name nothing less is to be understood than a
personal, consequently limited, consequently egoistic,
consequent!}- sinful being. If one tries to understand
(which seldom happens) what personality really
314 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
means, one will be inclined to regard the conception
of the Being of beings as personality almost as
blasphemy. It is far rather a supernatural power, a
world-turning principle, a something which no eye
sees, no name denotes, no concept reaches nor ever
can reach. And this Being in the last and pro-
foundest sense are we ourselves. For it is we of
whom a hymn of the Rigveda (10, 90) sings that
one part of our being constitutes this universe and
three parts are immortal in the heavens. From
the metaphysical substratum of our being, which
lies beyond existence in the bosom of the divine,
spring forth, in proportion as we become aware of
the aberration of our existence, those creative
elementary forces which, changing the unchangeable,
lead from the death-darkness of sin by virtue and
holiness to the light of denial. In this sense, reject-
ing all synergism, we may say in the words of
scripture: eo? yap e<rrt,v o evepy&v eV VJJLLV /cal TO
6e\et,v fcal TO evepyeiv (Phil ii. 1 3).
As for Christianity, so for us also God is the
principle of salvation, which, as the Holy Ghost,
makes itself felt daily and hourly in our heart. Nay,
we might with the Bible view go yet a step farther
and conceive God at the same time as the principle
of creation, if we would resolve (figuratively
speaking) to place the Fall before the creation of
the world. In this case the creation of the world
would be the expansion of affirmation in space, time,
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY 315
and causality, and consequently the making of it
visible, in which in fact lies the first step to
salvation.
299. Let us turn back from these high-soaring
and daring speculations to experience, to interpret
which is the beginning and end of our task ; and
even as we behold the sun by its reflection, so let us
grasp the divine by its traces in experience, and
confine ourselves to that. These traces we shall
find nowhere but in our inner being, where they
appear in both spheres, in that of willing and in
that of knowing.
In our Will the divine is manifested as that
power which accomplishes its turning to denial.
This turning may take place suddenly, but it may
also be brought about by a gradual transformation
of the heart. Such contradicts, it is true, the
invariability of the empirical character. But this
means nothing more than that we have no intel-
lectual form by which to conceive it. Again of the
overwhelming strength of this power of turning we
can form no conception. For a force which would
be strong Enough to stop the earth in its course and
to set it in motion in the opposite direction, must be
called weak in comparison to the power of the Holy
Ghost. In the former case it would be a question of
a merely physical change, though a great one, but
here we speak of a turning of the Will to life, of
316 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
which this whole universe, with all its suns and
planets, is the mere phenomenon, and which yet
dwells whole and undivided in each one of us, and
in each one of us will turn to salvation.
The second trace of the divine in us concerns
knowledge. Here it shows itself as that inner
voice which sits in judgment, even against our will,
on the good and bad deeds, as well of others as of
ourselves. It is manifested as that indignation
which seizes us at the sight of each wicked deed,
and as the admiration, often mingled with shame,
which is involuntarily drawn from us by a noble
action. But our own doing also has in this voice its
judge. It sounds in the anguish of conscience which,
after a committed crime, seizes the criminal and has
often enough driven him into the arms of temporal
justice, And it comes over us after good actions,
performed often with heavy personal sacrifice, as that
satisfaction with which no attainment of selfish ends,
no possession of earthly happiness can compare
as the peace of God which passeth all
understanding.
CONCLUSION
8 300. If in conclusion we look back on our
whole metaphysical structure, it appears to us as a
granitic mountain which, on the firm rocky ground
of experience towering high and higher, terminates
in three summits. We reached the first of these
summits when, in the metaphysics of nature,
we attained to the conviction of the unity of all
being and recognised how the one Will to life was
spread at our feet as the infinite variety of the
world. The second summit we climbed in the
metaphysics of the beautiful, Above us we
saw the world of the Ideas in eternal splendour,
beneath us their imperfect shadows in nature. But
there still remained in the metaphysics of
morality, the third summit, highest of all. Here, if
anywhere, \we might hope to cast a glance into the
eternal realm from which this whole world proceeds
as the place of probation and healing. With effort
we have climbed this utmost summit of human
knowledge and find it wrapped in clouds ; so that
painfully groping we scarce find a footing at the
3iS ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
very spot where we arc nearest the region of
light.
Higher no wing can bear us, here ends the
path, losing itself in mist, but not hopelessly. And
so we may be content if, gazing upward from this
highest summit of the finite, we perceive through
the thinning cloud -veil the eternal stars, clearly
enough to lighten our way through the night of
existence.
JVa tatra sfiryo bhati^ na candra-tarakam
Net ima vidyitto bhtinti^ kuto 'yam agni/i t ~
Tarn eva bhantam anubhatl swvatii)
Tasya d/iasd sarvam idam vibhatL
"There shines not the sun, nor moon, nor stars,
neither these lightnings, much less earthly fire. After
Him, the Shining One, all things shine, by His light
is lighted this whole world
})
(KAthaka-upanisliad)
v. 15).
ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDlNTA
IN ITS RELATIONS
TO OCCIDENTAL METAPHYSICS
AN ADDRESS
delivered kfore the Bombay Bratich of the Royal Asiatic Society,
Saturday^ the 2$th February 1893
BY
DR. PAUL DEUSSEN
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF KIEL, GERMANY
REPRINTED FROM THE ORIGINAL EDITION
BOMBAY, 1893

TO
ALL MY INDIAN FRIENDS
WHOSE KINDNESS
HAS MADE MY JOURNEY THROUGH INDIA
FROM NOVEMBER 1892 TILL MARCH 1893
IN ALL PARTS OF THE PENINSULA
SO DELIGHTFUL, INSTRUCTIVE, AND HEART-
ELEVATING
I DEDICATE THESE FEW PAGES
IN RECOMMENDING THEM TO THEIR
SERIOUS CONSIDERATION
P. D.
FAREWELL TO INDIA.
sun of India, what have we committed,
That we must leave thee and thy children now,
Thy giant trees, thy flowers, so well befitted
To thy blue heaven's never-frowning brow ?
And you, our Indian friends, whose hcaity feeling
Deep sympathy with you has fast obtained
From Ceylon to Peshawar and Darjceling,
Are you now lost to us, so soon as gained ?
Farewell ! Now Space and Time, in separating
Our bodies, will create a cruel wall ;
Until forgetful dailoicss overbading,
Like Himalayan fog, bedims you all.
Did we but dream of your brown lovely faces,
Of your dark eyes, and gently-touching hands?
Was it a dream that left such tender traces,
Accompanying us to foreign lands ?
O yes, a dream is all that we are living,
And India be a dream in this great dream ;
A dream, repose and recreation giving,
Under a paler heaven's fainter beam.
But what aic Time and Space, whose rough intiusion
Will separate what ib so near allied !
Are they not taught to be a meie illusion?
May we not be against them fortified ?
yes, this thought shall be our consolation,
When we are severed soon by land and sea !
Your sun and ours is one ! no separation !
Keep friendship, friends, let it eternal be.
COLOMBO, i6t& March 1893.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDANTA
ON my journey through India I have noticed with satis-
faction, that in philosophy till now our brothers in the East
have maintained a very good tradition, better, perhaps, than
the more active but less contemplative branches of the
great Indo- Aryan family in Europe, . where Empirism,
Realism, and their natural consequence, Materialism, grow
from day to day more exuberantly, whilst metaphysics, the
very centre and heart of serious philosophy, is supported
only by a few, who have learnt to brave the spirit of
the age.
In India the influence of this perverted and perversive
spirit of our age has not yet overthrown in religion and
philosophy the good traditions of the great ancient time.
It is true that most of the ancient darfana's even in India
find only an historical interest ; followers of the S&nkhya-
System occur rarely; Ny&ya is cultivated mostly as an
intellectual spo# and exercise, like grammar or mathematics,
but the Vedlnta is, now as in the ancient time, living in
the mind and heart of every thoughtful Hindoo. It is true
that even here, in the sanctuary of Vedantic metaphysics,
the realistic tendencies, natural to man, have penetrated,
producing the misinterpreting variations of ^ankara's
Advaita, known under the names Vigisht&dvaita, Dvaita,
324 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
Quddhiidvaita of Ramdnuja, Madhva, Vallabha, but India
till now has not yet been seduced by their voices, and of
hundred Vedantins (I have it from a well-informed man,
who is himself a zealous adversary of Cankara and follower
of Ranuinuja) fifteen perhaps adhere to Rfimfmuja,
five to Mddhva, five to Vallabha, and seventy-live to
Cankaracharya.
This fact may be for poor India in so many misfortunes
a great consolation ; for the eternal interests are higher
than the temporary ; and the system of the Ved&nta,
as founded on the Upanishads and VecUnta Sutras and
accomplished by ankara's commentaries on them, equal
in rank to Plato and Kant is one of the most valuable
products of the genius of mankind in its search for the
eternal truth as I propose to show now by a short sketch
of ankara's Advaita and comparison of its principal
doctrines with the best that occidental philosophy has
produced till now.
Taking the Upanishads, as Cankara does, for revealed
truth with absolute authority, it was not an easy task to
build out of their materials a consistent philosophical
system, for the Upanishads are in Theology, Kosmology
and Psychology full of the hardest contradictions. Thus in
many passages the nature of Brahman is painted out in
various and luxuriant colours, and again we read, that the
nature of Brahman is quite unattainable i(h human words,
to human understanding ; thus we meet sometimes longer
reports explaining how the world has been created by
Brahman, and again we are told that there is no world
besides Brahman, and all variety of things is mere error
and illusion; thus we have fanciful descriptions of the
Sams&ra, the way of the wandering soul up to heaven
PHILOSOPHY OF THE VE1)ANTA 325
and back to earth, and again we read, that there is no
Sams&ra, no variety of souls at all, but only one Atman,
who is fully and totally residing in every being.
Qankara in these difficulties created by the nature of his
materials, in face of so many contradictory doctrines which
he was not allowed to decline and yet could not admit
altogether, has found a wonderful way out, which deserves
the attention, perhaps the imitation, of the Christian dog-
matists in their embarrassments. He constructs out of the
materials of the Upanishads two systems, one esoteric,
philosophical (called by him nirgund, Didy&> sometimes
param&rthika ayasthfi), containing the metaphysical truth
for the few, rare in all times and countries, who are
able to understand it; and another exoteric, theological
(sagutiA vidyct) vyavaluiriM avastha), for the general public,
who want images, not abstract truth ; worship, not medi-
tation.
I shall now point out briefly the two systems, esoteric
and exoteric, in pursuing and confronting them through the
four chief parts, which ankara's system contains, and
every complete philosophical system must contain :
I. Theology, the doctrine of God or of the philoso-
phical principle.
II. Kosmology, the doctrine of the world.
III. Psychology, the doctrine of the soul.
IV. Eschatology, the doctrine of the last things, the
things after death.
326 ELEMENTS OK METAPHYSICS
I. THEOLOGY.
The Upanishads teem with fanciful and contradictory
descriptions of the nature of Brahman. He is the all-
pervading aka^a, is the purusha in the sun, the purusha in
the eye; his head is the heaven, his eyes are sun and
moon, his breath is the wind, his footstool the earth ; he is
infinitely great as soul of the universe and infinitely small
as the soul in us; he is in particular the i^ara^ the
personal God, distributing justly reward and punishment
according to the deeds of man. All these numerous
descriptions are collected by ankara under the wide
mantle of the exoteric theology, the sagujid w'ttyd of
Brahman, consisting of numerous "vidyds" adapted for
approaching the eternal being not by the way of knowledge
but by the way of worshipping, and having each its
particular fruits. Mark, that also the conception of God
as a personal being, an tyoara, is merely exoteric and does
not give us an adequate knowledge of the Atman ; and
indeed, when we consider what personality is, how narrow
in its limitations, how closely connected with egoism, the
counterpart of godly essence, who would think so low of
God as to impute to Him personality ?
In the sharpest contrast to these exoteric vidyds stands
the esoteric, nirgunct wdyh of the Atman Y and its funda-
mental tenet is the absolute inaccessibility of God to
human thoughts and words ;
PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDANTA 327
and again :
ll
and the celebrated formula occurring so often in Brihad-
iranyaka-Upanishad ; netil nefi ! viz., whatever attempt you
make to know the Atman, whatever description you give of
him, I always say : na #/, na ift\ it is not so, it is not so !
Therefore the wise Bahva, when asked by the king
Vashkali to explain the Brahman, kept silence. And
when "the king repeated his request again and again, the
nshi broke out into the answer :. " I tell it you, but you
don't understand it
; g&nto 'yam frtrnft, this- Atm is silence !
"
We know it now by the Kantian philosophy, that the
answer of Bahva was correct, we know it, that the very
organisation of our intellect (which is bound once for ever
to its innate forms of perception, space, time, and causality)
excludes us from a knowledge of the spaceless, timeless,
godly reality for ever and ever. And yet the Atman, the
only godly being, is not unattainable to us, is even not far
from us, for we have it fully and totally in ourselves as our
own metaphysical entity ; and here, when returning from
the outside and apparent world to the deepest secrets of
our own nature, we may come to God, notjby knowledge,'
but by anubhaya, by absorption into our own self. There
is a great difference between knowledge, in which subject
and object aje distinct from each other, and anubhava,'
where subject and object coincide in the same. He who
by anubhava
* comes to the great intelligence, "aham
brahma asmi" obtains a state called by ankara Samrd-
dhanani) accomplished satisfaction ; and indeed, what might
he desire, who feels and knows himself as the sum and
totality of all existence !
32$ ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
II. KOSMOLOGY.
Here again we meet the distinction of exoteric and
esoteric doctrine, though not so clearly severed by
as in other parts of his system.
The exoteric Kosmology according to the natural but
erroneous realism (avidya) in which we are born, considers
this world as the reality, and can express its entire
dependency on Brahman only by the mythical way of a
creation of the world by Brahman. Thus a temporal creation
of the world, even as in the Christian documents, is also
taught in various and well-known passages of the Upani-
shads. But such a creation of the material world by an
immaterial cause, performed in a certain point of time after
an eternity elapsed uselessly, is not only against the
demands of human reason and natural science, but also
against another important doctrine of the Ved&nta, which
teaches and must teach us (as we shall see hereafter) the
"
beginninglessness of the migration of souls," sams&rasya
andditwm. Here the expedient of (^ankara is very clever
and worthy of imitation, Instead of the temporary creation
once for ever of the Upanishads, he teaches that the world
in great periods is created and reabsorbed by Brahman
(referring to the misunderstood verse of the Rigveda:
t trr?TT *Wi^i%fchwnr ) ; this rnutual creation
and reabsorption lasts from eternity, and no creation can be
allowed by our system to be a first one, and
"
that for good
reasons, as we shall see just now. If we ask : Why has
God created the world ? the answers to this question are
generally very unsatisfactory. For His own glorification ?
How may we attribute to Him so much vanity ! For His
PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDANTA 329
particular amusement? But He was an eternity without
this toy ! For love of mankind ? How can He love a
thing before it exists, and how can it be called love, to
create millions for misery and eternal pain ? The Veddnta
has a better answer. The never-ceasing new-creation of
the world is a moral necessity connected with the
central and most precious doctrine of the exoteric Vedanta,
the doctrine of Samsra.
Man, says Cankara, is like a plant He grows, flourishes,
and at the end he dies : but not totally. For as the plant,
when dying, leaves behind it the seed, of which, according
to its quality, a new plant grows, so man, when dying,
leaves his karma^ the good and bad works of his life, which
must be rewarded and punished in another life after this.
No life can be the first, for it is the fruit of previous actions,
nor the last, for its actions must be expiated in a next
following life. So the Samsara is without beginning and
without end, and the new creation of the world after every
absorption into Brahman is a moral necessity. I need
not point out, in particular here in India, the high value of
this doctrine of Samstira as a consolation in the distresses,
as a moral agent in the temptations of life, I have to say
here only, that the Samsira, though not the absolutejruth,
is a mythical representative of a truth wTnch in itself is
unattainable to our intellect; mythical is this theory of
metempsychosjs only in so far as it invests in the forms of
space and time what really is spaceless and timeless, and
therefore beyorld the reach of our understanding. So the
Samsara is just so far from the truth, as the sagund "uidyh
is from the nirgunti vidya ; it is the eternal truth itself, but
(since we cannot conceive it otherwise) the truth in,an
allegorical form, adapted to our human understanding.
330 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
And this is the character of the whole exoteric Vedanta,
whilst the esoteric doctrine tries to find out the philoso-
phical, the absolute truth.
And so we come to the esoteric Kosmology, whose
simple doctrine is this, that in reality there is no manifold
world, but only Brahman, and that what we consider as
the world, is a mere illusion (mayo) similar to a mrigatrisfa
mM which disappears when we approach it, and not more
to be feared than the rope which we took in the darkness
for a serpent. There are, as you see, many similes in the
Vedanta, to illustrate the illusive character of this world,
but the best of them is, perhaps, when Cankara compares
our life to a long dream ; a man whilst dreaming does
not doubt of the reality of the dream, but this reality dis-
appears in the moment of awakening, to give place to a
truer reality which we were not aware of whilst dreaming.
The life a dream ! this has been the thought of many
wise men from Pindar and Sophokles to Shakespeare and
Calderon de la Barca, but nobody has better explained this
idea than (pankara. And, indeed, the moment when we
die may be to nothing so similar as to the awakening from
a long and heavy dream ; it may be, that then heaven and
earth are blown away like the nightly phantoms of the
dream, and what then may stand before us ? or rather in
us? Brahman, the eternal reality which was hidden to
us till then by this dream of life ! This wqyld is mya\ is
illusion, is not the very reality, that is the deepest thought
of the esoteric Veddnta, attained not by calculating farka
but by anubhava, by returning from this variegated world
to the deep recess of our own self (Atman). Do so, if
you can, and you will get aware of a reality very different
from empirical reality, a timeless, spaceless, changeless
PHILOSOPHY OF THE VED&NTA 331
reality, and you will feel and experience that whatever is
outside of this only true reality is mere appearance, is
inaya", is a dream ! This was the way the Indian thinkers
went, and by a similar way, shown by Parmenides, Plato
came to the same truth, when knowing and teaching that
this world is a world of shadows, and that the reality is
not in these shadows, but behind them. The accord here
of Platonism and Vedantism is wonderful, but both have
grasped this great metaphysical truth by intuition ; their
tenet is true, but they are not able to prove it, and in so
far they are defective. And here a great light and assist-
ance to the Indian and the Greek thinker comes from
the philosophy of Kant, who went quite another way, not
the Vedantic and Platonic way of intuition, but the way of
abstract reasoning and scientific proof. The great work of
Kant is an analysis of the human mind, not in the super-
ficial way of Locke, but going to the very bottom of it.
And in doing so, Kant found, to the surprise of the world
and of himself, that three essential elements of this out-
side world, viz. space, time, and causality, are not, as
we naturally believe, eternal fundamentals of an objective ;
reality, but merely subjective innate perceptual forms of our ,
own intellect. This has been proved by Kant and by his
great disciple Schopenhauer with mathematical evidence,
and I have given these proofs (the base of all scientific
metaphysics) in the shortest and clearest form in
my Mlemente<tfer Metaphysik a book which I am resolved
now to get translated into English, for the benefit, not of
the European? (who may learn German), but of my brothers
in India, who will be greatly astonished to find in Germany
the scientific substruction of their own philosophy, of the
Advaita Vedanta I For Kant has demonstrated that space,
time, and causality are not objective realities, but only
332 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
subjective forms of our intellect, and the unavoidable con-
clusion is this, that the world, as far as it is extended in
space, running on in time, ruled throughout by causality,
in so far is merely a representation of my mind and
nothing beyond it. You see the concordance of Indian,
Greek, and German metaphysics; the world is maya, is
illusion, says ^ankara ; it is a world of shadows, not of
realities, says Plato ; it is
"
appearance only, not the thing
in itself," says Kant. Here we have the same doctrine in
three different parts of the world, but the scientific proofs
of it are not in fankara, not in Plato, but only in Kant.
III. PSYCHOLOGY.
Here we convert the order and begin with the esoteric
Psychology, because it is closely connected with the esoteric
Kosmology and its fundamental doctrine: the world is
maya. All is illusive, with one exception, with the excep-
tion of my own Self, of my Atman. My Atman cannot
be illusive, as ankara shows, anticipating the
"
cogito> ergo
sum " of Descartes, for he who would deny it, even in
denying it, witnesses its reality. But what is the relation
between my individual soul, the Jlva-Atman, and the highest
soul, the Parama- Atman or Brahman? Here ankara,
like a prophet, foresees the deviations of Rta&nuja,
Madhva and Vallabha, and refutes them in showing that
the Jlva cannot be a part of Brahmanr-(R^mdnuja),
because Brahman is without parts (for it is timeless and
spaceless, and all parts are either successions in time or
co-ordinations in space, as we may supply), neither a
different thing from Brahman (Madhva), for Brahman
is ekam eva advittyam, as we may experience by amtbhava,
nor a metamorphosis of Brahman (Vallabha), for
PHILOSOPHY OF THE VKD\\T\
Brahman is unchangeable (for, as we know now by Kant,
it is not subject lo causality). The conclusion is, that
the Jiva, being neither a part noi a different thing, nor a
variation of Brahman, must be the Paramatman fully
and totally himself, a conclusion made equally by the
Vcdantin C^'ankara, by the Platonic Plotinos, and by the
Kantian Schopenhauer, But Cankata in his conclusions
goes perhaps further than any of them. If really our soul,
says he, is not a part of Brahman but Brahman himself,
then all the attributes of Brahman, all - pervadingness,
eternity, almightiness (scientifically spoken : exemption of
space, time, causality) are ours ; a/mm bmhma. aswi, 1 am
Brahman, and consequently I am all-pervading (spaceless),
eternal (timeless), almighty (not limited in my doing by
causality). But these godly qualities are hidden in me,
says ^ankara, as the fire is hidden in the wood, and will
appear only after the final deliverance*
What is the cause of this concealment of my godly
nature ? The Vpudhi's, answers ( 'aiikara, and with this
answer we pass from the esoteric: to the exoteric psycho-
logy. The Upadhi's are manas and indriyaX prdna with
its five branches, sCikshmam tjarinun, in short, the whole
psychological apparatus, which together with a factor
changeable from birth to birth, with my karman, accom-
panies my Atman in all its ways of migration, without
infecting its godly nature, as the crystal is not infected by
the colour painted over it. But whence originate these
Upftdhi's?
r
fhey form of course part of the m&y&i the
great world-illusion, and like majfd they are based on our
innate awtfyA or ignorance, a merely negative power and
yet strong enough to keep us from our godly existence,
But now, from where comes this twidyA, this primal
334 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
cause of ignorance, sin, and misery? Here all philo-
sophers in India and Greece and everywhere have been
defective, until Kant came to show us that the whole ques-
tion is inadmissible. You ask for the cause of awdya, but
it has no cause; for causality goes only so far as this
world of the Samsara goes, connecting each link of it with
another, but never beyond Samsara and its fundamental
characteristic, the aindyct. In inquiring after a cause of
avidyti with mdyd, Samsara and Up&dhi's, you abuse, as
Kant may teach us, your innate mental organ of causality
to penetrate into a region for which it is not made, and
where it is no more available. The fact is, that we are
here in ignorance, sin, and misery, and that we know the
way out of them, but the question of a cause for them is
senseless.
IV. ESCHATOLOGY.
And now a few words about this way out of the
Samsara, and first about the exoteric theory of it. In
the ancient time of the hymns there was no idea of
Samsara, but only rewards in heaven and (somewhat later)
punishments in a dark region (padam ga&Mrani), the pre-
cursor of the later hells. Then the deep theory of Sam-
sara, came up, teaching rewards and punishment in the
form of a new birth on earth. The Vedanta combines
both theories, and so it has a double expiation, first in
heaven and hell, and then again in a new existence on the
earth. This double expiation is different (i)'for performers
of good works, going \htfitriyana; (2) for worshippers of
the sagunam brahma, going the devaydna; (3) for wicked
deeds, leading to what is obscurely hinted at in the Upani-
shads as the tritiyam sth&nam, the third place, (i) The
PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDANTA 335
fitriyana leads through a succession of dark spheres to the
moon, there to enjoy the fruit of the good works, and, after
their consumption, back to an earthly existence. (2) The
devay&na leads through a set of brighter spheres to Brah-
man, without returning to the earth (^rt r 3T*lTref^ ! )
But this Brahman is only sagunam brahma, the object of
worshipping, and its true worshippers, though entering into
this sagunam brahma without returning, have to wait in it
until they get moksha by obtaining samyagdarganam, the
full knowledge of the nirgunam brahma. (3) The tritiyam
sthanani) including the later theories of hells, teaches
punishment in them, and again punishment by returning
to earth in the form of lower castes, animals, and plants.
All these various and fantastical ways of Samsara are con-
sidered as true, quite as true as this world is, but not more,
For the whole world and the whole way of Sams&ra is
valid and true for those only who are in the avidya, not
for those who have overcome it, as we have now to
show,
The esoteric Ved&nta does not admit the reality of
the world nor of the Sams&ra, for the only reality is
Brahman, grasped in ourselves as our own Atman. . The
knowledge of this Atinan, the great intelligence :
" aham
brahma asmi" does not produce moksha (deliverance), but
is moksha itself. Then we obtain what the Upanishads
say :
"H^I
'
i H
When seeing Brahma as the highest and the lowest
336 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
everywhere, all knots of our heait, all sorrows are split, all
doubts vanish, and our woiks become nothing. Certainly
no man can live without doing works, and so also the
fhwnmukfa; but he knows, that all these works are
illusive, as this whole world is, and therefore they do not
adhere to him nor produce for him a new life after death.
And what kind of works may such a man do ? People
have often reproached the Veda-nta with being defective in
morals, and, indeed, the Indian genius is too contemplative
to speak much of works ; but the fact is nevertheless, that
the highest and purest morality is the immediate consequence
of the Veda"nta. The Gospels fix quite correctly as the
highest law of morality :
" love your neighbour as your-
selves." But why should I do so, since by the order of
nature I feel pain and pleasure only in myself, not in my
neighbour ? The answer is not in the Bible (this venerable
book being not yet quite free from Semitic realism), but it is
in the Veda, is in the great formula, "tatjtyam asi" which
gives in three words metaphysics and morals altogether.
You shall love your neighbour as yourselves, because you
are your neighbour, and mere illusion makes you believe,
that your neighbour is something different from yourselves.
Or in the words of the Bhagavadgitah : he, who knows
himself in everything and everything in himself, will
not injure himself by himself, na hinasti Attnana
dfmdnam. This is the sum and tenor of all morality,
arid this is the standpoint of a man knowing himself as
Brahman. He feels himself as everything, so he
will not desire anything, for he has whatever can be had j
he feels himself as everything, so he will not
injure anything, for nobody injures himself. He lives in
the world, is surrounded by its illusions but not deceived
by them : like the man suffering from tinrira, who sees
PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDAXTA 337
two moons but knows that there is one only, so the Jlvan-
mukta sees the manifold world and cannot get tid of seeing
it, but he knows, that there is only ono being, Brahman,
the Atman, his own Self, and he verifies it by his deeds of
pure disinterested morality. And so he expects his end,
as the potter expects the end of the twirling of his wheel,
after the vessel is ready. And then, for him, when death
comes, no more Samsara :*T ^P TntfT ^rSfTOfnf I T5T T3T
W T^r ^T$fa He enters into Brahman, like the streams
into the ocean :
he leaves behind him n&ma and
rfifiam, he leaves behind
him individuality^ but he does not leave behind him his
Atman
} his Self. It is not the falling of the drop into
the infinite ocean, it is the whole ocean, becoming free
from the fetters of ice, returning from its frozen state to
that what it is really and has never ceased to be, to its
own all-pervading, eternal, almighty nature,
And so the Ved&nta, in its urrfalsified form, is the
strongest support of pure morality, is the greatest conso-
lation in the sufferings of life and death, Indians^ keep
toitl