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The Working of Dyarchy
in India
1919-1928
BY
KEEALA PUTRA '
BOMBAY
D. B. TAEAPOEEVALA SONS & Co.
"
KITAB MAHAL :" 190, HORNBY BOAD
1928

CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
INTRODUCTION ... ... ... ... i
I. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BEFORE THE
REFORMS ... ...
"
... ... 1
II. THE REFORMED CONSTITUTION ... ... 14
III. POLITICAL CONDITIONS ... ... ... 28
IV. DYAIICIIY IN THE PROVINCES ... ... 42
(1) The Governor
(2) The Executive Council
(3) Ministers and the Executive
(4) Ministerial Responsibility
V. DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES (contd.) ... 61
(1) The Legislature and the Executive
(2) Resolutions and Interpellations
(3) Committees
(4) The Party System
VI. FINANCE AND THE COUNCILS ... ... 72
VII. THE COUNCILS AND THE PEOPLE... ... 79
VIII. REFORMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ... 94
IX. THE FUTURE ... ... ... ... 110
(1) The Conditions of Enquiry
(2) The Government of India
(3) The Provincial Governments
(4) The Services
(5) The Franchise
CONCLUSION ... ... ... ... 147
INDEX ... ... ... ... ... 151

INTRODUCTION
THIS work does ,]not purport to do more than study the
working of Dyarchy in India. In no sense is it an attempt to
formulate a Constitution or to prescribe the course of political
evolution. That work is entrusted by Parliament to a Com-
mission of its own members and by the Indian leaders to a
Convention which is to meet at any early date. The present
writer has neither the equipment nor the desire to usurp their
legitimate functions. His object has been solely to analyse
the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution as it was enacted, and to
see how far it has been successful, as a first instalment of
Responsible Government in India. That was the declared
purpose of the Act. The Declaration of August 1917, now
incorporated in the preamble of the Act, makes this eminently
clear. That, obviously, is the first and fundamental problem
that the student of the Dyarchical Government has to answer.
Though the Reformed Government showed unexpected signs of
strength in many other directions, and proved a source of
great political progress, as will be shown in the course of the
book, in its main idea, introducing the principle of Responsible
Government, it proved an unqualified failure. The main issues
that arise out of this question, for which an answer has been
sought in this study, are the causes of this failure in its
different aspects, relating to the Governor, the Executive, the
Ministers and the Legislature.
If, on this fundamental question of Ministerial Responsi-
bility, the failing of the new Constitution is undouted, in
11 INTRODUCTION
other directions, probably no less important for our ultimate
development, its success has been equally undeniable. In the
scheme of political education, social legislation, liberalisation
of local government, and closer relation between the people
and the administration, the work of the Reformed Constitu-
tion merits warm approval. The haze of political controversy,
arising from the failure of the principle of Ministerial Respon-
sibilily, has obscured the achievements from the eyes of
Indian political observers.
The Commission of Enquiry, to examine the working of this
Constitution, has now been appointed. Given the limitation
of a Commission, consisting solely of Members of Parliament,
there is no doubt that its personnel is as impartial and as
competent as we can hope to have. By the terms of reference,
laid down in the Act itself, the Commission is to enquire
11
into the working of the system of Government, the growth
of education and the development of representative institu-
tions, in British India, and matters connected therewith." The
Commission is asked to report
"
as to whether and to what
extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible
government, or to extend, modify, or restrict the degree of res-
ponsible government then existing therein, including the
question whether the establishment of second chambers of the
local legislatures is or is not desirable." In announcing the
appointment of the Commission His Excellency Lord Irwin
justified the procedure adopted that of appointing a purely
Parliamentary Commission to deal with this question in the
following terms :
"
It would be generally agreed that what is required is a
Commission which would be unbiassed and competent to
present an accurate picture of facts in Parliament, but it must
be found willing to take whatever action a study of these facts
may indicate to be appropriate.
"
To fulfil the first requirement, it would follow that the
INTRODUCTION ill
Commission should be such as may approach its task with
sympathy and a real desire to assist India to the utmost of
its power, hut with minds free from preconceived conclusions
on either side. It is, however, open to doubt whether a
Commission constituted so as to include a substantial propor-
tion of Indian members, and, as rightly \\ould, British official
members also, would satisfy the iirst condition of reaching con-
clusions unaffected by any process of a priori reasoning. On
the one hand, it might be felt that the desire, natural and
legitimate, of the Indian members to see India a self-govern-
ing nation could hardly fail to colour their judgment of her
present capacity to sustain the role. On the other hand,
there are those who might hold that British ollicial members
would be less than human if their judgment were not in some
degree affected by long and close contact with the questions
to which they would now be invited to apply impartial
minds.
"
But even after such a Commission had written its report,
Parliament would inevitably approach the consideration of it
with some element of mental reservation due to an instinctive
feeling that the advice in more than one case represented
views to which the holder was previously committed. It
would move uncertainly among conclusions the exact value of
which, owing to unfamiliarity with the minds of their framers,
it would feel unable to appraise.
" We should, however, bo making a great mistake, if we
suppose that these matters are purely constitutional or could
be treated merely as the subject of judicial investigation.
Indian opinion has a clear title to ask that, in the elaboration
of a ew instrument of government their solution of the
problem or their judgment on other solutions which may be
proposed, should be made an integral factor in the examination
of the question and be given due weight. In the ultimate
decision, it is therefore essential to find means by which
IV INTRODUCTION
Indians may he made parties to the deliberations so nearly
Effecting the future of their country."
With this object of making Indian opinion an integral
factor in the examination of the question, His Majesty's
Government proposed that the Commission should co-operate
with a Joint Select Committee of the Central Legislatures in
all-Indian matters, and with the Select Committees of the
Provicial Legislatures in matters dealing with the Provinces.
It was also laid down that the Report when submitted to
Parliament,
"
will be referred for consideration to a Joint
Committee of both Houses " which will take evidence from
Indian bodies and consult a Joint Committee of the Central
Legislatures. The proposals, especially as they are based on
the exclusion of Indian representation from the Commission
have led to an acrimonious controversy winch is hardly suited
to a calm and dispassionate examination of so important a
political question as the future of Indian Government. What-
ever arguments there may be in favour of a purely Parlia-
mentary Commission, and it may be accepted that they are
many of undoubted validity, the alienation of Indian opinion
consequent upon so emphatic a repudiation of Indian claims
to equal participation in deciding the future of thir country,
should have been foreseen. As it is, the Commission is
threatened with a boycott which, whether politically wise or
suicidal, will certainly hamper its wrork and add to the diffi-
culties of the situation. It is to be hoped, that these adverse
circumstances will not prejudice the Commission in the
examination of the problem.
The refusal of experienced public men to give evidence on
the working of the system will certainly handicap tha Com-
mission in their enquiry. They may have before them only
the point of view of the Government the Civil Services
and of those non-officials who are more loyal to the Govern-
ment than the Government itself. Unless therefore, the
INTRODUCTION V
Commission takes special care to put itself in the place erf the
Indian Nationalist, it is more than likely, as circumstances
now stand, that its views will be moulded by official opinion.
It is therefore, all the more necessary, that an impartial and
detached study of the working of Dyarchical Government in
India should be made available to them.
The present writer does not claim any special qualirication
beyond that of an observant student of politics who has
lived all over India and watched the working of the system
with critical interest. He lias had the opportunity to watch
the proceedings of both the Central Legislatures and of one
Provincial Council almost daily for months from the press
gallery. These may not be sufficient qualifications to deal
with so important a problem, but they have saved the writer
from political partisanship.
There is only one more point to which the \\riter desires to
call attention in this Introduction : and that is a point of
vital importance in all discussions of the Indian Constitu-
tion. There is an idea, which one often meets with in
writings of eminent men, both English and Indian, that what
India wants is a Constitution suited to her own genius. This
subject is more fully treated in the chapter entitled
"
The
Conditions of Enquiry."
It may be stated, summarily that this vague phraseology
indicates either, a reactionary mind which sees in democratic
progress a challenge to interests, or a vague idealism generated
by a faith in India's past greatness. Both attitudes are
dangerous to the peaceful political evolution of India. What
India wants, and what Britain has undertaken to give her,
is nothing less than
"
Responsible Government." Even if
it is accepted that each country has differing political ideals,
and that institutions at variance with national character am
not likely to take root or to succeed in uncongenial soil,
the problem, as it affects India, remains the same. Indian
VI INTRODUCTION
political ideals are largely the reflection of what has grown up
in England, and the century and a half of political contact
has made them a part of Indian tradition. It is impossible to
efface from history the last 100 years of political growth in
India, and no one, who has studied the Indian movement, can
deny that in the realm of ideas, more than in the realm of
politics, the assimilated tradition of England has become the
basis of Indian thought. Moreover, the transformations of
government and the development of political institutions are
to be in co-operation with and not independent of Great
Britain. That fact alone renders all speculation about a
Constitution,
"
indigenously developed and suited to the
peculiar genius of India," futile.
The objective of Indian political development is clearly laid
down. It is " the gradual development of Self-Govern-
ing institutions with a view to responsible government
as an integral part of the Empire." If this declaration is
adhered to, it clearly negatives all suggestion of a departure
from the principle of Parliamentary responsible government as
the basis of the future Constitution of India.
It only remains now to thank those friends who have
helped the writer with suggestions and with sympathy. He is
deeply obliged to Mr. C. R. Reddy, Vice-chancellor of the
And lira University, whoso discussions with the writer, in the
days when they were associated in work, helped him greatly
to understand Council proceedings. He is also under
obligations to Professor Sarma of Patiala and Mr. Mahadev
Modak, both of whom helped him with their suggestions.
LONDON, November 23, 1927.
THE WORKING OF DYARCHY
IN INDIA
CHAPTER I
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BEFORE THE
REFORMS
THE administration of India is entrusted by Parliament to a
Governor-General in Council. The authority of Parliament is
supreme and it is exercised through the Secretary of State for
India who is invariably a member of the Cabinet. The
Government of India is required by section 33 of the Govern-
ment of India Act of 1915, to pay due obedience to all such
orders as it may receive from the Secretary of State. From
time to time successive Secretaries of State have laid it down
emphatically
"
that 'the Government established in India is
subordinate to the Government at Home and no Government
can be subordinate unless it is within the power of the
superior government to order what is to be done or left
undone/'* As recently as 1922, Lord Ourzon referred to the
Government of India as a subordinate branch of administra-
tion.
With this limitation, the Government of India rests with
the Governor-General in Council. He is invested
"
with all the
powers of Government over all parts of India, and is responsi-
ble for the good government in them all." The Governor-
General acts in Council and even when, under exceptional
circumstances, he overrides the authority of his Cabinet, his
*Dispatch of Gladstone's Government to Lord Mayo.
2 THE WOBKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
actions are officially considered to be that of the whole Govern-
ment. The Council consists of 6 ordinary members and the Com-
mander-in-Chief who is an extraordinary member. Originally,
the method followed was that of collective deliberation on
each question which was decided according to majority vote.
The system of each member holding a portfolio came into
existence only in the time of Lord Canning when the work of
the departments was distributed, as in a Cabinet, among the
members of the Council. The main departments from which
the members take their names are Eevenue, Law, Home,
Finance, Commerce and Industry, and Education, besides the
Foreign and Political, which is directly under the Governor-
General.
India is divided into 8 major provinces (excluding Burma)
and 6 minor charges. The eight major provinces are Madras,
Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh,the
Punjab, the Central Provinces and Berar, Bihar
and Orissa, and Assam. The minor provinces are
Coorg, Ajmir-Merwara, Baluchistan, the Andamans, Delhi,
and the Nort-West Frontier Province. Among the
major provinces, Madras, Bengal and Bombay,
were styled presidencies. They were administered by
Governors in Council. The United Provinces, the Punjab and
Bihar and Orissa were administered by Lieutcnant-Governors
without the help of executive &unils. Assam and the Central
Provinces were under Chief Commissioners.
The Provincial Governments, before the Reform scheme,
were merely what they were officially termed local Govern-
ments. The conception of the Government of India^ as one
indivisible whole under the direct charge of the Goveenor-
General in Council, involved strict control of provincial ad-
ministration. At every turn, in financial, in legislative and in
administrative matters, the Provincial Governments were
bound hand and foot to the Government of India. There was
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BEFORE THE REFORMS 3
no matter in which the Central Government of India could
not intervene, in fact did not intervene. This interference
developed to such an extent that the Decentralisation Com-
mission reported that the Government of India
"
have paid
too little regard to the importance of developing a strong sense
of responsibility among their subordinate agents and of giving
sufficient weight to local sentiments and traditions, in our
opinion, the burden of work could bo materially diminished if
the Indian Government were to refrain from interfering in
unnecessary detail with the action of the authorities subordi-
nate to them."
The control over the Provinces was most clearly seen in
the financial system of the pre-roform days. By the Acts of
1853 and 1858, the revenues of India were treated as one, and
from that time, the Provincial Governments were carried on
by a system of doles. The Provincial Governments had no
right of any kind to the revenues they raised. But this system
was modified in time, and slowly from 1870 onwards, the
Provincial Governments were given fixed grants and
also the right of raising additional revenues from taxation.
Soon afterwards, in Lord Lytton's time, the Central Govern-
ment substituted the system of grants to a surrender of
certain revenue heads to the Provinces and hence arose the
classification of revenues into Indian, provincial and divided.
The Central Government kept the right of resuming accumu-
lated balances in the Provinces in cases of necessity, with the
result that there was no incentive to economy in the
financial administration of the Provinces. This system was
modified in the time of Lord Curzon, when the revenues
assigned to Provinces were definitely fixed. These assign-
ments were based not on the revenues of each Province, but
on the demand each of them put forward, and consequently,
the Government kept a strict watcli on expenditure. The
whole effect of the system, before the Reforms, was to place
4 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
the Provinces under the complete control of the Central
Government and make them nothing more than suhordinate
agencies to the Government of India.
Though the supreme executive authority was thus vested
in the Governor-General in Council and of Governors in
Council and Lieutenant-Governors in the Provinces, the
administrative system which they directed, was composed of
the Cfvil Service which, in its corporate capacity, had
such powers that it could claim in fact to he the Government
of India. The Civil Services, hefore the Reforms, held every
superior appointment in India, witli the exception of the
Governor-General and the Law Member of his Council, the
Madras, Bombay and Bengal Governors and the Chief Justices
of the High Court. Even in the Viceroy's Council, all the
portfolios excepting Law, and in times of crisis Finance, were
held by members of the Civil Service. All the Lieutenant-
Governors belonged to the same service. A specified number
of the Judges of Provincial High Courts were also Civil Ser-
vice men. As the Montagu-Chelmsford Report expressed it :
"
It
(The I. C. S.) has heen in effect much more of a government
corporation than a purely civil service in the English sense/*
Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, who was a member of the Public
Service Commission (1913-1914), describes it thus : "The
Indian Civil Service is more than a collection of individuals.
It is a bureaucracy with a corporate life, a machine, a free-
masonry. It moulds the raw recruit into its own image. It
has to work as a whole. Many officers become wheels in a
mechanism working by rule and repetition.'*
The Indian Civil Services differed from the administrative
services in other countries in two ways. First, it was pre-
dominantly British in personnel. Though the recruitment
to the service was by open competition, as the examination
was held in London, the number of Indian candidates was
small. To keep the service essentially British in character
was considered a necessity. Secondly, it was Qot merely an
administrative body. The Civil Service claimed the right "to
advise the Government and insisted on being consulted on
all matters of policy. In fact they constituted a governing
caste, with rigid conventions and formulas. Thirdly, the
Civil Service was not concerned merely with what may be
called political administration. The superior judicial offices,
under the High Court Bench, were reserved for them. They
controlled, through the Secretariat, every branch of adminis-
tration. Even the public works department, forest adminis-
tration, police, and other technical services, were directed by
the officers of the Indian Civil Service. In fact they com-
bined the functions of the civil services with those of the
political heads of departments in parliamentary countries.
'
Slowly however, a new element was introduced into this
system of absolute bureaucratic control. This was the
association of popular representatives with the affairs of
Government. To the Legislative Council, established by the
Act of 1861, a few Indians were nominated in order to
represent Indian views. By the Indian Councils Act, 1892
a further step was taken in this direction. Lord Dufferin
declared that
"
the time has come for us to take another
step in the development of the same liberal policy and to
give a still wider share in the administration of public
affairs, to such Indian gentlemen as by their influence, by
their acquirements and the confidence they inspired in their
fellow-countrymen, are marked out as fitted to assist with
their counsels the responsible rulers of the country/' Lord
Dufferin's Government recommended that the Legislative
Couacil should be enlarged to include elected Indian represent-
atives. And though the principle of election was rejected by
the British Cabinet, the Council was enlarged to include Indian
members who were nominally appointed but really elected
by certain recognised bodies. The Council also received the
6 THE WOEKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
right to discuss the Budget and to interpellate the Govern-
ment.
The Minto-Morley Reforms of 1908 took the Councils a step
further. The principle of elective representation was for the
first time introduced into the Indian Councils. It was, of
-course, hedged in by numerous conditions. The Mohammedans
elected their own representatives in separate constituencies,
Chambers of Commerce, Landholders and other special inter-
ests were given direct representation. The general constituen-
cies themselves were constituted out of municipalities and
district boards. But with all this, the introduction of the
principle of elected representation on the Councils was an
important change. The Councils were constituted of officials,
nominated non-officials and elected representatives. In all
the Provincial Councils, the official votes were in a minority,
though the Government, with the help of the nominated
votes, could in all Provinces, except Bengal, out-vote the
elected representatives. In the Central Legislature the
Government had, at all times, a clear majority.
The enlarged Legislatures were given the right not only to
discuss the Budget, but to move resolutions on it and divide
the Council and to move resolutions on matters of general
interest. It also gave the members wide opportunities for
influencing the administration in general.
An integral part of the reforms of 1908, was the appoint-
ment of Indian members to the Executive Councils of the
Governor-General and the Provincial Governors. This was a
radical change and was carried out with difficulty, because of
the strenuous opposition it met with from King Edward VII.
Lord Morley also appointed an Indian to serve on*, the
Council of the Secretary of State. The appointment of
Indian public men, with no previous administrative training,
to the highest offices in the Government, was most important,
because it was the first open attack on the monopoly of the
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BEFORE THE REFORMS 7
Civil Service. Moreover, it was a recognition of the principle
of the civil as against the official control of departments,
and as Lord Morley made it clear, an emphatic assertion
against the principle of racial discrimination in high
appointments which the Government of India had so far
followed. k'z?
'
The Minto-Morley RefimnsMeft the Government of India
an autocracy ; but it was an autocracy which was in touch
with popular opinion, though seldom influenced by it. The
enlargement of the Legislative Councils led to considerable
popular influence on the legislative side of the Government's
work. It also familiarised the people with the right of the
elected representatives to demand increasing control of
administrative machinery. But unexpected weaknesses
manifested themselves in the course of its working. The
official members came to be organised into a bloc which voted
like an automaton and opposed non-official propositions
whether jiist or unjust. The non-officials, on the other hand
had no function but to criticise
;
and their criticism, in view
of the official bloc in the supreme Council, and the majority of
official and nominated -votes in the Provinces, carried but
little weight with the Government.
The important thing, however, was that a legislative
tradition had grown up side by side with the bureaucratic
tradition of the services, and the former had made decided
headway during the 30 years preceding the Reforms, at the
expense of the latter. The Minto-Morley Reforms, with
non-official majorities in the Provinces, and the official bloc
in the Central Government, emphasised these contradictory
tendencies.
Further reforms had become inevitable. The Civil Services,
developed in an atmosphere of personal administration, had
become, as a result of increasing control by the Secretariat,
a soulless machinery out of touch with the population which
8 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
it governed. At one time, slowness of communication with
headquarters left much local freedom to the district officials
the man on the spot had to act for himself. Railways,
telegraphs and telephones compacted the official machine to
to such an extent, that the man on the spot became
little more than a clerk or an agent to the man at the
headquarters. Under the changed conditions of Indian
political life, it was more than good officials of that kind that
India required. Administration is a part of government and
everywhere government is essentially political. But politics
in India of the 20th century differed essentially from politics
of the 19th. Then, political government meant only efficient
administration with as little interference in the social life of
the people as possible. Now, it involves an appreciation of
collective thoughts, social forces, political energies, and not of
these alone, but also of vague moods and unvocal feelings
which are always facts for politics and may, at any time,
become facts in politics. In short, the old world distinctions
between things political and things executive was getting
gradually obliterated. The mere executive efficiency which the
Indian Civil Service had developed to an astonishing extent,
was not of a character which could rise to that higher political
efficiency which develops an understanding of complex social
tendencies and gives insight into the things that agitate the
human mind.
It is these facts that Lord Morley had in mind, when he de-
clared in presenting the Indian Budget to the House of Com-
mons in June 1907.
"
They (experienced officers) all or nearly
all admit that there is estrangement, I ought to say refrigera-
tion, between officers and the people. For the last few ^ears,
and this is a very important point, the doctrine of administra-
tive efficiency has been pressed too hard
our administration, so shrewd observers and very experienced
observers assure me, would be a great deal more popular if it
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BEFORE THE REFORMS 9
was a trifle less efficient, a trifle more elastic generally. We
ought not to put mechanical efficiency at the head of our
ideas."
Moreover, the war had quickened the democratic impulse
in India. It had also made the demand for politicial reform
more and more insistent. The emphasis put by British and
Allied statesmen on self-determination during the later period
of the European war, reacted on the political movement in
India. British statesmen recognized that a clear and definite
statement of British policy towards India in relation to these
two facts the demand for self-government and the introduc-
tion of democratic institutions had become imperative. It
was under such conditions that the Declaration of 20th
August 1917 was made in Parliament. This Declaration which
lays down unequivocally the policy of the British Government
is as follows :
"
The policy of His Majesty's Government with which
the Government of India are in complete accord, is that o
increasing the association of Indians in every branch of th(
administration and the gradual development of self-governing
institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of
responsible government in India, as an integral part of the
British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in
this direction should be taken, as soon as possible, and that it
is of the highest importance as a preliminary to considering
what the steps should be that their should be a free and
informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at
Home and in India. His Majesty's Government have accord-
ingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should
accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss
these 'matters with the Viceroy and with the Government of
India to consider with the Viceroy the views of the Local
Governments and to receive with him the suggestions of
representative bodies and others.
10 THE WOBKING OF DYABGHY IN INDIA
"
I would add that progress in this policy can only be achiev-
ed by successive stages. The British Government and the
Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the
welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the
judges of the time and measure of each advance and they
must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon
whom new opportunities of service \vill thus be conferred and
by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be
reposed in their sense of responsibility. Ample opportunity
will be afforded for public discussion of the proposals which
will be submitted in due course to Parliament."
This Declaration contained three principles first, the
principle of associating Indians in an increasing manner with
the Government/) f t he^country which had already been accepted
by the appointment of Indians to the Viceroy's and the
Governors' Cabinets and in the Secretary of State's Council.
The second was a definition of the goal of British Indian
Government, which was declared to be
"
the gradual develop-
ment of a self-governing institution with a view to responsible
government in India, as an integral part of the Empire." The
British Cabinet and Parliament accepted by this Declaration
self-government for India on the Dominion model as their
ultimate object. The first was meant to meet legitimate
Indian grievances that they had no part in the administration,
the second was in response to the democratic impulse and the
demand for political freedom. The third principle was the
clear enunciation of the claim of the British Government to
be_the_sole judge ofjhertime and measure oTadvance.
In accordance with the statement contame3~linhe Decla-
ration, Mr. Montagu visited India in the winter of 1917-18,
and submitted to Parliament, a report which was signed joint-
ly by himself and by Lord Chelmsford who was then the
Governor-General. The Eeport is remarkable chiefly because
it recognised that the new official policy of gradually
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BEFORE THE REFORMS 11
developing
"
Self-Governing institutions with a view to
the progressive realisation of responsible government
"
was impossible on the lines of previous reforms. The
essential characteristic of the Minto-Morley Act was that
the Legislatures created under it were merely advisory bodies,
without sharing any kind of authority or responsibility. It
was impossible to develop representative institutions out of
these. The Mountagu-Clielmsford Report also recognised that
Self-Governing institutions were impossible as long as the Pro-
vinces continued to be agencies of the Government of India
without administrative independence. The Report, therefore,
came to the following conclusions and, as these form a basis
of the Reforms Act, it is important to keep them in mind for
the purpose of our discussion. They were :
"
(i) There should be, as far as possible, complete popular
control in locaj[ bodies and the largest possible
independence for them of outside control*
(iij The Provinces are the domain in which the earlier
steps towards the progressive realisation of
responsible government should be taken. Some
measure of responsibility should be given at
once and our aim is to give complete respon-
sibility as soon as conditions permit. This
involves giving the Provinces at once the largest
measure of independence, legislative, administra-
tive and financial of the Government of India,
which is compatible with the due discharge by
the latter of its responsibilities :
(iii) The Government of India must remain wholly
responsible to Parliament, and saving such
responsiblity, its authority in essential matters
must remain indisputable, pending experience of
the effect of the changes now to be introduced
in the Provinces. In the meantime, the Indian
12 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
Legislative Council should be enlarged and
made more representative and its opportunities
of influencing Government, increased :
(ix) In proportion as the foregoing changes take
effect, the control of Parliament and the
Secretary of State over the Government of India
and Provincial Governments must be relaxed/ 1
Two Committees came out to India in 1918, to study on
the spot, the problems connected with legislation based on
these recommendations : questions relating to franchise,
finance and functions. A Joint Committee of the two Houses
of Parliament was also appointed,to receive evidence on the
proposals. The Beforms Act of 1919* was the outcome of
these deliberations. It marked the close of an era in the
history of British connection with India. The old idea was
that India was a British possession to be governed, may be
for the benefit of Indians, but without their participation.
The Indian Government was not and did not pretend to be
responsible to Indians. The Eeforms Act did not introduce
^Responsible Government, but it introduced a change in the
principle of the Government of India. A large body of
influential Indian opinion considered the Beforms inadequate,
unsatisfactory and unworkable, but there was hardly any
controversy as to the rightness of the basic principle of the
Beforms. It was about the adequacy of the Measure and not
about its principles that Indian criticism was directed.
This change in the principle of government the trans-
formation from a purely British to a British-Indian Govern-
ment, was emphasised even before the passage of the Act
through the Houses by the appointment of Sir S. Sinha-to the
Imperial War Cabinet, and later by his elevation to the Peerage
as Lord Sinha of Baipur, and his inclusion in the Ministry as
I See Chapter III.
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BEFORE THE REFORMS 13
Under-Secretary of State for India. The fact that Lord'Sinha
was entrusted with the piloting of the Bill in the House of
Lords was, in itself, meant to emphasise the change that had
taken place in the relations between India and England. But
however good the intentions of statesmen in 1918 were,
circumstances beyond their control conspired to defeat themj
and the Reforms Act had to be worked, in an atmosphere, not
of good-will, but of distrust and suspicion, such as India had
never witnessed since 1857.
CHAPTER II
THE REFORMED CONSTITUTION
THE Reformed Constitution affected the Central Govern-
ment in three ways : in its relation to the Secretary of State,
in its control over the Provinces, and thirdly, in its relation to
the Legislatures. We have seen, that before the Reforms Act,
the ^Government of India was no more than a subordinate
administration carrying out the wishes and instructions of the
Secretary of State. The Act of 1919, made no alteration in
the theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty over India and the
Secretary of State's powers over the Government at Delhi
continued unimpaired. But though in theory it remained the
same, it is clear that there was a change in the relative posi-
tions of Whitehall and Delhi. The purpose of the Act was
that,, so far as possible, the Goveriii^uiiL uf IMS must take the
opimgj Jtf th ^ wishes* Jispecially
in financial matters, excepting jn regard To~~certain sub-
jects (called non-votable) which are protected by
section 67A from EEe vote of the Legislature, the
decision of the Assembly is, ip
_Qydj^ary circumstances, binding
on the Government o Ijadia* To this extent therefore, the
controPofthe Secretary of State over the Government of
India may be said to have been relaxed in practice in jfavour
of the Indian Legislatures.
Moreover, by section 19 A, power is given to the Secretary of
State in Council by rule to
"
regulate and restrict the exercise
* See infra, p. 45.
THE REFORMED CONSTITUTION 15
of the powers of superintendence, direction and control
vested in the Secretary of State ... or otherwise, in such
manner as may appear necessary or expedient in order to
give effect to the purposes of the Act of 1919."
Secondly, the Government of India has surrendered much of
the power it exercised over the Provinces. The authority of
the Government of India was maintained in three ways ; by
the financial system which left the Province at the mercy of
the Central Government : by the control of legislation, and
by interference even in the ordinary details of administration.
As the main provisions of the Act consisted in the establish-
ment of
"Responsible Government in the Provinces, the
authority of the Central Government, in all these three
matters, had to be strictly limited by the Act itself. The
whole range of subjects is divided into Provincial and Central,
and though the Central Government does not surrender its
supervisory and controlling authority over all Provincial
subjects, the purpose of these divisions was to emancipate
the Provincial Government from the parental tutelage under
which they had previously lived.
In financial matters also, the Provinces were more inde-
pendent of the Central Government. Before the Beforms, we
saw that the Provinces were dependent on the Central Gov-
ernment for their revenues and this was the greatest obstacle
in the way of Provincial autonomy. The Central and Provin-
cial revenues were divided under the Act and this separation
of finances laid the way for future development. The position
was now reversed. The Government of India Was not in a
position to meet its whole expenditure from Central revenues.
In fa^t, it was faced with a large deficit. The Committee
which was appointed to go into the question of financial
relations between the Provinces and the Central Government
recommended a system of provincial contribution, which was
to be the first charge on the Provincial revenues for the
16 THE WOBKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
upkeep of the Central administration. In some Provinces
this contribution was over 53 p. c. of the increased spending
power under the new distribution. Of the disastrous effects of
this system of Provincial contribution on the working of the
Reforms we shall speak later. But apart from the question of
contributions, which have now been modified, there is no doubt
that the separation of the Provincial and Central revenues
was one of the most important features of the Reforms.
Administratively, the authority of the Central Government,
in certain of the Provincial subjects transferred to the control
of the Legislative Council, has been abolished by statute. In
other Provincial matters also, though the responsibility of the
Central Government remains, the increased influence of the
Provincial Legislatures and a large measure of financial control
enjoyed by them render an inquisitorial interference, such as
was the practice before the Reforms, impossible in
practice.
So far as the Government of India was concerned, the most
important Reform introduced by the Act was the establish-
ment^ a bi-cameral Legislature with increased powers. The
Indian Legislature, as constituted by tEeTXct, consists of the
Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. The Legisla-
tive Assembly is an enlarged successor of the Minto-Morley
Council and consists of 100 elected members, and 40 nomin-
ated by the Governor-General, of whom 26 are officials; The
franchise for the Legislative Assembly is based on a fairly
high property qualification. For the first five years the
President of the Legislative Assembly was nominated by the
Secretary of State. The Legislative Assembly so enlarged ;
as to represent different interests and communities
in India, differed from the Minto Morley Council in the
following respects. The principle of direct ejection wasjntrp-
ducgd which made the Assembly ^ representative Legisla-
ture for the whole of India. Secondly the_Assembly had
THE REFORMED CONSTITUTION 17
a clear elected majority. The Minto-Morley Council hact
only a minority of elected members and the elections were
not direct, but by the elected members of the Provincial
Councils. The powers of the Assembly were also considerably
enlarged. Besides the right of moving resolutions and
interpellating the Government, the Assembly was given the
right to move adjournments, to discuss urgent matters of
public interest, and what was more important, was given an
effective control over a large portion of the Budget. Under
section 25 of the Act, supplies are to be voted in the form of
demands for grants, and except for certain heads declared by
the Government to be non-votable, the Assembly had, in
ordinary circumstances, control over the items presented fot
its approval. We shall discuss in detail the financial and
other powers of the Legislative Assembly in a later chapter.
The Council of State originated from a proposal meant as
a device to get through measures which were thrown out by
the Assembly. But the Joint Committee, which was firmly
convinced of the desirability of second Chamber, transformed
it into an upper House. It consists of 34 elected and 26
nominated members, not more than 20 of the latter being
officials. The franchise is based not merely on a high
property qualification but on status, such as past or present
membership c
"
a legislative body, past or present tenure of
office of rr jcal authority, past or present university
distinction, the tenure of office in a co-operative banking
society tfrthe holding of a title conferred for literary merif,
No Bill, except a money Bill, is deemed to have been passed by
the Indian Legislature, unless it has been agreed to by both
Chambers. The members of the Viceroy's Executive Council
who are members either of the Assembly or of the Council,
may speak in either, but may vote only in the Chamber to
which they are nominated.
Another important change introduced in the Oentral
18 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
Government is the increase in the number of Indian Execu-
tive Councillors. Before the Reforms, the Governor-General's
Council consisted of one Indian member out of six ordinary
members. After 1919, three of six are Indians. This was
meant as a fulfilment of that part of the Declaration of 1917
which spoke of the increasing association of Indians in every
branch of Government.
It will be clear from what has been said, that the most
important and fundamental changes that were introduced were
in relation to the organisation, authority and character of the
Central Government. In fact, as the Montagu-Chelmsford
Report clearly stated, the Provinces had first to be emanci-
pated_Jrom the control of the Central Government before
parliamentary responsibility couIH be introduced^ TlieTwhole
object of the AcJLwas, tHereforeT'to restrict the powers of the
Central Governmant ovflr the Provinces and jjajmtroduce
responsibility , to,jbhe elected representatives to the extent
that the authority of the Central Government was relaxed.
Thechief feature Q the Reforms from which the name Dyar-
chical Government arises is the separation of functions into
twojclasses, one called the Reserved departments which the
Governor, with the help of his Executive Council, administers
under the control and supervision of the Governor-General and
the Secretary of State, and the other called the Transferred
departments which are administered by the Governor with the
help of the Ministers responsible to the elected Legislature of
his Province. \ The purpose of the division was to introduce
parliamentary responsibility in certain important subjects,
and to give the Legislature the right to control and direct the
administration. Before the Reforms, the Governor in cCoun-
cil, was responsible for the whole of the administration directly
to the Central Government and indirectly to Parliament. If
the Provinces were to be emancipated from the control from
above, it can only be on the basis of control from below. The
THE REFORMED CONSTITUTION 19
alternative to control by executive order is conti^ol by popular
vote. In the Transferred subjects, this control was handed
over to the Legislature and their administration placed in the
hands of elected Ministers. Thus there came into existence
two divisions of Provincial Government, the Eeserved half and
the Transferred half. The main subiects that were JieserveB
for the administration of the Governor and his non-parliament-
ary Executive are Eevenue, Law and Order, and Finance. The
Transferred half* consists of local self-Government, medical ad-
minstration, public health and sanitation, and vital statistics ;
education, other than European and Anglo-Indian and exclu-
sive of the Benares Hindu University and the Aligarh Muslim
University, the Chiefs' Colleges and the Calcutta University
this latter only for a period of 5 years public works, except
in Assam : agriculture, exculsive of irrigation ; co-operative
societies, excise, religious and charitable endowments and
development of industries. The administration of these
departments was to be carried on by Ministers who were to be
responsible to the Legislature of the Province. So far as the
Transferred subjects were concerned, the control of the
Secretary of State and the Governor-General was relaxed, that
of the latter by the Act and of the former by a Rulel of the
Secretary of State in Council, dated 23rd of November 1920
made in exercise of bis powers conferred by section 33 of
the Act.
*
Officially defined as
"
matters relating to the constitution and
powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards,
mining boards of health and other local authorities established in the
province for purposes of local self-government, exclusive of matters
arising under the Cantonment, Act, 1910 ; subject to legislation by
Indian* legislature as regards (a) the powers of such authorities to
borrow or otherwise than from a provincial Gbvernment, and (b) the
levying by such authorities of taxation not included in Schedule II to
the Scheduled Taxes Rules.
t Rules under the Secretary of State's Acts, p. 258.
*20 THE WOBKING OP DYABCHY IX INDIA
The Eule declared
"
The powers of superintendence, direc-
tion, and control vested in the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of State in Council under this Act, or otherwise
shall, in relation to the transferred subjects be exercised only
for the following purposes, namely :
(i) to safeguard the administration of central subjects :
(ii) to decide questions arising between two provinces
' in cases where the provinces concerned fail to
arrive at an agreement :
(iii) to safeguard Imperial interests :
(iv) to determine the position of the Government of
India in respect of questions arising between
India and other parts of the British Empire : and
(v) to safeguard the due exercise and performance of
any powers and duties possessed by or imposed
on the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
State in Council under the Act, namely, section
29A, section 30 (la), Part VFI A, or of any rules
made by or with the sanction of the Secretary
of State in Council."
So far as the Central Government was concerned, section
45 A (3) of the Act laid down, that
"
the powers of superin-
tendence, direction, and control over Local Governments
vested in the Governor-General in Council shall, in relation to
the transferred subjects be exercised only for such purposes
as may be specified in rules made under this Act. . ."
The Devohition Rules, Part V (No. 49), limited this control
to the first, second and fifth clases of the rule which the
Secretary of State made restricting his own authority.
Within these limits the Provincial Government in the T^ns-
ferred departments is, responsible only to the Legislature and
is administered by Ministers appointed from leaders of parties
in the Councils and holding their office subject to the authority
of the Legislature.
THE REFORMED CONSTITUTION 21
The Reserved departments, on the other hand, are adminis-
tered by a non-parliamentary Executive, responsible only to the
Governor in Council and to the Secretary of State. Of the
nature of the division of their functions and the difficulties
arising therefrom, we shall speak in a later chapter. The
important thing to note here is that the Provincial Govern-
ment consists of two halves, one of which is responsible only
to the Governor-General, and the other is responsible to the
elected representatives : that Finance is a reserved subject,
administered by an Executive official, and that the two
halves share a common purse, though in its control the
Ministers have but little voice.
The Provincial Legislatures, which have thus been entrusted
with considerable powers of control, are constituted on a more
liberal franchise than the Indian Assembly. The strength of
the Council varies according to the Province. The following
table gives the number of elected and nominated members in
till Councils.
Elected Nominated Total
Madras ... 98 29 127
Bengal ... 114 26 140
United Provinces ... 100 23 123
Bombay ... 86 25 111
Bihar and Orissa ... 76 27 103
Punjab ... 71 22 93
Central Provinces & Berar 54 16 70
Assam ... 39 14 53
The Provincial Councils enjoy much larger powers than
the Central Legislature in all matters excepting legislation.
The legislative authority of the Provincial Councils is restricted
in two ways ; by the previous sanction of the Governor-General
in Council, which is required in certain specific matters, and
by the Provincial character of the Acts passed by the Councils.
The Governor has also the right of certifying, vetoing or of
22 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
reserving, for the consideration of the Governor-General, any
Bill passed by a Provincial Council. The power of certification
is an authority given to the Governor to declare that a Bill
(or a clause of it, or an amendment of it) affects the safety or
tranquillity of a Province and to direct that no proceedings
shall be taken thereon. The Governor also has the power of
witholding his assent to any Bill passed by the Council, if he
considers that it is necessary either for the peace and tranquil-
lity of his Province or it confers unfair advantages on some or
deprives others of advantages which they heretofore enjoyed.
The Instrument of Instructions lays this down clearly :
" We
do hereby specially require and charge you to see that no Act
of your Legislative Council shall be so framed that any of the
diverse interests of or arising from race, religion, education,
social condition, wealth or any other circumstance, may
receive unfair advantage, or may unfairly be deprived of privi-
leges or advantages which they have heretofore enjoyed, or bo
excluded from the enjoyment of benefits which may here-
after be conferred on the people at large." Besides this
power of veto, the Governor has also the right of reserving
for the consideration of the Governor-General in Council, a
Bill passed by the Legislature of his Province. The Governor
is not merely empowered but directed* to reserve for the
consideration of the Governor-General any Bill not having
been previously sanctioned by the Governor-General which
has been passed by the Legislative Council, if it appears to
the Governor to contain provisions :
(i) Affecting the religion or religious rites of any class
of British subjects in British India :
(ii) Regulating the constitution or function bf any
university :
Rules under section 12 (i) of the Government of India, Act 1919.
THE BEFOBMED CONSTITUTION 23
(iii) Having the effect of including within a Transferred
subject, matters which have hitherto been class-
ified as Reserved subjects :
(iv) Providing for the construction or management of a
light or feeder railway :
(vj Affecting the land revenue of a Province.
He may also reserve for the consideration of the Governor-
General, any Bill which appears to him to affect any matter
wherewith he is specially charged under his Instrument of
Instructions, or to affect any Central subject or the interests
of any other Province.
Subject to these important restrictions, the legislative
powers in the Provinces are in the hands of the Council. We
shall see, in estimating the work of the Council, that so far
as this authority is concerned, most Provincial Councils
have utilised it to the fullest extent. The only occasion
where the Governor of a Province had to reserve a Bill for
the cosideration of the Governor-General, was in the
important and far-reaching reform effected by the Hindu
Religious Endowment Act of Madras, which clearly came
within the provisions of the rule above discussed. The
same Government also vetoed, with less justification, Bill
seeking to protect tenant rights in Malabar, which in its
essential principles and main provisions had received the
previous sanction of the Governor-General. Otherwise, the
legislative activities of the Provincial Councils have been
unhampered. The financial authority of the Provincial
Councils over the Transferred subjects is complete. The
Council may cut down or refuse any demand made on behalf
of the
t
Transferred subjects. In the case of the Reserved
subjects, the Governor is given the right of certifying that the
expenditure provided for by the demand is essential to the
discharge of his responsibility for the subjects. There are
also four important heads on which the Council's vote is not
24 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
required for expenditure. These non-votable items are : (l)
the Provincial contributions to the Central Government, (2)
interest and sinking fund charges on loans, (3) expenditure
of which the amount is prescribed by law, (4) the
salaries and pensions of High Court Judges and the Advocate-
General of the Province.
The Council exercises control over the administration of
the Transferred departments and indirectly influences by
resolutions, questions, and by the reduction of demands, the
administration of the Reserved departments. It was meant
that the Councils should have considerable influence, though
no direct authority, over the affairs of the Reserved half. How
far and in what direction, they have been enabled to exercise
such influence, we shall see in a later chapter.
The Provincial Councils as we noticed before, consist of
elected members, representatives of special interests, nomin-
ated representatives of backward classes and of nominated
officials and Executive councillors who are members ex-officio.
Thus the elected members fall into two categories, those who
represent a popular electorate, e.g., members representing
Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans, and those who repre-
sent special interests, e. g., Indian and European Chambers of
Commerce. The nominated members also fall into two
divisions : those who are nominated to represent backward
classes, and officials who represent merely the minimum voting
strength of the Government. It is an anomalous Constitution
as will be shown when the working of the system is consider-
ed. This much may be said here that the composition of the
Council on the basis of the two contradictory systems, of
popular representation, and the nomination of permanent
officials, often junior officials who have no voice in the shap-
ing of policy, militates against its responsible character. Also,
so far, the members representing special European constitu-
encies have considered themselves bound in duty, on all
THE REFORMED CONSTITUTION 25
occasions, to vote with the Government. A permanent bloc of
this kind, based not on any similarity of opinion or interest,
but on the ground of supporting the Government, does not in
any way add to the strength or the usefulness of the Council.
The non-parliamentary Executive of the Provinces con-
sists of a Governor and two or four Councillors. It was
originally suggested that it should be statutorily laid down
that half the members of the Executive Council must be
Indian. But the Joint Committee of the two Houses, which
reported on the proposal, recommended that division of that
kind, on a racial basis, was inadvisable, though in practice it
was very desirable that at least half of the Executive should
be Indian. This has been uniformly followed. The control
in the Provinces, both in the Transferred and in the Eeserved
departments, had thus to a large extent been vested in Indian
hands.
It should not, however, be forgotten that though the
principle of responsibility was introduced and a measure of
Indianisation was decided upon(and carried out in the Execu-
tive Government), the autocratic character of the Government
was still maintained. In the Central Government there was
not even the pretence of responsibility. It is true that the
Assembly was given wide powers, but the irresponsible
authority of the Governor-General in Council was safeguarded,
by the extraordinary powers of certification and veto which
were reserved for the Governor-General, and also by the con-
stitution of the Council of State which was so composed as ta
give the Government a permanent and decided majority. The
division of the Budget demands into votable and non-votable
items constitutes a very serious restriction on the financial
powers of the Assembly. Even in the Provincial Legislatures,,
autocracy, though weakened, still sits armed with the rights of
certification and entrenched behind the Beserved half
of the Government. The limitation of the powers of the
26 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
Provincial Councils in legislative and financial matters has
already been noticed. Besides, in the power of making rules
which is vested in the Governor-General in Council, the
Government has always at hand a weapon with which to
enforce its authority.
But when all is said, it still cannot be denied that the
Montagu-Chelmsford Act introduced changes which though
inadequate in Indian opinion, fundamentally altered the
character of British rule in India. For the first time, it was
accepted that Britain is pledged not only to good government
in India, but to responsible Government. Until 1919, this
principle was altogether foreign to the structure of British rule.
Lord Morley stoutly repudiated the idea when he
introduced the Eeform Act in 1908. The introduction of this
principle, in however limited a field, and through a machinery
which even its advocates did not claim to be anything more
than a difficult and trying invention, was in itself a change of
far-reaching character. The bureaucratic citadel had been
breached ; not only breached, but an advance-guard planted
inside. It is inconceivable that any attempt will now be
made to go back on that. What every student of Indian
politics should remember is that, though the Montagu-
Chelmsford Eeforms were inadequate and unsatisfactory as
Indian opinion has consistently held, the turn that was taken
in 1919 was the right one. It was in the direction of Respon-
sible Government. It is easy now to forget that, at that time
other roads were equally open and might have been taken
without difficulty. One has only to read, either Mr. Gokhale's
Testament representing the Moderate view, or the Nationalist
scheme put forward by the Congress and the Muslim league,
to realise this. It is to the credit of Mr. Montagu that he
saw clearly the alternatives before him and stuck firmly to
the principle of Eesponsible Parliamentary Government as the
only line of sure advance. The introduction of that principle
THE KBFOKMED CONSTITUTION 27
is, in itself, the most important decision taken by Parliament
in British Indian history since the first interference by Lord
North in the affairs of the East India Company. That, in
spite of determined opposition to the details of the Reforms,
this great service of Mr. Montagu was recognised in India, is
clear from the feeling which was evoked all over India at his
death.
Secondly, it is equally clear that
"
the increasing associ-
ation of Indians in every branch of the administration," which
the Declaration of 1917 promised, was effected to a consider-
able though still inadequate extent. Half the Executive in
the Central as well as in the Provincial Governments are now
Indians. It was no doubt to emphasise this aspect of the
matter, thai an Indian was appointed Governor of Bihar and
Orissa, though, so far, the example has not been followed.
Appointments which wore, until recently, exclusively reserved
for Europeans, like Chief Justiceships of High Courts, have
now been thrown open. Though the appointment of Indians
to these posts has up to now, only been in the nature of ex-
ceptions, its purpose is unmistakable. It is to demonstrate
that the policy of the Government is increasingly to convert
the British rule in India from an alien administration into an
Indian Government, based no doubt on British connection,
but still Indian in its oiitlook and to a large extent Indian in
its personnel.
In these two respects Indian opinion has always looked
upon the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms as a distinct advance,
and, but for the political circumstances to which we must now
turn our attention, the working of the Reforms would, perhaps,
more satisfactory results.
CHAPTER III
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
WHEN the Beform proposalb were first made and the Act
itself was on the anvil, Indian opinion, though seriously
critical in its attitude, was in no sense hostile. The evidence
submitted before the Joint Committee of the two Houses,
on behalf of the leading political organisation of the country,
clearly showed that, though Indian opinion was strongly
against the provision by which the element of responsibility
introduced in the Councils was sought to be hedged round
there was every desire to work the Keforrns for what they were
worth, There was one section, the newly-formed party of
Literals, which enthusiastically welcomed it ; and that party
contained some of the most respected names in Indian politics,
men who were responsible, to a very large extent, for the
national movement. The Nationalists though they criticised
jaiany of its provisions, especially the continuance of legisla-
tive irresponsibility in the Central Government and were
loud in proclaiming the inadequacy of the measure of Res-
ponsible Government granted to the Provinces,
*
were still
prepared to work it. The present writer attended, as a guest,
a private party meeting of the Indian Home Eule League in
May 1919, in the house of Mr. Bal GangadharTilak, who was
then the accepted leader of the Left Wing Nationalists. It was
a conclave of party chiefs held under the presidency of Mr.
Tilak himself. The object of the meeting was to consider
the advisability of fighting the new elections on a party basis,
POLITICAL CONDITIONS 29
and it was unanimously agreed that every opportunity
provided by the new Reforms should be utilised to the fullest
extent. Mr Tilak himself agreed to stand for a constituency.
This was in May 1919. In May 1920, the whole aspect of
things had altered. Within the short period of one year, the
political atmosphere of India had undergone a complete change.
Goodwill and friendliness which had animated the discussions
following the Eeforms Report had vanished. The usually
calm atmosphere of India gave place to a violent thunder-
storm, in which the Reforms Act and the work of reconciliation
in general, attempted by Mr. Montagu and his advisers,
received an unexpected and violent blow.
What was it that had worked so sudden a change in the
political sky ? Pour factors, each of them important in itself,
contributed to it. They were the Rowlatt Bill, the massacre
of Jallianwalla Bayh, the Turkish Treaty and the attitude of
the Civil Service towards the Reforms. Early in 1919, the
Government of India introduced into the Legislative Council a
Bill to amend the provisions of the criminal law relating
to public safety. During the war, there was an emergency
Measure enacted in India, entitled the Defence of India Act,
an Indian version of the British D. O. R. A. The Executive,
having tasted the pleasure of summary criminal jurisdiction,
was not prepared to forego it and desired to enact its main pro-
visions as a permanent part of the criminal law of the country.
The official justification for this course was that a Com-
mittee, presided over by Mr. Justice Rowlatt to enquire into
revolutionary activities in India, had come to the conclusion
that the hands of the Executive must be strengthened. The
drastic atod draconian character of the legislation may be judged
from the following provisions : "Where in the opinion of the
local government there are reasonable grounds for believing that
any person is or has been actively concerned in such area m any
movement of an anarchical nature, the local government may
30 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
place all the material in its possession relating to his case
before a judicial officer who is qualified for appointment to a
High Court and take his opinion thereon. If, after consider-
ing such opinion, the local government is satisfied that action
under this section is necessary, it may by order in writing
give all or any of the following directions namely : that such
a person fa) shall within such a period as may be specified in
the order execute a bond : (b) shall notify his residence or
change of residence : (c) shall remain or reside in any area in
British India : fd) shall abstain from any act which in the
opinion of the local government is calculated to clieturb public
peace or is prejudicial to public safety : (e) shall report himself
to the officer in charge of the police station nearest to his
residence at such periods as may be specified." Moreover,
the Local Government was empowered by order in writing,
on the report of an official of its own choosing, to arrest
anyone without warrant and imprison him without trial and
to search any place.
Indian opinion was unanimous against the Bill. The
Indian members of the old Imperial Legislative Council, every
one of whom has since then risen to the highest position* in
India, opposed the Bill. While they were prepared to arm
the Government of India with necessary powers, they refused
*Mr. V. J. Patel, President of the Assembly ; Sir Tej Bahadur
Sapru, appointed Law Member of the Viceroy's Cabinet a year later ;
Sir B. N. Sarma, appointed in succession to various positions in the
Viceroy's Cabinet after a few months ; Sir Mohammed Shafi, Educa-
cation Member ; Right Hon. V. S. S. Sastri, appointed Delegate to the
Imperial Conference and Indian Representative at the Washington
Conference ; Sir Surendranath jjBannerjea, First Minister in Bengal ;
Mr. S. Sinha, Finance Member, Bihar Government ; the Rajah of
Mahmudabad, Home Member of the United Provinces Government ;
Sir F. Currimbhoy, Member of the Executive Council, Bombay
Government ; and Sir G. Chitnavis, the first President of the Central
Provinces Council*
POLITICAL CONDITIONS 31
to accept so violent a change from the Rule of Law to the Rule
of lettre de cachet. The question that was uppermost in
every Indian's mind at the time was : how can this piece of
czarist legislation be reconciled with the spirit of the proposed
Reforms ? The appeal that was made hy all the members was
to save the Reforms by liberalising the provisions of this bill.*
The Government stood adamant. A non-party observer, Mr.
J&. T. Paul, who was present at Delhi during the time, describes
the atmosphere which prevailed in the capital.
"
The
*The official description of the Rowlatt Act, its purposes and
the attitude of Indians towards it, may be seen in the following extract
from the Report on the Material and Moral Progress of India, 1919-20,
placed before the Houses of Parliament (pp. 2526.)
"In view of the salutary effect of this temporary provision
(Defence of India Act), the Rowlatt Committee concluded that the
principal requirements of the situation was the strengthening of the
ordinary machine of law and order in such a fashion as to lend it
permanently something of the power which it temporarily had
acquired when buttressed by the Defence of India Act. Accordingly,
Government determined to introduce two measures. . . One of the
bills was a temporary measure framed to enable anarchist offences to
be tried expeditiously by a strong court consisting of 3 High Court
Judges, with no right of appeal. The second bill was intended to make
a permanent change in the ordinary criminal law of the land. The
possession of a seditious document with the intention to publish or
circulate the same was to be punishable with imprisonment. . . ."
The feeling of hostility on the part of Indians, the same report
continues "sprang not so much from the provisions of the Bills
themselves as from a fear first that the powers which the Bills con-
ferred might be misused, and secondly, that the very fact that the
Bills were considered necessary, constituted an index both to the
genuine opinion of the Government about Indian aspirations and to
the stfength of the resistance ^hich the Government would probably
offer to their realisation. For it must be remembered that, though
the Montagu-Chelmsford Report had been published towards the end
of 1918, the Committees which were working out details had not yet
published their conclusions."
32 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
incidents of those fateful days stand before memory
in tragic vividness. I was at Delhi at the time. On a Satur-
day, Sir William Vincent was persuaded to allow a day to
intervene in the passage of the Rowlatt Bill. It was to he
taken up on the Monday and, as all the world expected, to he
forced through to a conclusion. 1 remernher that particular
Sunday. I called on Mr. Marris, Sir William Vincent's
secretary. 1 also called on Mr. Srinivasa Sastri. With
neither of them did I discuss the Bill, hut in their rooms and
wherever I went in Delhi, the atmosphere had one eveu
temperature, of set determination. Hope had fled from both
sides." It was the same all over India at the time the Bill
was being hurried through.
The Bill was rushed through ; but the agitation it produced
in the country was something, tho like of which the British
Government in India had never seen before. Mr. Gandhi,
whoso far had taken no loading part in Indian political
affairs, stepped forward and declared for a general It (Dial, a
day of mourning and strike, as a protest against this Measure.
He headed the agitation against tho Bill. The whole of India
answered his call, and in the Punjab, where the rumour of his
arrest had roused popular emotion to a pitch, the Govern-
ment in certain areas was handed over to the military
authorities. The events that culminated in the massacre at
Arnritsar and the fancy punishments -like the crawling order
by which no Indian was allowed to pass through a particular
street except by crawling on his belly -were of such a charac-
ter as to leave memories of humiliation and bitterness. The
following description, by Sir Valentine Cbirol, who cannot be
accused of pro-Indian bias, will show tho enormity of the
crime committed at Amritsar.
"
Order had been restored before General Dyer reached
Amritsar but, on an ill-omened day he thought himself justi-
fied in opening fire without warning upon a great crowd
POLITICAL CONDITIONS 33
assembled in the Jalliamvalla Bagh in defiance of his orders
prohibiting all public meetings. Only those, perhaps, who
have visited the Bayh, after studying the evidence given by
General Dyor beforo a Committee of Elnquiry presided over by
Lord Hunter, a former Solicitor-General of Scotland, can realise
the full horror of the tragedy enacted there. It was to dig so
sinister a gulf between the ruling and the subject race that the
story of that black day in the annals of British India cannot
be ignored. The Batik -once a garden has long been, save
for one clump of old trees, an open space covering perhaps
the aren of Trafalgar Square, enclosed on every side by mud
\\alls with tall houses rising in many places close up against
and above them. Thr appioaches are few and extremely
narrow. Hy one of them, leading on to the highest ground in
the Bagh, General Dyer with a party of 50 Gurkha entered
the Bayh, and ^aw, at a distance of perhaps a hundred yards,
a dense crowd, variously estimated at from (3,000 to 10,000,
most of them engaged in listening to speeches. General Dyer
assumed, rightly enough, that this \\asa public meeting in
contravention of his orders and a seditious one. Without a
word of warning, lie opened and kept upon them a fusillade
that did not stop until, as he himself said, his party's ammuni-
tion was almost exhausted, though the panic-stricken multitude
broke at once, struggling to escape through the narrow exits
or attempting vainly to climb the walls, or in despair throwing
themselves flat on the ground. General Dyer, according to his
own statement, personally directed the tiring to the points
where the crowd was thickest. The
"
targets,
"
he declared,
were
"
good
"
and by the time he and his men went off by the
same vvfty they had come, they had killed 379, according to
the official figures given some months later by Government,
and they left about 1200 wounded on the ground, for whom
he did not consider it his "job" to provide any help what-
ever. General Dyer was convinced that the sternest measures
34 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
were necessary to spread terror through the Punjab and
scotch a great revolutionary movement. He followed up his
actions at the Bagh by a
"
crawling order
"
compelling ail
Indians to go on all-fours who wanted to pass through a
certain street. . . ."*
The true facts about this tragedy were not known until
a few weeks later. The fury that burst upon India when the
facts came to light could be imagined. But it was not
General Dyer's action that hurt India most. An atavistic
relapse on the part of a military maniac need not have
embittered the relations between England and India ; but for
the attitude of the European community in India, iind of the
House of Lords in England. General Dyer was acclaimed a
hero in every European club in India. Subscriptions were
collected to give him a present worthy of his achievement.
Every European Association in India, except the Punjab
Association the exception is significant raised funds on his
behalf and championed his cause. While the Coalition
Cabinet, anxious for the safety of the Reforms and the prestige
of its civilian government, repudiated Dyer's theory of terrorism
,and relieved him from service, the House of Lords went to the
extent of passing a vote of thanks for his groat services in
India ! This was indeed adding insult to injury. The
atmosphere of bitterness and distrust was so strong in India,
that the Duke of Connaught in his speech, opening the new
Legislatures in February 1921, made a touching allusion in
public to it.
"
Since I landed in Bombay," said His Boyal
Highness,
"
I have felt around me bitterness and estrange-
ment between those who have been and should be friends.
The shadow of Amritsar has lengthened over the fait face of
India. I know how deep is the concern felt by His Majesty
the King-Emperor at the terrible chapter of the events in
the Punjab." But in spite ofy|u0 strong condemnation,
Sir Valentine Chjteft, India, pp. 907-209.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS 35
by the Duke of Connaught, the non-official Europeans in India
were ranged on the side of General Dyer. That curious
psychological factor which unites all Englishmen in a foreign
country in support of one of them, even when he is clearly in
the wrong, helped to create a racial bitterness to which there
is no parallel in Indo-British relations.
On the top of this came the estrangement of the
Mohammedan population over the question of the Turkish
Treaty. The Treaty of Severes had dismembered Turkey.
The Khalif was living in Constantinople as a protege of the
British. Smyrna was handed over to the Greeks, and Mr*
Lloyd George was egging on the Greeks to occupy as much of
Anatolia as they could. Mohammedan opinion in India was
indignant at what it considered a new and more objectionable
crusade against Islam. The religious fervour of the Moslems
was stirred and the Khilafat movement, which was the out*
come of it, took a definitely anti-British attitude.
Mr. Gandhi's non-co-operation was the result of these two
factors. We are not concerned here with the movement
itself. Mr. Gandhi declared that the only effective guarantee
against the repetition of the horrible incidents at Amritsar
was the achievement of Swaraj. He defined Swaraj not as
independence but as a change of heart on the part of the
British. What he was concerned about was not that the
Government of India was British and alien, but that it
possessed a mentality which could tolerate the massacre at
Amritsar, and allow the partition of Turkey against the
unanimous opinion of the Indian Muslims. He persuaded the
Congress and the country generally to accept his programme
of non-co-operation, one of the main planks of which was the
l^pycott of the Councils. It is not the wisdom of that policy
thartr is under discussion here. For our purpose, it is
necessary to remember, that the events of the preceding 12
months had conspired to bring into existence a movement
36 THE WORKING OF DYAHCHY IN INDIA
which placed on its banner the war-cry "Boycott the
Beforms."
The sullen opposition of a large body of the Indian Civil
Service to the Reforms also contributed to the feeling of dis-
trust that was growing up in India. It could never have been
expected that the Indian Civil Service, after enjoying unlimit-
ed powers for so long a time, would surrender its authority
without a struggle. The democratic impulse that the war
had quickened among all classess of people in England had
hardly touched Civil Service Officials in India. Living in an
atmosphere which was impervious to the ideas agitating
educated India, they rlid not, speaking generally, even know
of the transformation that was taking place before their
eyes. It was only when the Montagu-Chelrnsford Report
was published that they awoke to the new situation. We
need not be surprised that they did their best to whittle down
the proposals and in general to work against the idea of res-
ponsibility. The alternative scheme submitted by the
Lieutenant-Governors- -themselves the most senior members
of the Civil Service and its champions --repudiated the idea
of responsibility. They were prepared for concessions, but
only such concessions as would leave the power of the Civil
Service unimpaired. Another line of attack, on the part of the
Civil Service, was discovered in the first dispatch of the Gov-
ernment of India on the Reform Scheme, the dispatch of
March 5th, 1919. Propaganda on their behalf, inspired by
influential members of the Service, became intense in England.
It was no wonder that the cry of "White Mutiny
"
was raised
in India.
It was under these circumstances that the Reforms 'were
put into operation. The Indian National Congress had officially
declared against them and in favour of a policy of boycott.
Mohammedan opinion whole-heartedly supported Mr, Gandhi,
and the Conference of Uleraa declared that any co-operation
POLITICAL CONDITIONS 37
with the Government, under these circumstances, was sinful.
During the winter of 1920 21, the non-co-operation move-
ment gained almost universal hold over India. The effect of
all this was seen in the elections to the new Legislatures, at
which only a very small percentage of the electorate went to
the polls. There was great difficulty even m getting candi-
dates to stand. In one constituency, the* non-co-operators,
with a view to making the Councils look ridiculous, put up an
illiterate barber as a candidate and had him elected. The
imperial city of Delhi elected a sweetmeat-seller who, in
his manifesto, held forth the alluring prospect that if he were
elected he would sell his sweets rolled up in Eowlatt Acts. All
over the country the boycott of the Eeforms was effective. It
is true that thero was not a single constituency which did
not elect a member. But the interest of the whole people
was centred not on the Reformed Councils, but on the fight
that was being carried on by Mr. Gandhi and the non-
co-operators.
It w is not only at the time of the introduction of the
Reforms the feeling of ill-will manifested itself. All through
the last 8 years, from the year in which the Act was passed
until to-day, this heritage of distrust, suspicion and racial
antagonism has continued. With the first shot of Dyer's
guns at Amritsar vanished all prospects of friendly co-
operation. The non-co-operation movement synchronised
with
'
the Reforms. Though the movement itself was never
based on racial hatred, ife engendered, among the Eupopean
population, much mistrust and hostility. The transformation
of the non-co-operators into Swarajists, committed to a policy
of entering the Councils for the purpose of obstruction, did not
in any way affect their attitude. The feeling of friendly trust
in Indian affairs, .which was manifested by all sections of
political opinion in England during the early days of the
Beforms vanished, at what was interpreted as ungrateful
38 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
hostility on the part of the Indians. Biitish opinion
stiffened towards India. The alarmist stories of disgruntled
ex-Governors began to be credited, with the result that there
was a considerable fall in the number of British candidates
for the Indian Civil Service. In the I. 0. 8. examination of
1921, out of 86 candidates only 26 were Europeans. There
were 16 appointments and only 3 were Europeans one of
whom retired from service almost immediately. It became
the fashion to speak of India as the Lost Dominion. The
agitation in England reached such a stage that the Coalition
Cabinet felt called upon to reassure the Services and Mr.
Lloyd George was persuaded to make a speech in Parliament,*
to that effect. The speech he made had the effect of further
alienating Indian sympathies and making India suspect that
the Reforms were no more than a sham. The following
sentences in his speech gave colour to that interpretation :
"
Those changes (the Reforms) were in the nature of an
experiment, and they must be treated as an experi-
ment. A great and important experiment but still an
experiment
After stating that the Reforms had proved a success and
that Indians had shown themselves good Parliamentarians,
Mr. Lloyd George went on :
" What I want specially to say is this, that whatever
their success as Parliamentarians or as Administrators,
I can see no period when they can dispense with the
guidance and assistance of the small nucleus of the
British Civil Service. They are the steel-frame of
the whole structure. I do not care what you build on
it, if you take the steel-frame out, the whole structure
will collapse.'*
The conclusion of the speech was even more important :
*2nd of August 1923.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS 39
"
There is an institution which we will not interfere
with, there is one institution we will not cripple, there
is one institution we will not deprive of its functions
or of its privileges, and that is the British Civil Service
in India."
This statement in Parliament created consternation in
India. It was taken as a new Declaration, an attempt on the
part of the reactionaries to go back on the policy of 1917. It
is clear that if Mr. Lloyd George's speech meant anything at
all, it meant the repudiation of the principle of Eesponsible
Government even as the goal of British policy in India. Mr.
Lloyd George declared that the functions and privileges of
the British Civil Services will remain unimpaired. The
question that was asked in India was, how could any scheme
of Responsible Government, in however limited a sphere, such
as was given to India by the Act of 1919, be reconciled with
undiminished powers for a governing Civil Service ? Again,
if the British Government cannot visualise an India which is
not controlled by the Services, how can complete Responsible
Government, as an integral part of the Empire, the gradual
achievement of which was declared by the pronouncement of
1917 to be the goal of Indian policy, ever be realised ? There
was no necessity to take Mr. Lloyd George's declaration in that
tragic spirit. His speech was meant only to convey an
assurance to the Civil Services that the British Government
would look after their interests a legitimate and, perhaps
from the British point of view, a necessary step. What
we are concerned with is not the intrinsic importance
of the speech, but the effect it had in convincing the people in
India, that the Reforms were nothing more than dishonest
trickery. It is easy to see now that exaggerated importance
was attached by the Indian public to an indiscreet utterance,
but its effect was to stiffen the hostility of Indian public
opinion towards the Reforms.
40 THE WORKING OF DYAHCHY IN INDIA
A greater and far more serious check that the "Reforms had
to encounter, was the use of Regulation III of 1818, to arrest
and detain, without trial, a considerable number of public
workers in Bengal. Revolutionary crime was known to exist
there. On this point there is no doubt at all, and Indian
Nationalist leaders, like the late Deshabandhu Das, had
themselves acknowledged it in public. But that did not and
could not justify the arrest and deportation of a large number
of Bengali youths, some of whom were occupying responsi-
ble positions in public lifo. No charge was brought
against them. They wore not tried in any court of law.
They were arrested and deported merely on an Executive order
based on an arbitrary Regulation passed in JH18. Again, under
the Regulation itself, those arrested could be detained only for
six months. The Legislative Council refused to pass a law
authorising the Executive to prolong the imprisonment, but
by the use of the extraordinary powers vested in the
Governor, the Act was certified and taken as passed. Thus,
without either Legislative or judicial sanction, a Provincial
Government, even under the Reformed Constitution, lias been
able to arrest and deport those whom it disliked. The ques-
tion before the Indian public \vis not whether these youths
were actually engaged in revolutionary activity. They might
or they might not have been. Executive and judicial ideas of
revolutionary activity differ widely from each other. In
India there have been cases of people transported for life, by
Executive authority, for waging war against the King, being
made, shortly afterwards, Ministers of Government. Therefore,
in the absence of any evidence submitted before a court, the
Indian public naturally refused to accept the version given out
by the Executive. To their mind a more important principle
is involved in it. Is the Government in India based on the
Rule of Law or is it based on the despotic theory of lettre
de cachet ? If the Reformed Legislatures have not the
POLITICAL CONDITIONS 41
authority even to see that elementary justice is done, then the
public in India argued, the Reforms conferred not the sub-
stance but the shadow of Self-Government.
Thus, from the very beginning, the Reforms never had the
proper political atmosphere. A total lack of imagination on
the part of the Indian Government in insisting on
the Rowlatt Act the unwisdom of which has now been
proved by the fact that it has not been revived and
when it was on the Statute book it was never put in
operation- -and the tragedy at Amritsar, combined to prejudice
the Indian people and create in them a bitterness hardly
conducive to the working of the new scheme of government.
Successive mistakes on the part of both the British Cabinet
and of the Government of India and the prevalent idea that
the Civil Service was hostile to the change and working for
its failure, helped to sustain the feeling of bitterness and
to keep the people sullen and discontented. With patience
and understanding on both sides, much of this could have
been avoided. But by the time the bitterness in India, about
the Amritsar tragedy, and among the Mohammedans about
the Turkish peace, had died out, the attitude of the British
Government, and also of the public, towards India, had under-
gone a great change. The political success of the Reforms was
therefore jeopardised from the beginning. It is only when
this fact is understood, that the success and failure of the new
machinery introduced by the Act of 1919, will be properly
estimated.
CHAPTER IV
DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES
IT will be seen from the summary description of the Act of
1919, given in Chapter II, that the pivot on which the whole
Reforms scheme moved, was the establishment of partial Res-
ponsible Government in the Provinces, on the basis of a division
of functions into Transferred and Reserved halves. It is here
that Dyarchy, as a system of administration, was introduced.
The working of the Act, therefore, can be judged only by a
detailed analysis of the Reforms as they have functioned in
the Provinces
;
and it is to this problem that we must now
tiurn our attention. The subject has to be studied, not merely
to see how far the intentions of the Parliament have been
carried out in tho way of establishing Responsible Government,
but also from the point of view of administrative efficiency,
the method and extent of popular control and the nature and
line of further reforms. This could only be done bv examining
the working of the scheme during the last six years under the
following heads :
(i) The relation of the Governor and his Ministers :
(ii) The relations between the Transferred and the
Reserved halves :
fiii) The responsibility of the Ministers to the Legis-
lature :
(iv) The Legislature and the Executive :
(v) Popular control in administration :
(vi) Finance, the Civil Services and the Reforms.
DYAECHY IN THE PROVINCES 43
One preliminary observation about the division of subjects
into Transferred and Reserved, is of importance. This divi-
sion was, in the nature of things, arbitrary ; but it was more
than that. It was conceived in such a way that the Ministers!
who were supposed to administer the subjects Transferred,
were never in control of the whole of any single department.
The main subjects Transferred in all Provinces were education,
sanitation, local self-government, agriculture and industries.
But there were serious limitations affecting each of these. In
his evidence before the Muddi;nan Committee, Sir K. V.
Beddi, the first Minister of Industries in the Madras Govern-
ment, stated this limitation in the following words :
"
I was a Minister for development without the forests. I
was a Minister of agriculture minus irrigation. As Minister
of Agriculture, I had nothing to do with the administration
of the Madras Agriculturists Loans Actor the Madras Land
Improvement Loans Act. . . The efficacy and efficiency of
a Minister of Agriculture without having anything to db with
irrigation, agricultural loans, land improvement loans and
famine relief, may better be imagined than described. Then
again, I was Minister for industries without factories, boilers,
electricity and water power, mines or labour, all of which are
reserved subjects." The medical administration, which is
again under a Minister, is subject to No. 12 of the Devolution
rules which states that
"
a local government shall employ
such number of Indian Medical service officers in such
appointments and on such terms and conditions as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of State in Council.
"
Education,
again, is a much divided subject. European and Anglo-Indian
education is a reserved subject, presumably because Indian
Ministers could not be trusted to deal fairly with these
communities. Chiefs* Colleges and any institution maintained
by the Government,
"
for the benefit of the members of Hid
Majesty's forces or of other public servants, or of children oC
44 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
members of such members or servants " are outside the
control of Ministers. Besides, the Government of India
maintains an education department under the charge of
a Member of the Viceroy's Cabinet and the Central Legislature
has, by the rules, concurrent jurisdiction on all important
matters connected with Universities. The division of func-
tions therefore, was not made in such a way as to give the
Transferred departments autonomy within their own sphere.
(l) The Governor
The most important feature of the Keforms Act was the
change introduced in the ]x>sition of the Governor. In the
Reserved departments, the Governor in Council, that is the
Governor acting with his non-parliamentary Executive, was
responsible to 'the Secretary of State, through the Governor-
General in Council. So far his position had not changed.
With regard to the Transferred departments, the Governor was
clearly, understood to stand in a different position. The
Secretary of State and the Government of India have relaxed
their control over the Provincial Administrations in the
Transferred'subjects and reserved the right to interference and
control only in specified matters. To whom was the Governor
then responsible for the administration of those departments ?
Clearly the purpose of the Act was to make him not an
irresponsible Executive head, but a constitutional Governor
whose Ministers would be responsible to the Council. We
shall discuss the question of Ministerial responsibility
later in this Chapter. But so far as the Governors are
concerned, this intention of the Act was forgotten after the
first two years and the Governors claimed more rigfits and
authority than they ever possesed before the Beforms.* This
* Sir A. P. Patro, while still Minister of Education, stated in his
official memorandum that one of the serious anomalies in the Scheme
of Reforms is that the Governor of the Province is made more abso*
DYAECHY IN THE PROVINCES 45
was done by three methods. Under section 49 (2) of the Actj
power was given to the Governor to make Tlules And Orders
"'
for the more convenient transaction of business.
"
These
Tlules were so framed as to concentrate power, as far as possi-
ble, in the hands of the Governor. Secondly, the Governor
consulted the Ministers individually, and in cases of difference
of opinion, the practice has grown up of overruling the Minister,
though the Act, sec. 52 (#), lays down that he shall be guided
by that advice, except in cases of fundamental difference. Mr*
Chintamani, the first Minister of Education in the United Prov-
inces, stated in his memorandum to the Muddiman Commit-
tee, that he was even overruled in the matter of nomination
to a library committee.-* In the Eeserved departments, if there
is a difference of opinion between a Member and the Govern-
or, the matter is brought up before the Executive Council
and decided by a majority vote. The Governor, by dealing in-
dividually with the Ministers, has assumed greater power of
control over the Transferred departments, than over even the
Reserved departments, while in fact it was the whole purpose
of the Act that such control should only be exercised in
exceptional matters. Thirdly, the Governors ixi Provincea
have advanced the untenable theory that the Ministers are
only their advisers. The Eules framed under the Act (not by
Parliament but by the Government of India), proceed on
the assumption that thftjfi\y flnnncils are only an enlarge-
ment of the old Minto-Morley Councils, not intended to over-
to extend his field of consultation and
advice. On this ground, the Ministers were only supposed to
give advice which the Governor was at liberty to accept or
to reject. In fact, the Law Officers of the Madras Govern-
ment, went to the extent of taking objection to the Legislative
lute in the Transferred subjects than in the Reserved subjects . .
Under the provisions of section 52, the Governor is held to be in charge
of the departments transferred to the Ministers.
46 THE WORKING OF DVARCHY IN INDIA
Council discussing appointments in the Transferred subjects,
on the ground that the responsibility lay with the Governor
whose actions could not be criticised by the Council. This,
objection, which the President rightly ruled out, has important
bearings on the question of Ministerial responsibility. As the
law stands, by the rules framed under sub-section 5 of
section 72 D, no resolution can be moved in regard to any
action taken by the Governor even in the Transferred depart-
ments. So far as the Governor himself is concerned, the
problem clearly is this. If the Governor is a Constitutional
head, then it may be accepted that his action cannot be
criticised by the Councils on the ground that the Constitution
vests the responsibility on the Ministers. If on the other
hand, the Governor claims to uct on his own authority, it is,
equally clear that his actions should be open to discussion.
The present position is that, to the extent the Government
of India (and the Secretary of State) have relaxed control over
the Transferred subjects, the Governor's powers have been
increased and he virtually stands forth as an irresponsible*
rather than as a constitutional head. This has been well
brought out in the evidence given by ex-Ministers before the
Muddiman Committee. Mr. Chintamani, who was a Minister
in the United Provinces, stated the matter thus in his written
evidence :
"
I have passed through every stage from a
habitual :
'
Honourable Minister is responsible and his view
shall prevail,
'
and
'
I must support the Honourable Minister/
to being over-ruled in matters of varying degrees of importance
and unimportance down to nominations to a library
coifimittee.
" Lala Hari Kishen Lalf who was Minister iu
frhe Punjab, gave evidence to the same effect. J3ir A. P. Patro^
Mmister in Madras, stated that the Ministers were completely
under the control of the Governor. Sir Chimanlal Setalwad,
who was an Executive Councillor in Bombay, declared that the
Governor instead of limiting ibis interference to exceptional
DYABCHY IN THE PROVINCES 47
occasions of fundamental differences, claimed that "the
Minister's function in law was merely to advise."
There were two other important methods by which the
Governor's powers were aggrandised. The Instrument of
Instructions issued to the Governors charged them
"
to
safeguard all members of Our services employed in the said
presidency in the legitimate exercise of their functions, and in
the enjoyment of all recognised rights and privileges." This
Instruction is only to safeguard their interests, but it has
been interpreted to mean that all matters relating to the
services should be under the control of the Governor.
Nowhere does it give authority for their claim that the
appointments, postings and promotions in the Ministers'
departments should be under the sole charge of the Governor.
It gives him the right to see that no injustice is done. But
the Governors have assumed the sole power of appointment
and transfer, claiming to do so by virtue of a dispatch of
the Court of Directors in 1844, and the Ministers in their
departments are left absolutely powerless. In Bombay, the
Governor claimed this right even with regard to the
Executive Council. The practice before 1922 was that,
on the proposals being sent by the department to the
Private Secretary to the Governor, the Governor, if he
approved, circulated it to the Members in the following
form : "I propose to make, with the concurrence of my
Honourable Colleagues, the following appointments." The
Members of Council then recorded their opinion and the
majority view prevailed. The Governor decided to alter this
and the Members were then merely informed that he was
making the appointments. On one occasion even the form
"
the Governor in Council is pleased to appoint
*'
was changed
to
"
the Governor is pleased to appoint."
By the Bules of Executive Business, in all matters of
dispute between the Reserved and the Transferred half, the
48 THE WORKING OF DYAECHY IN INDIA
final authority lies with the Governor. This was an additional
source of power. In the days before the Reforms, in case of
any difference between two departments, the majority view of
the Council to which it was referred prevailed. Now the
Governor is the final authority, and this also has worked to
aggrandise the power of the Governor, at the expense of both
the Executive Council and of the Ministry.
As has been noticed, according to the Rules under sub-
section. 5 of section 72 D, the Legislative Council is powerless
to criticise any action of the Governor. He sends messages
to the Council to which no reply can be voted. Besides this,
he has wide powers reserved under the Act itself, restricting
the Legislative and Financial authority of the Council. He can
certify Measures rejected by the Council, he can veto, or reserve
for the consideration of the Government of India, legislation
passed by the Council. He can disallow resolutions, even
after the President has accepted them. Of all these, there
are many instances in the history of the working of the
Reforms in Provinces.
Sufficient has been said to show that, so far as the Govern-
ors are concerned, the opposite of what was intended by the
Act has been the result. Before the Reforms, he was primus
inter pares among his Members of Council. Now, he is the
final authority in cases of difference between the two halves.
He has assumed complete control over the services, while his
legitimate function was only to see that injustice was not done.
While the control oHhe sui>erior authority has been relaxed
and he is no longer responsible in matters relating to the Trans*
ferred departments to the Governor-General, and through him
to the Secretary of State, he has not surrendered that respon-
sibility to the Ministers to whom the Act intended it to be
surrendered. Provincial autonomy has thus meant an increase
in the power of the Governor, without a corresponding increase
in his responsibility to the Legislature.
DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES 49
(2) The Executive Council
Only less important than the relation of the Governor with
Ministers, is the position of the non-parliamentary Executive
in charge of the Keserved departments vis-d-vis the Ministers
in charge of the Transferred half. The Finance department
stands in a different position which will be discussed in the
next chapter. The Executive Council consists of Members
appointed direct by His Majesty, either from among the Civil
Service or from the ranks of Indian public men. In Madras,
Bombay and Bengal the Executive Councils consist of four
Members, two Civil Servants and two Indians. In the other
Provinces, the Councils consist of two members, one from the-
Civil Service and one Indian.
(3) Ministers and tJie Executive,
It was the clear intention of the Joint Parliamentary
Committee that the Reserved and Transferred halves should
hold joint consultations. The Committee in fact laid consid-
erable stress on it. The Instructions to the Governors also
charged them to this effect
" You shall encourage the habit of
joint deliberation between yourself, your Councillors and your
Ministers, in order that the experience of your official advisers
may be at the disposal of your Ministers, and that the know-
ledge of your Ministers as to the wishes of the people may be
at the disposal of your Councillors.'* The Secretary of State
for India also said in the House of Commons that " it is
absolutely essential that during the transitional period, there
should be opportunities of influence and consultation, bet-*
ween the two halves."*
What the Joint Committee recommended was only that both
the Ministers and the Councillors should discuss jointly, while
the decision in their respective spheres should be taken
separately. This system was ignored for the fust two years
* Speech of Mr. Montagu on the 5th of June 1919, on the second
reading of the Bill in the House of Commons.
50 THE WORKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
IP Madras, bv Lord Willingdon, in favour of a unitary Cabinet,
jbutsoon the Madras Government also came back to a
dyarchical view of consultation. In other Provinces, the
unitary system was not tried and joint consultations were
informal. In Bombay, the papers relating to the Keserved
subjects were not circulated beforehand, and in the United
Provinces, on some matters of importance, the opinion of the
Ministry was not taken. Neither half, in fact, was anxious
for such consultations.
More important was the question of their mutual relations
in the Council. The close association of Ministers with the
policy of the Reserved half, which they did not approve and
which their party often condemned, did not strengthen the
position of the Ministers in the Legislative Council. Many of
the Measures proposed by the Executive are naturally un-
popular in the Legislature. The Ministers, more often than
otherwise, share the views of their followers. And yet they
could neither give a lead to their party, nor openly support
their colleagues. On one occasion, the Madras Ministers, who
had a solid majority behind them, encouraged their followers to
throw out a major legislative proposal of the Government with
regard to irrigation. The Executive Councillor concerned re-
signed immediately. But this is the only occasion on which the
Ministers have been able, through parliamentary action, to
force their influence on their colleagues on the Executive side.
The equally anomalous spectacle of a Member of the non-
parliamentary Executive speaking, canvassing and voting
against proposals of bis popular colleagues, was seen in the
tj. P. Council. The Madras Ministers during the Irrigation
Bill debate, at least kept constitutional propriety by keeping
neutral, though their attitude was well known. They neither
spoke nor voted against it. But in the United Provinces
Council, in the debate on the Djgtriot Boards. BilL a Member
of the Executive Council spoke strongly against the proposals
DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES 51
of the Minister. On the second day of the debate, the Finance
Member openly asked the officials to vote against the Bill.
tgXFhe Leadership of the Legislatures is given by the
Governor to the senior Member of the non-parliamentary
Executive and not to the popular Minister who is supposed to
command the majority. In the management of the Council,
the Ministers have thus
.become no more t^han an appendjx_of
the Executive. They are used merely as cover for executive
action and, though leaders of a party possessing power in
the House, they are often forced to speak for official proposals
to which they are known to be opposed, or at least vote in
their favour when their party votes against it. S
It should be noticed that the non-parliamentary Executive
in this connection does not mean the Civil Service. Half the
Members of the Executive Councils are Indians, and it is these
champions of Reserved subjects, who are more anxious for
autocratic authority and for the lessening of the Ministers
powers than the Members of the Civil Service. It is not, as
has been suugested, a rivalry between the Civil Service and the
Ministers, an attempt on the part of the former to regain
their position lost by the Reforms. The aggressive champions
of executive irresponsibility to the Legislature, have as often
been Indian public men as senior Civil Servants. Sir C. P.
Ramaswamy Iyer, the Law Member in Madras, invented the
ingenious theory that, by virtue of a dispatch of the Court of
Directors, all appointments, even in the Transferred depart-
ments, were made by the Governor. The Law Member of
Bengal, Sir Abdur Rahim, distinguished himself equally by his
refusal to be influenced by the Council. The Maharajah of
Mahmudabad, \vho was the Home Member of the United Pro-
vinces Council, was as strong an advocate of irresponsibility
in the Reserved subjects as the most orthodox Civil Servant.
Though the rivalry was not fortunately on a racial basis,
there could be no question as to what the principle involved
52 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
was. The Members of the Executive Council while desiring
to sail under the cover of the Ministers' influence in the
Legislature, were not prepared to take them into confidence or
consult them in matters of importance. The Ministers, on the
other hand, chafed at being made tools of by the Executive
and at being forced to serve by their influence and their tacit
support policies to which they were opposed. This was pro-
bably an inherent defect, something which we could not
dissociate from a division of functions such as the Act provid-
ed. But it should be noted that this continuous rivalry
aft'ected the Ministers' relations with the Council and even-
struck at the root of responsibility to the Legislature.
(4) Ministerial Expansibility
The whole purpose of the division, in fact the whole purpose-
of the Act, was to make the Ministers responsible for the
administration of the Transferred departments to the Legis-
lature. On this point there can be no doubt. We shall now
see how far the Minister was, in fact, made responsible to the
Legislature. The elementary condition of parliamentary,
responsibility is that the Minister should be removable by the
vote of popular representatives % whose confidence he is
supposed to possess. Secondly, lie should have such effective-
control of his department as to be able to defend the proposals
emanating from, the policy pursued by, and the action taken
under that department. A third essential condition is that^
the Legislature should be given every opportunity to review
the work of the Ministers and to approve or disapprove of it.
Looked at from any of these points of view, the responsibility
of Ministers to the Councils has been a myth.
The Ministers are appointed by the Governor as in all
constitutional countries. This does not matter much,
because, presumably, the Ministers are chosen from among,
those who can command a majority of elected votes.
DYAKCHY IN THE PROVINCES 53
in the Legislature. But^ the problem of responsibility
arises when the composition ef the Chamber is concerned .
The presence of officials and nominated members,15noiinting
bo 30 p. c. of the votes, creates a bloc which can maintain the
ministers, even if they command the votes of only a minority
Df elected members. It should be remembered that in the 70
p. c. of elected members, a considerable section comes from
special constituencies like European Chambers of Commerce
and landholders whose votes, irrespective of the question
at issue, are at the disposal of the Government. In the
Madras Council there are 1 "27 Members : of these 29 consist of
nominated officials and non-officials and Executive Councillors.
Of the 98 who were elected, the Madras Chamber of Com-
merce and the Madras Trades Association (both Unions of
European merchants) elect 3, though the number of electors is
altogether less than 200. The planters (Europeans) have
another seat. Then there is one European seat for the
Madras Presidency and one for the Anglo-Indians. This
gives the Government G votes as secure as those of their own
officials. Besides this, the landholders, who are created
into special constituencies, elect another 6, who in
times of need, owing to their financial obligation to the
Government, could be as much depended upon to vote in
favour of officials like the Europeans and the nominated
Members. Thus the representatives of the general electorate
consisting of Hindus, Mohammedans and Christians, number
only 86, while the Government has, for all occasions a
clean unquestioned bloc of 41 votes. If therefore, anyone
can carry with him 23 elected votes out of the 86, he can be
established in authority as a Minister responsible to the
Council. His responsibility clearly is not to the elected
representatives, but to the Government bloc consisting of
special interests, officials and nominated non-officials. It is
this retainer vote that props up the Ministers and not the
votes of the elected representatives.
54 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
That this is not merely a theoretical objection can be seen
from the analysis of voting on important motions in the Legis-
lative Councils. In July 1927, the opposition in the Madras
Council moved a vote of censure on the Ministers. The motion
was "defeated/* but the division showed that a clear majority
of elected Members was against the Ministry. The Ministers
have not so far resigned, presumably because their responsi-
bility in the Council is towards the majority which maintains
them, consisting mainly of the officials and the nominated
members. Again in November 1923, when the question was
raised of officials voting to keep in power, Sir Charles
Todhunter admitted that whips had been issued asking officials
and non-officials attached to them to come to the support
of the Government.
* This identification of the fortunes
of the
"
responsible ministry
"
with that of the irres-
ponsible half, shows more clearly than anything else, that
whatever the intentions of the Act, the Ministry is not
responsible to the Legislature and works independently of
popular opinion.
Permanent officials nominated to the Council are permitted
to take part in the discussion, and vote even on matters
relating to the Transferred subjects. If Ministers were
removable by the Legislature and the opposition could come
into power, this anomaly would not have heen countenanced ;
because now a permanent official may have to defend in
the Council under a new Minister, a proposal which he
vehemently opposed under an old one. The size and unity of
the official bloc often leads also to the curious position of the
non-parliamentary Executive being able to command more
B
* This problem was recently raised in the U. P. Council (4th Nov.
1927)> where a Swarajist member moved a resolution on the subject.
The reply of the Government was that it was too late to rectify the
procedure*
DYAROHY IN THE PROVINCES 55
votes than
'
the responsible Ministers
*
who may exist solely
on the support of the official janissaries. This also is not a
theoretical proposition, as the position of the present Madras
Ministry shows. The Executive in that Province has an
official bloc of 40 votes and the Ministers command barely 25,
with the result that they have become subordinates to the
non-parliamentary half in all matters, including those for
which they are supposed to he responsible to the Council.
Tli is problem, of course, would not arise if any party
could command in the Council an adequate majority. But
this is almost impossible under the present conditions. Taking
Madras again, there are only 86 seats for open election out of
127. An absolute majority, which would make the Ministers
independent of the retainer vote, means the capture of 65 seats
out of an available total of 86, which is more than 75 p. c.
Unless a party can secure from the general constituencies
(Hindu, Mohammedan and Christian) 75 p. c. of all seats,
the chance of a Ministry responsible to the Council and
removable by the Council does not really arise. Thus, so far
as removability by the Legislature is concerned, Ministerial
reSiion^ibillfy'Ts clearly a myth.
SecondlyTTf the Minister Is to be considered responsible to
the Council, Helimsl have effective control of tha department
which he is supposed to administer. The evidence of the
Ministers and ex-ministers clearly shows that this has not
been the case. We have noticed, in a previous section, the
claim put forward and exercised by the Governor of being the
deciding authority in the Transferred subjects. The Ministers*
it was said, had only the right of advice which could be rejected
for any sufficient reason. The Bengal ex-Minister, Nawab Ali<
Chaudary, put the position thus in his evidence.
"
It came to
this : while the Minister was responsible to the Legislative
Council for his administration, it was the Governor who had,
the final decision on almost all questions, though he was very
56 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
little in touch with the Council."* Parliamentary responsi-
bility of Ministers can only be a sham, when the effective
authority of the department rests not with the Ministers, but
with a Governor whose actions are declared by rules to be
above criticism by the Legislative Council. It is, perhaps, this
consideration which led the Madras Ministers, in replying to
the vote of censure in November 1923, to repudiate altogether
the doctrine of responsibility to the Council. The Rajah of
Panagal, the Chief Minister of Madras, declared in his speech
that as he was appointed by the Governor, he was responsible
only to the Governor. This constitutional doctrine that the
Minister is responsible not to the Council but to the
Governor, though a complete perversion of the declared
purpose of the Act of 1919, and amazing from a Minister
who held the position, ostensibly because he was the
leader of the majority party in the Councils, was no doubt
in accordance with the facts. It \vas to the Governor
-and not to the Council that the Minister considered
himself to be responsible. J'Yom a parliamentary leader,
the Dyarchical Minister had sunk to the position of a minor
official.^
The third condition of effective Ministerial responsibility is
that the Legislatures should have full facilities for expressing
their disapproval of the policy of the Ministers. But the
legislative procedure in the Provinces, instead of giving import-
ance to what is the charter of its influence and authority, has
under official Presidents refused facilities for discussion. In
Madras, when Sir P. Bajagopalachari was President, he ad-
mitted a motion of no-confidence in the Ministers. But in
Bengal, such a motion was declared ultra vires by the Presi-
dent. The only opportunity afforded by the Act, and by the
'rules framed thereunder, for removing unpopular Ministers is to
'Written evidence before the Muddiman Committee! p. 218, vol. 5.
DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES 57
reduce their salaries at the time of budget demands. Even in
Provinces where the motions for expressing lack of confidence
4ire permitted, the rule is not established that these should
have precedence over private resolutions.
Thus, from every point of view, Responsible Government
ven of a partial character, which was the purpose and object
of the Reforms, has failed altogether to materialise.^ The size'
itnd permanence of the official bloc, and the special interests,
which are bound to support the Executive at all times,
seriously restrict the value of a majority in the Legislature as
an expression of popular confidence. Responsibility to a
majority consisting mainly of this bloc is not responsibility to
popular representatives but to official nominees. This was not
and could not have boeu the purpose of the Act. As it is,
with the Leadership of the House in the Executive Councillor
and the Ministers themselves moulding their policy in order to
secure the good-will of the official bloc, and the Councils
unable to enforce their nominal authority, the Ministers have
become subordinate administrators, taking their orders from
the Governor and depending for their existence on the good
graces of their colleagues. It is clear, in this particular
matter, which was the essential part of ihe Reforms of 1919,
that the Act was worked by the Executive in a spirit which
,_--.-.
.rfi . I" -*
__L. r- -T- -1 ~ - ~ - * * ' V-
^ *~S~*~*
travestied its intentions. \This is out another instance, of
wnicETmaiay 'SaiTbeTound in British Indian history, of the
local authorities taking away what the Parliament had
given.
It was again the clear intention of Parliament that the
Ministers should be jointly responsible for the administration
of the Transferred departments. A true system of parliamentary
government involves the collective responsibility of the Miniat
and is clearly against separate and departmental responsibility.
The Joint Parliamentary Committee was emphatic on the
point/' The Committee think it important
"
they said
"
that
58 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
when the decision is left to the Ministerial portion of the-
Government, the corporate responsibility of the Ministers
should not be obscured ... In cases which are of suffici-
ent importance to have called for discussion of the whole
Government, they are clearly of opinion that the final decision
should be that of one or the other portion of the Government
as a whole." The Act itself, section 52 (<?), lays it down that
"
in relation to Transferred subjects, the Governor shall be
guided by the advice of his Ministers unless he sees sufficient
cause to dissent from their opinion.
"
This use of the plural, in
conjunction with the Joint Committees' view, leaves no doubt
that the principle of joint ministerial responsibility was laid
down in the Act. But the rules of Executive Business wet e
framed in all the Provinces with L the exception of Madras,
during the first two years on the assumption that the
Governors should act separately and and not jointly with th&
Ministers. In Madras, Lord Willingdon appointed a Chief
Minister and it was understood that the collective responsibility
of the Ministers was enforced at least for a time. In the
United Provinces, the Ministers who were appointed for the first
time protested against the idea of departmental responsibility
and Sir Harcourt Butler yielded to their representation*
But Sir William Marris, according to the evidence of
Mr. Chintamani, considered it a deviation from the spirit
of the Act and separate responsibility was enforced after
the resignation of Mr. Chintamani and Pandit Jagat
Narayan.
It must be recognised that there were many obstacles to
this idea of collective responsibility in the Provinces, where no
party had a sufficient following as to be able to command a
majority. In the Punjab and in Bengal, where the communi-
ties were fairly balanced, it was clear that Ministers had to be
selected from both the parties. To force identical responsible
ity on Ministers whose principles were different and whose
DYABCHY IN THE PROVINCES 59
supporters were fighting against each other in the Council,
would have been troublesome. But with some insistence on
the part of the Governor, as in Bengal, such a Cabinet of
moderate Hindu, Mohammedan and Sikh Members in the
Punjab would not have been altogether impossible. In any
oase, even in Provinces where such difficulties did not exist, as
in Bombay, the Central Provinces and the United Provinces,
the principle of collective responsibility was not accepted by
the Governors, who dealt with each Minister separately and
without reference to his colleagues.
Thus, so far as Ministerial responsibility is concerned, the
whole scheme was defeated by the tendencies noticed above.
The Ministers never really had authority. They were not
directly responsible to the Councils. Their joint responsibility
was not enforced. It is these facts that made the Non-co-
operators declare that they would not accept office unless
there was real responsibility. To accept ministerial office
under the dyarchical system was to convert oneself into an
instrument of Executive Government, rather than serve the
public as its chosen representative. It is not only the Non-
co-operators who saw the problem from this prospective. Mr.
E. Villiers, who was the representative of the European com-
munity in the Bengal Legislative Council, in refusing to offer
himself as a candidate for the third time, issued a manifesto in
which he stated his point of view with regard to Ministerial
responsibility. He said
"
instead of teaching her (India)
responsibility we are teaching her irresponsibility. Until the
Reforms are re-cast, until they are applied to the Provinces as
separate States, until such subjects as are Transferred no
matter how small or how unimportant they may berare
transferred lock, stock and barrel, uninterfered with by the
Governor and uninfluenced by Government votes in the Coun-
cil, . . I see no hope for the success of the Beforms."
When it is remembered that the whole system of
60 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
Dyarohy was invented to ensure Ministerial res-
ponsibility to the Council, and to give the Councils
and their agents, the Ministers, effective power over
specified subjects, it will be realised how the intention of
Parliament and the purpose of the Act was thwarted by the
Bules made by the Government of India, and by the Gover-
nors and by the constitutional practice established in the
Provinces by the civilian administrators who were in charge
of them.
CHAPTER V
DYAECHY IN THE PEOVINCES (continued)
(1) The Legislature and the Executive
When the authority of the Legislature, in its own special
field of Transferred subjects, is so restricted, it is not possible
that it would have effective power in those important depart-
ments of Government reserved for the Executive Council. The
Eeserved subjects, as we noticed, include all the important
branches of executive government, such as Eevenue, Law and
Order, Finance, Justice and Home administration. Over these
the direct authority of the Council was limited to voting on
demands* This control of the purse, in the ordinary course
of things, would have been an important power, but it was
greatly restricted by the right of certification, expressly granted
by the Act to the Governor. Besides this right to cut down the
demands for the executive side, the Legislatures have also the
power to discuss, interpellate and move resolutions on all
Provincial matters. Thus, though the authority of the
Governor in Council, and through him of the Secretary of
State, continued unimpaired, as the Act itself stated,
it would be untrue to say that the Legislatures had
no influence on the executive side. Besides, the Councils
elected standing Committees one of which, the Finance Com-
mittee, was statutory which were in close touch with the
administration and influenced the decision of the Executive by
the expression of the views represented in the Council. These
three methods of action became popular in the Councils and
62 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
were used effectively to press the Indian point of view on the
administration.
The power of voting on grants, though the most important,
and within its limits most effective, was conditioned by two
facts ; one was, it could be used when only the Government
asked for money either at the budget time, or on a supple-
mentary grant. As this was ordinarily only once a year, the
right of controlling the Executive through the purse was not
a weapon open to the Council at all times. The second restric-
tion was the right of certification vested in the Governor.
Budget procedure is regulated by the Eules made
under the Act and by the Standing Orders of the Council.
The Budget is introduced by the Finance Member on a day
previously notified, usually at the end of February or
early in March. After two or three days' interval, given
to the Members to study the provisions, there is a general
discussion of the Budget for three days. After this, the
Members send in notices for omitting or curtailing particular
items or totals of expenditure in any part of the Budget
which is open to the vote of the Council. After a further
interval of a week, the Executive Councillors and the Ministers
responsible for the departments concerned move their demands,
when the motions for omission or reduction are discussed to
express the views of the Council on the policy followed by the
department. These discussions continue for a maximum of
12 days andit is, djjringthat time that _the Council assumes
the aspect of a
"
grand inquest.". L
kind were discussecTm 1923-24. During the first four years, no
less than 753 motions for reduction were discussed out of a total
of 3,393 rnptions admitted for discussion. In Bengal, this power
was used with equal effect and steady pressure was exerted on
the Executive to conform to the wishes of the Council. The
Bombay Government notes the same fact in its report to the
Government of India on the working of the Eeforms. It states
DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES 63
"
The most important example of the way in which the
Legislative Council have forced Government to conform to their
wishes in the matter of retrenchment, was the 60 lakhs cut from
the Budget of 1922-23. The manner in which they attained this
end was eminently practical. Instead of attempting to reduce
the total by rejecting or reducing various budget demands in
detail, a course which would have involved them in great
difficulties and split their own ranks over the interests affected,
they wisely took the course of rejecting the Entertainments
Tax Bill and threatened the rejection of the Stamp Bills if
their demand for retrenchment was not substantially met.
Government thereupon promised to cut it down by 60 lakhs a
promise which has been more than fulfilled."*
The right of certification, which is vested in the Governor,
is in the nature of things an extraordinary power. It has been
used and liberally used in all the Provinces, but it is impossi-
ble to certify every vote that is reduced or rejected. Though
a serious restriction on the rights of the Council, certification
cannot affect the influence of the Legislature on the Executive
exercised through a strict control of the purse. That this
right has been used wisely by the Council is recognised by all
Provincial Governments. The Government of Bombay, under
SirGeorge Lloyd, which of all the Provincial administrations
was, least friendly to the Beforms, states that
"
there have
been no important instances in which the Legislative Council
have abused the powers
"
of financial control. It is true that
in Bengal, the non-official parties joined together to throw
out the whole budget; but the political conditions of that Pro-
vince owing especially to the arbitrary measures taken under
the Bengal Ordinance---necessitated the utmost use of the
constitutional powers of the Legislature,in order to demonstrate
to the Executive Government the protest of the people against
that particular policy.
"Views of Provincial Governments 1923, p. 68.
64 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
Motions for tokeg^uts have been the common method for
expressing the popular views with regard to the administration
of departments. They have provided ample* opportunities
for criticism of Executive action as well as of Government
policy. The Government was enabled to find out the strength of
popular feeling on particular questions and the Members cam$
often to appreciate the Executive point of view. On the whole,
it is undeniable that the Councils have used their power of
voting on demands with moderation and wisdom, and directed
it mainly to pressing the popular view and influencing the
Government in administration.^
(2) Resolutions and Interpellations
Besides the great influence the Council thus exercised
by its rights with regard to taxation of appropriation,
there was the more popular and easier method, open at
all times, of raising discussions on resolutions and on motions
of adjournment. Non-official Members in ail Councils have
used liberally their powers with considerable benefit to the
public. In the first Reformed Councils, there was a noticeable
tendency to put down motions even on matters of routine and
detail ; but with greater experience, the Members have concen-
trated their attention to important matters of policy. This is
evidenced by the fact that there has been a considerable
decrease in the number of resolutions tabled for discussion.
The use to which the Members have put this power and the
importance which they have attached to it, may be judged
from the range of subjects discussed. Among the important
resolutions discussed and carried in Madras, were those asking
for the enfranchisement of women (1st April 1921), ^the re-
settlement of Provincial contributions (2nd of April), the intro-
duction of permanent settlement of land revenue (14th of De-
cember 1921), the appointment of a Retrenchment Committee
(16th Sept. 1922), and the increase in the pay of village head-
DYABCHY IN THE PEOVINCBS 65
men. The resolutions discussed in all Councils, dealt with
important questions of public policy like the separation of
judicial and executive functions, encouragement of temperance,
the grievances of railway passengers, &c. The Provincial
Governments were fully alive to the importance of concil-
iating the views of the Councils in these matters,
wherever possible. Of the 109 Eesolutions that were passed
in the Bengal Council from 1921 to 1923, the Government
took action in accordance with the recommendations on 51
cases and part action on 29. This is true of all Provinces.
While the Provincial Governments have justly refused to
consider the resolutions to be mandatory, they have all along
tried to give effect to them as recommendations emanating
from popular representatives on which action should be taken,
if possible.
The right of interpellation has been another potent instru-
ment in the hands of the Council. Though from its very
nature, it could not be put to the same use as the right to
move Eesolutions, in pressing upon Government questions oi
policy or expression of popular discontent or disapproval, the
power of putting questions to the Executive, on matters oi
daily administration, has been of great value, especially in
bringing to the notice of the higher authorities, the petty
oppressions and malpractices of the lower ranks of officials.
By this method, the Council was enabled to keep a strict
watch on the administration. It is true, that in the
first sessions of the Reformed Councils, the Members
asked questions, the reply to which benefited no one and
cast unnecessary burdens on the departments concerned. But
with growing experience and strict enforcement of Standing
Orders and the discretionary powers vested in the President,
this right has gained in value as a check on the administration.
In these matters, the Councils have been able to use their
authority in full for two reasons. First, because the leading
66 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
Members in the new Legislatures had considerable experience
of these powers in the Minto-Morley Councils. Resolutions,
on important matters, constituted the chief activity of the
Councils before 1920. The constitutional practice relating
to them was widely known and appreciated and the
increased opportunities given by the Councils were fully
utilised by the Members. The same could be said about the
right of interpellations. The motions of adjournment were
altogether new ; and as a result, there was considerable
misunderstanding as to their use. The Presidential ruling, that
the adjournment of the House could not be moved unless-
the matter was one of urgent public importance, was
not appreciated in the beginning, when Members were
anxious to call the attention of the Government to some
crying public need, by resorting to this method. After
the first two sessions of the Council, the limitations of the
procedure of adjournment were fully recognised, and their value
was thereby increased by being confined to what is really of
urgent public importance.
(3) Committees
The influence of the Councils on every sphere of Government
activity would tend to become spasmodic and periodical, if it
were exerted solely through questions, resolutions and annual
votes on demands. The continuity of this check was main-
tained by the system of Committees, which came to be an
important feature of the Reformed Government. Both the
Councils and the Administration recognised in the Committee
system, a fruitful method of associating non-officials with Gov-
ernment, whereby the former could be familiarised witji the
problems that affect the Government and the latter could
realise the popular points of view. Such Committees are,
mainly, of two kinds :
(i) Standing Committees elected by the Council or
DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES 67
appointed by the Government from among
Members of the Council :
(ii) Committees appointed by the Government, at the
instance of the Council, to further some scheme
or enquiry which the Council deems to be
important.
Of these Standing Committees, jhe only onewhich
is_ statutory^Js^ J;he Public Accounts Committee con-
stituted under Eule^ S^oTtho Council Rules, Tor the purpose
of dealing with the audit and appropriation accounts of the
Provinces and other matters as may be referred to it, by the
Finance Committee. The Public Accounts Committee consists
of 10 Members, of whom 7 are elected and 3 are nomin-
ated. Of the work of this Committee, the Madras Government
states
"
Its most important resolutions dealt with the publicl
works department and the finances of local bodies. With
reference to the first, it emphasised the need for closer exami-
nation by the Finance department with a view to check such
irregularities as starting works without estimates, exceeding
estimates without sanction, and the late payment of bills. As
regards local bodies, the Committee took a very serious view of
the growing practice of overdrawal of accounts ..."
The Finance Committee deals with current and pro-
posed expenditure. This consists of 9 Members, of whom
3, including the President who is the Finance Mem-
ber, are nominated by the Government, while 6 are elected by
the Council. The Finance Committee is the most important of
all the Committees of the Council. Before it are placed, for
discussion, proposals involving new or recurring expenditure,
before they are included in the Budget. The discussion in the
Committee helps the Finance Member to judge the temper of
the House on Jiis proposals and he gets a chance of accommo-
dating them to the point of view of non-official Members
without open conflict in the Council. The Finance Committee
68 THE WORKING OF DYAECHY IN INDIA
is even of greater importance from the popular view-point,
because it enables the leading Members of the Council to study
all schemes of new expenditure before they come up for
discussion in the Council.
The departmental Committees appointed to advise the ad-
ministration could not be said to have met with conspicuous
success. These Committees, which were appointed to all
important departments, consisted of a majority of non-officials.
Such Committees have been of value in providing selected
Members with knowledge of departmental problems, but
otherwise, they have had no influence on the course of
administration. The point of view of the Government with
regard to these Committees may be inferred from the view
expressed by Sir Harcourt Butler and his Council in the
United Provinces.
"
The conclusions of the Governor in
Council on the Standing Committees system generally are, that
it ought to be absolutely confined to the subject of finance and
public accounts. There are clear indications that its extension
into the administrative departments will mean collision and
result in the duality and confusion which attends the working
of a similar system in France." The Provincial Govern-
ments have also, on occasions, found it advisable to
appoint Committees of the Council to study projects of
legislation which they have in view, both in order to canvass
support and to know the trend of popular opinion.
Prom the point of view of the influence of the Legislature
over the Executive, the Committees, appointed in pursuance
of resolutions and interpellations in the Council, are more
significant. Such Committees are appointed under popular
pressure and the purposes for which they are constituted is
either to examine some official policy, or to suggest ways and
means for reducing expenditure, or to go into complaints of
serious public importance. Most Councils put considerable
pressure on the Government for the reduction of expenditure,
DYABCHY IN THE PROVINCES 69
and the Committees appointed to go into the questions are
naturally inquisitorial in their methods and uncompromising
in their attitude towards public expenditure. In Madras, the
Committee system seems to have specially flourished. Of the
Committees appointed as a result of resolutions and interpella-
tions in Council, the following are the most important. The
Board of Eevenue Eeorganisation Committee, whose main re-
commendations have been given effect to ; the Famine Code
Eevision Committee, the Education Eeorganisation Committee,
the Andhra University Committee, the Srirangam Temple
Committee and the Cauvery Delta Irrigation Committee. The
increasing use of these Committees by the Council, as
well as by the Government, has had the result of bringing the
administration of the Provinces more into touch with the
people and less impervious to non-official views.
(4) The Party System
The influence of the Council on the administration would
have been much greater, if the work in the Council had been
directed by well-organised parties. The only organised party
in Indian public life has so far been the Swarajists, the main
plank in whose platform was non-accegtance of office and
organised obstruction of Government work. Naturally, the
object of such a party whero it liad an absolute majority as
in the Central Provinces in 1924-27 would be to make the
administration of the Transferred departments, through the
Ministers, impossible. That was what happened in the
Central Provinces and in Bengal. Where the Swarajists
could not command a majority, their influence as a party on
the administrative work of the Government would be negli-
gible. Apart from the Swarajists, there has been no organised
party in the English sense, in any of the Provincial Councils.
TheJMSnisters selected by the Governors had factions to sup-
port them, based mainly, as in the Punjab, Bengal and Madras,
70 THE WOBKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
on communal groupings, more than on political opinion. But it
must be remembered that Dyarchy, as worked in India, did not
postulate a party system : more, it made the growth of party
system impossible. The Members are elected"" off programmes
which embrace not merely the subjects under the administra-
tion of Ministers, but those under the Reserved half.
The line of demarcation, therefore, often cuts through the
supporters of the Ministers and their opponents in
matters relating to the Eeserved subjects. Again, even
if the Ministers are the leaders of a party, they
cannot, in important matters, voice party opinion, or even
give a lead to their followers on matters affecting the Reserved
side. Thus, it often happens that the Ministers vote with
their colleagues on the Reserved side and suffer defeat along
with them, while the party is victorious. It is impossible to
conceive a party system in which the leaders are defeated
but the party remains victorious. In the Oudh Rent Bill in
the U. P. Council, the Liberal party, whose leader was then
Minister, refused its support to the Government. The leader
remained neutral and continued to be Minister, while the party
voted against the Bill. The party system is also rendered
impossible by the theory of individual responsibility of
Ministers which, as we have noticed, was the accepted princi-
ple in the Provinces. When two Members of opposing views
are nominated Ministers in a Province, their parties would
not support a common programme, and the defeat of the one
would not mean the defeat of the other. Thus, besides the
Opposition, there will be at least two groups which will be
partially in opposition and partially in office. Besides, party
system can develop only when there is a rempvable
executive. When even the Ministers are not in practice
removable, because of the retainer-vote of the Government
which is at their disposal, the theory of party government
breaks down. Thus, there was never an opportunity for the
DYABCHY IN THE PROVINCES 71
development of a grouping based on opposition or support to
the Government in the Councils. The work in the Councils
was, therefore, unorganised and in consequence did not have
as much influence as it could have had.
CHAPTER VI
FINANCE AND THE COUNCILS
WE have traced in outline, in the second chapter, the
financial system that was established in the Provinces. It
may be summarily stated as a division of the revenue heads
into Central and Provincial : the Central revenues being
collected and expended by the Government of India and the
Provincial heads being handed over to the Provinces for their
expenditure. The main heads of revenue allocated to the
Provinces were, receipts accruing from provincial subjects, the
proceeds of taxes which may be lawfully imposed in the
Province and a share in the income-tax collected within the
Province. All the other sources of revenue, such as customs,
railway earnings and land revenue, were reserved for the
Government of India. As the Goverment of India was faced
at the outset of the Keforms with a large deficit, it was
decided that the Provinces should pay contributions in pro-
portion to their increased revenue, to enable the Central
Government to balance its budget. The share of each Province
was settled by a Committee of which Lord Meston was
President. The contributions fixed were as follows :
Madras ... 348 lakhs
Bombay ... 46
Bengal ... 63
United Provinces ... 240 ,,
Punjab ... 175
Central Provinces ... 22
Assam ... 15
FINANCE AND THE COUNCILS 73
It was further provided (Devolution rule 18) that when the
Government of India's revenues showed improvement, a reduc-
tion would be made in the contributions of Provincial Govern-
ments who had under this award to pay more than others.
The finances of the Government of India continued to be
extremely unsatisfactory till 1926, and the hoped for reduction
did not take shape till that year. The Provinces, therefore,
especially Madras and the United Provinces, which between
them paid over 60 p. c. of the contributions, started with a
heavy handicap. In criticising the Meston Award, at the time
when it was under discussion, Sir Harcourt Butler, who was
Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, pointed out that
it was unwise
"
to commit the new system of government
beforehand to a preliminary agreement which, so far as he
could see, will hamper the natural development of the Province
for years to come.
"
This pessimistic anticipation was fully
justified by events. For the first 6 years of the Reforms,
the unjust levy continued and left the Provinces without
adequate funds for the developments which the Reforms had
led the public to anticipate. What had appealed most to the
public, with regard to the Act of 1919, was the fact that
"
the
nation-building
"
departments ; e. g. education, sanitation and
local government, were handed over to the Ministers. It
was naturally expected that progressive schemes for
which the old Councils had been clamouring would
now be taken up : that the educational system
would be reorganised, that primary education would be made
free and compulsory, that greater attention would be paid
to rural and urban sanitation, and that encouragement would
be given to Indian industry and agriculture. The Ministers
who were appointed were all committed to schemes of this
kind. But it was soon found that there was no money
available for developments in these departments. The Meston
Award had killed the child even before it was born.
74 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
The system of financial administration in the Provinces also
contributed to the difficulty. The Joint Select Committee did
not accept the proposal of a divided purse and left Finance as
a subject common to both sides. Eule 36 (I) of the Devolution
Eules made Finance a Eeserved subject under the control of
an Executive Councillor. The Finance department by the
nature of its functions is more powerful than all other depart-
ments. It has a practical veto on the schemes and proposals
of other departments under rule 87 G iii which charges the
department
"
to examine and advise on all schemes of new
expenditure for which it is proposed to make provision in the
estimates and to decline to provide in the estimates for any
scheme which has not been so examined." Clearly, it is in the
departments of Education, Sanitation, Industries and Agri-
culture, that proposals, involving new expenditure, originate,
more than in the departments of Law and Order and Revenue.
The Transferred departments are therefore practically placed
under the supervision of a Member of the Executive Council,
who is not likely to be in sympathy with the objects that the
Ministers have in view. This is what led all the Ministers
to complain of before the Muddiman Committee, that the
Finance department had greatly hampered the working of the
Beforms. Sir K. V. Eeddi, in his memorandum submitted
to that Committee, complained that
"
the Ministers were
unable to carry out schemes costing very little money and
for the carrying out of which they had the mandate of the
country and the Legislative Council, because the Finance
department and the Finance Member made it impossible, on
the strength of the powers vested in them.
"
The position of the Finance department on the side of the
Eeserved half, handicapped the Ministers and thereby the acti-
vity of the Legislatures in another way. All the schemes of the
Transferred departments were fully known to the Executive
Council, while the proposals of the Eeserved half remained
secret. The Eeserved half would therefore know what sums are
FINANCE AND THE COUNCILS 75
available for re-appropriation. With the knowledge they
possess of the existence of funds, the Members of the
Executive Council apply for re-appropriation at a compara-
tively early stage. The Executive Councillors, therefore, get
larger sums by way of re-appropriation and are thereby
enabled to carry their schemes through/'*
Thus burdened with a system of contributions which left
the Provincial exchequers very little balance, and a Finance
department which exercised effective control over all new
schemes and discouraged all proposals if they involved ex-
penditure, the Councils and the Ministers could not carry
through schemes of improvement which they had promised
the country. The Finance department was the nerve system
of the whole scheme : that nerve system was not only weak,
but diseased ; weak, because the Meston Award had not
worked out satisfactorily, owing to the continued deficit in the
finances of the Central Government; and diseased, because of its
permanent alliance with the Eeserved half. Much of the
difficulties in the working of Dyarchy must be traced to this.
One other matter, relating to the failure of the Eeformed
Government to come up to the anticipations aroused
by it, must be noticed here ; that is the position of
the permanent services under the Reforms. It was expected
that a noticeable breach would be made in the wall
of bureaucratic government by the changes introduced
in the Provinces. Not only the people of India, but the
Services themselves believed it to be so. In the first two
years of the Eeformed Government, there was a remarkable
fall in the number of candidates for the Indian Civil Service.
In thq, examination of 1921, out of 86 candidates only 26
were Europeans. There were 16 appointments and only 3
were Europeans, one of whom almost immediately retired
from service. The number of retirements on proportionate
* Sir K. V. Reddi's evidence, vol. 5.
76 THE WOBKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
pension was also large. The extent of the alarm that was
felt among the officials, at the possibility of their interests
being subordinated to the demands of India, may be realised
by the measures they took. They formed associations to
protect their interests by the same kind of methods, as
Sir William Joynson Hicks explained in his speech in the
House of Commons championing the Services,*
"
as those
by which Trade Unionists in this country band themselves
together to protect themselves from hardship/'
But the ground that was lost was soon gained. Within
the firsu two years, the Services consolidated their position
and were once more in supreme authority. This was done
by three methods. The Ministers were not given authority
over the Imperial Services in matters relating to (a) promotions,
(b) transfers, and (c) disciplinary action. As we have noticed, the
Governor was specially charged to see that the officials
received fair play, an instruction which was interpreted so
liberally by the authorities, as to deny the Ministers control
over the Services which served under them. The right of
appeal to the Governor-General in Council and the Secretary
of State was maintained as before. The cumulative result
of all this was that the Services continued undiminished in
authority and unimpaired in their prerogatives.
Much confusion and friction had been foreseen in the
relations between the Ministers and the Services. The
Government of India, in its letter of March 5th, 1919, gave
a picture of what might happen under the Eeforms.
"Ministers will be taking over departments staffed by
public servants, Europeans and Indians alike, with no
personal experience of popular government, whp may
tend to be impatient of new methods and unappreciative
of changes in policy. Ministers may be apprehensive
of obstruction and intolerant of the rigidity of official
*
August 2, 1922,
FINANCE AND THE COUNCILS 77
methods. We recognise that it is possible, that in the
exercise of their responsibility and from the best of
motives, the Ministers may adopt a policy which the
Service feels, it cannot consistently with its conscience
and self-respect, carry out. Ministers may, again, naturally
prefer their own agents and be disposed to treat lightly
vested claims to important or desirable appointments.
Officers who personally render themselves unpopular will be
treated with less consideration than they sometimes
receive now. Disciplinary cases will present a difficulty
and a Minister's handling of them will be more closely
scrutinised than if the decision lay with an official. In
short, Ministers and Government servants will take time
to shake down into each other's ways. It would be
foolish to imagine otherwise."
These predictions have not been fulfilled, not because
the Ministers and Civil servants took no
"
time to shake
down into each other's ways," but because the Ministers
were transformed from effective political chiefs to nominal
figure-heads. The relations between the Civil Service and the
Ministers have been extremely cordial ; not one of the
ex-Ministers who gave evidence before the Muddiman
Committee has complained of the attitude of his civilian
subordinates. The reason is that, after the first shock, the
Civil' Service set itself to consolidate its authority, which it
did effectively in the course of the first two years of the
Eeformed Government.
Thus, so far as the working of Dyarchy is concerned, the
hopes that have been based on it have not been realised in its
executive and administrative aspects. Ministerial responsibility
was denied from the beginning. The position of the Finance
department and the undiminished authority of the Services
allowed the Councils very little effective power, though their
indirect influence on administration was considerable. In
78 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
short, so far as the executive and administrative sides are
concerned, the Councils have been merely a continuation of
the Minto-Morley Beforms and nothing more ; and, even in the
Transferred departments, the position approximated more and
more, as time went on, to the earlier Councils than to the-
Parliamentary Government which it was supposed to
inaugurate. In the Dyarchical animal, which was a crosa
between the irresponsible Advisory Councils of the Minto-
Morley type and responsible Parliamentary Government, the
characteristics of the first become more and more clear with
age, though the colour and shape remain that of the second.
CHAPTEB VII
THE COUNCILS AND THE PEOPLE
So far, we have been concerned with the relations of the
Council with the Government, in both its Transferred and
Eeserved sides and with its machinery, the Services. A no less
important question is the relation between the Councils and
the Public. A parliamentary institution stands midway
between the government which controls it from above and the
people below, who elect the members with a view to watch,
influence and direct the executive. The relations with those
in authority form but one aspect of the problem. The rela-
tions with those below those whose interests the Councils
represent and those from which they derive their authority
are of equal importance in judging the work of a representative
system.
The Eeforms had a direct and immediate effect of enfran-
chising a considerable section of the Indian people. Altogether
about 5,000,000 persons were given the right to vote and this
was a change which was bound to have far-reaching conse-
quences. It is true, that in the first election, a very large
percentage of voters did not take part, but that in
itself was an evidence of political awakening, because,
the Boycott of the elections was not due either to
apathy or to ignorance, but to the intense political
propaganda of Mr. Gandhi's non-co-operation movement.
It was a conscious aot of refusal which was, in itself, a
determined expression of the will of the electorate. The second
80 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
and third elections which took place after the breakdown of
the non-co-operation movement, were characterised by party
propaganda in the country, and the popular interest aroused,
justified the expectation that the masses would soon learn the
value of the vote. The experience of the elections shows that
political education through voting has made considerable pro-
gress in India. In the general election that followed the first
Councils, many of the most prominent politicians, who,
either as Ministers or as Members of the Councils had
acted against popular opinion, lost their seats. Among
those whom the electorate rejected were men like
Sir Surendranath Bannerjea, one of the founders of the
national movement, whose activities in the Reformed Council
made him unpopular, Paranje Pye, Minister of Education in
Bombay, and Sir Chimanlal Setalwad, Vice-ohancellor of the
Bombay University. In the elections in 1926, the voting was
even more remarkable as an assertion of the will of the elec-
torate on the policy of Ministers. In Madras, during the first
two Councils, the South Indian Liberal Federation, represent-
ing the non-Brahmin party, was in power. It commanded an
effective majority in the Council. The Ministry which was
put in power had the enthusiastic support of the
Council, and their administration of the Transferred depart-
ments proved a striking success. The social legisla-
tion which they undertook and carried through the Councils,
was welcomed by the public, and their activities in educational
and industrial fields were on the whole considered beneficial
and in the interests of the people. They were responsible for
such far-reaching reforms as the Hindu Eeligious Endowment
Act and the Madras University Act. The former
placed the accumulated wealth of Hindu temples and
monasteries under secular control, while the latter converted
the University of Madras from an examining body into a
teaching institution. But in spite of their success in adminis-
THE COUNCILS AND THE PEOPLE 81
tration and their achievements in legislation, popular opinion
turned against them, on the ground that they were not suffi-
ciently strong to influence the Executive in its general policy.
The Ministry was suspected of being too much influenced by
the Reserved side and it was held responsible to the public for
the actions of the whole Government. The Ministers were of
course powerless to influence the decisions of the Government
on important matters affecting law and order, revenue and
other subjects administered by the Eeserved side. They were
also suspected of being lukewarm in championing public rights
against the encroachment of the Executive. The result was
that this party, which had an overwhelming majority in the
two previous Councils, was practically annihilated at the polls
in the general election of 1926,
The real difficulty of the relations between the Councils and I
the People lies in the communal grouping of Members.
We shall have something to say of the system of communal
representation in a later chapter. What is of importance
here is that a large body of the Members of the Council do
not represent the general people but special communities. In
every Pro\7ince, theie is a solid block of Members elected to
represent communal constituencies, whose responsibility is
towards the community which elects them. This sectional
character of representatives affects their attitude towards
public questions which they approach from the point of view
of the communities they represent. Their activities inside
and outside the Council tend to be sectional, with the result
that political discussion in the country goes on communal
rather than national lines. In the general scheme of
political education of the people, this is undoubtedly a great
disadvantage.
Another fact which handicaps the effective political educa-
tion of the people, which would have resulted from the
Eeforms, is the artificial character of the Provinces. The
82 THE WOBKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
present division of India into Provinces rests on historical
accidents. Their boundaries take neither geographical nor
ethnical considerations into account. The districts jumbled
together into one administration, with the name of a Province
or a Presidency, have often little in common in economic
interests. Their populations speak different languages and
often are of different races. Thus in Madras, there are 3
important languages, Tamil, Telugu and Malayalam. The
Tamil population, comprising 18 million people, occupy the
area south and west of Madras, while the Telugu population
live in the northern districts. The Telugus have been
demanding the constitution of their districts into a separate
province for a long time, and there is much to justify their
demand. The Telugu population over 20 millions is
homogeneous in race. They occupy a well-defined area and
speak the same language. But the Presidency of Madras
jumbles both these people together, to make an unwieldy
whole, creating thereby jealousies and antagonisms between
the people. Again, the Province of Bihar and Orissa, as its
very name shows, is an artificial creation. The Oriyas are a
different people and their area is also clearly marked out
geographically. The Presidency of Bombay consists of 3
clearly separable areas with distinctive imputations. The
Mahrattas, in the south, form a compact nationality with
Poona as their capital. The Gujuratis form a no less import-
ant population, and they have also a capital at Ahmedabad.
Bind is no more connected with Bombay than Aden is, but it
is an integral part of the Presidency. The artificial character
of these divisions makes political work in the Provinces well-
nigh impossible. Except Bengal, the United Provinces and
the Punjab, every Province has at least two important
languages spoken by the people. Political propaganda and
work among the people can only be through their mother-
tongue and the present divisions render that important aspect
of representative government extremely difficult.
THE COUNCILS AND THE PEOPLE 83
But in spite of these difficulties, the political education of
the people has made marked progress during the last 8 years.
The discussions and debates in the Councils are reported with
great prominence in all the papers, both in the Indian and
English languages, and are read, studied and commented upon
even in the villages. The popularity and circulation of the
vernacular newspapers have much increased during the period
of the Reforms, and whatever be the value of the comments
offered by them, the propagation of political news, especially
of the discussions in the Councils, has had the benefit of
interesting the large class of vernacular-educated people in
political questions.
A more important instrument of political awakening, has
been the new system of local self-government. From the
time of Lord Ripon's Act, which really laid the foundation of
representative institutions in modern India, local self-govern-
ment has been a great source of political experience. Just
before the Reform Act came into operation, the local boards
and municipalities had been reconstituted on a more popular
basis. Official control over them was relaxed and they were
placed under non-official chairmen. As a result there was, as
the Madras Government noticed in their memorandum present-
ed to the Muddiman Committee,
"
an awakening of civic
consciousness." The capture of municipalities by advanced
political parties, like the Swarajists, also goes to prove that the
interest in local administration is increasing, especially as a
training ground for the higher politics of the Councils. Many
of the leading Members in the Councils are also members of
district boards and municipalities, and successful work in local
government, is a claim which is valued b;y the electors to the
Legislature. It is also a significant fact that one of the first ques-
tions, the Ministers took up on assuming office under the
Reformed Government, was the reorganisation of municipalities
and district boards. In the Punjab, three important Acts, the
84 THE WORKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
Small Towns Act, the Village Franchise Amendment Act, and
the Town Improvements Act, were passed with the object of
disseminating a democratic and self-reliant spirit among the
people, and of setting up a better organisation for the purposes
of sanitation and public health. In the case of municipalities
and district boards, the franchise was also lowered, and the
Punjab Government recognized that the movement towards
the democratisation of local bodies was accelerated by the
introduction of the Reforms. The Bombay Council passed,
in 1922, an Act which extended the franchise, removed sex
disqualifications and gave increased powers to local boards.
In Calcutta, an important Measure was introduced by
Sir Surendranath Bannerjea and passed by the Council,
democratising the Corporation and removing sex disqualifica-
tion in municipal franchise. In the United Provinces also, a
Measure was enacted reducing municipal franchise and a
District Board Act liberalising rural bodies. In Bihar and
Orissa, three important Measures dealt with the problem of
local government on a similar basis. The Reformed Govern-
ments could not, therefore, be accused of neglecting local self-
government, and this was, to a large extent, due to the realisa-
tion by the Ministers of the important part played by the
district boards and municipalities in influencing local opinion.
The close contact between the people and tbeir representa-
tives in the Council, could also be seen in the legislation
which the Ministers undertook or which the Reserved side
introduced, as a result of pressure by the Members. The
claims of urban and rural tenants were voiced loudly in the
Councils and found general support. The Madras City Tenants
Protection Bill of 1921, and the Calcutta Rent Act of 1923,
show that the interests of the poorer classes were not neglect-
ed by the Councils. In Madras, a Bill to protect the tenants
in Malabar was introduced by a non-official member and was
passed by the Council with the support of the Ministerial
THE COUNCILS AND THE PEOPLE 85
party. But the Governor refused his sanction and appointed
a Committee to go into the whole question and report with a
view to official legislation. In the United Provinces also, the
Council took up tenancy legislation and passed the Oudh Bent
Act, giving the tenants of the Talukdars a life-interest in their
holdings with 5 years reversion to the heirs.
Another group of important legislative enactments initiated
hy Ministers dealt with education. The whole country had
demanded, for a long time, a change in educational policy with
a view to making it more Indian in outlook. The officialised
Universities were denounced as charnel-houses of Indian
freedom and were looked upon with distrust by all political
parties. Naturally, the Indian Ministers utilised the very
first opportunities afforded to them to reform the Universities
and liberalise their constitutions. In Bengal, this was not
possible, because by the Government of India Act, the Calcutta
University was considered a Central subject for the first five
years. The Madras University was reorganised by the
Madras University Act of 1922. Until then, the University
was solely an examining board which did not concern itself
with teaching or with the administration of colleges. The Act
popularised its constitution and introduced facilities for direct
teaching and for maintaining close contact with colleges. In
the United Pro\inces, the Allahabad University was re-
constituted, and two new Universities, those of Lucknow and
Agra, were established. In Bombay, an important step was
taken towards the introduction of compulsory primary
education.
Far-reaching social legislation was also attempted in some
Provinces. Of these the most important Measures were the
Bengal Children's Act, 1Q22, and the Hindu Eeligious Endow-
ment Act of Madras. The Children's Act of Bengal followed
the same lines as the English Acts. Though the Government
had not included in the Bill a provision empowering rescue
86 THE WORKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
officers to rescue minor girls from bouses of ill-fame, the non-
official majority in the Council moved an amendment and carried
it in spite of official opposition. It was a reform, the need
for which had long been felt, but which it would have been
impossible to pass in the Minto-Morley Councils, where the
opposition of the Government was sufficient to kill any
proposal.
The Hindu Eeligious Endowment Act of Madras was an
almost revolutionary change in social reform, which was
welcomed with enthusiasm by its supporters, and attacked as
violent, unconstitutional and exproprietary by its opponents.
As this is a type of important legislation which the British
Government could not have undertaken at any time, it is
necessary to examine its principles to understand the
attitude of the new Councils to social and religious reform.
The Hindu temples and monasteries in South India possess
vast properties, either through endowments or through
the accumulation of income derived from pilgrims. The
mutts or 'monasteries which were originally endowed for
charitable and religious purposes had come, in course
of time, to be considered as the private property of the incum-
bents for the time being, who owed no account and utilised
the funds in any way they chose. This naturally gave
rise to grave abuses. The trustees of the temples also
assumed proprietary rights and the endowments which really
belonged to the Hindu public had practically passed into pri-
vate hands. As this is a matter closely affecting the Hindu
religion, the Government, in conformity with its declared policy
of religious neutrality, could never have intervened and
legislated for its control. The Madras Ministry essayed the
task by its Hindu Eeligious Endowment Bill. It established a
Hindu Board on the line of the Board of Charities, and placed
all the temples except those which were strictly proprietary
and private directly under its contiol. It empowered the
THE COUNCILS AND THE PEOPLE 87
Board to assume the management of these endowments in
case of maladministration, to inspect them, and provided for
accounting and auditing in all establishments. An important
clause which aroused much controversy was that which intro-
duced the cy pres doctrine in relation to surplus funds. The
Board was authorised to divert the accumulated surplusage in
the temples for education in the Hindu religion, sanitation of
pilgrim centres, and other objects of allied interest, which
would benefit the Hindu community as a whole.
This Bill was revolutionary, in so far, as it was the
first attempt that was made to legislate directly in matters
affecting the Hindu religion. It would have met with universal
opposition if it had originated from the Government or had
been passed by official votes. Such an enactment was possible
only, because the Council had an elected majority which
championed the cause of social reform and was able to explain
the Measure to the ignorant populace. The cry of "religion in
danger" with which such a Measure would have been greeted if
the British Government had introduced it, could not be raised
when its originator was himself a Hindu and his supporters
were men of approved orthodoxy. The reactionary elements,
defeated in the Council, made its amendment or repeal their
main plank in the general election ; but the country returned
the same Minister and the same Party to power, though with
an attenuated majority.
Sufficient has been said already to show that the Keformed
Councils take their legislative work seriously and in the
interest of the people they represent. It is often said that, as
the Councils aie elected on a narrow franchise, they represent
only certain sections and not the whole people, and therefore,
cannot be trusted with responsibility. This was the same
with the British Parliament before 1832, but it was never said
that the House of Commons could not therefore speak for
the people of England or claim to represent them. The
88 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
Beformed Legislatures in India, in all the varied phases of their
activity, have shown an equal sense of responsibility towards
the people whom they represent and, as the analysis of the
legislation given above would show, have in every way
tried to discharge that obligation. There is no case of a
progressive, social and economic legislation, that has failed to
pass through the Councils through want of non-official
support. There is clear evidence of the anxiety of non-
official Members to press forward with schemes of education,
sanitation and social reform. There was, in fact, considerable
zeal manifested by the Councillors to liberalise the provisions
of existing Acts, in order to associate the rural and urban
population with the government of their areas.
The success or failure of the Councils, as [Responsible Legis-
latures, can be judged on 3 grounds :
(ij Have they shown a sense of responsibility in
matters relating to administration : especially
in relation to finance ?
(ii) Have they truly represented the opinion of
the country ?
(iiij Have they, in their activities, kept in view the
advancement of the public ?
The work of the Provincial Councils must be submitted to
these tests before we can say how far they have been
successful in the use of the new opportunities given to them.
It is only, if in all these matters they have acted with discre-
tion, prudence and wisdom, and with a view to national
progress, that the Councils can be said to have achieved
success. We are now in a position to attempt to answer these
questions. .
In considering the attitude of the Councils, the
suspension of the Eeforms in Bengal and the Central Provinces,
should not conceal from us the work of the other six Provinces
during the whole period of the Reforms, and of Bengal and
THE COUNCILS AND THE PEOPLE 89
the Central Provinces themselves during the first and the
third Councils. The action of the Swarajist combination in
Bengal did not mean the break down of the Reforms. It was
meant as a demonstrative protest against tho insufficiency of
the Reforms, the irresponsibility of the Ministers, and other
weaknesses on the Executive side of Dyarchy which we pointed
out in the preceding chapters. It cannot, however, be too
much emphasised that there is a fundamental difference
between the Executive and Conciliar it is impossible to call it
parliamentary as it has not full responsibility side of the
Reforms. The Executive side fell far short not only of the
expectations of tho Indian people but of the intentions of
Parliament. The Conciliar side, on the other hand, increased
in authority as time went on, by the establishment of conven-
tions and by the compromises which the Executive, needing
money and not desirous of certifying it, was forced to enter
into with popular representatives. So far as this important
aspect of the Reforms is concerned it has proved a striking
success.
In the matter of financial responsibility, though the Councils
justly insisted on retrenchment and scrutinised with vigilance
all expenditure, they were always ready, if the Executive had a
strong case, to support taxation. The Bombay memorandum
says
* " The main spring of the Legislative Council's action
in all financial business has been the desire to avoid respon-
sibility for fresh taxation, but they have faced it where the
plain necessity has been established, as for instance, in the
increase in Court Pees and Stamps." The United Provinces
Government also bears witness to this reasonable and respon-
sible altitude of the Council. The memorandum of that
Government (1923) says
"
The attitude of - the Council
towards these measures (of taxation) was hostile but not
unreasoned. . . . On the whole the Governor in Council
"1923, p. 67.
~
90 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
does not think that the Legislative Council responded badly to
the call made to them to shoulder responsibility. It is true
that the new burdens were moderate, that large concessions
had been made and that additional revenue was granted in
fact, in the first instance, for one year only. But the fact
remains that a Legislature, unaccustomed to such a decision
and within nine months of dissolution, agreed to place
moderate additional burdens upon the tax-payers in order to
maintain the Provincial finances on a sound basis." In the
Punjab when, at the end of the year, demands were made for
excess grants, the Council showed its disapproval, but did not
refuse to vote the demands. In Madras, the Ministry and the
Council supported additional schemes of taxation though after
scrutiny and criticism. It cannot, therefore, be said that the
Councils have either shirked their financial responsibilities or
refused to face the unpopularity of fresh taxation.
It is, of course, true that the Councils utilised this
power with caution and in such a manner as to increase
popular authority over the Executive. The Bombay Govern-
ment noted that
"
the Legislative Council have learnt to use
their wide powers in financial matters to enforce respect for
their opinion in extra financial matters. For example, the
Budget provision for revision of the pay of village officers was
recently rejected by the Legislative Council, not upon its merits,
but as a protest against what they considered to be the
unsympathetic attitude of Government with regard to the
imprisonment of a Member of the Legislative Council."
In matters of law and order also, this sense of responsibility
was evident from the beginning. In this, as in the matter of
financial responsibility, the Councils have a two-fold /unction.
They must support the Government to maintain law and order,
but they are also the constituted guardians of popular rights and
theiefore have the primary duty of seeing that the Executive
does not, in the name of law and order, unnecessarily encroach
THE COUNCILS AND THE PEOPLE 91
on the rights of the citizens. A popular assembly has there-
fore to be critical of actions taken in the name of law and
order ; but also, at the same time, to support the Government in
its duty of maintaining public peace. How have the Councils
fulfilled this important function? In Madras, as the late
Education Minister pointed out in his minute appended to the
Madras Government memorandum, (1924)
"
the Legislature
fully realised its responsibility during critical times. The
passing of enactments safeguarding peace and order in the
country is the most positive proof of the realisation of the
responsibility/' The Madras Government itself officially
acknowledged this fact. It says in the official memorandum,
(1924)- -" In regard to the riots in Madras there was some
difference of opinion ; but in dealing with the other disturb-
ances and demonstrations against authority, the Government
received a great measure of support from the Council.
Throughout the Malabar rebellion, there was a gratifying
disinclination to embarrass the Government. Early in the life
of the Council, when the District Magistrate of Malabar, with
the approval of the Government, found it necessary to restrain
the agitator Yaqub Hasan, leave was obtained to move the
adjournment of the Council, to discuss this action, but in the
course of the discussion, it became clear that the balance of
opinion was opposed to any censure." In other Provinces also,
in times of extreme crisis, the Councils have supported Execu-
tive action even when they were sceptical of its wisdom and
critical of its methods.
The second test by which a legislature could be judged is
whether it has represented the gequine_opijoiQn.,af-the- country.
The boycott of the Councils, preached and to a large extent
enforced, by the Non-co-operators led to a serious position in
the first Councils. In all the Provinces, except Madras, the
Councils represented only a small percentage of the elect-
orate and could in no sense claim to speak on behalf of the
92 THE WOBKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
people. But, it is equally true, that in the second and third
Councils, the elections were held amidst widespread political
and party activity and the Members elected could claim to re-
present, in a very large measure, the opinion of the electorate.
The views of the Members found support in the constituencies
and opinion in the electorate was reflected in the Councils*
Most of the Members came from the districts they were,
elected to represent, and were therefore, in a position to be
closely in touch with the views of their electors. Except with
regard to the first Councils, it could not be said that the
Eeformed Legislatures represented no one and spoke only on
their own authority.
The third test is how far the Councils tried to improve the
conditions of the people, and how far their activities have been
directed towards the political, social and economic develop-
ment of the country. The analysis of provincial legislation
given in this chapter will show that, in all Provinces, the
Councils took their responsibility in this matter seriously and
championed progressive measures for the benefit of the
masses. Constant pressure was put on the Executive to intro-
duce measures for the extension of education, sanitation and
public health. The Hindu Eeligious Endowment Act of Madras
shows how the Councils have not lacked courage in setting
themselves to reform long-established abuses in Hindu society*
The real justification of the Indian Councils lies, and must he,
in the attitude which they take in purely social, economic,
and welfare questions ; Government intervention in which is
rendered impossible, by the leaden weight of the encrusted
traditions of Indian society. In all these matters, the Councils
have utilised their authority with courage, caution and fore-
sight. The obstructionist tactics followed for a time in Bengal
and the Central Provinces, have obscured the achievement
of the Councils in these directions. The Swarajist action, as
we said before, was a protest against the inadequacy of the
THE COUNCILS AND THE PEOPLE 93
Reforms, and was largely due to causes, traced in a pievious
chapter, which had nothing whatever to do with the powers
and functions of the Council. But even in these Provinces,
after a short suspension, the Councils are working satisfactorily
and in accordance with the best traditions established in other
Provinces.
Thus Dyarchy in the Provinces, though it did not usher in
Responsible Government even in the Transferred departments,
and only led to a strengthening of the power of the Governor
on the Executive side, has, in the legislative and conciliar
aspects, resulted in considerable success. The administrative
efficiency of the Provinces could not be said to have suffered ;
nor could the Services complain of a parliamentary inquisition
into their conduct. The Legislative work undertaken has been
everywhere of a progressive and liberalising character, and, at
least so far as the work in the Councils was concerned, all the
fears entertained by the opponents of Indian reform have
certainly been falsified.
CHAPTEB VIII
REFORMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
THE working of the Reforms in the Central Government is
outside the scope of this work, as the principle of Dyarchy
was not introduced in the Cabinet of the Governor-General.
The Government of India continued to be responsible solely to
the Secretary of State and through him to Parliament. Though
its character remained unchanged, it was reformed with a view
to associate it more with Indian opinion. The Central Legisla-
ture was reconstructed into two Houses, a popularly elected
Legislative Assembly and a Council of State meant as a second
Chamber. The Assembly consists of 110 members 26 offic-
ials, 14 nominated non-officials and 100 elected representatives.
All Central Legislation in India must be introduced in the
Assembly or in the Council of State and ordinarily must be
passed by them. But if the Governor-General certifies that
any
"
Bill is essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests
of British India," it becomes law on his signature, if it is
passed by either of the Houses, or if rejected by both, on his
own authority. As the Council of State was constituted
specially.in order to prevent a complete dead-lock,the Governor-
General would never be forced to resort to ^ the methods of
lit de justice, of enacting legislation on his own authority.
With the consent of one of the Houses, he could promulgate a
Law which he certified to be essential, and the only
safeguard against arbitrary action, is the provision laid down
in sub-section 2 of Section 67 B of the Act, that
REFORMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 95
all such preferential Acts shall be laid before the Houses of
Parliament and shall not have effect until they have received
His Majesty's assent. There has been only one case of actual
legislation besides the Finance Bills thrown out or radically
amended by the Assembly in which this extraordinary power
has been used : that of the Princes Protection Act which
was thrown out by the Lower House.
In matters affecting finance, the Council of State following
the Houso of Lords, has no voice. The Assembly is vested
with wido powers of financial control, except in matters declar-
ed by the Act itself to be non-votablo. It is provided that
the appropriation of revenue relating to the following heads of
expenditure shall notbe^ submitted to the vote of the Legisla-
tive Assembly, nor shall they be oven to discussion by either
Chamber at the time when the annual statement is under con-
sideration. (1) Interest in sinking fund charges and loans,
(2) the expenditure of which the amount is prescribed by law,
(3) salaries and pensions of persons appointed by or with the
approval of His Majesty or by the Secretary of State in Coun-
cil, (4) salaries of Chief Commissioners and Judicial Commis-
sioners and (5) expenditure classed by the order of the Govern-
or-General as ecclesiastical, political and defence.
Subject to these exceptions, every proposal for expenditure
must be submitted to the vote of the Assembly. The only
restriction imposed on the free exercise of its discretion is, that
if the Governor-General in Council declares that he is satisfied
that any demand refused by the Assembly is essential to the
discharge of his responsibilities, he can act as if the demand
had been actually assented to. This extniordinar^power
consid(ifrably restricts the financial control of the Assembly,
but in practice it has been ^s^T^onTy on occasions when the
Assembly has been deliberatelyA recalcitrant, or the demand
refused is essential. All faxatlon Bills must come before the
Assembly and be passed by it, but the same power, as in other
96 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
acts of legislation, rests with the Executive Government to
certify them,. in case the Assembly refuses leave to introduce
them or fails to pass them, in a form recommended by the
Governor-General m Council.
Both the Assembly and Council of State have the power of
interpolating and moving resolutions on all questions of
importance, except those relating to the foreign relations of
the Government, or to its relations with Indian States, or in
reference to any matter which is sub jiidice.
The most important characteristic of the Central Govern-
menFT^^ in a more emphasised form, the
anomalous structure of a parliamentary body possessing an
elected non-official majority, without ultimate" responsibility
on any matter. TL'ne Act Cakes for granted the political and
financial irresponsibility of the legislatures and provides not
only for extraordinary powers in case they should prove
recalcitrant, but for the normal continuance of administration
in face of whatever it may do. It is given the power to vote,
but no responsibility attaches to its use. An irresponsible
votejft the moat demoralising of political influences It is
the very negation of the idea of parliamentary government,
as it encourages members to vote without any consideration
as to what the resujt of that vote would be. This is exactly
what the more extreme section of the Legislative Assembly
has done. They know well enough, that if they throw out the
Finance Bill, the Government would certify it and everything
would go on in the normal manner. This knowledge
is a direct encouragement to recklessness and certainly not.a
method of creating a sense of political responsibility either in
the electorate or in the Legislature. Every vote on the
Finance Bill is now taken as a demonstration, perhaps futile,
but certainly spectacular. To throw out the Finance Bill
looks like that ultimate sanction of Parliamentary Govern-
ment, the refusal of supply. The Indian parties can indulge
EBPOEMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 97
in it without inconvenience when they know that not a single
department would suffer by it. This is why, that while in
matters of legislation, the Nationalist party in the Indian
Assembly has not only showed itself to be reasonable,
moderate and progressive, in financial matters it has preferred
spectacular demonstration to constructive criticism.
But, besides the inherent vice of votes without authority,
the Central Legislatures also suffer from the fact that the
Government of India whom it seeks to influence, may be to
control, is itself not a free agent. The Government of India
is only a subordinate branch of the administration in London,
and as such, is under the orders of the Secretary of State, who
may direct it to take any particular course of action without
reference either to the view of the Governor-General in Council
or of the Indian Legislature. It often happens that the
Government of India recognises the wisdom of the attitude of
the Assembly or at least is prepared to compromise with it on
the ground of expediency. But the orders of the Secretary of
State, may direct it to follow a contrary course. The recent
action of the Whitehall authorities in directing the withdrawal
of the Reserve Bank Bill, after the Government of India had
come to an agreement in principle with the Opposition in the
Assembly, is a case in point. The Eeserve Bank Bill was
an important Measure arising out of the recommendations
of the Hilton Young Commission on Indian currency. The
Bill as originally introduced contained provisions which were
not acceptable to Indian opinion. But its importance was
recognised and a reasonable agreement was reached after
prolonged negotiations. When the Bill, as agreed upon by the
Government of India and the Nationalist parties, seemed to
have entered on smooth waters and to all appearance was
going to arrive safely in port, an order was received from
the Secretary of State directing the Governor-General
in Council not to proceed with it. Sir Basil Blackett, the
98
.
THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
Finance Member, is known to have offered his resignation as a.
result of this arbitrary intervention, and the Assembly pro-
vided the strange spectacle of the Nationalist opposition
championing the cause of the Government und the official
spokesman trying half-heartedly to condemn themselves ! So
long as the Government of India is treated merely as an
agency of the Secretary of State irreverently alluded to in
India as the Grand Moghul at Whitehall the Legislative
Assembly can merely be a body where the vote will be looked
upon more as a method of political demonstration than as an
instrument of Government, as a weapon and not as a trust
which is to be used with a full sense of responsibility as to its
consequence.
It should not however, be thought that the Legislative
Assembly does not realise in full the authority that is vested
in it by the control of finance limited though it be and that
it does not know how to increase its power and make its influ-
ence felt by its judicious use. The Assembly has been able
to gain many points in its favour by the indirect use of this
power. One important instance may be quoted. When the
Government sought to separate railways from general finances
and made it an important part of its policy, the Assembly
insisted, as the price of its assent to the proposals, that an
Indian Member should be appointed to the Railway Board
and that the dictation of Whitehall in the purchase of railway
stores must stop. On the latter point, the Government could
only communicate the view of the Assembly to the Secretary
of State, but an assurance was given that, in practice, such
interference would not take place in future. The appointment
of an Indian Member to the Railway Board was definitely pro-
mised, though it has not yet been realised. It is impossible, as
long as the Government of India remains subject to Whitehall,
to make it in any degree responsible to the Assembly ; but at
the same time, it is in this matter that with the lever of
BEFORMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 99
financial control, the Legislative Assembly has more and more
enforced respect for its views and compelled the Government
to follow it in many important matters.
The position of the Government of India in matters rela-
ting to administration and finance, apart from general legisla-
tion, is difficult, under the Act of 1919. It is placed in the
awkward position of being responsible to two masters. It is
clear that legally the Government of India is answerable only
to the Secretary of State. But even that legal theory can be
maintained only on the basis of certification and legislation
by the autocratic method of lit de justice. As it is, in
practice the responsibility of the Government of India to the
Central Legislature is a fact which we cannot ignore. It is-
responsible to the Assembly, not in the sense that if it goes
against its wishes it could be removed, or its officers impeach-
ed
;
but in the more general <jenso of being compelled to con-
form to its wishes, for the sake of avoiding both the incon-
venience of always having to fight against a hostile majority
which has considerable powers, and the odium of having to
depend always on extraordinary power for ordinary business.
The peculiarity of the present position is, that while the direct
authority of the Indian Legislature is limited by the rights of
certification, &c., its power of giving trouble is unlimited*
Naturally, the Government is desirious of conciliating an
opposition which is troublesome and which can make
its life unpleasant. This indirect responsibility towards the
Legislature, which has grown during the six years of the
Eefonns, conflicts seriously with its responsibility to the
Secretary of State, as was recently seen in the case of the
Beserste Bank Bill.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Eeforms in criticising the proposal
submitted jointly by the Muslim League and the National
Congress, expressed in strong language their disapproval of a
scheme which gave the Council influence and power, while the
100 THE WOBKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
responsibility remained with the Exacutive. This is what the
Eeport said with regard to that scheme
"
It is unsound that
the Legislature and the Executive should derive their power
from and be responsible to different authorities. As one observer
has put it
'
the Executive has a mandate for good government
from the Secretary of State and the British Parliament, and
the Legislature has ex hypothesi a mandate from the electorate :
the two mandates may not agree and which is to yeild ?'
There would certainly be questions on which the mandates did
not agree. If the latter gave way, it would become merely the
agent of the legislature."* This very same unsound principle
against which the authors of the Joint Report directed their
destructive criticism 1ms boon enshrined in the Central Legis-
lature. That is now fully recognised. The official Eeport of
the Government of India on the
"
Material and Moral
Progress of the country," presented to Parliament in
1921, contains the following observations on the constitution-
al position resulting from the system of an elected majority
without responsibility.
"
Since the ultimate decision rests
with the Governor-General, an authority who, from the point
of view of the Legislature, is not only irremovable but also
immune from discussion, the elected members can, if they
BO desire, play the parliamentary game with most of its
privileges and none of its penalties. If the Government
of India accept the opinion of the elected majority, the
responsibility, either for good or for evil, still remains with
the Executive. If good results, the elected members are
naturally able to claim credit with the country. If the conse-
quences are evil, there is no inducement for them to assume
an onus which really rests on the shoulders of the Executive.
On the other hand, if the opinion of the elected members
is not accepted by the Government, no matter with what
weight of argument the officials are fortified in their refusal,
*
PP. 143-144-
REFORMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 101
the only consequence is that the Legislature is affronted and
Indian political opinion is presented with a new grievance."
The constitutional authority which the Assembly has
won by the use of its financial and other powers,
should not conceal from us this fundamental and primary
defect of the Central Legislature. It has demoralised public
life in India, by making criticism of Government measures
uninstructed and reckless. It has put the authorities into
the anoaialous position of having to obey the Legislatures or
go its way by the use of arbitrary powers. On its political
side, it has only accentuated the faults of the Minto-Morley
system, and this has been the weakest spot in the Eeforms.
But, as in the Provincial Councils, the legislative work of
tho Assembly and the influence it lias exerted on the
Executive in national affairs, have been its real justification.
During its life of six years, the Assembly has placed to its
credit a great deal of legislation, the full value of which could
not be appreciated to-day. They may be divided into 3
categories (l) legislation to establish rights of citizenship: (2)
Acts of social progress : and (3) Acts of codification. The
record of the Legislative Assembly, with regard to all these
matters of vital interest to the nation, is highly creditable.
The first Assembly, naturally enough, devoted most of its time
to eradicating from the Statute book evidences of subjection,
inferiority and repression, which affected the self-respect of
the people of India. The most important of these were the Acts
abolishing racial distinction in criminal trial and the Meas-
ures giving effect to the reports of the Repressive Laws and
Press Law Committees. There were provisions in the criminal
law ofr India akin to the privileges of capitulations enjoyed by
European nationals in Asiatic and African countries e. g. the
right of a European to be tried by a jury consisting of a
majority of Europeans. Indian public opinion had always con-
* Moral & Material Progress Report, 1924, PP- 53-54-
102 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
sidered this an unjust provision which ensured the Eupopean*
even under British rule, a different law from that which was
administered to the Indian. It was considered a galling
humiliation to Indians and an intolerable stigma on India's
fair naino. An attempt was made, in the time of Lord Bipon,
to amend these provisions, but the European community rose
up in revolt and threatened to proceed to extreme measures.
The Government was forced to yield and the special privileges
of European nationals continued to be on the Indian Statute
book. Under tho changed conditions of to-day, those provisions
were considered anomalous, and under pressure from the
Legislative Assembly, a Committee was appointed, consisting of
Indian and European members, to report on the question.
Legislative effect was given to their recommendations, and
though tho privileges of Europeans have not been totally
abolished, the Assembly was able to amend tho law in a manner
which left it loss offensive to Indian sentiment than before.
Another piece of important legislation establishing the
rights of Indian citizenship, dealt with tho abrogation of tho
Bepressive Laws. Tho fact of India's political subjection was
emphasised by the extraordinary powers which tho Exocutivo
wielded under the authority of Kogulations and Laws which
limited personal liberty. A Committee was nppointed by the
Legislature to report on this question, and, though its recom-
mendations were halting and partial, the legislation which
gave effect to it registered a considerable advance in the march
of popular freedom. A third measure of importance was the
amendment of the Press Law. Before the Beforms, the
Executive had armed itself with wide powers to restrict
criticism in the Press. The Nationalist newspapers especially
suffered greatly, and there was not a single organ of advanced
Indian opinion which had not come into conflict with the
comprehensive provisions of the Press Act. The Local
Governments had the right of not only punishing the Editor of
EEFOBMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVEBNMENT 103
an offending newspaper, but of demanding a heavy money
security and of confiscating the press and machinery. This
Law was a special object of resentment, as the section of the
public affected by it was tho most vocal, as it was also the
most influential, among the educated classes. The general
public resented it as a humiliation and a bar-sinister to their
citizenship. The Assembly lost no time in taking up this ques-
tion, and a Committee was appointed under pressure from the
Legislature, to enquire and report on it. Tho Committee
recognised tho necessity of leaving in the hands of the
Government, sufficient authority to deal with mischief-mongers,
but recommended tho liberalisation of the provisions and the
repeal of those clauses which were meant to be repressive
rather than punitive.
The influence of the Assembly in establishing for the people
the rights of citizenship was exerted in other important
directions also. It was able to persuade the Army Authorities
to undertake important schemes as a step in the direction of
national defence. A territorial organisation meant to give
military training to Indian youths and to provide for a reserve
of officers and men in case of necessity, was started by the
Army Command, in order to meet the wishes of tho Assembly.
A more important scheme, which in course of time must have
a profound effect on the political evolution of the country, was
the proposal (now being carried into effect) to Indianise 8 units
of the army by the gradual displacement of European officers
by Indians holding tho King's Commission. These schemes
naturally meant the establishment of a Military College in
India and the reservation of facilities for Indian
Cadets at Sandhurst. No country can claim its freedom
withoift being able to defend itself effectively, and
no citizen can be considered free, who has not
the right to defend his freedom from aggression. National
freedom is a privilege : national defence is its corre-
104 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
spending duty. The Assembly, in recognising this and in
demanding a share in the defence, has established on a firm
basis the right of Indians to citizenship, even more than by
abrogating racial distinctions and amending repressive laws.
The Central Legislature also interested itself largely in social
legislation. The Indian Factories Amendment Act, modernised
the law on that important subject along English lines. The
Workman's Compensation Act and the Indian Mines Act
introduced essential though still inadequate safeguards for
the protection of workers. The non-official Members have
shown, indeed, a most progressive spirit in legislation intended
to benefit the poorer classes, and Measures like the Bill
introduced by Mr. Chamanlal for weekly payment of labourers,
could not get through the Legislature merely because of the
opposition of the Government. On the side of social
reform, the most important legislation perhaps the most
important single Act that has been passed in India
for many hundred years is the Civil Marriage Act. The
history of this Measure is interesting. In the old Legislative
Council, leading non-officials brought forward a Measure to
validate marriage between different castes in Hindu society.
It must be said en passant, that according to Hindu religious
law, marriages between two members of different castes, of
even different sub-castes, was not valid. Progressive men
among the Hindus had long recognised the evil effects of this
system which fragmentised Hindu society into mutually
exclusive groups, each standing entrenched behind immemorial
customs against social freedom. The first Bill which was
introduced by the Hon.B.N. Basu was thrown out by the official
majority in the Council. Another attempt was made by the
Hon. V. J. Patel, now Speaker of the Assembly, but th&t also
met with the same fate. In the first Eeformed Legislature,
Dr. (now Sir) H. S. Gour introduced a similar measure, but ifc
was thrown out by one vote, the majority of elected non-
REFORMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 105
officials voting for the reform. In the second Assembly, the
Measure received overwhelming support from the Nationalist
majority, and in spite of the opposition of officials was passed
by the House. Many other non-official bills to promote the
cause of necessary social reform, for which educated India has
been clamouring, were brought forward in the Assembly on
behalf of the Nationalist opposition. Among the most important
may be mentioned a Bill to regulate Hindu religious
endowments, and a Bill for raising the age of con-
sent for marriage. The last Measure which was
introduced in the Assembly, during the summer session
of 1927, was opposed by the Government as being too radical,
though the proposal was only to raise the marriageable age to
14. But in spite of official opposition, the Bill has been taken
up for consideration.
The codifying activities of the Legislature were mostly
directed towards criminal procedure. Lord Eeading in his
speech proroguing the Chambers on the 28th July 1923, stated
that
"
in the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act the Legis-
lature brought to a successful conclusion a task of great
magnitude and complexity which had occupied the energies of
the craftsmen for nearly a decade/'
There is another aspect of the work of the Assembly
which demands special attention, and that is, the constant
pressure put on the Government to encourage the industrial
development of the country. As a result of a resolution of
the House, the Government appointed an Industrial Commis-
sion with a predominantly Indian personnel, and, on their
report, embarked on a policy of discriminating protection. A
Tariff Board was set up with powers to enquire into the condi-
tion of special industries and to recommend methods for their
encouragement. The Steel Protection Act is the most out-
standing result of this policy. Again, an Indian Marine Com-
mittee was appointed, as a result of a resolution in the
106 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
Assembly for enquiring into the possibility of developing
Indian shipping, and the Legislatures have been assiduous
in pressing the vital need of an Indian Merchant
Marine. Again, the Assembly demanded and obtained a pro-
mise from the Government that, as far as possible, all stores
for Government and railways would be purchased in India.
It is clear from these facts, that the economic prosperity and
industrial development of India occupied much of the attention
of the Reformed Legislatures, and their achievements in this
direction have been by no means inconsiderable.
The Assembly has exertedJts influe&Ge^x^JJ^
tion by every means in its power, by resolutiQiis^ questions and
motions "of
"actiQiinimientr Among the important resolutions
of a politicaTnature, carried in the House, may be mentioned
the motion recommending tho immediate abolition of the
distinction between votable and non-votable items. The demand
for a Bound Table Conference to settle the Constitution of
India, and the resolution separating railway from general
finances. The appointment of Committees to advise the
various departments of the Government of India has also
been a source of influence and was utilised a great deal by the
Assembly. There is no doubt that the authority and influence
of the Legislatures have increased in scope and become more
effective in operation than the authors of the Act had
intended.
The increase of its powers and influence being undoubted,
the question is naturally asked whether these powers
have been used wisely and for the benefit of the people-
We have seen, that so far as the popular point of view
is concerned, the activities of the Assembly have been
directed towards political progress by the establishment of
the rights of citizenship and by the partial Indianisation of
the civil and military services : towards economic prosperity,
by the encouragement of Indian industries : and towards
EEFOEMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 107
social reform by enlightened legislation. But have their in-
creased powers of control over the Executive been used wisely ?
The answer to this depends on the view-point one takes on
the question of Indian political evolution. If the Assembly is
considered merely as an advisory body, the use of its powers
in forcing the Government to yield on important questions, may
be considered, as Anglo-Indian critics have done, an
aggressive and unwise act. But, if we look upon the
Assembly as a constitutional legislature representing the
people, evidently its purpose is to enlarge its functions and
authority by the use of every opportunity that presents itself.
The electorate expects the Assembly not only to safeguard its
existing rights, but to press its claims in every manner, and
acquire on behalf of the people, increasing influence over the
Government. This, it is submitted, is the only point of view
from which a Constitutional Assembly can be judged. It is
clear, that both Parliament and the Government of India,
accepted this point of view when the idea of entrusting more
powers to the Assembly, by the establishment of constitutional
convention, was recognized and even encouraged. Lord
Beading in the prorogation speech from which we have
already quoted, stated the principle thus :
" When I examine
the position the Legislative Assembly has attained, the use it
has made of its opportunities, the effect and dignity with
which it conducts its debates, and the broader aspects of its
powers on the policy of the Government of India, I cannot
but feel that the Assembly at times takes far too narrow and
restricted a view of its potentialities and real influence."
If this is the principle by which the attitude of the
Assembly is to be judged, it is not possible to criticise as
unconstitutional or even aggressive, the spectacular demonstra-
tion of the Nationalists in the spring session of 1924. The
Nationalist majority at that time threw out the Budget on the
principle of grievances before supply. It may have been an
108 THE WOBKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
unreal action, on the ground that the Assembly could not with-
hold supplies, because the Governor-General had the right of
certifying it under his emergency powers, but that was all the
more reason for a constitutional demonstration of this nature.
Parliamentary obstruction may be futile, but it cannot
certainly be called unconstitutional. It may be unwise, but
on that account it cannot be stigmatised as being a
subversive action, especially when it is used for the purpose of
demanding a revision of the Constitution. The Szvarajists
have given ample proof, after the first ebullition of their
obstructionist enthusiasm, that they know how to utilise the
machinery of the Assembly to further the national cause.
They have served on Select Committees and co-operated with
the Government to get important legislation through. They
have even assumed the strange and unfamiliar role of being
defenders of the Government of India against the dictation of
the Secretary of State in the matter of the Eeserve Bank
Bill. It is, therefore, merely mistaking the shadow for the
substance when the cry is raised that the Nationalist majority
in the Assembly did not take their responsibilities seriously
and hampered the working of the Government instead of
co-operating with it.
The Central Legislature, in spite of the fact that it was given
powers without responsibility, and therefore was encouraged
in a way to take up an unreasonable position, has been one of
the most successful features of the Eeform Act. It has l>een
critical of the attitudeol ihe Government : it has on occasions
used its powers for purposes of political demonstrations. But
no impartial critic, who studies its debates and estimates its
work, can fail to come to the conclusion that it has
used its powers for the benefit of the people with
reasonable regard to the difficulties of the Government and
the anomalous position of a non-sovereign Executive. Its
legislative work has been far-reaching and comprehensive ; iti
REFORMS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 109
influence, in matters of administration, has not been directed
either towards a weakening of the Central Government or
exercised without consideration for the supreme necessity of
maintaining law and order. Its enthusiasm for social reform
has been praiseworthy and it has been assiduous in its
demand for Indianisation of the services and for a share in
national defence. It has effected considerable retrenchment
in administration and has continuously impressed on the
Government the necessity of economy.
Nor can it be said that it has refused to shoulder the
responsibility of unpopular taxation. It is true, that the
Assembly reduced the salt tax and forced the Governor-
General to have recourse to his extraordinary powers to
restore it ; but that was not because the popular represent-
atives did not realise the necessity of balancing the budget or
of imposing fresh taxation, but solely on the ground that a
tax on salt was unjust to the poor man. In the years of
extreme financial stringency, the Assembly cheerfully assented
to fresh taxation, imposing a heavy burden on the people,
merely insisting, as it was in duty bound to do, that effective
retrenchment of unnecessary expenditure must precede the
demand for fresh taxation. In the light of these facts, it is
impossible to deny that the Assembly has used its power with
tact, moderation and wisdom, and, if it has assumed powers
or extended its authority over grounds which it was not
originally meant to cover, it was solely on the strength of its
proved capacity to wield more authority without entailing
trouble or difficulties for the Government. So far, as the
Central Government is concerned, the Reforms, therefore, have
achieved a measure of success far in excess of what was hoped
by Parliament and even the Authors of the Act.
CHAPTER IX
THE FUTUKE
(1) The Conditions of Enquiry
WE have now to turn our attention to the question as to
how and in what manner the Government of India Act should
be amended to satisfy the Indian claim for greater self-
government and fulfil the promise contained in the Declaration
of 1917, which was subsequently embodied in the preamble to
the Statute of 1919,
'
of progressive realisation of responsible
government.' It was laid down in the Act that this progress
could only be in successive stages. With the appointment of
the Simon Commission, announced in Parliament on the 8th of
November last, one such step has been definitely reached. The
Government of India Act lays down that
"
at the expiration of
10 years after the passing of the Government of India Act,
1919, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of both
the Houses of Parliament, shall submit for the approval of Hia
Majesty the names of persons to act as a Commission for the
purpose of enquiring into the working of the system of govern-
ment, the growth of education and the development of
representative institutions in British India and matters
connected therewith, and the Commission shall report as to
whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the
principle of responsible government or to extend, mbdify or
restrict, the degree of responsible government then existing
therein, including the question whether the establishment
of second chambers of the local legislatures is or is not
THE FUTURE 111
necessary.
" The Commission therefore has full right to
recommend a restriction of the powers now enjoyed by the
Legislatures, if it finds that they have been unwisely used. But,
from what has been said in the previous chapters, it must be
clear that there is no possibility whatever of the Commission
finding either that the Eeforms have failed or that Indians are
incapable of working them or that they have not worked them
satisfactorily. The only question that really faces the
Commission, and through it the British Public and Parliament,
is the line or direction of further advance.
The Declaration of 1917, which the peoples of both countries
have accepted, may be said to define the goal. The British people
are committed to the policy 'of progressive realisation of respon-
sible government in India as an integral part of the British
Empire/ Accepting that as the goal to which we must
advance, the immediate problem resolves itself into a
definition of the further stage, the second degree, to which
India must now be raised. The questions that we shall discuss
in the following chapters deal with some of the major issues
which will come before the Commission for consideration.
They may be divided conveniently under 4 heads : (l) the
Government of India, (2) the Provincial Governments, (3) the
Services, (4) Franchise.
One preliminary remark, however, must be made. Both
Indian public men and British Ministers have recently been
announcing that what India wants is a constitution
"
suited
to her own genius/' This is a phrase common in India,
and those who understand the psychology of the national
movement, know that it is a phase of the re-action against the
West that is now manifesting itself in every aspect of Indian
life. When Indian politicians talk of institutions suited to
Indian genius, it means one of two things ; either a constitu-
tion indigenously developed without outside ideas and
influence, or a natural development from purely Indian.
112 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
institutions. Both of these, if one may be permitted an
expressive vulgarism, are pure moonshine. The development
of a constitution on a purely Indian basis is an impossibility*
Village government, caste panchayats, and ancient republics
are all undeniable facts, but it is no more possible to go back
to them so as to develop an Indian constitution, as it is to
make the Ganges flow back to the Himalayas. The problem
of an Indian constitution developing naturally out of the
institutions that existed in the country previous to the British
rule, is equally impossible. The constitution of the Moghul
Empire served India well at the time. If the Mahrattas had
been left free to grow into an all Indian empire, they might
have developed a constitution suited to their policy and to
their methods of administration. But no one would, for a
moment, consider the possibility of establishing in India a
constitution of the kind which Akbar founded or which Sivaji
and his successors found serviceable in the 17th and the 18th
centuries.
Indian political ideals and Indian political practice are
largely the reflection of what has grown up in England. The
contact between India and England, which people are inclined
to consider as superficial and unimportant, except in the
political and commercial spheres, is in truth more funda-
mental and more far-reaching in the realm of ideas. The
British political tradition has become a part of the heritage of
India and this is the governing fact in the Indian situation.
This may be proved by an analysis of the daily attitude of not
only the leading politicians, but of any person who takes
interest in politics. I shall take a few examples. The greatest
complaint that India has, at the present time, and about which
we hear every day in the Indian press, is the arrest and
deportation of a large number of people without trial or other
judicial proceedings. This is characterised as being the
rule of Unlaw, as against the rule of law. The rule of law,
THE FUTURE 113
as a judicial conception, is purely English, but the Indian
public has taken it as part and parcel of the conception of
public rights in India. The right of certification again
has given rise to much bitterness, but this denial of
discretion to executive authority, where the legislature has
resolved in a particular manner, is again a purely British
practice. In fact tho whole conception of law, politics
and public rights which is now prevalent in India, as a part
of the mental equipment of every educated Indian, is wholly
derived from English sources. It is not that the conception
of liberty did not exist in India. The Indian idea of liberty
was the right of social institutions to develop without political
interference. Tho liberty to the Indian meant, until recently,
the freedom to follow the customs of his caste, religion and
sect, rather than the political ideas which we associate with
it. No ancient government, Mohammedan, Hindu, or Bud-
dhist, would have thought of interfering with them. One such
interference by the British led to two years of bloodshed in
the Mutiny. But that conception of freedom has entirely
vanished. People now clamour for social reform, that is the
interference of tho State in the customs and institutions of the
people. Their complaint now is that the British Government
does not lend its support to the efforts that are being made to
re-order society. And this is but natural. So long as the
State was merely a tax-collecting machine, ensuring peace and
safety, freedom for the individual could not mean anything else.
The fuller life which man required, he was compelled to find
in the independent social institutions of caste and trade groups.
But the State has long ago ceased to be a mere tax-collecting
machine. Modern life makes a superimposed state an
impossibility. A state has to educate, legislate, and control a
man in a hundred other ways. It is worthy of note that the
ancient states did not have to legislate. They had only to
administer laws which had either grown up as customs or had
114 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
been laid down by religious leaders as the ideal law. It was
not the state that legislated, but private jurists like Jimuta-
Vahana or prophets like Mohammed. With the conception of
the executive organ of social forces manifesting itself mainly
in legislative and educative activities, the ancient conception
of liberty, as the right to live under the laws of groups without
interference from outside, ceases to have validity.
With this changed conception of the functions of the State,
comes the new idea of liberty as the right of man to order his
own state, especially as it is an organisation which interferes
so much in his life. Liberty now is not freedom from state
control but the right to control the state. This, as we have
seen, arises from the growth of the functions of executive
government. A state which does not educate, which
does not enforce sanitation, fight diseases, regulate conditions
of work, &c., will not now be considered civilised. This
enlargement of functions necessarily involves limitation of
individual freedom and group autonomy. The Hindu can no
longer be allowed to refuse being vaccinated, on the
plea of religious scruples because small-pox among one
section involves danger to the life of others than he can
refuse to pay taxes.
If so much is granted, all the talk about going back
to indigenous institutions and developing a constitution
without outside influence will be found to be a vain dream.
The attitude of English statesmen when they talk of not
imposing British ideas on Indian people is equally the
result of fallacious thinking. What they mean is that what
has proved to be of benefit to England, may not, in the
conditions of India, prove to be of benefit to the Indian
people. They point out that representative institutions have
not been worked with success in any country except in
England and in her Colonies, that more than one country has
gone back on it, that Asiatic nations which have tried
THE FUTURE 115
the experiment are still struggling to find their equilibrium, as
iu China, unless those institutions have been used merely to
disguise autocracies as in Turkey and in Japan. All this is
true and unquestionable. But this line of argument ignores
two important, and in this case, cardinal facts. The first is
that the Indian political tradition during the last one century
the century that saw the development of democratic
institutions in England has been entirely British ; the second,
which is equally important, is that representative institutions
in India are meant to be worked in co-operation with the
British and not independently of her. A self-governing India
postulates not merely representative institutions, but a British
connection, involving British co-operation for some time in the
maintenance of essential services, British advice in matters of
high policy, and close collaboration in matters of defence.
Even, if the claim is accepted that representative institutions
are a purely British affair, there is therefore every reason why
they should flourish in India as in other British Dominions.
It is not merely a priori assumption. The experience
of the Minto-AIorley Councils and of the Montagu-Chelmsford
Reforms of 1919, has clearly proved the fact. The Minto-Morley
Eeforras may not have registered much of a political
advance, but their working showed the aptitude that the Indian
mind had for representative institutions. Sir Guy Fleetwood
Wilson, who was Finance Member of the Government of India,
expressed thus the effect which these Councils made on his
mind.
"
All of a sudden there burst upon India a really
representative body which expressed the opinions of educated
Indians. It came as a great shock to a great many people,
and I do not think, I could possibly have coped with it I
dare say I did not cope with it happily at any rate I
struggled there with it had it not been that as a private
secretary I had had to sit under the gallery of the House of
Commons for year after 3 ear during the debates. It was
116 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
really a small House of Commons, composed of men with
brilliant intellects and men who were extraordinarily hardwork-
ing. The mind of an Indian will assimilate knowledge rapidly,
its receptive capacity is good, and it is really a serious matter
to cross swords with them in debate :"* What has been said
of the working of the Legislature under the 1919 Keforrns,
establishes the same fact. The Indian mind has shown a true
appreciation of parliamentary responsibility and democratic
institutions, not because there wero democratic bodies in
ancient India, hut because they have, by tho prolonged
contact with the British and by the penetration of ideas
from the schools, become a part of the national character.
It is impossible for modern Indians now to go back to the
rule of a Chandragupta, Harsha or Akbar, just as much as it
is for English people to go back to George III or even
William IV. The idea of an Indian Constitution on indigenous
models and on principles suited to oriental minds if there be
such must therefore be abandoned as foolish and illogical.
It is clear on what basis tho Indian Constitution should lie.
It can only he on tho basis of responsible government in the
English sense; that is, government by an executive responsible
to and removable by a parliament consisting of tho elected
representatives of the nation. That is clearly laid down in
the Declaration of 1917 and is embodied in tho preamble of
the Act. Any attempt to go back on that principle, would be
nothing less than a grave betrayal of tho trust on which
England claims to hold India and a disaster fraught with the
gravest consequences for the future.
(2) The Government of India
If the principle of the enquiry into the Constitution of
India be the widening of the existing institutions with a view
to the progressive realisation of responsible government, then
* Vide " The Future Government of India/' by Vyasa Rao, p. 9.
THE FUTURE 117
the main problem for which a solution has to be found may be
stated in a few words. To what extent and in what manner
can the Government of India be freed from the control of the
Secretary of State and made responsible to an Indian Parlia-
ment. This is the fundamental question. The Government of
India as we have noticed, is merely a subordinate agency of
the British Government which, through the Secretary of State
for India, controls the administration of a country many thou-
sands of miles away. The first essential condition of responsible
government in India is that the Governor-General in Council
should be freed from the leading strings of the Secretary of
State. The Secretary of State is said to exercise his authority
on behalf of Parliament, but, as we shall show, the parliament-
ary control over him is merely in name. Of all the Cabinet
Ministers, the Secretary for India is the only one whose
actions never come in for an effective debate in Parliament. It
is a recognized convention, that the affairs of India should be
above party politics, and in fact, it has been so ever since the
impeachment of Warren Hastings. Since that time an Indian
policy has never been a plank in any party's platform. It is.
true, that the Labour party in its annual conferences passes*
generally without discussion, a resolution affirming the right
of India to govern itself. But the few months during which
a Labour government was in power sufficed to convince India,
though not the more conservative section of the British public*
that whatever be the professions of Labour statesmen when
out of office, they are no more likely to bring their socialist
point of view to the consideration of Indian questions than the
other traditional parties are. The control of Parliament in the
affairs
.of India must therefore be ruled out as an effective check
to the authority of the Secretary of State who governs India
by dispatches from Whitehall.
If the Secretary of State is not, in fact, responsible to-
Parliament, then clearly there is no justification for the
118 THE WOBKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
constitutional position taken up that the Government of India
is merely an agency which should carry out every direction
from Whitehall, without murmur and without question. That
principle makes it impossible for the Government of India to
take up an honest and straightforward attitude on many
questions that are brought up for discussion in the Legislative
Assembly. It subordinates the interests of India so it is
suspected with ample evidence in the earlier history of
Whitehall dictation to the economic and trade interests of
London. It leads to decisions taken without due appreciation
of Indian opinion and conditions. Finally, it reduces the
status of the Government of India to that of every day
subordination, especially in these days when order.* could be
conveyed by cable and by radio. The first step in any Reform,
therefore, must be the relaxation of the Secretary of State's
control over the Government of India.
I should not be understood to be arguing for a complete
abolition of the supervisory authority vested in the Secretary
of State. It will take considerable time before the Secretary
of State for India occupies the same position as the Minister
for the Dominions. In matters affecting imperial and foreign
policy, defence, and to a less extent, vital changes affecting
the Constitution, the Secretary of State, as representing the
paramountcy of Parliament, would still have to possess
effective authority. But his control over the internal policy
of the Indian Government and his interference in the daily
affairs of administration must vanish, with the development of
responsible government in India.
If the Government is to be made autonomous in this limited
sense, it is not, evidently for the purpose of enthroning a
Grand Moghul at Delhi instead of at Whitehall. The power
of the Secretary of State could be relaxed only to the
Legislatures. As Mr. Montagu well put it, the alternative to
the government by dispat is government by vote. In those
THE FUTURE 119
matters over which the Parliament, through the Secretary of
State, resigns control, the Indian Assembly should be given the
final power. The problem of Indian reforms is essentially the
problem of constituting in India an authority to which the
Government of India may be made responsible to the extent
that it ceases to be answerable to the Secretary of State.
There is one supremely important fact that stands in the
way of this suggestion of making the Government of India, in
certain matters, responsible to the Indian Legislature, and that is
the complex character of its functions. The Governor-General
in Council has two distinct and clearly separable functions. It
is in one aspect, the direct government of British India, which
covers only two-thirds of the Indian Empire. Besides this, it
is also the Central Authority, the Paramount Power which is
suzerain over Indian States, and is the Supreme Authority for
the whole of India. The fact that these two functions are
concentrated in the same hands, should not blind us to their
distinct and separable character. It is clear that the Govern-
ment of India, in its Imperial capacity, i. e. as the Paramount
Power, cannot be made responsible to a Legislature elected only
from British India. That would be handing over the rights
that belong to the whole people of India to a part of it.
It is obvious that the people of British India have no more
claim to authority over the people of the Indian States than
the latter have to authority over them. Clearly, therefore, until
such time as it is possible to establish a Parliament repre-
senting the people not only of British India but of the Indian
States as well, that aspect of the Government which d^als with
the whole of India must remain outside the control of the
Legislature.
This can easily be achieved by bifurcating the functions of
the Government. The Governor-General is now his own
foreign minister and prime minister. A bifurcation of function,
as suggested here, would mean that these two offices should be
120 THE WORKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
separated. The Governor-General in Council, as representing the
Paramount Power in his relations with Indian States, with the
Indian foreign neighbours, would continue to be the represen-
tative of the Crown and the Cabinet responsible only to
Parliament. In his capacity as the Chief Governing Agent
of British India, he would be responsible to the Indian
Legislature.
It may be objected, by superficial critics, that this is merely
perpetuating a system of Dyarchy in the Central Government.
A moment's consideration will show that this is most
emphatically not so. The essence of Dyarchy is that it
divides the functions of a Unitary Government, interdependent
in every matter, into halves and makes the Governor-General
arbitrator in matters of dispute. The division here proposed
in the Central Government is merely the separation of two
distinct functions, whose union, in the same hands, has been
the cause of much confusion. So far as the administration of
British India is concerned and it is only there that
Parliament can directly interfere the administration will
be one and unitary under a Prime Minister and Cabinet who
would represent all the constitutional powers of the Governor-
General in relation to British India. The Central Govern-
ment, in its capacity as a Paramount Power, will be a distinct
authority interested in the affairs of British India only to the
same extent as it is now in the affairs of Mysore or Baroda.
Without such a differentiation, responsible government is
impossible in India, because the British Government has not
the right, even if it so wishes, to hand over the suzerain
powers which it enjoys over the people of Indian States to the
people of British India.
Where these functions are separated and the Government of
British India comes to be concerned solely with the people
directly under the authority of Britain, the problem of respon-
sibility in the Central Government becomes easy. The
THE FUTURE 121
administration of British India could be made responsible to a
British Indian Legislature. The anomaly of the dual control
of the Government of India would vanish, and the Secretary of
State would retain in his hands, only as much of his authority
as is necessary to safeguard Imperial interests, such as lines of
communication, naval and military defence, and matters affect-
ing foreign policy. The present accusation that the economic
and political interests of the Indian States are being sacrificed
for the advancement of British India would also lose its effect.
This is, in fact, the only possible solution consistent with the
promise contained in the Declaration of 1917, that responsible
government was the goal of British policy and the guarantee
of independence given to the Indian States by their treaties.
(3) The Provincial Governments
The centre of the whole Beform Act of 1919, as we had
emphasised in the earlier part of this study, was the Devolu-
tion of Powers to Provincial Governments. Dyarchy in the
Provinces was no more and no less than a system of specific
devolution. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report in adumbrating
this scheme in relation to the Provincial Governments, stated
as follows :
"
The considerations of which we took account in
Chapter VI forbid us immediately to hand over complete
responsibility. We must proceed therefore by transferring
responsibility for certain functions of Government while
reserving control over others. From this starting point we
look for a steady approach to the transfer or complete responsi-
bility." The goal of Provincial Reforms is stated in the last
sentence in the most unequivocal terms. Provincial autonomy,
together with the establishment of complete responsible
government in the Provinces, was the objective towards which
Dyarchy was to serve as a stepping stone. The objective
was in no sense new. In the famous dispatch of the Hardinge
Government, dated Aug. 25th, 1911, the principle of Provincial
122 THE WOBKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
autonomy receives full recognition.
"
The only possible solution
of the difficulty/' said the Government of India of which Lord
Hardingewas then the head, "would appear to be gradually to
give the Provinces a larger measure of self-government until
at last India would consist of a number of administrations
autonomous in all provincial affairs, with the Government of
India above them all and possessing power to interfere in cases
of misgovernment but ordinarily restricting their functions to
matters of imperial concern." The object was therefore not
new. What was new, was the introduction of the principle
that, to the extent the Provinces became autonomous, they
must be responsible to the elected Legislature.
We have, in the earlier portions of this book, seen how
far Dyarchy has been successful in this respect Its diffi-
culties and troubles have arisen almost solely on account
of the unnatural division of functions and the preponderance
of authority given to the Keserved subjects. It was devised as
a transitional method of familiarising the Councils with
political responsibility. In that fundamental object it has
been eminently successful, though as a method of administra-
tion, it did not achieve the success which its advocates hoped
for it. But it should not be forgotten that what was tested
was not whether Dyarchy would work but whether the Councils
and the Ministers responsible to them could be trusted with ad-
ministrative responsibility. On this latter point there has been
no difference of opinion. Though Dyarchy as an administration
might have failed, the political capacity of the Councils and
the Ministers has been fully vindicated. The problem before
the Commission, as well as before the student of Indian poli-
tics is what is the next step ?
The answer to that question, in the words of the* Joint
Eeport, lies in the transfer of complete responsibility in the
Provinces. In the opinion submitted to the Muddiman
Committee, Sir William Marris recorded the following opinion :
THE FUTURE 123
"
Dyarchy is obviously a cumbrous, complex, confused
system having no logical basis, rooted in compromise, and
defensible only as a transitional expedient. The difficulties
and defects inherent in the scheme are quite incurable by the
mere alteration of the Act, or the rules. There is no half-way
house between the present and a new constitution, conces-
sions which fall short of complete provincial autonomy will
secure neither stability nor contentment."
The only possible alternative to the present system in
Provincial Government is to abolish the division of the
Transferred and Eeserved halves, and re-establish a unitary
Government removable by and responsible to the Legislature.
This means clearly two things : one that the Government of
India which still maintains control over the Eeserved subjects
of the Provinces, must relax it to the same extent as in the
Transferred departments, i.e. establish Provincial autonomy :
secondly, the control which was previously exercised by the
Government of India, must be exercised by the Legislatures,
i.e. establish responsible government.
The Provinces of India can be autonomous only within a
limited sphere. The power of the Central Government must
remain unimpaired over a vast variety of subjects, in view of
India's peculiar social, political and racial structure. Apart
even from questions like defence, customs, railway policy,
post and telegraphs, it is clear that a good deal of
Provincial legislation must be indirectly controlled by the
Central Government. Of these, the most important
naturally will be Bills affecting social structure, land
settlement, &c. Where provincial jealousies are great,
and the particularism of nations in formation or
already in existence is so keen as in India, the most
essential thing, if political unity is to be preserved, is to main-
tain a powerful Central Government. The demand for
Provincial autonomy should not obscure this essential fact.
124 THE WOBKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
Within the limits thus laid down, the Provinces may be given
full freedom from the control of the Central Government. And
to the extent that they are free from the Central Government,
they should be made fully responsible to the Legislature. The
line of reform lies in this direction. The responsibility in Pro-
vincial matters to the Councils must be full and absolute.
There is no further justification for the division into Trans-
ferred and Reserved halves, with the Governor as a final arbiter
of conflicting jurisdiction. This, as we saw,led to an aggrandise-
ment of the power of the Governor to an extent which would
have been inconceivable before the Reforms, and to a complete
travesty of the principle of Ministerial responsibility, especially
in their accountability to the Legislature. What is of importance
is that, in any further scheme of reform, the respoiisiblity of the
Ministers to the Legislature should be made absolute and
unquestionable, and it should not be possible for any Governor
to put forward the claim that the Ministers are only his ad-
visers whose counsel he is at liberty to accept or to disregard.
This essential reform involves another the abolition of
the Reserved half. Much of the trouble in Provincial
administration arose out of the unnatural relation that
subsisted between the Reserved and Transferred halves. The
Transferred half became the appenage of those powerful
departments which were still under the control of the non-
parliamentary Executive. How this transformation took
place we have noticed in another chapter. As long as Finance
remains a Reserved subject, and the portfolio of Law
is in the hands of an Executive Councillor, the centre of grav-
ity must always shift away from the Ministers. If the new
Reforms are not to be an expensive sham and a meaningless
mockery of parliamentary institutions, the whole Provincial
administration, subject to the advice and control of the
Governor, should be transferred to the Ministry. This is
what the Indian demand of Provincial autonomy means.
THE PUTUBB 125
This would mean a large measure of power for the Provincial
Legislative Councils. The administration of all the depart-
ments will be responsible to them through a Parliamentary
Executive, removable directly by a vote of no-confidence or
indirectly by a refusal to support important Government
proposals. An Executive which has to justify its policy before
the Council and whose appropriations may, to a large extent,
be cut down, but which is not removable by its vote, strikes
at the root of parliamentary government, and unless this
is changed, by the abolition of the Reserved half, there can be
no real responsibility to the Councils. With this would also
go the "Betainer vote/
1
which is a device meant to give
the non-parliamentary Executive a minimum number of
votes which would be decisive in case there are two
parties in the Council. The abolition of the nominated
votes, raises other problems besides the responsibility
of the Executive, especially the representation of the sup-
pressed and backward classes, which will be dealt with in
the section on Franchise. Here, it is sufficient to say, that no
system of parliamentary government in the Provinces, mean-
ing thereby the full responsibility of the Executive to an
elected Legislature, can co-exist with a system of nominated
members, commanding a large and indivisible bloc and
constituting a guard of janissaries impervious to public
opinion, around the Government.
In connection with the constitution of provincial govern-
ment, there is one subject which the terms of the
Parliamentary Commission specially require it to investigate,
and that is the desirability of establishing second chambers in
the Provinces. The Central Legislature consists at the present
time' of two Chambers, the Legislative Assembly and the
Council of State. The Council of State was created, as its
authors declared, as a counterpoise to a popularly elected
lower house, which the authorities wereafraid might take up
126 THE WORKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
ail irresponsible attitude. In the Central Government, which
is responsible for the defence and other vital matters
concerning the whole of India, such a Chamber, which will by
its constitution be cautious and more amenable to official
opinion, may be necessary. It is, however, worth while
noticing that even in this sphere, its debates have
attracted but little attention, and its powers have been
utilised by the Government only for the purpose
of getting its sanction, as a preliminary, to certifying
the Finance Bills and other Legislative Measures, like the
Princes Protection Act. No such functions of importance
concerning the
%
peace, tranquillity or safety of India, are
entrusted to the Provinces, and therefore, even if the
Legislative Councils behaved irresponsibly, there is no reason
why the Government should be anxious to put them right.
When the Legislatures realise that irresponsible actions will
only react on themselves, they will be more cautious in their
attitude towards Government measures. In fact, the Provincial
Legislatures, even under Dyarchy, have shown in spite of
extreme political pressure to act otherwise, a spirit of
moderation and responsibility which would justify the belief
that, if given full responsibility, and made to feel that the result
of unwise and immature decisions would only be their own
undoing, they will not abuse their powers to a greater extent
than legislatures in other countries are prone to. Prima facie
there is, therefore, no reason to extend the principle of a two-
chamber Legislature to the Provinces.
During the course of the last 7 years, during which the
Reformed Constitution has been worked, no section of Indian
opinion has so far demanded the establishment of a second
chamber in the Provinces. On the other hand, Indian
opinion has looked upon the proposal with suspicion, and
has generally considered it as another device by which
the Services desire to entrench themselves in power. The
THE PUTUEE 127
experience of the Council of State has only tended to prove
this. That body, consisting of Government nominees, landed
magnates and representatives elected from constituencies
where popular opinion cannot hope to permeate, has not
fulfilled either the purpose of the Government to serve as a
popular cover for its extraordinary powers, or the proper func-
tion of a second chamber as a revisory body. After this
experience Indian politicians, and so far as one can judge, even
the Indian Government, are not anxious to extend the
principle to the Provinces.
The only plausible agreement that could be advanced in
favour of a second chamber in the Provinces is, that it would
serve as a field for the representation of special interests, like
Chambers of Commerce, depressed classes, &c., and could be
utilised to provide safeguards for minorities. An upper
Chamber, constituted on such a basis of special representation,
and minority safeguards, would not clearly carry weight
with the public, and could hardly constitute an efficient
revisory authority, except in regard to the special interests
it is supposed to safeguard. It is not denied that these
interests should be provided with adequate safeguards and
guarantees, but a second chamber, constituted for the purpose,
would be the least effective way of doing it ; firstly, because
public opinion will always look upon it as a body set up to defeat
the intentions of the popular legislature, and secondly, it would
not, through lack of powers in financial matters, carry
the same authority with the Government. The proposal for a
second chamber in the Provinces therefore, would not find
support with ai\y section of the people, and is not justified by
political or administrative necessity.
(4) The Services
The problem of the Administrative Services in India covers
the whole field of Indian politics and government. A full and
128 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
detailed discussion of their organisation, functions and future,
would take us outside the scope of this work. We shall
confine ourselves here solely to the question of the nature of
adjustments that would have to be made in the Services in case
a further advance in the direction of self-government is to be
made.
No one in India wants a weakening of the Executive power
of the essential Services which have done so much to establish
a united administration over so vast an area. The power of
organisation, the executive efficiency and the methods of
administration which the Indian Services represent are among
the most valuable assets, and constitute the basis on which
every future Government of India has to be raised. The
greatest credit is due to the British people in having provided
India with this strong and durable administrative foundation.
No less is the credit of having developed Provincial Services,
mainly Indian in personnel, but deriving its administrative
tradition from the all-India Services which were essentially
British in character. It is the existence of these two bodies,
one thoroughly British in principle and mainly British in
personnel, and the other deriving its inspiration from the Supe-
rior Services, but manned entirely by Indians, that makes the
progressive realisation of self-government possible.
At the same time, it is clear that with the increasing
adoption of the methods of parliamentary government, import-
ant changes in the function of the Services are inevitable. A
bureaucracy, which not only administers but governs, is
incompatible with parliamentary government. The position
of the Civil Services up to 1921, was essentially that of a
governing corporation. So far as the Transferred subjects
were concerned, there was in principle, an alteration of
character as the Ministers in charge were given the right to
initiate policies and control their execution. In practice, as we
have noticed, the Services were too powerful for the Ministers,
THE FUTURE 129
and parliamentary government in Executive matters was but
imperfectly realised even in the Transferred departments. If
effective power is to be transferred to Indian hands, it is
obvious that the governing functions of the Civil Services
must disappear and their control and direction in India should
go to the Ministers. It is not desired that the Services should
become the sport of political factions or that higher appoint-
ments in them should go according to the
"
spoils
"
system,
We shall be able to suggest methods by which the invasion of
politics could be resisted. What is emphasised here, is the
necessity of transforming the Civil Services from a partially
political corporation into a purely administrative body, as in
England and in other parliamentary countries.
At the present time, the Services wield political authority
in three ways. The senior members of the Service are
in charge of the main subjects on the Eeserved side, combining
in their office parliamentary and administrative functions.
The Governors (of five out of the eight major Provinces)
are senior civilian officials ; and thirdly, permanent official
heads of departments are nominated to every Legislative
Council in which they speak and vote as members. It will be
conceded that this system goes against the principle of
parliamentary government, and was justifiable only on the
plea that the experience of officials of tried capacity was
essential to train the Indian Councils in the art of administra-
tion. Complete responsible government in the Provinces
postulates, at least, that official heads would cease to be Mem-
bers of Council and that the non-parliamentary Executive
consisting of Civil Service officials and nominated Indians
would vanish. The continuance of nominated permanent
officials on the ministerial side would lead to impossible posi-
tions ; because, with a removable Ministry, the heads of
departments, unless they are also to resign their offices
with their Ministers, would have to speak in support of
130 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
contradictory motions in the Council. The continuance of
I.C.S. officials as Executive Councillors would ex hypothesi be
impossible, as complete responsibility in the Provinces would
mean that they should be removable by the Council.
If Ministers are thus made responsible for all departments,'
and the Civil Service is to be transformed into a purely
administrative machinery, then it is clear that the present
unnatural relations existing between them must also disappear.
Now, in the Transferred departments, the Ministers are
supposed to be in control, but they have no authority over the
permanent officials. The promotions, transfers and postings
are in the hands, nominally, of the Governor, but in practice in
the hands of the Chief Secretary who is himself a senior
official. Thus the Services continue to bo self-governing and
the Minister has not authority even over his Secretary. The
fact that, in spite of this anamoly, Indian Ministers and Euro-
pean officials have pulled together well, is highly creditable to
both. That was possible only because, on the one hand, the
Ministers realised the limited authority the Councils possessed
in the matter of enforcing their rights ; and on the other, the
officials recognised the changed character of the administration,
and were accommodating in form though not often in spirit.
But with the grant of increased powers for the Councils, the
question is bound to come to a crisis, if the Ministers do not
possess the ordinary authority of parliamentary heads over their
departmental officials. It is in this direction that important
changes have to be introduced in the function of the Services.
The authority of the Minister in ordinary matters of discipli-
nary action, in promotions, postings and transfers, must be
recognised as final, and the permanent officials made clearly to
understand that the responsibility of administration does not
lie with them, but with the Councils.
It is, at the same time, only just that the Services should
be given effective guarantees against injustice, nepotism and
THE FUTURE 131
political corruption. It would be a disaster of the first
magnitude, if the Superior Services which have been built up
through the efforts of over a century and on which depends
the peaceful evolution of self-government, should be made a
prey to shifting political considerations and communal and
personal interests. This can be effectively guaranteed
by continuing the power now vested in the Governor to
see that personal injustice is not done to officials on
flimsy pretexts. Again, the present right, enjoyed by officials
of appealing to the Government of India and the Secretary of
State, may be transferred to the Public Services Commission
which should be constituted with full powers of disciplinary
authority over the Services.
A service so constituted and its legitimate authority and
powers effectively guaranteed in the manner suggested above,
would be a steel-frame in the right sense of the word for the
structure of Parliamentary Government in India. It would
mean a considerable diminution of the powers now enjoyed by
the Civil Services. That is but inevitable in the change from a
bureaucratic to a parliamentary form of government. Only so
much of the functions of the Civil Services, as is incompatible
with the authority of the Councils, should be thus curtailed.
For the rest, the purely administrative authority of the
Services should be maintained intact and without interference
either from the Ministers or from the Council. This is as
much a part of parliamentary government, as the correspond-
ing duty of the Council and the Ministers to maintain in
their own hands, the purely political and governmental aspects
of administration.
Two other problems, affecting the Services, deserve notice.
The first is the question of
"
Indianisation," and the second,
the attempt that is being made as a corollary to it, to
introduce the principle of communal representation in the
Services. With the introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford
132 THE WOBKING OP DYAECHY IN INDIA
Eeforms, the Government of India accepted the principle that
the Public Services of India should be progressively Indianised.
Even before 1919, the penetration of the Indian element in all
the Superior Services of India was going on steadily. In the
Judicial, Educational and other
"
non-safety
"
Services, the
Indian element had already become very considerable, and their
work had met with universal appreciation. The Provincial
Services were completely Indian in personnel, and though the
controlling authority was vested in the heads of the Superior
Services, tho efficiency cmd integrity of the Provincial Services
were generally recognised and the importance of their contri-
bution to administrative work was nowhere questioned. When
the principle of
"
increasing association of Indians with every
branch of administration " was officially laid down by the
Parliamentary Declaration of August 1917, it was understood
in India to mean that the Superior Services would be progres-
sively Indianised. Important steps were taken in this direction
in connection with the Eeforms, the most significant of which
was the direct recruitment of Indians for the Indian Civil
Service by an open competitive examination in India. It was
also laid down that a specific percentage of the Service should
be made Indian as soon as possible. Indian self-government, as
the British Cabinet and the Indian Government recognised,
involves a progressive Indianisation of the Services to the
utmost possible extent, without destroying or weakening the
principles borrowed from British public life, on which it has
been built. The policy of Indianisation, which the Govern-
ment of India has followed during the last 7 years with
caution, has led to no catastrophe. It has not witnessed any
sudden fall in administrative efficiency, nor has it diluted the
tradition of the Civil Services. The Indian demand therefore
is that this policy should be extended, not with a view to
displace the British element in the Services, but in order to
give greater opportunity to Indians.
THE FUTUBE 133
There is, however, a serious element of weakness in the
demand for a complete Indianisation of the Services, and that
is the pressure exercised to introduce the principle of
communal representation in recruitment. It goes without
saying that, ideally speaking, competence, character and
education alone should form the criteria for recruitment to
the Public Services. Unfortunately, in the special conditions
of Indian political and social structure, this is not wholly
possible. The minority communities, especially the Moham-
medans, the Sikhs and the Anglo-Indians, claim that their
interests in the Public Services, should be specially looked after
by nominations to higher appointments not merely on the basis
of efficiency, but on the ground of community. It is certainly
just that the Public Services should be recruited equally
from all communities without distinctions of caste or creed.
There is also much to be said for the view that the method of
selection by open competitive examination puts a premium
on mere book knowledge, while administrative services require
other characteristics besides mere intelligence of a specialised
type. The claim of the Mohammedans, Sikhs and others, so-
far as they are based on this, is certainly just. But when this
principle of representation in offices is claimed on the basis of
a numerical percentage, and is pressed with vigour as part of a
political programme, there is serious danger that the ideal of
an efficient public service may be subordinated to a method of
balancing communal claims. That this is no imaginary danger
may be shown from a few cases. In Madras, the Mohammedan
population is just over 5 per cent. They claimed immediately
after the Minto-Morley Reforms, that their interests should be
represented on the High Court Bench. As there was no
Mohammedan lawyer of sufficient standing in Madras, a
Bengali Mohammedan had to be brought in to satisfy their
claim. The non-brahmins of Madras have again been claiming
that a certain percentage of appointments in all departments.
134 THE WOBKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
should be allotted to them, and during the days of their
power, they influenced the Government to make appointments
to the High Court Bench on a communal basis. There is no
doubt that the authorities in making appointments should
take the claims of communities into consideration. But any
system of recruitment into the highest branches of the Public
Services, based on the principle of balancing communal claims,
is fraught with the greatest danger.
The progress of Indianisation, therefore, must necessarily
be cautious, because any attempt to man the essential
Services by officials recruited on a communal basis, would mean
the breakdown of the administrative system whose unimpaired
strength is the only foundation on which Indian self-govern-
ment can be built. Subject to this grave limitation,
the method of advance lies in progressively Indianising the
machinery of Government and subordinating every branch of
it to Parliamentary control. Without it no scheme of
responsible Government can work, and unless this is attempted,
the policy of the Imperial Government of gradually leading
India into an autonomous state would be rendered ineffective
in the long run.
(5) The Franchise
The problem of representative government is essentially
one of finding a proper electorate which is capable of judging
the political issues before the country, or at least, of choosing
between the opinions of rival candidates. In earlier times,
when communications were difficult and the machinery of
party government in its modern form was undeveloped, even
in democratic countries, the electorate had only to. choose
some local man of influence whose interests were in most
cases theirs or, at least, in whose judgment they had complete
confidence. But with the development of well-defined parties
choosing candidates, finding funds and controlling elections,
THE FUTURE 135
the functions of the electorate have become more complicated.
The electorates have now to choose between rival programmes
and decide what, in their opinion, is the best for the country.
They are called upon to express an opinion on legislation that
has already been passed or is under contemplation, on
questions of taxation which may affect the price of the cloth
which they wear or of the ploughs they use. The interest of
the representative, more often nominated by the caucus for
his influence in and knowledge of the locality, is not
necessarily the same as that of the electors, and hence
the electorate has not only to elect but keep a constant
watch on the proceedings in parliament. All this necessitates
that the electorate should be well-informed, critical and
thoroughly alive to the country's interests. To find such an
electorate is the main problem in India.
Three main difficulties stand in the way : illiteracy, com-
munal claims and untouchability. The effect of these on
finding a wide and representative electorate is different, but
cumulatively, they make the present method of Indian repre-
sentation a most complicated, ineffective and ill-arranged
system, to which there is no parallel anywhere else.
Illiteracy in modern times is by itself a great handicap to a
parliamentary elector. While it is possible to find illiterates
who are well-informed and shrewd, and fully-educated in the
best sense of the term, the effect of a general and widespread
illiteracy, extending over 90 per cent of the population, would
only be to make the masses totally ignorant and impervious
to modern ideas. This is no argument against Indian self-
government, because, if the British administration of over
100 years could educate only so small a percentage of
the population, it is all the greater reason for holding
that that Government should be reformed. But, in its
immediate effects, it makes a thoroughly democratic electo-
rate a dangerous experiment, for it would hand over
136 THE WORKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
political power to those who could not yet form reasoned
opinion on questions affecting the administration.
Illiteracy therefore necessarily restricts the franchise. We
have, as a result, to accept the principle that in India adult
universal suffrage, and all the other machinery of advanced
democracy, would not be immediately possible. A restricted
franchise, based on a small property, or minimum educational
or administrative qualifications, becomes a necessity.
The present electoral qualification in the Provinces, in the
popular constituencies, is based on property. In Madras, for
example, it is laid down that a person shall be qualified as an
elector for the city constituency, who was assessed
for property-tax, or tax on companies, or professional-tax, or
occupied for not less than 6 months in the previous
year, a house in the city for an annual value of
not less than Bs. 60, or was assessed to income-tax,
or is a retired, pensioned or discharged officer, or
non-commissioned officer or soldier of His Majesty's
Eegular Forces. In the rural constituencies the vote is given
to any person who was registered as a rayatwari pattadar,
inamdar or registered lease-holder or holder of land the annual
rent value of which is not less than Es 10/-, or was assessed
to income-tax or municipal-tax or is a retired officer or soldier
of the Army.
Under the then prevailing conditions of India, there can be
no doubt that the electorate established by the Act of 1919
was liberal and reasonably representative. So far as the
masses in India continue to be steeped in ignorance, it is
impossible to alter this basis so radically as to abolish all
property qualification. But it is equally clear that any
enlargement of the Eeforms must be based on a further
liberalisation of the franchise. This is possible, by giving the
right of votes to all who have gained electoral experience,
by having been registered voters for a fixed period of time in
THE FUTUEB 137
the local institutions such as municipalities and local boards,
or have been members, for a fixed time, of any registered trade
union or co-operative society. As the electoral qualifications
in the local-government institutions are popular and democratic,
and include as much of the urban and rural population as
could be reasonably thought capable of political education, and
as the trades union and co-operative societies, expanding and
popular bodies, whose membership brings considerable know-
ledge of affairs, an enlargement of franchise based on these
proposals, would tend to liberalise the electorate, without the
risk of political power passing into the hands of the uneducated
masses. It will, at the same time, give political representation
to the labouring classes whose interests may otherwise
suffer, by an electoral system based entirely on property
qualifications.
A more difficult problem that faces the student of Indian
franchise is the question of communal representation. The
system of the representation of communities by different
electorates arose in India, as a result of the demand of the
Mohammedans for the protection of their special interests.
The Mohammedan community is numerically only one-third
of the total population of India. When the Minto-Morley
Eeforms were on the anvil, the Mohammedans claimed that
the introduction of the principle of popular representation in
the Legislatures of India would lead to the sacrifice of their
interests, as they were in a numerical minority on an all-India
calculation. They claimed that, even in the Punjab and in Bengal
where they were in a majority, they were educationally and
economically so backward as to require special protection.
The Indian leaders did not deny the right of minorities for
adequate guarantees, both in representation and in the
distribution of power ; but the Mohammedan claim was more
than this. The Mohammedans insisted that their represent-
atives should not be elected from the common electorate, but
138 THE WORKING OP DYAECHY IN INDIA
represent merely the Mohammedan community and the
Mohammedan interests in the Councils. Lord Morley, though
he recognised that communal representation was a principle
fraught with the gravest mischief, accepted it as a temporary
measure. In that stage of Indian development, there was
perhaps nothing inherently wrong in what Lord Morley did.
The Government of India was an autocratic authority which
took the representatives of the people into consultation. The
Minto-Morley Eeforms did not pretend to alter the autocratic
character of the Constitution and emphasised the fact that the
Councils were only consultative. When national interests are
in the keeping of autocracy, sitting above and beyond the
rivalry of communal interests, no harm could come from the
Councillors whom it consulted being representatives of special
interests. In such a Council, where the Mohammedans came to
put forward the points of view of Mohammedans, and Hindus
to put forward Hindu claims, it was but natural that
representation should be by special electorates. But the
mistake lay in thinking that the Minto-Morely Councils would
remain purely consultative bodies. From their very first
session, they became parliaments, with limited authority, and
it was clear that, in a short space of time, they would claim
authority as representing the nation.
Lf the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, this system was
perpetuated under pressure from Mohammedan opinion. The
Mohammedan community, organised under the banner of the
Muslim League, made the acceptance of communal represent-
ation the price of their co-operation in the agitation for
further reforms. In the Congress that met at Lucknow, the
Hindu leaders yielded to the demand, and an agreement, known
as the Lucknow Pact, was signed on the basis of Mohammedan
representation through separate electorates. The Lucknow
agreement, which was in the main accepted by the Montagu-
Chelmsford Eeport and by the Joint Committee, laid
THE FUTURE 139
down the percentage of Mohammedan representation
in all the Provinces on a combined basis of numeri-
cal and
"
political importance." At the time of the
Lucknow Pact, the Indian leaders had no thought of represen-
tative parliamentary institutions, and their idea of reform lay
mainly in the direction of an enlargement of the Minto-Morley
Councils with non-official majorities and more effective power.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms changed the whole system.
The fundamental principle was the establishment of a semi-
parliamentary system in the Provinces. As we have already
seen, this involved a considerable devolution of political power
to the Councils which, for the first time, became not merely
consultative bodies, but parliamentary institutions deciding the
issues which affect the whole population. It is clear that the
principle of sectional representation cuts at the root of parlia-
mentary government. The central conception of parliament
is that it is representative of national interests and voices the
opinion of the people. Unless each member of such an
assembly feels that he is elected to safeguard the interests of
the country and to represent the interests of the people, the
collective authority of parliament ceases to exist. What
happens now is the very opposite of this. The Legislatures
consist of members representing Hindus, Mohammedans,
Sikhs and Europeans : none of them represent the country.
They all speak for their own communities and are entitled to
speak only for them. While they can with justice claim to
represent the point of view of various sections, they cannot
claim to represent the views of the people as a whole.
Besides, the system of representation by separate electo-
rates, has led inevitably to an accentuation of communal
feelings. The only method of getting elected from a Hindu
constituency is by championing extreme Hindu claims. No
Mohammedan who did not pose as a faithful follower of the
Prophet and a hater of the idolatrous Hindus, had any chance
140 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA
of getting elected to the Councils. This is not an a priori con-
clusion. In the general elections that took place in the winter
of 1926, the supporters of the Hindu Maha Sabha put up candi-
dates against the Swarajist party candidates on the platform
of orthodox Hinduism. The main plank of the Malia Sabha
candidates was that they were better Hindus and that the
Swarajists were non-communal in outlook. The same
tendency was evident among the Mohammedan candidates.
It is the more fanatical section, that which was imbued
with the strongest communal spirit, that gained the ear of the
separate electorate. Even those politicians who were known
to be lax from the religious point of view, had to publicly
profess the orthodox creed to get elected. Thus Hindus,
who freely eat beef, had to pose before the electorate as the
champions of the cow ; while Mohammedans who were
notqrious wine-bibbers and were never known to pray, became
the clamant supporters of the Mohammedan claim of
" No
Music before Mosques/'
Not only has representation through separate electorates
led to bringing the more communal spirited of politicians to
the forefront to the exclusion of the more liberal-minded, but,
it has also had the effect of introducing religion as a first-class
issue in all political questions. Since the representatives to
the Assembly and the Councils are elected to champion com-
munal and not national interests, and the communal electorate
ensures the election of only those who are extreme champions
of communal claims and more ; since the record of the repre-
sentatives will be judged by their constituencies, not by
what they do in the interests of the country, but by
what they do in the interests of the community, it naturally
follows that every question of importance will be viewed, not
from the public point of view, but from the special advantage
that would accrue to the community from it.
There is another deplorable result that has followed
THE PUTUBE 141
from this system. Since the Mohammedans have
secured representation through special electorates, the other
minorities have not been slow to follow their example. The
Sikhs in tho Punjab, and the Indian Christians in Madras
have demanded and obtained the same privilege. This princi-
ple could in fact be indefinitely extended.
Now, what is the basis on which this claim is worked ? In
the case of Mohammedans it is said that they are an import-
ant minority which should be protected. While in an all-
India sense this is a claim of some validity, from the point of
view of the Provinces, it is of little value. In the two major
Provinces of the Punjab and Bengal, the Mohammedans are in
a majority. Surely then they could not want separate represen-
tation to protect themselves in Provinces where they are in
a majority, as the claim is made on the basis of their being in
a minority. In Madras they are only 6 per cent of the
population, in the United Provinces 13 per cent, and in
Bombay only about 12 per cent. In the Provinces where they
are in such ineffective minority, separate representation is
clearly no effective guarantee. In the Provinces where they
are in a majority, separate representation is clearly un-
necessc'iry.
So far the proportion of seats has been decided not
strictly on tho basis of numbers. The Mohammedan
claim has been that the numerical strength of their
representation should be on the basis of their political
importance. On this basis, the 13 per cent of Mussalmans in
the United Provinces were to receive 35 per cent of seats,
while the Mohammedan majorities in Bengal and in the
Punjab were converted into minorities. The claim now made
is that the disproportionate distinction of seats in the United
Provinces, Madras and Bombay, must be retained on the basis
of the political importance of the Mohammedans, while in the
Punjab and Bengal, they should receive majorities propor-
142 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
tionate to the numerical strength. If the basis of political
importance is taken, curious situations arise both in the
Punjab and in Bengal. In the Punjab, there is the numerically
small but politically very highly important community of
Sikhs who supply a very large portion of the Indian army.
Once the principle of representation on the basis of political
importance is recognised, their claim to a larger percentage of
elected seats, than their numbers warrant, could not be
contested. The Mohammedan majority of the Punjab
vanishes, if the Sikhs are given seats commensurate with their
importance. In Bengal also the case is the same. The land-
owners of Bengal are mainly Hindu. The Mohammedan
population in East Bengal is poor and uneducated, as compared
to their Hindu brethren in West Bengal. Then there are those
interests which are specially represented in the Councils. If
representation is granted to the Hindu community com-
mensurate with its political importance, the Mohammedan
majority in Bengal is immediately converted into a minority >
because the landholders (5 seats), the Calcutta University
(l seat), the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce (2 seats),
the Bengal Marwari Association, the Bengal Mahajan Sabha
(1 seat each) are practically Hindu constituencies. Thus the
separate representation of minorities, on the basis of political
importance, really works against the Mohammedans by depriv-
ing them of the majority to which they are entitled in the
Punjab and in Bengal. In fact, it is maintained merely in the
interest of the Mohammedans of the United Provinces, who
form only 13 percent of the population, but receive 35 per cent
of representation.
No one denies that adequate guarantees should be inserted
into the Indian Constitution to see that minorities do not
suffer. But separate representation is the most in-
effective method of doing it. It gives no guarantee in
Provinces where the community is in a minority and makes
THE FUTUBE 143
it powerless where it is in a majority. Other methods have
to be devised combining an effective guarantee for minorities
with the principle of national representation. This would be
possible only by a common electorate with reserved seats,
with judicial guarantees for the free performance of religious
and social rights recognised by law. The principle of the
reservation of seats has been in operation in Madras where it
has proved extremely successful. The non-brahmin
communities of Madras, though they form 98 per cent of the
population, asked for communal representation, on the ground
that the social and sacredotal authority of the Brahmins
gave them an advantage which they turned to political
advantage. Instead of introducing communal representation,
a minimum number of seats was reserved for them on the
common electorate. This insured a proper representation of
non-brahmins, while it maintained the general principle of
electing those who had the confidence of the people. The
result has been that after the first election, the non-brahmins
themselves found out that extreme and uncompromising
communal claims were of no use with the electorate, the result
being that communal passions have practically died out
in the Province. So far as the Mohammedans are concerned,
in the Provinces where they are in a majority, the problem of
separate representation does not really arise. So also in
Bombay, Madras, the Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa,
their representation does not give rise to difficulties ; because
neither numerically, politically nor economically, do they
possess any special importance which may not be guaranteed
by a reservation of seats higher in proportion to that which
they are numerically entitled. The crux of the problem lies
in the United Provinces where, though they are in a minority
of 13 per cent, their economic and political importance is far in
excess of their numbers. A considerable percentage of the
larger landholders in Oudh are Mohammedans. It is but iusfc
144 THE WORKING OF DYABCHY IN INDIA
that representations in this Province should be such as to
guarantee them the maintenance of this influence. This could
be done by reserving a third of the seats to which they are
entitled by the present arrangement.
The question of Mohammedan representation in the
Legislative Assembly is more difficult. The Mohammedan
representatives, in whatever way elected, are bound to remain
in a perpetual minority. The guarantees which the minorities
require, cannot therefore be in the method of representation.
They must be sought in other constitutional provisions. One
such, which has been made by some of the leaders of the
Muslim community, is the proposal that no legislation should
be enacted by the Assembly which two-thirds of the elected
members of a particular community claim to affect their reli-
gion. This, in effect, gives the veto on legislative proposals to
the majority of a single community. Besides, it would be
impossible to think of any serious legislative proposal which
does not affect the religious practices of either Hindus or
Mussalmans. If the prescribed majority of a community
consider essential legislation to affect their interests adversely,
which is the authority to adjudicate on the matter ? This is
ill-conceived, unworkable, and from every point of view
unsatisfactory.
The solution of this problem seems to my mind, to lie
in submitting the matter to a supreme court which will be
vested with authority to decide on all matters of constitu-
tional importance. It may be laid down in the constitution
that the Assembly is incompetent to deal with matters
affecting recognised religious dogmas of any community. It
should be left to the court to decide what %ce rec-
ognised religious dogmas. Another proposal which may
be submitted is that the procedure followed by the
British Parliament under Lord Oxford's Parliament Act, in
deciding what is a money Bill, may be followed here. A
THE FUTURE 145
Special Committee of both Houses, with the Speaker as
Chairman, and the community concerned having two-thirds of
the seats, may be authorised to declare, whenever any case
arises, where it is a piece of legislation affecting religious be-
liefs. With constitutional guarantees of this kind incorporated
in the Act itself, the just suspicions of the Mussalman
minority, that their interests would suffer under a scheme of
increased self-government, may be adequately met.
There remains the question of the representation
of the untouchable classes. Untouchability has become,
at the present time, merely a question of ceremonial
pollut on which does not affect civil rights. Theoretically,
the 60 million untouchables, if they have the requisite
qualifications, have equal right with the rest of the
population in matters of franchise. But the hold of the
Hindu caste system is so rigid and the weight of it so heavy,
and the economic handicaps so great, that ordinarily, their
interests would not find representation in the Councils. What
should be remembered, in this connection, is that the problem is
not social or religious but economic, for even the untouchables
who have turned Christians would find it impossible to get
their interests represented. Eepresentation must therefore
take not the form of providing seats for certain depressed
classes, but in giving adequate importance in the Central and
Provincial Legislatures to the proletarian classes. This would
include unorganised urban labourers, agricultural labourers,
undeveloped tribes, and others who may be called the un-
propertied workers. At the present time, these classes are
represented by nominated members, a system which, as we
have shown, cuts at the root of legislative responsibility, with-
out even safeguarding, in any way, the interests of the classes
represented or giving them opportunities of political education.
The suggestion here proposed, is that separate electorates
should be formed for these classes for a period of 10 years,
146 THE WOEKING OP DYABCHY IN INDIA
with the essential provision that the candidates to those seats
may be members of any community. The necessary thing is
that the depressed classes should awake to their rights and
the power of the vote is the easiest method of making them
conscious of their power.
It may be objected that, in this proposal, we are advocating
representation by separate electorates which we have
condemned in the case of IVCussalmans. That is certainly
true, but a moment's consideration would show that,
at least for the next 10 years, the evil effects of separate
representation would not show itself in the case of the
depressed classes. The main objection we raised, in the
case of Mohammedan separate representation, was that it led
to the extreme communalists of both camps getting elected
from their group constituencies. In the case of the
depressed classes, it is clear that at least for 10 years to come,
there will be very few men of their own communities who
would represent them in the Council. The provision, that
members of other communities may stand for the depressed
classes seats, will bring home to those classes the value of the
power vested in them, as the members of the higher communi-
ties soliciting their vote will be dependent on their favours
and have to champion their claims.
CONCLUSION
WE have now finished our examination of the main
features of the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitu-
tion and the broad lines on which it should be enlarged. The
Simon Commission who, in the words of French political
usage, came out merely as rapporteurs, have only the
duty of presenting an accurate picture to Parliament and
suggest the line of action that a proper study of these facts
may indicate to be appropriate. It is more than likely that
the Commission may report in favour of granting India a
Constitution which could, in course of time, without frequent
parliamentary enquiries and legislative changes, be expanded
into that of a self-governing Dominion. Such a course would
clearly be justified from the results achieved by the Montagu
Act. Our analysis has shown, that though the scheme
itself may have failed in important respects, the capacity
of Indians to work it with due appreciation of Imperial
and Indian responsibility, has been established beyppcj
doubt. It has certainly educate^ .the ; ^ectorate^, psfcp^-
lished healthy relationship between, -the .people
(
and-.tl)jp
Government, and at least in the; Pjrofyincial
proved the capacity of Indians to carpy o
even under the most difficult circumstances* It is certainly no
fault of the Indian Ministers of the Indian Legislatures, that
the Devolution Bules gave the Governors more authority than
they posseseed before, and made the Finance Members the
dictators alike of the Beserved as of the Transferred half. These
148 THE WORKING OP DYARCHY IN INDIA
were unseen possibilities latent 'in the Act, which showed
themselves only when the system was put to the test. The fact
that these faults made themselves more and more evident as
time went on, does not in any way take away from the credit
of the Councils or of the Ministers. On the other hand, it
only adds increased weight to the argument that, even under
these adverse circumstances, the Councils and their leaders
have been able to achieve so much in the domains of legisla-
tion and of administrative progress.
Whatever the recommendations made, the future Constitu-
tion must be based on principles which unite the past with the
future and not separate them. Those features of our political
past, on which we can build safely and securely, are the
traditions of the Bule of Law and Parliamentary Government
which we have inherited from the British connection, the
Centralised Administration which descends through ages
from Chandra Gupta Maurya to Aurangzeb, Wellesley
and Curzon, and the limited countervailing influence
of autonomous local Governments so strongly represented at
the present time by the Indian States. Any Constitution
that we may build or may be built for us by the British
Parliament, must be, if it is to be successful or lasting, built
within this frame work.
It has often been said that India is not a nation or a
country, but a continent inhabited by many nations. What-
ever be the truth in that statement, no one can deny that
powerful unifying forces are at work, which compel even the
most exclusive Indian Euling Princes to accept, in principle, the
idea of collective association with the Government of India.
Of all such unifying forces, a proper Constitution with a strong
Central authority, maintained with the help of Britain, will be
the strongest. The unification of India through political
institutions, a common political language and an administra-
tive machinery, is the greatest movement set on foot by the
CONCLUSION 149
British contact with this country. And it is but historically
right that any proposals that are made, to or by the Commis-
sion, should keep in view this jjzndamental but unseen
objective of British rule in India.
Printed at The Huxley Press, 114, Armenian Street, G.T., Madras

INDEX
Absolute Government, old system
of, 2
Act of 1908, see Morley-Minto
Reforms, 6
Act of 1919, the Reforms, 12/lS,
73 99
Act of 1919, further amendment
of the Reforms, no
Adjournment Motions on impor-
tant matters, 66
Amendment of the Criminal law
of India favouring Europeans,
102
Analysis of the Montagu-Chelms-
ford Reforms, Intro, i, 42
Anglo-Indian claims to represent-
ation in the Public Services,
133
Anomalous position of the
Executive Government, 99
Arguments in favour of a purely
ParliamentaryCommission,Intro.
ii/iv.
Artificial division of Provinces,
representative government han-
dicapped owing to, 81/82
Assam, 2, 21, 72
Autonomy in the Provinces, 121
Autonomy, limitations to Provin-
cial,-^
B
Bengal, 2, 21, 40, 63, 69, 72, 82, 85,
88,92,141
Bicameral System in the Central
Government, 16
Bihar & Orissa, 2, 21, 82, 84
Bills, certification of, in the
Central Legislature, 17, 94
Bills, certification of, in the
Provincial Legislatures, 21
Bill, for raising the Age of
Consent for marriage, Io5
Bombay, 2, 21, 50, 63, 72, 82, 84, 85,
89, 141
Boycott of the Reformed Councils,
35/37,79,91
.
Boycott of the Simon Commission,
Intro, iv
British India, Future Administra-
tion of,to be made responsible to
a British Indian Legislature, 121
British India, Provinces of, 2
Budget debates, 6, 96
Budget procedure in the Pro-
vinces, 62/64
Budget, the Legislative Assembly
given effective control of the, 17
Bureaucracy, after the Reforms, 75
Bureaucracy, before the Reforms^
Causes of failure of the party
System, 70
Central Exchequer assisted from
Provincial revenues, 72
Central Government, a future
powerful, essential, 123
Central Government, bicameral
system in the, 16
152 INDEX
Central Government, no dyarchy
in the, 94
Central Government, reforms in
the 14, 94109
Central Legislature, given powers
without responsibility, 108
Central Legislature, Joint sittings
of both chambers of the, 94
Central Legislature, powers of
the, 99
Central Legislature, reconstruct-
ed, 94
Central Legislature, under Morley-
Minto reforms, 17
Central Legislature, Successful
working of the, under the
Reforms, 108
Central Provinces, 2, 21, 69, 72, 88,
92
Central Revenues, Separation of
Provincial and, 16
Certification, Right of, by the
Governor, 61/63
Certification, Powers of, & veto
reserved for the Governor-
General, 25, 94, 96
Chief Commissioners, 2
Civil Marriage Act passed, 104
Civil Servants, appointments held
before the Reforms, 4
Civil Servants, effective guaran-
tees to, in the future against
personal injustice, 131
Civil Service, administrative
authority of the, to be maintain-
ed intact, 131
Civil Service, changes in the,
inevitable in the future, 128
Civil Service, functions of the,
before the Reforms, 4, 5
Civil Service, governing functions
of the, to be transferred to
Ministers, 129/130
Civil Service, methods of the,
75/77
Civil Service, to be transformed
into a purely administrative
body, ia9
Commander-in-Chief, 2
Commission, reasons, for a purely
Parliamentary, Intro, ii/iv
Committee, the system, 66
Communal Electorates, objections
to, 139-142
Communal representation, dis-
advantages of, in Councils, 81
Communal representation in the
Public Services, 131
Communal representation, system
of, 137
Composition of the Madras Legis-
lative Council, 53, 55
Conciliar side of Dyarchy, the, a
success, 89, 93
Conditions of Enquiry, Intro. v,IIO
Constituencies, general and special,
136
Constitution for India, basis on
which the future, should be
evolved, 148
Constitution for India, Round
Table Conference to settle a
future, 106
Constitution for India, suited to
her own genius, Intro, v, III
Constitution on Indian ideals futile,
Intro, yi, II2/H6
Constitution, the Reformed, 14
Convention of Indian leaders,
Intro, i
Council of India, before and
after the Reforms, 2, 18
Council .of State, a redundant
body, 127
Council of State, composition of
the, 17, 127
Council of State, no voice in finan-
cial matters, 95
Council of State, number of Mem-
bers in the, 17
Council of State, origin and
purpose of the, 17, 94, 125
Council of State, powers of the, 96
Councils, The, and the People, 79
Criminal Procedure Amendment
Act passed, 105, .
Curzon, Lord, 13, 148
Decentralization Commission, 3
Declaration of 1917 Policy enunci-
INDEX 153
ated in the, Intro, i, 9, 10, 18,
116, 121
Defect of the Central Legislature,
101
Defence of India Act, 29
Democratic Institutions, develop-
ment of, 9
Departmental Committees, purpose
of appointing, 68/69
Departments of the Government
of India, 2
Depressed Classes, see Untouch-
ables, 145
Developments in Provinces retard-
ed owing to the Meston award,
73
Devolution of Powers to Provin-
cial Governments, 42, 61, 12 1
Devolution Rules, 20, 43, 74, 147
Difficulties in forming a represent-
ative Indian Electorate, 135
Discussions on Resolutions in the
Councils, 64, 65
District Officer, Former and New
role of, 8
Dufferin, Lord, his policy of en-
larging the Council, 5
Dyarchy, Alternative for, in the
Provinces, 123
Dyarchy, Causes of failure of, 75,
122, 123
Dyarchy, Not worked in the way
intended, 43
Dyarchy, The Central Govern-
ment exempt from, 94
Dyarchy, The Essence of, 120
Dyarchy, Working of, in the Pro-
vinces, 18, 42,61
E
Education, Legislative enactments
dealing with, 85
Education of the electorate a
primary measure, 135
Elected Members in Provincial
Councils, 21, 24
Elected representation, Introduc-
tion of, in the Councils, 6
Elections, boycott of the first, 79
Electoral qualifications in the
Provinces, 136
Electorates based on property
qualifications, 136
Electorates, Functions of, 134
Electorates, separate temporary,
suggested for untouchables, 145
Electorates, strength of Provin-
cial, 79
Entertainments Tax Bill, Rejec-
tion of the Bombay, by the
Legislature, 36
Executive Councillor, Finance a
reserved subject under an, 74
Executive Council (Central), com-
position of the, 18
Executive Council (Central), must
be Members of Legislature, 17
Executive Council (Provincial),
Composition of, 25, 49
Executive Council (Provincial),
Responsible to Parliament, 44
Executive Councillors, grounds
for removing, 125
Executive Service too powerful
for Ministers. 128
Expenditure, Non-yotable items
of, in the Provincial Councils, 24
Finance a reserved subject under
an Executive official, 21
Finance & the Councils, 72
Finance Bill, The, 96
Finance Committee, duties and
composition of the, 67
Finance Department, Powers of
the, 74
Finance in pre-reform days, 3, 1 5
Finance Member, Dictator of the
Reserved and Transferred
halves, 147
Finance, Provincial, cause of
discord, i5, 73
Franchise, Extension of, in the
Provinces, 84
Franchise in rural constituencies,
136
154 INDEX
Franchise in urban constituencies!
136
Franchise qualifications for Coun-
cil of State, 17
Franchise qualifications for Legis-
lative Assembly, 16
Franchise, qualifications for Pro-
vincial Legislatures, 21
Franchise, The, in India, 134
Friction between the Executive
Government and the Legislature,
100 101
Funds, reappropriation of, for
Provincial purposes, 75
Future Constitution,The, of India,
1 10
Gandhi effect of Mr., 's non-co-
operation movement 32,35/37,
x, . -Government by dispatch, ir;
Government by vote, 1 18
Government of India, The, before
the Reforms, I
Government of India, contribu-
tions from Provincial revenues
to the 15/16, 72
Government of India, control over
Provinces relaxed, i5, 18, 19, 123
Government of India, divided
responsibility under the Act, 99
Government of India, not a free
agent, 97
Government of India, responsible
to the Central Legislature, 99
Government of India, subordina-
tion to the Secretary of State, I,
94,118
Government of India, the future,
116
Government of India, to be made
responsible to an Indian Parlia-
ment, 117
Governor, attitude to Ministers, 45
Governor, danger of his special
powers, 46, 47, 48, 124
Governor, dual functions of the, 44
Governor, Exceptional powers in
Finance and Legislation, 22/23,
48
Governor, Increased powers to
147
Governor, may reserve Provincial
Bills, 22
Governor, restricted powers sug-
gested, 124
Governor, right of certification by
the, 61/63
Governor, statutory position of
the, 44
Governor in Council, reserved
subjects administered by, 21, 44
Governor-General, assent of,
required to Provincial Bills, 21
Governor-General, danger of his
special powers, 96
Governor-General, exceptional
powers in Finance and Legisla-
tion, 21/23, 94/95
Governor-General, may reserve
Provincial Bills, 22
Governor-General, powers of
certification and veto reserved
for the, 25, 94, 96
Governor-General in Council, in
his relations with Indian States
to be responsible to Parliament,
120
Governor-General in Council of
British-India, to be responsible
to the Indian Legislature, 120
Governor-General in Council,
powers of the, I, 20
Governor-General in Council,
proposal to separate functions
of the, 119
Hilton Young Commission on
Indian Currency, 97
Hindu Maha Sabha, the, party, 140
Hindu Muslim, differences, 140
Hindu Religious Endowment Act,
23, 80, 86
Illiteracy restricts franchise, 135
India, referred to as the
' Lost
Dominion/ 38
INDEX 155
Indian Christians, Madras, repre-
sentation through separate elec-
torates, 141
Indian Constitution, protection for
minorities in the new, 142
Indian Constitution, The future,
to be based on principles unit-
ing the past with the present, 148
Indian Merchant Marine, 106
Indian Nationalism, growth of, 9
Indian Parliament, The Central
Government to be made respon-
sible to an, 119
Indian political Ideals and prac-
tice, 1 12
Indian Ruling Princes, 148
Indians, Appointment of, to the
Executive Councils, 6, 1 8
Indians, Association of, in all
branches of administration, 9, 27,
132
Indians, direct recruitment of, for
the Civil Service, 132
Indians, first appointment of, to
the Legislature, 5
Indianisation of 8 units of the
Army, 103
Indianisation of the Public Ser-
vices, 131
Industrial Commission appointed,
105
Interpellation, right of, in Provin-
cial Councils, 65/66
Interpellation, right of, in the
Central Legislature, 17
Jallianwalla Bagh, The massacre
of, 29, 32/35
Joint Select Committee of the
Central Legislatures to co-
operate with the Simon Com-
mission, Intro, iv
Joint sittings of the Legislative
Assembly and Council, 94
Khilafat movement, Out-come of
Treaty of Severes, 38
King in Council, Bills reserved for
the assent of the, 95
Law & Order, Provincial enact-
ments in support of, 90
Laws enacted for the Industrial
development of India, 105
Leadershipof the Provincial Legis-
latures, 5l
Legislation enacted during the life
of the Assembly, 101
Legislation enacted on behalf of
the depressed classes, 104
Legislative Assembly, constitution
of the,
.16,94
Legislative Assembly, fiscal and
other powers of the, 95, 96, 98,
Legislative Assembly, Moham-
medan representation in the, 144
Legislative Assembly, number of
members in the, 16,94
Legislative Assembly, powers of
the, enlarged, 1 7
Legislative Assembly, President of
the, 16
Legislative Assembly, the enlarged,
a representative body, 16
Legislative Council, composition
of the, 49
Legislative Council, President of
the, 5 1
Legislative Council, Enlargement
of the, 5/7
Legislative Side of Dyarchy, The,
a success, 85, 93
Legislature and the Executive,
Provincial, 61
Legislature, Cut of 60 lakhs in the
Bombay Budget of 192223 by
the, 63
Legislatures, grant of autonomy
to Provincial, 123
Legislatures to have complete res-
ponsibility in Provincial matters,
124
Liberalisation of the Franchise, 136
Liberal party, Reforms welcomed,
by the, 28
Lieutenant-Governors, 2
156 INDEX
Lloyd George, Mr's declaration
on behalf of the Civil Service,
38/39
Local Governments, Control of,
before the Reforms, 2
Local Self-Government, Transfer
of, to popular control, 83
Lucknow Pact, The, 139
Madras 2, 21, 50, 69, 72, 82, 84, 85,
90, 91, 141, 143
Major issues to be considered by
the Simon Commission, III
Measures enacted for popularising
local self government 84
Meston, Lord, 's award criticised,73
Military College, Establishment
of a, for Indians, 103
Ministerial Responsibility, 52 60
Ministerial Responsibility, a
failure, Intro, i, 77
Ministers and the Executive,
Relations between, in the Pro-
vincial Councils, 49, 130
Minorities, protection for, 142
Mohammedans, claim to com-
munal representation in the
Public Services, 133
Mohammedans, Claim for separate
electorates conceded by the
Minto-Morley Reforms. 137
Mohammedans,claim of "No Music
before Mosques," 140
Mohammedans, differences with
Hindus, 140
Mohammedans, separate represen-
tation of, in all Provinces, 139,
141
Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution,
Intro, i.
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms,
criticism in the, on the scheme
proposed by the Muslim League
and National Congress, 99
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms,
inadequacy of, 26
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms,
Mohammedans claim for separate
electorates perpetuated in the
138
Montagu-Chelmsford Report,
conclusions on the, II
Montagu, Mr's Reforms appreciat-
ed by Indians, 27
Morley, Lord, 's remarks on a too
rigid administration, 8/9
Morley-Minto Councils, 17, 86
Morley-Minto Reforms, 6, Il5, 138
Morley-MintoReforms,Effect of,78
Municipalities, reorganisation of,
and district boards, 83
Muslim League, The, 99, 138
N
National Congress, Indians, 36, 99
National Defence, Schemes for,
103
National Electorate, method to be
devised for a representative, 143
National interests, Communal re-
presentation a set-back to, 139,
140
Nationalist, The, Party, 28, 97
Nominated members in Provincial
Councils, 21, 24
Non-brahmins of Madras, seats re-
served on the common elector-
ate, 143
Non-co-operation, Mr. Gandhi's
movement, 32, 35/37, 79. 9*
Non-votable heads of expenditure,
14, 24, 95
Objections to communal represent-
ation in recruitment to Public
Services on the basis of a numer-
ical percentage, 133
Objective of Indian political deve-
lopment, Intro, vi
Parliamentary Government in
India demands diminution of
power of the Civil Service, 128,
129, 130, 131
IHDEX 157
Parliamentary Responsible Gov-
ernment the basis of India's
future Constitution, Intro, vi, 116
Parliament, certified bills laid
before both houses of, 9$
Parliament, Control of, over
Indian affairs, I, 94, 117
Parliament, proposed combined,
representing British India and
the Native States, 119
Party System, in the Provincial
Councils, 69/71
Party System, town ver : country,
84
People, The, granted the right to
vote under the Reforms, 79
Pledge of responsible government
given to India by Parliament, 9
Policy, The new, 9
Politicial conditions and reforms,
8,28
Political education of the people,
marked, 83
Politicial powers held by the Civil
Service, 129
Powers of Provincial Legislature
of voting on grants, 62
Presidencies, the three, 2
Press Law, amendment of the, 102
Princes' Protection Act, 98, 126
Procedure of adjournment, limita-
tions of the, 65
Provinces, artificial character of,
a bar to effective representative
Government, 8182
Provinces, progress of political
education in the, 83
Provinces, The, of India, 2
Provincial contribution to the
Central Government, 15/16
Provincial Councils, legislative
powers of, 23
Provincial Governments before
the Reforms, 2/3
Provincial Governments, future
sphere of, 121
Provincial Heads of Administra-
tion before the Reforms, 2
Provincial Legislation, part con-
trol of, by the Central Govern-
ment, 123
Provincial Legislatures, constitu-
tion of, 21, 24,
business and proceedure
of, 21
Provincial Services, the, 128, 132,
Public Accounts Committee,
Statutory, 67
Public Services, all branches of
the, to be under Parliamentary
control, 134
Public Services Commission,
Transfer of the right of appeal
of Civil Servants to the, 131
Public Services, equal recruitment
from all communities, 133
Punjab, 2, 21, 72, 82, 83, 84, 90, 141
Railway Board, Appointment of
an Indian Member to the, 98
Record of work of the Legislative
Assembly, 101
Recruitment for Indian Civil
Service retarded after the Re-
forms, 38, 75,
Reforms, Attitude of the Civil
Service to the, 29, 36, 38/39
Reforms, Factors that have con-
tributed to the failure of the,
28/41
Reforms, hampered by Finance
Department, 74
Reforms inadequacy of the, 12,
26,28
Regulation III of 1818, Use of,
in Bengal, 40
Relations between Civil Servants
and Ministers, 77
Religion, the main issue in all
political questions due to com-
munal representation, 140
Religious differences among com-
munities, future settlement of,
144
Repeal of the Press Law, 102/103
Report of the Simon Commission
to be referred to a Joint Com-
mittee of both Houses of
Parliament, Intro, iv
Reserve Bank Bill, 97, 99
158 INDEX
Reserved half, proposed abolition
of the 124
Reserved subjects, under the Gov-
ernor in Council, 18/21, 44
Resolutions, right to move and
discuss, in theLegjslature,6,I7,64
Responsibility of Ministers to the
Legislatures absolute, 124
Responsible Government, com-
plete, in India impossible unti
the functions of the Governor-
General in Council separated,120
Responsible Government, further
extension of, urged, no
Responsible Government, in the
Provinces a failure, Intro, i,
52/60
Responsible Government, intro-
duction of, in 1919, 26, 42
Responsible Government, pledge
of, given to India, Intro, v, 9
Responsible Government, pro-
gressive advance of, 9/1 1
Retainer Vote, abolition of the,!25
Retainer Vote, constituting an
official bloc, 7, 53/54, 125
Revenue, Heads of, allocated to
Government of India, 72
Revenue, Heads of, allocated to
Provinces, 72
Rivalry between ministers and the
Executive, 50/52
Round Table Conference to settle
the Constitution of India, 106
Rowlatt Bill, the, 29/32, 41
8
Scheme of reforms suggested by
the Muslim League and the
Second Chambers in the Provinces
unnecessary, 126/127
Secretary of State, control of the,
relaxed, 12, 14/1 5, 19
Secretary of State, powers of the,
in Indian affairs, 1, 20, 94, 97
Secretary of State, control of the,
over the internal policy of the
Government of India to cease,
118
Select Committees of Provincial
Legislatures to co-operate with
the Simon Commission, Intro, iv
Self-Government, Development of,
9/10, 83, 128
Separation of Railway from
general finances, 106
Separation of Central and Provin-
cial revenues, 16
Services, The, the administrative
foundation of the Indian Gov-
ernment, 127/128
Sex disqualification, removed in
municipal franchise, 84
Sikhs, claim to communal re-
presentation in the Public
Services, 133
Sikhs, representation through
separate electorates, 141
Sinha, Lord, elevation to the
Peerage, 12
appointment to the Impe-
rial War Cabinet, 12
Simon Commission, The, Intro, ii,
HO, 147
Social legislation undertaken by
the Central Legislature, 104/105
Social reforms in the Provinces, 85
Special Committee of Central
Legislature, Proposed, to settle
religious differences, 145
Standing Committees, Appoint-
ments of, 66
Steel Protection Act passed, 105
Success of the Provincial Councils
as reformed Legislatures, 88, 92
Supreme Court, proposed, to settle
religious differences, 144
Swaraj, Mr. Gandhi's definition
of, 35
Swarajist, The, party, 37, 69, 83,
89, 92, 108, 140
Taxation, attitude of Provincial
legislatures towards fresh, 89
Taxation Bills, Legislative Assem-
bly consider all, 95
Tenancy legislation, 23, 84
Transfer of Provincial adminis-
tration to the Ministry, lg? 124
INDEX 159
Transferred Subjects in the Pro-
vinces, 43
Transferred Subjects, Ministerial
responsibility in the, 52/60
Transferred Subjects, under the
Governor and Ministers, 18/20.
Treaty of Severes, The, 29, 35
Ulema, Conference of, favour boy-
cott of Reforms, 36
Unification of India, The, 148
United Provinces, 2, 21, So, 72, 82,
84, 85, 89, 141, M3
Untouchables, Representation, of
the, on the electorate, 145
Votable and non-votable items,
abolition of the distinction
between, 106
Voting, Power of, on Budget
demands used with care by
Legislatures, 64
W
War, Change of Policy for India
due to the Great, 9
"White Mutiny," Cry of, raised
in India against the Civil
Service, 36
Piloted at the Huxley Press, 114, Armenian Street, Madras